instar 1.3.459 → 1.3.460

package/src/data/builtin-manifest.json

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 {
   "$schema": "./builtin-manifest.schema.json",
   "schemaVersion": 1,
-  "generatedAt": "2026-06-10T02:35:41.285Z",
-  "instarVersion": "1.3.459",
+  "generatedAt": "2026-06-10T03:11:13.813Z",
+  "instarVersion": "1.3.460",
   "entryCount": 199,
   "entries": {
     "hook:session-start": {
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:agents": {
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "sessions",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:backups": {
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "operations",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:git": {
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "coordination",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:memory": {
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "memory",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:semantic": {
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "memory",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:status": {
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:capabilities": {
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "mapping",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:project-map": {
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "mapping",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:coherence": {
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "coherence",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:topic-bindings": {
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "sessions",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:context": {
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "context",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:scope-coherence": {
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "coherence",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:canonical-state": {
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "state",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:ci": {
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:sessions": {
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "sessions",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:jobs": {
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "scheduling",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:skip-ledger": {
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "scheduling",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:telegram": {
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "communication",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:attention": {
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "communication",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:relationships": {
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "relationships",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:feedback": {
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "feedback",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:updates": {
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "updates",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:dispatches": {
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "dispatches",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:quota": {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:publishing": {
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "publishing",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:private-views": {
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "publishing",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:tunnel": {
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "networking",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:events": {
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "networking",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:evolution": {
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "evolution",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:watchdog": {
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:topic-memory": {
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "memory",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:state-sync": {
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "coordination",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:intent": {
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "intent",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:triage": {
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "safety",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:operations": {
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "safety",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:sentinel": {
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "safety",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:trust": {
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "safety",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:monitoring": {
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:commitments": {
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "commitments",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:episodes": {
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "memory",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:messages": {
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "coordination",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:system-reviews": {
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "monitoring",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "route-group:machine-mesh": {
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@
       "type": "route-group",
       "domain": "security",
       "sourcePath": "src/server/routes.ts",
-      "contentHash": "eb4defe5f4d62b96e65a44a77d27e716388b052e5eb94d1edf19358f96ee9b5a",
+      "contentHash": "1ed553bfb7805aff766d3d95e6e8f65778d535f804d86ba5b6b7916bc36f9068",
       "since": "2025-01-01"
     },
     "cli:init": {

package/upgrades/1.3.460.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Upgrade Guide — vNEXT
+
+<!-- assembled-by: assemble-next-md -->
+<!-- bump: patch -->
+
+## What Changed
+
+When two agents on the SAME computer talk over Threadline, a reply could get silently quarantined by
+the anti-hijack guard. The cause: same-computer delivery labels the sender by NAME, but the
+conversation is filed under the sender's FINGERPRINT (derived from their public key) — so the guard
+compared a name against a fingerprint, decided they didn't match, and isolated the reply into a fresh
+empty thread (the conversation "read empty"). The fix teaches the receiving side to work out the
+sender's fingerprint — using the exact same recipe the conversation was filed with (`fingerprint`, else
+the first 32 chars of the public key) — and hand the guard just that one fact. Now a legitimate reply
+matches its conversation and resumes; an unknown sender is still isolated (fail-safe). The cross-machine
+(internet) path was never affected — it already carries the fingerprint. This is the inbound companion
+to the duplicate-identity fix shipped just before it.
+
+## What to Tell Your User
+
+If you run more than one agent on the same machine and noticed that a co-located agent's replies were
+"going through but not arriving" — or that a conversation between two of your agents kept restarting in
+empty threads — this fixes it. Their replies now stay on the same conversation thread. You don't need
+to do anything; it takes effect after the agent updates and restarts. Nothing changes for agents talking
+across different machines.
+
+## Summary of New Capabilities
+
+A reliability/correctness fix, not a new feature: same-computer agent-to-agent replies now resolve to
+the right conversation instead of being false-isolated by the anti-hijack guard. The guard stays fully
+active and still isolates any sender it can't resolve.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- 13 unit tests for the shared name→fingerprint resolver (incl. the publicKey-only shape that was the
+  blocking case, name collisions → no-guess, and malformed/missing-file fail-safe).
+- 3 unit tests driving the REAL anti-hijack guard: the no-hint case reproduces the live incident
+  (`sagemind` isolated on thread `199c20fe owned by 1db85f…`); the hint case resumes; a mismatched hint
+  still isolates.
+- 2 integration tests chaining the real resolver (against a real on-disk `known-agents.json`) into the
+  real guard, on the exact incident data shape.
+- Typecheck clean; 1710 existing threadline tests unaffected; independent second-pass security review:
+  CONCUR.
+- Spec (converged iter 2, approved): `docs/specs/threadline-local-delivery-fingerprint-attribution.md`.

package/upgrades/side-effects/threadline-local-attribution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+# Side-Effects Review — Threadline local-delivery fingerprint attribution
+
+**Version / slug:** `threadline-local-attribution`
+**Date:** `2026-06-09`
+**Author:** `Instar Agent (echo)`
+**Second-pass reviewer:** `independent reviewer subagent — CONCUR (Phase 5; high-risk: anti-hijack security surface + A2A routing)`
+
+## Summary of the change
+
+Fixes the anti-hijack guard isolating legitimate same-machine replies (the live Luna incident, thread
+`199c20fe`). On local delivery the sender is stamped by NAME (`from.agent`), but the thread owner is a
+FINGERPRINT (`publicKey[:32]`), so the guard mismatched and isolated. Driven by the converged spec
+`docs/specs/threadline-local-delivery-fingerprint-attribution.md`. Three pieces:
+(A) a new shared resolver `src/threadline/peerFingerprint.ts` — `resolvePeerFingerprint(entry) =
+fingerprint || publicKey[:32] || null` (lowercased) + `resolvePeerFingerprintByName(stateDir, name)`
+(collision/absent/malformed → null); (B) the `/messages/relay-agent` route resolves `from.agent` and
+passes the result to `handleInboundMessage` via a NEW narrow optional param `opts.inboundSenderFingerprint`,
+consumed ONLY in the anti-hijack `inboundFp` fallback — NOT a full relayContext; (C) the outbound
+owner-record sites (`captureOrigin` / `recordSent` peerFp) adopt `resolvePeerFingerprint` so record and
+compare derive identically. Tests: 13 resolver unit + 3 anti-hijack unit (incl. incident reproduction:
+no-hint isolates, hint resumes) + 2 integration (resolver-from-real-file → guard, the publicKey-only
+shape). 1710 existing threadline tests green; typecheck clean.
+
+## Decision-point inventory
+
+- `ThreadlineRouter.handleInboundMessage` anti-hijack `inboundFp` (identity the guard compares) —
+  **modify** — add `opts.inboundSenderFingerprint` to the fallback chain; logic unchanged.
+- `/messages/relay-agent` ingress — **modify** — resolve `from.agent` → fingerprint, pass the hint.
+- Owner-record derivation (`captureOrigin`/`recordSent`) — **modify** — route through the shared helper
+  (same chain, now lowercased).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Over-block
+
+No legitimate input is newly rejected — the change is the opposite (legitimate replies that were
+false-isolated now resume). The only new *match* is a sender whose NAME resolves to the thread owner's
+fingerprint. An unknown / unresolvable name still falls back to the name and isolates a fingerprint-owned
+thread (fail-safe), so nothing legitimate-but-unknown is newly *admitted* into a victim thread either.
+
+## 2. Under-block
+
+A process running as the same OS user that holds the receiver's relay-agent token could stamp
+`from.agent = <a known peer's name>`, resolve to that peer's fingerprint, and resume that peer's thread.
+This is the **committed trust tradeoff** (spec §C): bounded by token custody (the real authorization
+boundary, unchanged); pre-fix the guard already operated on the self-asserted name and merely
+always-isolated locally (no real protection); the cross-machine attacker path is Ed25519-verified and
+untouched. Tightening *who may call* `/messages/relay-agent` is the correct hardening and is tracked
+out-of-scope.
+
+## 3. Level-of-abstraction fit
+
+Correct layer. The resolution happens once at the ingress (the route), and the guard consumes a narrow
+hint — not a full relayContext (which would change grounding/history/persistence, convergence B2/M1).
+The shared resolver is the right primitive: record and compare funnel through ONE derivation so they
+cannot drift (the round-1 blocking self-bug was exactly such a drift — a `fingerprint`-only resolver
+no-op'd on the live `publicKey`-only sagemind).
+
+## 4. Signal vs authority compliance
+
+**Required reference:** docs/signal-vs-authority.md
+
+- [x] No — the hint is a signal to the guard's comparison; it has no block/allow authority of its own.
+
+The guard's block/allow LOGIC is byte-for-byte unchanged; only the identifier handed to it differs. An
+unresolved sender still isolates. No brittle blocking authority is added.
+
+## 5. Interactions
+
+- **Shadowing:** the hint is consumed at exactly ONE site — the anti-hijack `inboundFp` (verified:
+  `inboundFp`/`inboundName` referenced only at the 3 comparison/log lines). It cannot leak into
+  grounding-preamble injection, history depth, affinity (still `verified`-gated, untouched), or the
+  persisted `participants.peers` — those are gated on `relayContext` presence, and we pass `undefined`
+  for relayContext on the local path.
+- **Double-fire / races:** none — pure per-message resolution from the existing `known-agents.json`.
+- **Owner-record case:** the refactored recorder now lowercases the fingerprint (the resolver
+  lowercases); the inbound hint is also lowercased → consistent. Existing threads recorded before this
+  PR keep their stored owner; hex fingerprints are already lowercase, so existing lowercase-hex owners
+  still match (the incident owner `1db85f…` is lowercase). An existing owner stored in mixed case would
+  not match a lowercased hint — but it would have isolated before this fix too (inbound was a name), so
+  no regression.
+
+## 6. External surfaces
+
+- **Other agents / relay:** strictly improves A2A coherence — legitimate co-located replies resume
+  instead of being isolated into dead threads. Cross-machine relay path untouched (it already carries
+  the fingerprint).
+- **No new route / config knob / dashboard / CLAUDE.md template.** Transparent correctness fix.
+- **Persisted state:** no migration. The owner record now stores a lowercased fingerprint going forward
+  (was the same value, possibly mixed case); resolution is computed per-message from `known-agents.json`.
+- **Authenticated cross-machine ingress** (`ThreadlineEndpoints.ts:429`) is deliberately NOT given the
+  TOFU name-hint (it's Ed25519-verified; `from.agent` is already a fingerprint) — verified by reading
+  the code (convergence round 2).
+
+## 7. Rollback cost
+
+Pure code change across one new file + two existing files. Rollback = revert the PR; the route stops
+passing the hint and the owner-record reverts to the un-lowercased chain. No data migration, no agent
+state repair, no user-visible regression during rollback.
+
+---
+
+## Conclusion
+
+A focused, fail-safe ingress fix: a shared resolver (closing the publicKey-only no-op the convergence
+caught), a narrow hint to the guard (avoiding the relayContext side effects the convergence caught), and
+record/compare funneled through one derivation. The committed trust tradeoff is documented and bounded by
+the unchanged token boundary. 23 new tests incl. the on-real-guard incident reproduction; 1710 existing
+threadline tests unaffected; typecheck clean. High-risk classification (anti-hijack security surface)
+triggers the Phase-5 second-pass review below.
+
+---
+
+## Second-pass review (if required)
+
+**Reviewer:** independent reviewer subagent
+**Independent read of the artifact: concur**
+
+Code-grounded audit of all 7 areas. Confirmed: the hint is consumed at exactly ONE site (the
+anti-hijack `inboundFp` fallback) and leaks into NOTHING else — grounding/history/affinity/participants
+are all gated on `relayContext` presence, and the local path passes `relayContext = undefined`. Fail-safe
+verified (`?? undefined` on miss → name fallback → isolate). The resolver's `publicKey[:32]` provably
+equals `computeFingerprint` (`publicKey.subarray(0,16).toString('hex')`), so it derives the canonical
+fingerprint, not an arbitrary truncation; the collision Set-rule correctly does not false-collide a
+fingerprint + its publicKey twin. Lowercasing is value-preserving (known-agents fingerprints come from
+`Buffer.toString('hex')` = always lowercase). No caller breaks. The "hint resumes" test genuinely REDs
+on main (main ignores the 3rd arg → isolates) and passes on the branch.
+
+Two MINOR non-blocking notes: (1) the implementation funneled the shared helper through the two
+owner-record sites (the load-bearing record/compare consistency); the other outbound `[:32]` matching /
+self-guard sites (`routes.ts` ~L17404/17418/17450, ThreadlineMCPServer ~L508/853) retain their
+byte-identical inline `(… || '').toLowerCase()` chain — verified equivalent (they feed matching/self-guard,
+not the owner record), so consistency is intact; a full DRY funnel is a tracked follow-up, not a
+correctness gap. (2) `ThreadlineEndpoints.ts:429` (Ed25519-authenticated cross-machine ingress) is
+correctly NOT given the TOFU hint. Clear to ship.