instar 1.3.1337 → 1.3.1339

package/dist/threadline/relayUnknownSenderTrust.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * Relay unknown-sender trust (docs/specs/a2a-relay-unknown-sender-trust.md, ACT-066).
+ *
+ * The relay emits `unknown-sender` for a message whose sender's keys this agent
+ * does not hold (it cannot decrypt it, so the payload is plaintext). Until this
+ * module, that path skipped InboundMessageGate entirely and handed every such
+ * message onward at trust level `verified` (reason `relay-authenticated`) — and
+ * recording the interaction created a fingerprint trust profile at `verified`,
+ * so the sender stayed `verified` for every later message on every path.
+ *
+ * The relay proves the sender holds the private key of its fingerprint. It does
+ * not prove who the sender is, and nobody granted that fingerprint anything.
+ *
+ * This module resolves the sender's trust from the SAME AgentTrustManager the
+ * relay gate reads and applies the SAME operation-permission table. The trust
+ * manager stays the single authority for level → operations; nothing here
+ * re-implements it. Dry-run (the default when on) logs and counts would-refuse
+ * verdicts and delivers exactly as before; only an explicit `dryRun: false`
+ * refuses, emits the held level, and stops new fingerprint profiles from being
+ * created at `verified`.
+ */
+import type { AgentTrustLevel, AgentTrustManager } from './AgentTrustManager.js';
+import type { ReceivedMessage } from './client/ThreadlineClient.js';
+/** The slice of AgentTrustManager this module reads and writes. */
+export type RelayUnknownSenderTrustManager = Pick<AgentTrustManager, 'getProfileByFingerprint' | 'getAllowedOperationsByFingerprint' | 'recordMessageReceivedByFingerprint' | 'getOrCreateProfileByFingerprint'>;
+/** An operation name no trust level allows: a wire `type` that is present but unusable. */
+export declare const INVALID_RELAY_OPERATION = "(invalid-type)";
+/**
+ * The operation a plaintext relay payload asks for. The plaintext wire carries
+ * `chat` for a message and `ack` for a delivery ack (ThreadlineClient); neither
+ * name is in the level table, so `chat` (and a missing type) map to `message`.
+ * Any other string is taken as the operation name, exactly as the relay gate
+ * takes an E2E `type`; a non-string type maps to a name nothing allows.
+ */
+export declare function classifyRelayPlaintextOperation(wireType: unknown): string;
+export interface RelayUnknownSenderVerdict {
+    /** The level the trust manager holds for the fingerprint (`untrusted` with no profile). */
+    level: AgentTrustLevel;
+    operation: string;
+    /** May this level perform this operation, per the trust manager's table. */
+    allowed: boolean;
+    /** A trust profile counts for the fingerprint (a first-contact profile does not). */
+    hasProfile: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the sender's held trust level and whether it may perform the
+ * operation. Reads only.
+ *
+ * A profile this path itself wrote at first contact while observing
+ * (`relayFirstContact`, source still `setup-default`) counts as no profile:
+ * under enforcement it would never have been written at `verified`. Once the
+ * operator or a pairing decides (any other source), the profile counts.
+ */
+export declare function resolveRelayUnknownSenderTrust(tm: Pick<RelayUnknownSenderTrustManager, 'getProfileByFingerprint' | 'getAllowedOperationsByFingerprint'>, fingerprint: string, wireType: unknown): RelayUnknownSenderVerdict;
+export interface RelayUnknownSenderTrustMode {
+    /** Gate-resolved: `enabled` omitted ⇒ the developmentAgent gate decides. */
+    enabled: boolean;
+    /** Default TRUE: log + count would-refuse verdicts, deliver exactly as today. */
+    dryRun: boolean;
+}
+interface RelayUnknownSenderTrustConfigShape {
+    developmentAgent?: boolean;
+    threadline?: {
+        relayUnknownSenderTrust?: {
+            enabled?: boolean;
+            dryRun?: boolean;
+        };
+    };
+}
+/** The live mode (spec "Configuration"). Read per message. */
+export declare function resolveRelayUnknownSenderTrustMode(live: {
+    enabled?: boolean;
+    dryRun?: boolean;
+}, config: RelayUnknownSenderTrustConfigShape): RelayUnknownSenderTrustMode;
+/** True only when the check is on AND enforcing. */
+export declare function isRelayUnknownSenderTrustEnforcing(mode: RelayUnknownSenderTrustMode): boolean;
+/**
+ * The level a NEW fingerprint trust profile is created at. Today `verified`;
+ * `untrusted` while the check is enforcing — a first contact is not a grant.
+ */
+export declare function newFingerprintProfileLevel(mode: RelayUnknownSenderTrustMode): AgentTrustLevel;
+/** In-memory counters on the authed /health (the rollout evidence). */
+export interface RelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters {
+    /** Unknown-sender messages the check ran on. */
+    evaluated: number;
+    /** The held level may perform the operation. */
+    allowed: number;
+    /** Dry-run: would have been refused; delivered as today. */
+    wouldRefuse: number;
+    /** Enforcing: refused, not delivered. */
+    refused: number;
+    /** Dry-run: a first contact wrote a `verified` profile, marked `relayFirstContact` (enforcement would write none). */
+    firstContactProfiles: number;
+    /** The trust lookup threw. */
+    lookupErrors: number;
+    /** New fingerprint profiles created at `untrusted` because the check was enforcing. */
+    profilesCreatedUntrusted: number;
+}
+export declare function createRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters(): RelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters;
+/** The one server-log line per would-refuse / refuse verdict. */
+export declare function relayUnknownSenderTrustLogLine(kind: 'would-refuse' | 'refuse', fingerprint: string, v: RelayUnknownSenderVerdict): string;
+/** What `gate-passed` carries (the shape the server's relay consumer reads). */
+export interface RelayUnknownSenderPassDecision {
+    action: 'pass';
+    reason: 'relay-authenticated' | 'probe';
+    trustLevel: AgentTrustLevel;
+    fingerprint: string;
+    message: ReceivedMessage;
+}
+export interface RelayUnknownSenderHandlerDeps {
+    trustManager: RelayUnknownSenderTrustManager;
+    mode: () => RelayUnknownSenderTrustMode;
+    counters: RelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters;
+    emit: (decision: RelayUnknownSenderPassDecision) => void;
+    log?: (line: string) => void;
+}
+export type RelayUnknownSenderOutcome = 'passed-legacy' | 'passed-dry-run' | 'would-refuse-delivered' | 'passed' | 'refused' | 'refused-lookup-error';
+/**
+ * Handle one unknown-sender relay message after the payload-size check.
+ *
+ *  - off: exactly today's behaviour (record, emit `verified`).
+ *  - dry-run: today's delivery, plus the verdict counted and logged.
+ *  - enforcing: refuse when the held level may not perform the operation;
+ *    otherwise emit the held level. The interaction is recorded only for a
+ *    sender that already has a profile, so a stranger's probe writes nothing.
+ */
+export declare function handleRelayUnknownSender(deps: RelayUnknownSenderHandlerDeps, received: ReceivedMessage, wireType: unknown): RelayUnknownSenderOutcome;
+/**
+ * Process-wide counters (one relay client per server process). The bootstrap
+ * writes them; the authed /health reads them.
+ */
+export declare const relayUnknownSenderTrustCounters: RelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters;
+/** Tests only: zero the process-wide counters. */
+export declare function resetRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters(): void;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=relayUnknownSenderTrust.d.ts.map

package/dist/threadline/relayUnknownSenderTrust.d.ts.map

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package/dist/threadline/relayUnknownSenderTrust.js

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/**
+ * Relay unknown-sender trust (docs/specs/a2a-relay-unknown-sender-trust.md, ACT-066).
+ *
+ * The relay emits `unknown-sender` for a message whose sender's keys this agent
+ * does not hold (it cannot decrypt it, so the payload is plaintext). Until this
+ * module, that path skipped InboundMessageGate entirely and handed every such
+ * message onward at trust level `verified` (reason `relay-authenticated`) — and
+ * recording the interaction created a fingerprint trust profile at `verified`,
+ * so the sender stayed `verified` for every later message on every path.
+ *
+ * The relay proves the sender holds the private key of its fingerprint. It does
+ * not prove who the sender is, and nobody granted that fingerprint anything.
+ *
+ * This module resolves the sender's trust from the SAME AgentTrustManager the
+ * relay gate reads and applies the SAME operation-permission table. The trust
+ * manager stays the single authority for level → operations; nothing here
+ * re-implements it. Dry-run (the default when on) logs and counts would-refuse
+ * verdicts and delivers exactly as before; only an explicit `dryRun: false`
+ * refuses, emits the held level, and stops new fingerprint profiles from being
+ * created at `verified`.
+ */
+import { resolveDevAgentGate } from '../core/devAgentGate.js';
+/** An operation name no trust level allows: a wire `type` that is present but unusable. */
+export const INVALID_RELAY_OPERATION = '(invalid-type)';
+/** Probes, as in InboundMessageGate: they pass with reason `probe`. */
+const PROBE_OPS = new Set(['ping', 'health']);
+/**
+ * Delivery acks are consumed by the ack stage before the inbox, the warrants
+ * gate and every router (docs/specs/a2a-ack-never-acked.md): they only record
+ * that our own earlier send arrived. Refusing them would make every peer we
+ * write to look unreachable, so every level may send one.
+ */
+const ACK_OP = 'ack';
+/**
+ * The operation a plaintext relay payload asks for. The plaintext wire carries
+ * `chat` for a message and `ack` for a delivery ack (ThreadlineClient); neither
+ * name is in the level table, so `chat` (and a missing type) map to `message`.
+ * Any other string is taken as the operation name, exactly as the relay gate
+ * takes an E2E `type`; a non-string type maps to a name nothing allows.
+ */
+export function classifyRelayPlaintextOperation(wireType) {
+    if (wireType === undefined || wireType === null || wireType === 'chat')
+        return 'message';
+    if (typeof wireType === 'string' && wireType)
+        return wireType;
+    return INVALID_RELAY_OPERATION;
+}
+/** Credentials never travel the plaintext fallback (verified-pairing spec). */
+const CREDENTIAL_SHARE_OP = 'credential-share';
+/**
+ * Resolve the sender's held trust level and whether it may perform the
+ * operation. Reads only.
+ *
+ * A profile this path itself wrote at first contact while observing
+ * (`relayFirstContact`, source still `setup-default`) counts as no profile:
+ * under enforcement it would never have been written at `verified`. Once the
+ * operator or a pairing decides (any other source), the profile counts.
+ */
+export function resolveRelayUnknownSenderTrust(tm, fingerprint, wireType) {
+    const operation = classifyRelayPlaintextOperation(wireType);
+    const found = tm.getProfileByFingerprint(fingerprint);
+    const profile = found && !(found.relayFirstContact && found.source === 'setup-default') ? found : null;
+    const level = profile?.level ?? 'untrusted';
+    let allowed;
+    if (operation === ACK_OP) {
+        allowed = true;
+    }
+    else if (operation === CREDENTIAL_SHARE_OP) {
+        allowed = false;
+    }
+    else if (level === 'untrusted') {
+        // One intended difference from the gate's table: an `untrusted` sender's
+        // probe is NOT passed on. The gate passes probes expecting them handled
+        // inline, but the server's `gate-passed` consumer routes every message it
+        // receives to a session — so passing a stranger's ping would hand it the
+        // very session this check exists to deny. Only its delivery acks pass.
+        allowed = false;
+    }
+    else {
+        allowed = tm.getAllowedOperationsByFingerprint(fingerprint).includes(operation);
+    }
+    return { level, operation, allowed, hasProfile: !!profile };
+}
+/** The live mode (spec "Configuration"). Read per message. */
+export function resolveRelayUnknownSenderTrustMode(live, config) {
+    const block = config.threadline?.relayUnknownSenderTrust;
+    const enabled = resolveDevAgentGate(live.enabled ?? block?.enabled, config);
+    // Only an explicit `false` leaves dry-run; anything else observes.
+    const dryRun = (live.dryRun ?? block?.dryRun) !== false;
+    return { enabled, dryRun };
+}
+/** True only when the check is on AND enforcing. */
+export function isRelayUnknownSenderTrustEnforcing(mode) {
+    return mode.enabled && !mode.dryRun;
+}
+/**
+ * The level a NEW fingerprint trust profile is created at. Today `verified`;
+ * `untrusted` while the check is enforcing — a first contact is not a grant.
+ */
+export function newFingerprintProfileLevel(mode) {
+    return isRelayUnknownSenderTrustEnforcing(mode) ? 'untrusted' : 'verified';
+}
+export function createRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters() {
+    return {
+        evaluated: 0, allowed: 0, wouldRefuse: 0, refused: 0,
+        firstContactProfiles: 0, lookupErrors: 0, profilesCreatedUntrusted: 0,
+    };
+}
+/** Peer-supplied text is never logged raw: printable ASCII only, bounded. */
+function logSafe(value) {
+    return value.replace(/[^\x21-\x7e]/g, '?').slice(0, 48) || 'unknown';
+}
+/** The one server-log line per would-refuse / refuse verdict. */
+export function relayUnknownSenderTrustLogLine(kind, fingerprint, v) {
+    return `[relay-unknown-sender-trust] ${kind} fp=${logSafe(fingerprint).slice(0, 12)} profile=${v.hasProfile ? 'yes' : 'no'} trust=${v.level} op=${logSafe(v.operation)}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Handle one unknown-sender relay message after the payload-size check.
+ *
+ *  - off: exactly today's behaviour (record, emit `verified`).
+ *  - dry-run: today's delivery, plus the verdict counted and logged.
+ *  - enforcing: refuse when the held level may not perform the operation;
+ *    otherwise emit the held level. The interaction is recorded only for a
+ *    sender that already has a profile, so a stranger's probe writes nothing.
+ */
+export function handleRelayUnknownSender(deps, received, wireType) {
+    const { trustManager: tm, counters } = deps;
+    const log = deps.log ?? ((line) => console.log(line));
+    const fingerprint = received.from;
+    const mode = deps.mode();
+    const legacyDeliver = () => {
+        // Evidence only: an unreadable profile counts as existing (no first-contact mark).
+        let existed = true;
+        try {
+            existed = !!tm.getProfileByFingerprint(fingerprint);
+        }
+        catch { /* @silent-fallback-ok — counter evidence only */ }
+        if (mode.enabled && !existed) {
+            // Dry-run keeps today's profile write, but the profile is created already
+            // marked (one atomic write — a crash cannot leave it unmarked), so neither
+            // later dry-run verdicts nor enforcement count it as a grant.
+            counters.firstContactProfiles++;
+            try {
+                tm.getOrCreateProfileByFingerprint(fingerprint, undefined, { relayFirstContact: true });
+            }
+            catch { /* @silent-fallback-ok — the record below writes today's profile */ }
+        }
+        tm.recordMessageReceivedByFingerprint(fingerprint);
+        deps.emit({ action: 'pass', reason: 'relay-authenticated', trustLevel: 'verified', fingerprint, message: received });
+    };
+    if (!mode.enabled) {
+        legacyDeliver();
+        return 'passed-legacy';
+    }
+    let verdict;
+    try {
+        verdict = resolveRelayUnknownSenderTrust(tm, fingerprint, wireType);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        counters.lookupErrors++;
+        log(`[relay-unknown-sender-trust] lookup failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+        if (mode.dryRun) {
+            legacyDeliver();
+            return 'passed-dry-run';
+        }
+        // Enforcing and the authority cannot answer: fail closed. The relay sender
+        // gets no answer either way, exactly as for a gate block.
+        return 'refused-lookup-error';
+    }
+    counters.evaluated++;
+    if (mode.dryRun) {
+        if (verdict.allowed) {
+            counters.allowed++;
+            legacyDeliver();
+            return 'passed-dry-run';
+        }
+        counters.wouldRefuse++;
+        log(relayUnknownSenderTrustLogLine('would-refuse', fingerprint, verdict));
+        legacyDeliver();
+        return 'would-refuse-delivered';
+    }
+    if (!verdict.allowed) {
+        counters.refused++;
+        log(relayUnknownSenderTrustLogLine('refuse', fingerprint, verdict));
+        return 'refused';
+    }
+    counters.allowed++;
+    if (verdict.hasProfile)
+        tm.recordMessageReceivedByFingerprint(fingerprint);
+    deps.emit({
+        action: 'pass',
+        reason: PROBE_OPS.has(verdict.operation) ? 'probe' : 'relay-authenticated',
+        trustLevel: verdict.level,
+        fingerprint,
+        message: received,
+    });
+    return 'passed';
+}
+/**
+ * Process-wide counters (one relay client per server process). The bootstrap
+ * writes them; the authed /health reads them.
+ */
+export const relayUnknownSenderTrustCounters = createRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters();
+/** Tests only: zero the process-wide counters. */
+export function resetRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters() {
+    Object.assign(relayUnknownSenderTrustCounters, createRelayUnknownSenderTrustCounters());
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=relayUnknownSenderTrust.js.map

package/dist/threadline/relayUnknownSenderTrust.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "instar",
-  "version": "1.3.1337",
+  "version": "1.3.1339",
   "description": "Coherence infrastructure for self-evolving AI agents — on the Claude Code or Codex subscription you already have.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",