instar 1.3.256 → 1.3.258

package/dist/commands/server.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"server.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/commands/server.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AA4SH,UAAU,YAAY;IACpB,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACrB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb;2DACuD;IACvD,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACpB;AAkxDD,wBAAsB,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAm8QtE;AAED,wBAAsB,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAsDzE;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAuD5E"}

package/dist/commands/server.js

@@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ let _meshSelfId = null;
 let _resolveRouterUrl = null;
 /** Multi-Machine Session Pool §L4: per-topic placement pin store ("move this to <nickname>"). */
 let _topicPinStore = null;
+/** Cross-machine secret-sync (spec Phase 4): route-facing handle (push lever + read-only status). */
+let _secretSyncHandle = null;
 /** Recognize + apply a "move/run this on <nickname>" relocation on inbound; returns handled=true when the message WAS a relocation command (so it must not also be dispatched). */
 let _tryNicknameRelocation = null;
 /** Per-topic framework override (claude-code | codex-cli). Populated from
@@ -9168,6 +9170,33 @@ export async function startServer(options) {
                             .catch((err) => console.warn(`  [session-pool] owner-side resume failed for topic ${topicId}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`));
                     },
                 });
+                // ── Secret-sync inbound handler (cross-machine secret distribution, spec Phase 4) ──
+                // Dark by default; live on the dev agent via the developmentAgent gate. An inbound
+                // `secret-share` command is decrypted to THIS machine's X25519 key and stored in the
+                // local encrypted vault. The sender's authenticity + registered-peer gate are enforced
+                // by the mesh acceptance layer before this runs; confidentiality is enforced by the
+                // decryption (a payload not sealed to our key fails). The OUTBOUND provisioner is wired
+                // after the MeshRpcClient is constructed (below).
+                const _secretSyncEnabled = config.multiMachine?.secretSync?.enabled
+                    ?? !!config.developmentAgent;
+                let _secretShareHandler;
+                if (_secretSyncEnabled) {
+                    try {
+                        const secretSyncMod = await import('../core/SecretSync.js');
+                        const secretStoreMod = await import('../core/SecretStore.js');
+                        const cryptoMod = await import('node:crypto');
+                        const secretStore = new secretStoreMod.SecretStore({ stateDir: config.stateDir });
+                        _secretShareHandler = new secretSyncMod.SecretShareHandler({
+                            ownEncryptionPrivateKey: () => cryptoMod.createPrivateKey(meshIdMgr.loadEncryptionKey()),
+                            store: { set: (k, v) => secretStore.set(k, v) },
+                            log: (m) => console.log(pc.dim(`  ${m}`)),
+                        });
+                        console.log(pc.dim('  [secret-sync] enabled — inbound handler wired'));
+                    }
+                    catch (err) {
+                        console.log(pc.dim(`  [secret-sync] inbound handler not wired: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`));
+                    }
+                }
                 meshRpcDispatcher = new meshMod.MeshRpcDispatcher({
                     verify: {
                         selfMachineId: meshSelfId,
@@ -9209,6 +9238,9 @@ export async function startServer(options) {
                         transfer: ownAction,
                         release: ownAction,
                         deliverMessage: deliverMessageHandler,
+                        'secret-share': (cmd, sender) => _secretShareHandler
+                            ? _secretShareHandler.handle(cmd, sender)
+                            : { ok: false, reason: 'secret-sync disabled' },
                     },
                     logger: (m) => console.log(pc.dim(`  ${m}`)),
                 });
@@ -9284,6 +9316,70 @@ export async function startServer(options) {
                     const selfNickTimer = setInterval(() => { void convergeSelfNickname(); }, 60_000);
                     if (typeof selfNickTimer.unref === 'function')
                         selfNickTimer.unref();
+                    // ── Secret-sync OUTBOUND provisioner (push-on-provision, spec Phase 4) ──
+                    // Constructed here (after meshClient + peerUrl exist). Encrypts the secret set
+                    // PER online peer to that peer's X25519 key and pushes a signed `secret-share`.
+                    // Dark by default; live on the dev agent via the same gate as the inbound handler.
+                    // Exposed to routes via _secretSyncHandle (push lever + read-only status). A boot
+                    // best-effort push covers a peer that came online after a secret was provisioned
+                    // elsewhere; the deterministic POST /secrets/sync-now is the explicit lever.
+                    if (_secretSyncEnabled) {
+                        try {
+                            const secretSyncMod = await import('../core/SecretSync.js');
+                            const secretStoreMod = await import('../core/SecretStore.js');
+                            const cryptoModOut = await import('node:crypto');
+                            const provStore = new secretStoreMod.SecretStore({ stateDir: config.stateDir });
+                            const readSecrets = () => {
+                                // @silent-fallback-ok — no vault on disk (or unreadable) ⇒ nothing to sync; an
+                                // empty set makes provisionAll a clean no-op rather than crashing the boot path.
+                                try {
+                                    return provStore.read();
+                                }
+                                catch {
+                                    return {};
+                                }
+                            };
+                            const onlinePeers = () => meshIdMgr.getActiveMachines()
+                                .filter((m) => m.machineId !== meshSelfId)
+                                .filter((m) => machinePoolRegistry?.getCapacity(m.machineId)?.online ?? false)
+                                .map((m) => ({ machineId: m.machineId, nickname: machinePoolRegistry?.getCapacity(m.machineId)?.nickname ?? null }));
+                            const provisioner = new secretSyncMod.SecretProvisioner({
+                                secretsToSync: readSecrets,
+                                listPeers: () => onlinePeers()
+                                    .map((p) => {
+                                    const pem = meshIdMgr.getEncryptionPublicKeyPem(p.machineId);
+                                    if (!pem)
+                                        return null;
+                                    const b64 = cryptoModOut.createPublicKey(pem).export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' }).toString('base64');
+                                    return { machineId: p.machineId, encryptionPublicKey: b64 };
+                                })
+                                    .filter((x) => x !== null),
+                                send: async (machineId, command) => {
+                                    const url = peerUrl(machineId);
+                                    if (!url)
+                                        return { ok: false, reason: 'no peer url' };
+                                    const r = await meshClient.send({ machineId, url }, command, 0);
+                                    return { ok: r.ok, reason: r.reason };
+                                },
+                                log: (m) => console.log(pc.dim(`  ${m}`)),
+                            });
+                            _secretSyncHandle = {
+                                enabled: true,
+                                provisionAll: () => provisioner.provisionAll(),
+                                localKeyPaths: () => secretSyncMod.secretKeyPaths(readSecrets()),
+                                syncTargets: onlinePeers,
+                            };
+                            // Boot best-effort: push current secrets to any peer already online.
+                            // @silent-fallback-ok — fire-and-forget; per-peer failures are already captured
+                            // in provisionAll's result array, and a fresh push fires on the next provision /
+                            // the deterministic POST /secrets/sync-now. Boot must never block on a peer.
+                            void provisioner.provisionAll().catch(() => { });
+                            console.log(pc.dim('  [secret-sync] enabled — outbound provisioner wired'));
+                        }
+                        catch (err) {
+                            console.log(pc.dim(`  [secret-sync] outbound provisioner not wired: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`));
+                        }
+                    }
                     // This machine participates in the session pool, so a read-only standby may
                     // persist the PER-SESSION state of sessions it's handed (the pool's owner-side
                     // resume only fires for CAS-confirmed owned sessions, and only past 'dark').
@@ -9573,7 +9669,7 @@ export async function startServer(options) {
         catch (err) {
             console.log(pc.dim(`  [session-pool] rollout gate not wired: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`));
         }
-        const server = new AgentServer({ config, sessionManager, state, scheduler, telegram, relationships, feedback, feedbackAnomalyDetector, dispatches, updateChecker, autoUpdater, autoDispatcher, quotaTracker, quotaManager, publisher, viewer, tunnel, evolution, watchdog, topicMemory, triageNurse, projectMapper, coherenceGate: scopeVerifier, contextHierarchy, canonicalState, operationGate, sentinel, adaptiveTrust, memoryMonitor, orphanReaper, coherenceMonitor, commitmentTracker, semanticMemory, activitySentinel, rateLimitSentinel, releaseReadinessSentinel: releaseReadinessSentinel ?? undefined, messageRouter, summarySentinel, spawnManager, systemReviewer, capabilityMapper, selfKnowledgeTree, coverageAuditor, topicResumeMap: _topicResumeMap ?? undefined, sessionRefresh: _sessionRefresh ?? undefined, autonomyManager, trustElevationTracker, autonomousEvolution, coordinator: coordinator.enabled ? coordinator : undefined, localSigningKeyPem, leaseTransport, onLeasePullRequest: () => leaseCoordinatorRef?.currentLease() ?? null, liveTailReceiver, handoffWireTransport, onHandoffBegin, onHandoffInitiate: handoffInitiate, handoffInProgress: handoffSentinelInProgress, messageLedger, currentInboundByTopic, replyMarkerTransport, onReplyMarker: messageLedger ? (marker) => { const m = marker; messageLedger.applyRemoteReplyMarker(m.dedupeKey, { platform: m.platform, replyIdempotencyKey: m.replyIdempotencyKey, epoch: m.epoch, topic: m.topic ?? null }); } : undefined, whatsapp: whatsappAdapter, slack: slackAdapter, imessage: imessageAdapter, whatsappBusinessBackend, messageBridge, hookEventReceiver, worktreeMonitor, subagentTracker, instructionsVerifier, handshakeManager: threadlineHandshake, threadlineRouter, conversationStore, warrantsReplyGate, collaborationSurfacer, threadResumeMap, topicLinkageHandler: topicLinkageHandler ?? undefined, threadlineRelayClient, threadlineReplyWaiters, listenerManager: listenerManager ?? undefined, responseReviewGate, messagingToneGate, outboundDedupGate, telemetryHeartbeat, pasteManager, featureRegistry, discoveryEvaluator, completionEvaluator, unifiedTrust, liveConfig, sharedStateLedger, ledgerSessionRegistry, worktreeManager, oidcEnrolledRepos: parallelDevConfig?.oidcEnrolledRepos, initiativeTracker, projectRoundRunner, projectDriftChecker, machineHeartbeat, machinePoolRegistry, meshRpcDispatcher, sessionOwnershipRegistry, topicPinStore: _topicPinStore ?? undefined, meshSelfId: _meshSelfId ?? undefined, resolveRouterUrl: _resolveRouterUrl ?? undefined, sessionPoolE2EResultStore, proxyCoordinator, topicIntentStore, topicIntentArcCheck, usherSignalStore, intelligence: sharedIntelligence ?? undefined, telegramBridgeConfig, telegramBridge: telegramBridge ?? undefined, threadlineObservability, briefDeps, workingMemory, taskFlowRegistry, threadlineFlowBridge, sessionReaper, agentWorktreeReaper, mcpProcessReaper, geminiLoopRunner, sleepController, agentActivityState, reapLog, sleepWakeDetector, unjustifiedStopGate, stopGateDb, stopNotifier });
+        const server = new AgentServer({ config, sessionManager, state, scheduler, telegram, relationships, feedback, feedbackAnomalyDetector, dispatches, updateChecker, autoUpdater, autoDispatcher, quotaTracker, quotaManager, publisher, viewer, tunnel, evolution, watchdog, topicMemory, triageNurse, projectMapper, coherenceGate: scopeVerifier, contextHierarchy, canonicalState, operationGate, sentinel, adaptiveTrust, memoryMonitor, orphanReaper, coherenceMonitor, commitmentTracker, semanticMemory, activitySentinel, rateLimitSentinel, releaseReadinessSentinel: releaseReadinessSentinel ?? undefined, messageRouter, summarySentinel, spawnManager, systemReviewer, capabilityMapper, selfKnowledgeTree, coverageAuditor, topicResumeMap: _topicResumeMap ?? undefined, sessionRefresh: _sessionRefresh ?? undefined, autonomyManager, trustElevationTracker, autonomousEvolution, coordinator: coordinator.enabled ? coordinator : undefined, localSigningKeyPem, leaseTransport, onLeasePullRequest: () => leaseCoordinatorRef?.currentLease() ?? null, liveTailReceiver, handoffWireTransport, onHandoffBegin, onHandoffInitiate: handoffInitiate, handoffInProgress: handoffSentinelInProgress, messageLedger, currentInboundByTopic, replyMarkerTransport, onReplyMarker: messageLedger ? (marker) => { const m = marker; messageLedger.applyRemoteReplyMarker(m.dedupeKey, { platform: m.platform, replyIdempotencyKey: m.replyIdempotencyKey, epoch: m.epoch, topic: m.topic ?? null }); } : undefined, whatsapp: whatsappAdapter, slack: slackAdapter, imessage: imessageAdapter, whatsappBusinessBackend, messageBridge, hookEventReceiver, worktreeMonitor, subagentTracker, instructionsVerifier, handshakeManager: threadlineHandshake, threadlineRouter, conversationStore, warrantsReplyGate, collaborationSurfacer, threadResumeMap, topicLinkageHandler: topicLinkageHandler ?? undefined, threadlineRelayClient, threadlineReplyWaiters, listenerManager: listenerManager ?? undefined, responseReviewGate, messagingToneGate, outboundDedupGate, telemetryHeartbeat, pasteManager, featureRegistry, discoveryEvaluator, completionEvaluator, unifiedTrust, liveConfig, sharedStateLedger, ledgerSessionRegistry, worktreeManager, oidcEnrolledRepos: parallelDevConfig?.oidcEnrolledRepos, initiativeTracker, projectRoundRunner, projectDriftChecker, machineHeartbeat, machinePoolRegistry, meshRpcDispatcher, sessionOwnershipRegistry, topicPinStore: _topicPinStore ?? undefined, secretSync: _secretSyncHandle ?? undefined, meshSelfId: _meshSelfId ?? undefined, resolveRouterUrl: _resolveRouterUrl ?? undefined, sessionPoolE2EResultStore, proxyCoordinator, topicIntentStore, topicIntentArcCheck, usherSignalStore, intelligence: sharedIntelligence ?? undefined, telegramBridgeConfig, telegramBridge: telegramBridge ?? undefined, threadlineObservability, briefDeps, workingMemory, taskFlowRegistry, threadlineFlowBridge, sessionReaper, agentWorktreeReaper, mcpProcessReaper, geminiLoopRunner, sleepController, agentActivityState, reapLog, sleepWakeDetector, unjustifiedStopGate, stopGateDb, stopNotifier });
         // Boot-recovery (tunnel-failure-resilience spec Part 6): if the agent
         // died mid-relay-episode, the persisted tunnel.json carries
         // rotationPending=true. Rotate the dashboard PIN + authToken BEFORE