instar 1.3.268 → 1.3.270

package/dist/coordination/MandateAudit.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * MandateAudit — append-only, hash-chained audit of every mandate gate decision.
+ *
+ * Every gate decision (ALLOW and DENY alike) is recorded. The hash chain (each
+ * entry embeds the hash of the previous one) makes a deletion or edit detectable
+ * (threat-model T8): break any link and `verifyChain()` reports the first broken
+ * index. The chain head is surfaced read-only for the operator. An external,
+ * out-of-process sink is a follow-on hardening, called out in the spec.
+ *
+ * Accountability after the fact is what makes ahead-of-time delegation safe: a
+ * misbehaving mandate is killable AND every action it authorized is reconstructable.
+ */
+import type { MandateAuditEntry, MandateDecision } from './types.js';
+/** Canonical bytes an entry's hash covers — field-ordered, hash EXCLUDED. */
+export declare function canonicalAuditEntry(e: Omit<MandateAuditEntry, 'hash'>): string;
+export interface MandateAuditDeps {
+    filePath: string;
+    now?: () => number;
+}
+export declare class MandateAudit {
+    private readonly d;
+    constructor(deps: MandateAuditDeps);
+    /** Append a decision, chaining it to the current head. Returns the new entry. */
+    record(input: {
+        mandateId: string;
+        agentFp: string;
+        action: string;
+        decision: MandateDecision;
+        reason: string;
+        conditionResult?: boolean | null;
+    }): MandateAuditEntry;
+    /** All entries (oldest→newest). Tolerant of a missing file / a torn trailing line. */
+    all(): MandateAuditEntry[];
+    /** The current chain head hash ('' when empty). */
+    headHash(): string;
+    /**
+     * Verify the hash chain end-to-end. Returns `{ ok: true }` when intact, else
+     * `{ ok: false, brokenAt }` with the index of the first entry whose recomputed
+     * hash (or prevHash linkage) does not match — the tamper signal.
+     */
+    verifyChain(): {
+        ok: true;
+    } | {
+        ok: false;
+        brokenAt: number;
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateAudit.d.ts.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateAudit.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/coordination/MandateAudit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * MandateAudit — append-only, hash-chained audit of every mandate gate decision.
+ *
+ * Every gate decision (ALLOW and DENY alike) is recorded. The hash chain (each
+ * entry embeds the hash of the previous one) makes a deletion or edit detectable
+ * (threat-model T8): break any link and `verifyChain()` reports the first broken
+ * index. The chain head is surfaced read-only for the operator. An external,
+ * out-of-process sink is a follow-on hardening, called out in the spec.
+ *
+ * Accountability after the fact is what makes ahead-of-time delegation safe: a
+ * misbehaving mandate is killable AND every action it authorized is reconstructable.
+ */
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+/** Canonical bytes an entry's hash covers — field-ordered, hash EXCLUDED. */
+export function canonicalAuditEntry(e) {
+    return JSON.stringify([
+        e.ts, e.mandateId, e.agentFp, e.action, e.decision, e.reason,
+        e.conditionResult, e.prevHash,
+    ]);
+}
+function sha256(s) {
+    return createHash('sha256').update(s).digest('hex');
+}
+export class MandateAudit {
+    d;
+    constructor(deps) {
+        this.d = deps;
+    }
+    /** Append a decision, chaining it to the current head. Returns the new entry. */
+    record(input) {
+        const prevHash = this.headHash();
+        const ts = new Date(this.d.now ? this.d.now() : Date.now()).toISOString();
+        const unsigned = {
+            ts,
+            mandateId: input.mandateId,
+            agentFp: input.agentFp,
+            action: input.action,
+            decision: input.decision,
+            reason: input.reason,
+            conditionResult: input.conditionResult ?? null,
+            prevHash,
+        };
+        const entry = { ...unsigned, hash: sha256(prevHash + canonicalAuditEntry(unsigned)) };
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(this.d.filePath), { recursive: true });
+        fs.appendFileSync(this.d.filePath, JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
+        return entry;
+    }
+    /** All entries (oldest→newest). Tolerant of a missing file / a torn trailing line. */
+    all() {
+        let content;
+        try {
+            content = fs.readFileSync(this.d.filePath, 'utf8');
+        }
+        catch { /* @silent-fallback-ok — audit file may not exist yet; empty history is the natural default */
+            return [];
+        }
+        const out = [];
+        for (const line of content.split('\n')) {
+            if (!line.trim())
+                continue;
+            try {
+                out.push(JSON.parse(line));
+            }
+            catch { /* @silent-fallback-ok — torn-trailing-line tolerance; a crash mid-append must not poison reads */ }
+        }
+        return out;
+    }
+    /** The current chain head hash ('' when empty). */
+    headHash() {
+        const all = this.all();
+        return all.length ? all[all.length - 1].hash : '';
+    }
+    /**
+     * Verify the hash chain end-to-end. Returns `{ ok: true }` when intact, else
+     * `{ ok: false, brokenAt }` with the index of the first entry whose recomputed
+     * hash (or prevHash linkage) does not match — the tamper signal.
+     */
+    verifyChain() {
+        const all = this.all();
+        let prevHash = '';
+        for (let i = 0; i < all.length; i++) {
+            const { hash, ...unsigned } = all[i];
+            if (unsigned.prevHash !== prevHash)
+                return { ok: false, brokenAt: i };
+            const expected = sha256(prevHash + canonicalAuditEntry(unsigned));
+            if (expected !== hash)
+                return { ok: false, brokenAt: i };
+            prevHash = hash;
+        }
+        return { ok: true };
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateAudit.js.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateAudit.js.map

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package/dist/coordination/MandateGate.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * MandateGate — the deny-by-default enforcement point for autonomous A2A actions.
+ *
+ * `evaluate()` runs the spec's ordered checks (§4) and AUDITS every decision (allow
+ * AND deny). With NO valid mandate loaded the gate denies everything — so the system
+ * is inert (weakens nothing) until Justin authors a mandate through the PIN-gated path.
+ *
+ * Order (any miss → deny, audited):
+ *   1. mandate exists
+ *   2. authorship valid (T1/T2)
+ *   3. not expired (T4)
+ *   4. not revoked (T5)
+ *   5. caller is a named party (T6/T9)
+ *   6. an Authority matches `action` AND `params` are within `bounds`
+ *   7. if the Authority requires a condition, it evaluates true from REAL state (T7/T10)
+ *   8. → allow
+ *
+ * The agent's "judgment" never authorizes anything — the mandate (a human-authored
+ * policy) and the objective conditions do. This is `requester ≠ authorizer` preserved.
+ */
+import type { MandateStore } from './MandateStore.js';
+import type { ConditionsRegistry } from './conditions.js';
+import type { MandateAudit } from './MandateAudit.js';
+import type { MandateEvaluation, MandateAuditEntry } from './types.js';
+export interface MandateGateResult {
+    decision: 'allow' | 'deny';
+    reason: string;
+    conditionResult: boolean | null;
+    audit: MandateAuditEntry;
+}
+/** Every key in `bounds` must be present in `params` with a deeply-equal value.
+ *  `params` MAY carry extra keys — the bounds only constrain the keys they name. */
+export declare function paramsSatisfyBounds(params: Record<string, unknown>, bounds: Record<string, unknown>): boolean;
+export interface MandateGateDeps {
+    store: MandateStore;
+    conditions: ConditionsRegistry;
+    audit: MandateAudit;
+    now?: () => number;
+}
+export declare class MandateGate {
+    private readonly d;
+    constructor(deps: MandateGateDeps);
+    private nowMs;
+    private deny;
+    private allow;
+    evaluate(ev: MandateEvaluation): MandateGateResult;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateGate.d.ts.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateGate.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/coordination/MandateGate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/**
+ * MandateGate — the deny-by-default enforcement point for autonomous A2A actions.
+ *
+ * `evaluate()` runs the spec's ordered checks (§4) and AUDITS every decision (allow
+ * AND deny). With NO valid mandate loaded the gate denies everything — so the system
+ * is inert (weakens nothing) until Justin authors a mandate through the PIN-gated path.
+ *
+ * Order (any miss → deny, audited):
+ *   1. mandate exists
+ *   2. authorship valid (T1/T2)
+ *   3. not expired (T4)
+ *   4. not revoked (T5)
+ *   5. caller is a named party (T6/T9)
+ *   6. an Authority matches `action` AND `params` are within `bounds`
+ *   7. if the Authority requires a condition, it evaluates true from REAL state (T7/T10)
+ *   8. → allow
+ *
+ * The agent's "judgment" never authorizes anything — the mandate (a human-authored
+ * policy) and the objective conditions do. This is `requester ≠ authorizer` preserved.
+ */
+/** Deterministic, key-sorted serialization for value comparison. */
+function stableStringify(value) {
+    if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return JSON.stringify(value);
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return '[' + value.map(stableStringify).join(',') + ']';
+    const obj = value;
+    return '{' + Object.keys(obj).sort().map((k) => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + stableStringify(obj[k])).join(',') + '}';
+}
+/** Every key in `bounds` must be present in `params` with a deeply-equal value.
+ *  `params` MAY carry extra keys — the bounds only constrain the keys they name. */
+export function paramsSatisfyBounds(params, bounds) {
+    for (const key of Object.keys(bounds)) {
+        if (!(key in params))
+            return false;
+        if (stableStringify(params[key]) !== stableStringify(bounds[key]))
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+export class MandateGate {
+    d;
+    constructor(deps) {
+        this.d = deps;
+    }
+    nowMs() {
+        return this.d.now ? this.d.now() : Date.now();
+    }
+    deny(ev, reason, conditionResult = null) {
+        const audit = this.d.audit.record({
+            mandateId: ev.mandateId, agentFp: ev.agentFp, action: ev.action,
+            decision: 'deny', reason, conditionResult,
+        });
+        return { decision: 'deny', reason, conditionResult, audit };
+    }
+    allow(ev, reason, conditionResult) {
+        const audit = this.d.audit.record({
+            mandateId: ev.mandateId, agentFp: ev.agentFp, action: ev.action,
+            decision: 'allow', reason, conditionResult,
+        });
+        return { decision: 'allow', reason, conditionResult, audit };
+    }
+    evaluate(ev) {
+        // 1. exists
+        const mandate = this.d.store.get(ev.mandateId);
+        if (!mandate)
+            return this.deny(ev, `mandate "${ev.mandateId}" not found`);
+        // 2. authorship valid
+        if (!this.d.store.verifyAuthorship(mandate)) {
+            return this.deny(ev, 'mandate authorship proof is invalid (forged or edited)');
+        }
+        // 3. not expired
+        if (this.nowMs() > Date.parse(mandate.expiresAt)) {
+            return this.deny(ev, `mandate expired at ${mandate.expiresAt}`);
+        }
+        // 4. not revoked
+        if (mandate.revoked) {
+            return this.deny(ev, `mandate revoked at ${mandate.revoked.at}: ${mandate.revoked.reason}`);
+        }
+        // 5. caller is a named party
+        if (!mandate.agents.includes(ev.agentFp)) {
+            return this.deny(ev, `agent ${ev.agentFp} is not a named party to this mandate`);
+        }
+        // 6. an authority matches action + params within bounds
+        const matching = mandate.authorities.find((a) => a.action === ev.action && paramsSatisfyBounds(ev.params, a.bounds));
+        if (!matching) {
+            const sameAction = mandate.authorities.some((a) => a.action === ev.action);
+            return this.deny(ev, sameAction
+                ? `params exceed the bounds of authority "${ev.action}"`
+                : `no authority for action "${ev.action}" in this mandate`);
+        }
+        // 7. condition (if any) evaluates true from real state
+        if (matching.requiresCondition) {
+            const ok = this.d.conditions.evaluate(matching.requiresCondition);
+            if (!ok) {
+                return this.deny(ev, `objective condition "${matching.requiresCondition}" not met`, false);
+            }
+            return this.allow(ev, `authority "${ev.action}" granted (condition "${matching.requiresCondition}" met)`, true);
+        }
+        // 8. allow (no condition)
+        return this.allow(ev, `authority "${ev.action}" granted`, null);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateGate.js.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateGate.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/coordination/MandateStore.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/**
+ * MandateStore — persists Coordination Mandates and verifies their authorship.
+ *
+ * A mandate is valid only if its `authProof` verifies (threat-model T1/T2): the proof
+ * is produced ONLY by the PIN-gated issuance path (the human-authenticated surface,
+ * Justin's decision A on issuance), so an agent holding only its Bearer token cannot
+ * mint or widen a mandate. The proof covers the AUTHORED, immutable fields; `revoked`
+ * is a store-managed flag (a later mutation), so it is excluded from the proof and
+ * checked separately on every gate evaluation.
+ *
+ * The signer/verifier are INJECTED (like the other signed stores): tests use a
+ * deterministic stub; production uses an HMAC over the server's issuance secret.
+ *
+ * Trust boundary (stated, not hidden): integrity of the on-disk mandate + revocation
+ * flag against an attacker with LOCAL write access is the same trust root as today
+ * (threat-model T12, out of scope) — the proof stops a forged/edited AUTHORED mandate;
+ * local-file tamper of server-managed state is the baseline trust boundary.
+ */
+import type { Authority, CoordinationMandate } from './types.js';
+/** Canonical bytes the authProof covers — the AUTHORED fields only (proof + revoked excluded). */
+export declare function canonicalMandate(m: Omit<CoordinationMandate, 'authProof' | 'revoked'>): string;
+export interface MandateStoreDeps {
+    /** Absolute path to the mandates JSON file. */
+    filePath: string;
+    /** Sign the canonical mandate bytes (HMAC over the issuance secret in production). */
+    sign: (canonical: string) => string;
+    /** Verify a proof against the canonical mandate bytes. */
+    verifySig: (canonical: string, proof: string) => boolean;
+    now?: () => number;
+    /** Mandate id generator (default: random). Injected for deterministic tests. */
+    genId?: () => string;
+}
+export interface IssueMandateInput {
+    scope: string;
+    agents: [string, string];
+    authorities: Authority[];
+    author: string;
+    expiresAt: string;
+    id?: string;
+    createdAt?: string;
+}
+export declare class MandateStore {
+    private readonly d;
+    constructor(deps: MandateStoreDeps);
+    private nowIso;
+    private readAll;
+    private writeAll;
+    /**
+     * Issue (author) a mandate. ONLY the PIN-gated route should call this. Signs the
+     * authored bytes, persists, returns the mandate.
+     */
+    issue(input: IssueMandateInput): CoordinationMandate;
+    /** Verify a mandate's authorship proof (T1/T2). */
+    verifyAuthorship(m: CoordinationMandate): boolean;
+    get(id: string): CoordinationMandate | undefined;
+    list(): CoordinationMandate[];
+    /** Revoke a mandate (idempotent). Returns the updated mandate, or undefined if absent. */
+    revoke(id: string, reason: string): CoordinationMandate | undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateStore.d.ts.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateStore.d.ts.map

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package/dist/coordination/MandateStore.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/**
+ * MandateStore — persists Coordination Mandates and verifies their authorship.
+ *
+ * A mandate is valid only if its `authProof` verifies (threat-model T1/T2): the proof
+ * is produced ONLY by the PIN-gated issuance path (the human-authenticated surface,
+ * Justin's decision A on issuance), so an agent holding only its Bearer token cannot
+ * mint or widen a mandate. The proof covers the AUTHORED, immutable fields; `revoked`
+ * is a store-managed flag (a later mutation), so it is excluded from the proof and
+ * checked separately on every gate evaluation.
+ *
+ * The signer/verifier are INJECTED (like the other signed stores): tests use a
+ * deterministic stub; production uses an HMAC over the server's issuance secret.
+ *
+ * Trust boundary (stated, not hidden): integrity of the on-disk mandate + revocation
+ * flag against an attacker with LOCAL write access is the same trust root as today
+ * (threat-model T12, out of scope) — the proof stops a forged/edited AUTHORED mandate;
+ * local-file tamper of server-managed state is the baseline trust boundary.
+ */
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+/** Deterministic, key-sorted serialization so the proof survives JSON round-trips
+ *  and key reordering. */
+function stableStringify(value) {
+    if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return JSON.stringify(value);
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return '[' + value.map(stableStringify).join(',') + ']';
+    const obj = value;
+    const keys = Object.keys(obj).sort();
+    return '{' + keys.map((k) => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + stableStringify(obj[k])).join(',') + '}';
+}
+/** Canonical bytes the authProof covers — the AUTHORED fields only (proof + revoked excluded). */
+export function canonicalMandate(m) {
+    return stableStringify([
+        m.id, m.scope, m.agents,
+        m.authorities.map((a) => [a.action, a.bounds, a.requiresCondition ?? '']),
+        m.author, m.createdAt, m.expiresAt,
+    ]);
+}
+export class MandateStore {
+    d;
+    constructor(deps) {
+        this.d = deps;
+    }
+    nowIso() {
+        return new Date(this.d.now ? this.d.now() : Date.now()).toISOString();
+    }
+    readAll() {
+        try {
+            const raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(this.d.filePath, 'utf8'));
+            return Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [];
+        }
+        catch { /* @silent-fallback-ok — mandates file may not exist yet; an empty store is DENY-BY-DEFAULT (the safe state) */
+            return [];
+        }
+    }
+    writeAll(mandates) {
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(this.d.filePath), { recursive: true });
+        fs.writeFileSync(this.d.filePath, JSON.stringify(mandates, null, 2));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Issue (author) a mandate. ONLY the PIN-gated route should call this. Signs the
+     * authored bytes, persists, returns the mandate.
+     */
+    issue(input) {
+        const id = input.id ?? (this.d.genId ? this.d.genId() : `mandate-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`);
+        const createdAt = input.createdAt ?? this.nowIso();
+        const authored = {
+            id, scope: input.scope, agents: input.agents, authorities: input.authorities,
+            author: input.author, createdAt, expiresAt: input.expiresAt,
+        };
+        const mandate = {
+            ...authored,
+            revoked: null,
+            authProof: this.d.sign(canonicalMandate(authored)),
+        };
+        const all = this.readAll().filter((m) => m.id !== id);
+        all.push(mandate);
+        this.writeAll(all);
+        return mandate;
+    }
+    /** Verify a mandate's authorship proof (T1/T2). */
+    verifyAuthorship(m) {
+        const { authProof, revoked, ...authored } = m;
+        return this.d.verifySig(canonicalMandate(authored), authProof);
+    }
+    get(id) {
+        return this.readAll().find((m) => m.id === id);
+    }
+    list() {
+        return this.readAll();
+    }
+    /** Revoke a mandate (idempotent). Returns the updated mandate, or undefined if absent. */
+    revoke(id, reason) {
+        const all = this.readAll();
+        const idx = all.findIndex((m) => m.id === id);
+        if (idx < 0)
+            return undefined;
+        if (!all[idx].revoked) {
+            all[idx].revoked = { at: this.nowIso(), reason };
+            this.writeAll(all);
+        }
+        return all[idx];
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=MandateStore.js.map

package/dist/coordination/MandateStore.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/coordination/conditions.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/**
+ * Conditions registry — named, objective predicates that gate high-risk authorities.
+ *
+ * Structure > Willpower applied to delegation: a conditioned authority (e.g. a
+ * future `execute-cutover`) fires ONLY when its named condition evaluates true from
+ * REAL state — `integrity-gate-pass` ← `runIntegrityGate().passed`,
+ * `parity-zero-divergence` ← `ParityMonitor.gate().cleared`. The agent's assertion
+ * that "it's safe" is NEVER the input; the objective check is (threat-model T7/T10).
+ *
+ * Resolvers are INJECTED so this module stays decoupled from the integrity/parity
+ * machinery. A condition with no wired resolver evaluates **false** (deny-safe): an
+ * un-evaluable gate must never fall open. The first mandate (Justin's A/A/B) carries
+ * NO conditioned authority, so nothing here is exercised yet — it is built for the
+ * future cutover authority and tested on both sides of the boundary.
+ */
+/** A resolver returns the live truth of a condition from real state. */
+export type ConditionResolver = () => boolean;
+export declare class ConditionsRegistry {
+    private readonly resolvers;
+    /** Register (or replace) the resolver for a named condition. */
+    register(name: string, resolver: ConditionResolver): this;
+    /** True iff the condition is registered. */
+    has(name: string): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Evaluate a (possibly compound) condition. A `+`-joined expression
+     * (e.g. 'integrity-gate-pass+parity-zero-divergence') is the AND of its parts —
+     * ALL must resolve true. An unregistered part → false (deny-safe). Any resolver
+     * that throws → false (deny-safe).
+     */
+    evaluate(expr: string): boolean;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=conditions.d.ts.map

package/dist/coordination/conditions.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/coordination/conditions.js

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * Conditions registry — named, objective predicates that gate high-risk authorities.
+ *
+ * Structure > Willpower applied to delegation: a conditioned authority (e.g. a
+ * future `execute-cutover`) fires ONLY when its named condition evaluates true from
+ * REAL state — `integrity-gate-pass` ← `runIntegrityGate().passed`,
+ * `parity-zero-divergence` ← `ParityMonitor.gate().cleared`. The agent's assertion
+ * that "it's safe" is NEVER the input; the objective check is (threat-model T7/T10).
+ *
+ * Resolvers are INJECTED so this module stays decoupled from the integrity/parity
+ * machinery. A condition with no wired resolver evaluates **false** (deny-safe): an
+ * un-evaluable gate must never fall open. The first mandate (Justin's A/A/B) carries
+ * NO conditioned authority, so nothing here is exercised yet — it is built for the
+ * future cutover authority and tested on both sides of the boundary.
+ */
+export class ConditionsRegistry {
+    resolvers = new Map();
+    /** Register (or replace) the resolver for a named condition. */
+    register(name, resolver) {
+        this.resolvers.set(name, resolver);
+        return this;
+    }
+    /** True iff the condition is registered. */
+    has(name) {
+        return this.resolvers.has(name);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Evaluate a (possibly compound) condition. A `+`-joined expression
+     * (e.g. 'integrity-gate-pass+parity-zero-divergence') is the AND of its parts —
+     * ALL must resolve true. An unregistered part → false (deny-safe). Any resolver
+     * that throws → false (deny-safe).
+     */
+    evaluate(expr) {
+        const parts = expr.split('+').map((p) => p.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+        if (parts.length === 0)
+            return false;
+        for (const part of parts) {
+            const resolver = this.resolvers.get(part);
+            if (!resolver)
+                return false;
+            let result;
+            try {
+                result = resolver() === true;
+            }
+            catch {
+                result = false;
+            }
+            if (!result)
+                return false;
+        }
+        return true;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=conditions.js.map

package/dist/coordination/conditions.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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