instar 1.3.548 → 1.3.549

package/dist/core/UserRegistryReplicatedStore.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/**
+ * UserRegistryReplicatedStore — the SIXTH concrete consumer of the HLC replicated-store
+ * foundation (WS2.6a) and the SECOND PII kind (after WS2.3 relationships). It layers the
+ * `user-record` replicated kind onto the generic substrate (ReplicatedRecordEnvelope /
+ * UnionReader / ConflictStore / RollbackUnmerge / ReplicationBudget / StoreSnapshot) so that
+ * a user the agent knows on machine A is known on machine B — ONE user registry, not
+ * one-per-machine.
+ *
+ * It is the literal analog of `RelationshipsReplicatedStore.ts` (the WS2.3 PII reference
+ * consumer): a UserProfile is a registered principal (the multi-user identity the
+ * UserManager resolves an inbound message to), so it carries directly-identifying PII and
+ * REUSES the WS2.3 PII machinery (type-clamp, disclosure-min projection, channel-set
+ * recordKey, tombstones, flag-coherence) rather than reinventing or downgrading it. THIS IS
+ * PURE LOGIC. No fs, no Date directly, no network. It defines:
+ *
+ *   A. The `user-record` store schema — a STRICT typed validator that TYPE-CLAMPS every
+ *      known field (`createdAt` ISO-8601-or-absent, `telegramUserId` a finite number,
+ *      `channels[]`/`permissions[]`/free text length-bounded + jailed). The schema is a
+ *      DISCRIMINATED UNION on `op` — an `op:'put'` VALUE schema AND an `op:'delete'`
+ *      TOMBSTONE schema coexist under the one kind, so a tombstone is never marked invalid
+ *      by the value schema.
+ *
+ *   B. The disclosure-minimized PROJECTION — `buildUserRecordData` emits ONLY the enumerated
+ *      resolution + merge-relevant fields, NEVER the raw on-disk blob and NEVER the local
+ *      `userId` `id`. `recordKey` is the cross-machine IDENTITY SURFACE, derived
+ *      deterministically from the SORTED channel-set ("type:identifier" pairs) — the SAME
+ *      identity model as relationships (a user IS their channel identifiers, mirroring
+ *      UserManager.channelIndex) — never the per-machine `userId` (VM-A and VM-B mint
+ *      different ids for the same human; a UUID-keyed record could never collide them).
+ *
+ *   C. The TOMBSTONE builder — `buildUserTombstoneData` emits an `op:'delete'` record
+ *      `{ recordKey, op, hlc, origin, deletedAt }` so a removeUser propagates as a positive
+ *      signal across an offline-then-rejoining peer instead of a record absence. CRITICAL:
+ *      the UserManager.removeUser() path MUST emit a tombstone, else a peer re-replicates the
+ *      locally-removed user forever (resurrection).
+ *
+ *   D. The union-aware read — `mergeUnionToUsers` collapses a `Map<recordKey, UnionResult>`
+ *      into the merged user view. Users are HIGH-impact at the REPLICATION layer (a concurrent
+ *      divergent edit to the SAME channel-set identity goes through APPEND-BOTH-AND-FLAG —
+ *      both versions surface, never a silent clobber; auto-merging two divergent profiles
+ *      could fuse two distinct humans). The CONSUMER READ path is ADVISORY: a replicated user
+ *      record is a HINT about what my OTHER machines know — NEVER my authoritative answer to
+ *      "who is this inbound sender?" (identity RESOLUTION of an inbound principal is
+ *      LOCAL-ONLY, mirroring REQ-M14 — the local channelIndex is always authoritative). The
+ *      read NEVER writes a foreign record into the local store.
+ *
+ *   E. Foreign-record render safety — `renderForeignUserContext` wraps a replicated record in
+ *      an explicit `<replicated-untrusted-data origin="…">` envelope and sanitizes EVERY
+ *      rendered field. There is no "trusted because machine-set" render slot for a foreign
+ *      record.
+ *
+ * DECIDED FORKS (build prompt, recorded verbatim in the PR ELI16):
+ *   1. recordKey = sha256 of the SORTED channel-set ("type:identifier" pairs), NEVER the
+ *      local `userId` (cross-machine identity surface — see deriveUserRecordKey).
+ *   2. Impact tier = HIGH at the REPLICATION layer (append-both-and-flag), ADVISORY at the
+ *      READ layer (a replicated user is a hint, never the authoritative inbound-resolution).
+ *   3. disclosure-min: strip the local `userId` — a peer's local id is meaningless + a mild
+ *      correlation leak; the channel-set IS the cross-machine identity.
+ *
+ * SAFETY POSTURE: MECHANISM, dark by default. Nothing here blocks a user-initiated action.
+ * The local `userId` is NEVER part of the replicated schema and is stripped from every emitted
+ * projection (disclosure minimization).
+ */
+import type { UserProfile, UserChannel } from './types.js';
+import type { StoreFieldSchema, ReplicatedEnvelope } from './ReplicatedRecordEnvelope.js';
+import type { ImpactTier, OriginRecord, UnionResult } from './UnionReader.js';
+import type { ReplicatedKindBounds } from './ReplicationBudget.js';
+import type { HlcTimestamp } from './HybridLogicalClock.js';
+/** The stateSync config sub-key + advert suffix for this store (e.g.
+ *  `multiMachine.stateSync.userRegistry.enabled`). Equal to the advert flag key
+ *  `stateSyncReceive['userRegistry']`. */
+export declare const USER_STORE_KEY = "userRegistry";
+/** The JournalKind string this store rides — the DUAL-REGISTRY's dynamic half.
+ *  MUST also be present in CoherenceJournal.JOURNAL_KINDS (the static half), or the
+ *  store advertises receive=true yet serves/applies/pulls nothing. */
+export declare const USER_RECORD_KIND = "user-record";
+/**
+ * Users are HIGH-impact at the REPLICATION layer (fork #2): a concurrent divergent VALUE
+ * edit to the SAME channel-set identity surface from different origins goes through
+ * APPEND-BOTH-AND-FLAG — both versions preserved, ONE deduped conflict, never a silent
+ * overwrite (auto-merging two divergent profiles could fuse two distinct humans). The READ
+ * path (mergeUnionToUsers) is ADVISORY — a replicated user record is a HINT about what my
+ * OTHER machines know, NEVER my authoritative answer to "who is this inbound sender?".
+ */
+export declare const USER_IMPACT_TIER: ImpactTier;
+/** Mirrors a reasonable per-user channel count (UserManager has no hard cap; this bounds a
+ *  hostile peer's flood). */
+export declare const MAX_CHANNELS = 50;
+/** Per-free-text-string clamp for name / each channel identifier / each permission / each
+ *  free-text profile field. */
+export declare const MAX_FREETEXT_LENGTH = 2000;
+/** A channel `type` / permission is a short slug. */
+export declare const MAX_SLUG_LENGTH = 128;
+/** Permissions cap. */
+export declare const MAX_PERMISSIONS = 50;
+/**
+ * Per-kind replication bounds. The user registry is FEW + bounded (a handful of registered
+ * principals), so the per-store retention mirrors the pref-record / learning-record siblings
+ * (a small window with a few archives). NEVER `rotateKeep: 0` (rotate-but-never-delete would
+ * be a compliance defect for any PII kind, REQ-D1). The rate cap COALESCES (latest state per
+ * recordKey per interval) so a churny upsert loop does not flood the stream.
+ */
+export declare const USER_RECORD_BOUNDS: ReplicatedKindBounds;
+/**
+ * Per-entry size cap RAISED to 64KB for this PII kind. The default
+ * APPLIER_MAX_ENTRY_BYTES = 8KB could be smaller than a fat profile (many channels + a long
+ * bio), so under it the highest-PII records would never replicate AND would wedge the stream.
+ * 64KB is provably above the disclosure-minimized projection's maximum (50 channels ×
+ * (128 + 2000) ≈ 106KB worst-case shows why we additionally enforce a HARD post-projection
+ * ceiling): a record that STILL exceeds 64KB after projection is REJECTED with a named error
+ * (never silent-truncate, never suspect-wedge). See assertProjectionUnderCap.
+ */
+export declare const USER_MAX_ENTRY_BYTES: number;
+/**
+ * The store-specific field names the `user-record` VALUE schema OWNS (the unknown-field
+ * counter's allowlist). The local `userId` `id` is DELIBERATELY ABSENT — it is per-machine
+ * and never replicated (fork #1/#3: the recordKey keys on the channel-set identity surface,
+ * not the id). `recordKey`/`hlc`/`op`/`origin`/`observed` are reserved envelope fields, never
+ * store fields.
+ */
+export declare const USER_STORE_KNOWN_FIELDS: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+/** The tombstone's store-owned fields beyond the reserved envelope set. `deletedAt`
+ *  is the only store field a delete carries. */
+export declare const USER_TOMBSTONE_KNOWN_FIELDS: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+/** Is `v` a valid ISO-8601 date string (and ONLY a date — no smuggled markup)? A string
+ *  Date.parse rejects, or that contains an injection char (`<`, `>`, `"`), is not a clean ISO
+ *  date. */
+export declare function isIso8601(v: unknown): v is string;
+/**
+ * The `user-record` store schema — a DISCRIMINATED UNION on `op`. Strict typed validation on
+ * top of the envelope: reject free text beyond the known fields, TYPE-CLAMP every known field
+ * (createdAt ISO-8601, telegramUserId finite number, channels/permissions/free text
+ * length-clamped + jailed) so markup cannot smuggle through a render slot that bypasses
+ * sanitize(). Returns the validated store-specific object (known fields only), or null to
+ * reject the WHOLE record. PURE (no I/O, no mutation of `raw`).
+ *
+ * The envelope validator has ALREADY validated `op` ∈ {put,delete} before calling this. We
+ * branch on it so a tombstone `{recordKey, op:'delete', hlc, origin, deletedAt}` passes (only
+ * `deletedAt` is a legal store field for a delete) WITHOUT being marked invalid by the rich
+ * VALUE schema.
+ */
+export declare const userRecordStoreSchema: StoreFieldSchema;
+/**
+ * Normalize one channel into its stable uid form `type:identifier` (lowercased type, trimmed
+ * identifier). This is the SAME `${type}:${identifier}` key UserManager.channelIndex uses to
+ * resolve a user across platforms.
+ */
+export declare function channelUid(channel: UserChannel): string;
+/**
+ * Derive the cross-machine-stable recordKey for a user (fork #1). A user is "the same" across
+ * machines by their CHANNEL SET (mirroring UserManager.channelIndex), NOT by the per-machine
+ * `userId` — VM-A and VM-B mint different ids for the same human, so an id-keyed record could
+ * never collide them (exactly the relationship-UUID trap WS2.3 solved with the channel-set
+ * key).
+ *
+ * The key is a deterministic, collision-resistant hash of the SORTED, de-duplicated
+ * channel-uids: `sha256(sorted(channelUids).join('\n'))`, hex-truncated to 32 chars (the same
+ * shape UnionReader.conflictId uses). Sorting makes it order-independent (the two machines
+ * converge to the SAME key for the same channel set); the hash makes it a bounded,
+ * non-path-shaped string (the envelope's recordKey jail accepts it). A user with NO channels
+ * (a degenerate local-only record) is NOT replicable — it has no cross-machine identity
+ * surface — and is reported as null so the caller skips emission (it can never collide a
+ * stranger by an empty key).
+ *
+ * COLLISION SAFETY: two DIFFERENT users share a key ONLY if they share the EXACT same full
+ * channel set — which IS the UserManager's own definition of "the same user" (the channelIndex
+ * maps one user per channel-uid and refuses a cross-user collision). SPLIT-IDENTITY SAFETY: the
+ * same user derives the SAME key on both machines IFF both hold the same channel set; when the
+ * sets differ (one machine learned an extra channel) the keys differ — correct (they are not
+ * yet provably the same user on the machine missing the channel).
+ */
+export declare function deriveUserRecordKey(channels: ReadonlyArray<UserChannel>): string | null;
+/** The `data` object a `user-record` journal entry carries. */
+export type UserRecordData = Record<string, unknown>;
+/** Input to buildUserRecordData: the record to emit, the freshly-ticked hlc, this machine's
+ *  origin id, and the observed-witness (the hlc already merged for THIS recordKey before
+ *  writing, or absent). */
+export interface BuildUserRecordInput {
+    record: UserProfile;
+    hlc: HlcTimestamp;
+    origin: string;
+    observed?: HlcTimestamp;
+}
+/** The named error a record-over-cap surfaces: not silent-truncate, not suspect-wedge. */
+export declare class UserRecordTooLargeError extends Error {
+    readonly recordKey: string;
+    readonly bytes: number;
+    constructor(recordKey: string, bytes: number);
+}
+/**
+ * Build the disclosure-minimized `user-record` envelope `data` for an `op:'put'` (fork #3).
+ * Emits ONLY the enumerated resolution + merge-relevant fields — NEVER the raw on-disk blob,
+ * NEVER the local `userId` id. recordKey = the derived channel-set identity surface (fork #1).
+ *
+ * Returns null when the record has NO channels (no cross-machine identity surface ⇒ not
+ * replicable — the caller skips emission). Throws UserRecordTooLargeError when the projection
+ * STILL exceeds the 64KB per-entry cap (a NAMED, surfaced rejection — never silent-truncate).
+ */
+export declare function buildUserRecordData(input: BuildUserRecordInput): UserRecordData | null;
+/** Throw UserRecordTooLargeError if the projected data serializes over the per-entry cap. The
+ *  cap is set so a legal disclosure-minimized record can never reach it; this is the
+ *  belt-and-suspenders named rejection. */
+export declare function assertProjectionUnderCap(recordKey: string, data: UserRecordData): void;
+/** Input to buildUserTombstoneData: the channel set of the deleted user (to derive the
+ *  recordKey identity surface), the freshly-ticked hlc, the origin, and the deletedAt
+ *  timestamp. */
+export interface BuildUserTombstoneInput {
+    channels: ReadonlyArray<UserChannel>;
+    hlc: HlcTimestamp;
+    origin: string;
+    deletedAt: string;
+    observed?: HlcTimestamp;
+}
+/**
+ * Build an `op:'delete'` TOMBSTONE `data` for a user removal. recordKey = the SAME channel-set
+ * identity surface the value records key on, so the tombstone reaches the same human's record
+ * on every machine even though the local ids differ. Returns null when the user has no channels
+ * (no identity surface to tombstone).
+ *
+ * CRITICAL: the UserManager.removeUser() path MUST call this, else a peer re-replicates the
+ * locally-removed user forever (resurrection). The delete-resurrection guard lives in the merge
+ * (a later `delete` hlc wins over an earlier `put`).
+ */
+export declare function buildUserTombstoneData(input: BuildUserTombstoneInput): UserRecordData | null;
+/** A merged user view entry: the projected record fields PLUS its origin machine id (so a
+ *  foreign record is rendered inside the untrusted-data envelope). READ-ONLY — NEVER written
+ *  back into the local store. */
+export interface MergedUserView {
+    recordKey: string;
+    origin: string;
+    /** The validated, type-clamped projection fields (the receive-side schema already ran on
+     *  apply; here `data` is that validated portion). */
+    data: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** True when this view entry is one of ≥2 concurrent variants of an OPEN conflict
+     *  (append-both — both surface; the read NEVER suppresses a usable view AND NEVER blocks on
+     *  the unresolved conflict). */
+    conflicted: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Collapse a `Map<recordKey, UnionResult>` into the merged user view.
+ * HIGH-impact-at-replication / ADVISORY-at-read contract (fork #2):
+ *   - A resolved single value ⇒ that one view entry.
+ *   - An OPEN concurrent conflict ⇒ BOTH (all) `put` variants as separate entries (append-both
+ *     — both surface as ADVISORY hints; the read NEVER suppresses a usable view AND NEVER
+ *     BLOCKS waiting on operator resolution — a replicated user is a hint, not authority). A
+ *     `delete` variant contributes nothing to display.
+ *   - A delete-resolved key (every origin's latest is a tombstone) ⇒ nothing (the
+ *     delete-resurrection guard: a later delete wins over an earlier put).
+ * The read is READ-ONLY: a replicated record NEVER clobbers a divergent local record — the
+ * local store files are never written here.
+ */
+export declare function mergeUnionToUsers(union: Map<string, UnionResult>): MergedUserView[];
+/**
+ * Render a FOREIGN (replicated) user record into a session-context block, wrapped in an
+ * explicit `<replicated-untrusted-data origin="…">` envelope so the session model treats it as
+ * a PEER'S claim to re-ground against, never a directive AND never the authoritative
+ * inbound-resolution answer. EVERY rendered field is escaped — there is no "trusted because
+ * machine-set" slot. A null `data.name` (a malformed view) yields null.
+ */
+export declare function renderForeignUserContext(view: MergedUserView): string | null;
+/**
+ * Build an OriginRecord for the OWN user registry (the single-origin materialization the union
+ * reader merges against peer replicas). recordKey = derived channel-set identity surface; the
+ * envelope carries a SYNTHETIC own-origin HLC stamp derived deterministically from the
+ * record's createdAt (physical) so the own record has a well-formed, stable position relative
+ * to peer records. Returns null for a channel-less record (no identity surface). The local
+ * `userId` is NEVER carried into the replicated namespace (fork #1/#3).
+ */
+export declare function userToOriginRecord(record: UserProfile, origin: string): OriginRecord | null;
+/** The ReplicatedKindRegistry registration for the `user-record` store. server.ts registers
+ *  this onto the shared registry; the dual-registry coupling test asserts `kind` is also
+ *  present in JOURNAL_KINDS. */
+export declare const USER_KIND_REGISTRATION: {
+    readonly kind: "user-record";
+    readonly store: "userRegistry";
+    readonly schema: StoreFieldSchema;
+};
+/** Convenience: the store's contributing journal kinds (for rollback-unmerge's
+ *  kindsForStore('userRegistry') wiring). */
+export declare function userContributingKinds(): string[];
+/** The store's impact tier resolver, for ReplicatedStoreReader.tierOf. Returns HIGH for the
+ *  `userRegistry` store (and HIGH for any unknown store — the conservative
+ *  append-both-and-flag direction, never a silent clobber). */
+export declare function userTierOf(_store: string): ImpactTier;
+/** Re-export the envelope type for callers building/applying user-record envelopes. */
+export type { ReplicatedEnvelope };
+//# sourceMappingURL=UserRegistryReplicatedStore.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/UserRegistryReplicatedStore.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"UserRegistryReplicatedStore.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/UserRegistryReplicatedStore.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8DG;AAIH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,KAAK,EACV,gBAAgB,EAEhB,kBAAkB,EAEnB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAEvC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC9E,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAM5D;;0CAE0C;AAC1C,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE7C;;sEAEsE;AACtE,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,UAAmB,CAAC;AAKnD;6BAC6B;AAC7B,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/B;+BAC+B;AAC/B,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAQ,CAAC;AACzC,qDAAqD;AACrD,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,CAAC;AACnC,uBAAuB;AACvB,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,CAAC;AAElC;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,oBAIhC,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAY,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAQxD,CAAC;AAEH;gDACgD;AAChD,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAE5D,CAAC;AAaH;;YAEY;AACZ,wBAAgB,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,CAMjD;AAsBD;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,gBAkEnC,CAAC;AAMF;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM,CAIvD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAMvF;AAMD,+DAA+D;AAC/D,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;AAErD;;2BAE2B;AAC3B,MAAM,WAAW,oBAAoB;IACnC,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACpB,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;CACzB;AAED,0FAA0F;AAC1F,qBAAa,uBAAwB,SAAQ,KAAK;aACpB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM;aAAkB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM;gBAAhD,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAkB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM;CAI7E;AAMD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAwBtF;AAED;;2CAE2C;AAC3C,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAKtF;AAED;;iBAEiB;AACjB,MAAM,WAAW,uBAAuB;IACtC,QAAQ,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;CACzB;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,uBAAuB,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAW5F;AAMD;;iCAEiC;AACjC,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;yDACqD;IACrD,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9B;;oCAEgC;IAChC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACrB;AAOD;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,cAAc,EAAE,CAenF;AAYD;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAiB5E;AAMD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAoB3F;AAMD;;gCAEgC;AAChC,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB;;;;CAIzB,CAAC;AAEX;6CAC6C;AAC7C,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAEhD;AAED;;+DAE+D;AAC/D,wBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,CAErD;AAED,uFAAuF;AACvF,YAAY,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC"}