instar 1.3.154 → 1.3.155

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+ # Side-Effects Review — Correction & Preference Learning: Self-Violation Signal
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+
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+ **Version / slug:** `correction-self-violation-signal`
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+ **Date:** `2026-05-31`
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+ **Author:** `echo`
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+ **Second-pass reviewer:** `not required — observe-only + dark by default; the detector holds no blocking authority and cannot alter/delay/block any outbound message`
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+
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+ ## Summary of the change
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+
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+ Extends the shipped Correction & Preference Learning Sentinel so a stored-but-violated
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+ preference becomes a learning signal instead of evaporating. A learned preference can
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+ carry an OPTIONAL `violationPattern` (regex or keyword set). When the agent sends an
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+ outbound message that contradicts that pattern, the contradiction is recorded as a
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+ self-violation in the `CorrectionLedger` (a recurrence-reinforcing `user-preference`
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+ occurrence keyed on the violated lesson), so the preference's salience grows for the
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+ next session-start injection.
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+
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+ Files: new `src/monitoring/SelfViolationDetector.ts` (pure `detectSelfViolation`);
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+ `src/core/PreferencesManager.ts` (+optional `violationPattern` on `PreferenceEntry`
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+ and `RecordPreferencePayload`, persisted/round-tripped, upsert-preserving); the
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+ outbound seam in `src/server/routes.ts` (a new OBSERVE-ONLY `observeSelfViolation`
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+ fire-and-forget branch inside `checkOutboundMessage`, structurally independent of the
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+ tone-gate verdict); config `monitoring.correctionLearning.selfViolationSignal`
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+ (types.ts + ConfigDefaults.ts); Agent-Awareness (templates.ts) + Migration-Parity
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+ backfill (PostUpdateMigrator migrateClaudeMd).
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+
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+ ## Decision-point inventory
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+
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+ - `detectSelfViolation(text, prefs)` (new) — add — pure, deterministic, returns the
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+ list of violated preferences. No authority; precision-biased (lone weak match never
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+ fires); never throws.
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+ - `observeSelfViolation` seam branch (new) — add — records a matched violation to the
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+ ledger + an audit line. Fire-and-forget VOID; cannot influence delivery.
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+ - `PreferenceEntry.violationPattern` (new optional field) — add — absent ≡ never
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+ checked (back-compat).
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+ - Tone-gate / `checkOutboundMessage` block-decision — UNCHANGED — the observe branch
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+ runs before the gate-availability early-return and never feeds the gate or the
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+ return value.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## 1. Over-block
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+
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+ Not applicable. The feature has NO block/allow surface. The observe branch runs as a
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+ fire-and-forget `void observeSelfViolation(...).catch(...)` that is structurally
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+ incapable of returning a block verdict, throwing into the delivery frame, or mutating
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+ the message. The wiring-integrity + E2E tests assert the message is delivered
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+ byte-for-byte unchanged whether or not a violation is detected.
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+
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+ ## 2. Under-block
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+
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+ There is nothing to under-block — the feature never blocks. The "miss" direction
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+ (a real self-violation going unrecorded) is the deliberately-chosen safe direction:
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+ precision over recall. A lone/weak keyword never fires, an unparseable pattern is a
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+ no-check, and a preference without a `violationPattern` is skipped. A false
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+ self-violation that nags is the bad direction, so the matcher is conservative. A
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+ missed recording costs only a slightly weaker recurrence signal next session.
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+
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+ ## 3. Level-of-abstraction fit
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+
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+ Correct. The detector is a pure, exhaustively-tested function (mirrors the
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+ deterministic `scrubSecrets` / Layer-0 classifier discipline of the same sentinel).
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+ The recording reuses the shipped `CorrectionLedger.record()` dedupe-upsert and its
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+ `toApiView()` raw-text-stripping discipline; the occurrence is a `user-preference`
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+ record at the code-determined `LEARNING_DETERMINISTIC_THRESHOLD` so it feeds the
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+ existing 3-pronged recurrence gate exactly like any other distilled correction. No
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+ new persistence layer, no new gate, no new authority.
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+
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+ ## 4. Signal vs authority compliance
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+
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+ **Required reference:** [docs/signal-vs-authority.md](../../docs/signal-vs-authority.md)
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+
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+ - [x] Yes — this change produces a SIGNAL (a ledger occurrence + an audit line) and
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+ holds ZERO authority over any message. The user's explicit hard rule ("we've been
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+ bitten by guards that block messages having too much power") is honored structurally:
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+ the observe call is a separate VOID branch that runs regardless of the
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+ `MessagingToneGate`'s verdict and never influences it. The single authority for
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+ outbound delivery remains the `MessagingToneGate` (rules B1–B17), entirely unchanged.
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+
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+ ## 5. Interactions
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+
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+ - **Shadowing:** none. The observe branch is additive at the top of
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+ `checkOutboundMessage`; it does not read or alter the signals, the gate result, or
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+ the 422 path. With the tone gate null, the observe branch still runs (it precedes
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+ the gate-availability early-return) and the message still passes through.
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+ - **Double-fire:** the ledger dedupe-upserts on `kind:normalizedLearningHash`, so
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+ repeated self-violations of the same preference collapse to ONE record with an
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+ incrementing `occurrenceCount` (asserted by the integration test) — never a pile.
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+ - **Races:** the observe call is fire-and-forget and lazy-imports its modules; the
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+ ledger is the shipped WAL SQLite store (single-writer-safe, fail-open on any error).
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+ Two concurrent sends recording the same preference are both safely upserted.
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+ - **Feedback loops:** none. The detector reads `.instar/preferences.json` (written by
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+ `recordPreference`) and writes the ledger; it never writes preferences, so it cannot
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+ amplify its own pattern. The CorrectionAnalyzer that consumes the ledger is
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+ off-hot-path (weekly cron) and only ROUTES via the existing by-construction
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+ authority-bounded driver.
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+
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+ ## 6. External surfaces
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+
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+ - **Other agents / install base:** pure additive source + a default-OFF config
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+ sub-flag (auto-applied via ConfigDefaults; code reads `cl?.selfViolationSignal !==
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+ true` so an agent whose config lacks the field behaves identically — OFF). The
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+ optional `violationPattern` is fully back-compatible: shipped `.instar/preferences.json`
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+ files have no such field and are simply never self-violation-checked (unit-tested
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+ with a legacy-shaped file). Agent-Awareness + Migration-Parity are handled
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+ (templates.ts bullet for new agents; idempotent content-sniffed migrateClaudeMd
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+ backfill for existing agents).
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+ - **External systems:** none. The detector is local + deterministic; no LLM call, no
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+ network. (Distinct from the capture/distill loop, which is a separate, already-shipped
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+ surface.)
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+ - **Persistent state:** existing `correction-ledger.db` only (one extra occurrence
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+ row per matched violation, bounded by the shipped per-key occurrence cap). Plus a
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+ best-effort `[self-violation]` stderr audit line. No new files.
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+ - **Timing:** none. No timers; the observe call is one bounded synchronous detect plus
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+ one ledger write, off the delivery path.
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+
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+ ## 7. Rollback cost
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+
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+ Pure additive code + a default-off config sub-flag. Revert the commits → the detector,
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+ the seam branch, the schema field, the config flag, and the awareness text disappear;
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+ nothing else changes. Any ledger occurrences already recorded are inert and indexed
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+ exactly like every other correction record (no schema change to the ledger). No
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+ migration, no state repair, no user-visible behavior change (it never acted on a
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+ message).
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+
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+ ## Conclusion
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+
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+ This review confirmed the change is observe-only: a tested, precision-biased,
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+ never-throwing decision function plus a fire-and-forget recording branch that is
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+ structurally incapable of blocking, delaying, or altering any outbound message. It
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+ ships dark behind both `correctionLearning.enabled` and the new `selfViolationSignal`
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+ sub-flag, is fully back-compatible with existing preference files, and reuses the
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+ shipped ledger's privacy + dedupe discipline. Clear to ship.