imapkit 5.2.0 → 5.3.1

package/dist/cjs/oauth/provider.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1422 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * The OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect provider of the `oauth` option (README "OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect"): the
+ * authorization code flow with PKCE for mail clients, with tokens that IMAP (XOAUTH2, OAUTHBEARER) and SMTP (AUTH
+ * XOAUTH2) accept. No passwords: a consent policy decides every sign-in, from the first rung that has one: a queued
+ * decision, the user (picked by `login_hint`), the client, the server default. `prompt` shows the consent page,
+ * where the tester picks an account and clicks Allow or Deny. Strict like the IMAP side: a request that breaks a
+ * MUST of the RFCs is refused and the error description names the rule.
+ *
+ * This file holds the protocol logic and the state, src/oauth/http.ts the HTTP server and src/oauth/pages.ts the
+ * pages. Times come from `server.now()`, so tests with a fixed clock can let tokens expire.
+ */
+var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
+    return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
+};
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.OAuthProvider = void 0;
+exports.redirectMatches = redirectMatches;
+const node_crypto_1 = __importDefault(require("node:crypto"));
+const store_operations_js_1 = require("../store-operations.js");
+const rest_js_1 = require("../rest.js");
+const policy_js_1 = require("./policy.js");
+const jwt_js_1 = require("./jwt.js");
+const LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS = ['http://127.0.0.1/*', 'http://localhost/*', 'http://[::1]/*'];
+const DEFAULT_CLIENTS = {
+    imapkit: { name: 'ImapKit test client', redirectUris: LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS },
+    'imapkit-approve': { name: 'ImapKit test client (always allows)', redirectUris: LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS, consent: 'approve' },
+    'imapkit-deny': { name: 'ImapKit test client (always denies)', redirectUris: LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS, consent: 'deny' }
+};
+// OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.4 and 11, the consent page shows these descriptions
+const STANDARD_SCOPES = {
+    openid: 'Confirm who you are (OpenID Connect ID token)',
+    email: 'See your email address',
+    profile: 'See your name',
+    offline_access: 'Stay signed in (a refresh token)'
+};
+const PROMPT_VALUES = ['none', 'login', 'consent', 'select_account'];
+// RFC 6749 section 3.3: scope-token = 1*( %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E )
+const SCOPE_TOKEN = /^[\x21\x23-\x5b\x5d-\x7e]+$/;
+// RFC 7636 section 4.1: code-verifier = 43*128unreserved, the S256 challenge is 43 base64url characters
+const PKCE_VALUE = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-._~]{43,128}$/;
+// parameters of an authorization request that the provider reads, the rest are listed as ignored on the consent page
+const KNOWN_PARAMS = new Set([
+    'response_type',
+    'client_id',
+    'redirect_uri',
+    'scope',
+    'state',
+    'code_challenge',
+    'code_challenge_method',
+    'nonce',
+    'login_hint',
+    'prompt',
+    'response_mode',
+    'request',
+    'request_uri'
+]);
+const PENDING_TTL = 600 * 1000;
+// how long an expired or revoked token is still known as such
+const TOKEN_MEMORY = 24 * 3600 * 1000;
+const randomToken = (bytes = 32) => node_crypto_1.default.randomBytes(bytes).toString('base64url');
+/**
+ * Reads the parameters of a request. RFC 6749 section 3.1: a parameter without a value counts as omitted, and
+ * one that is sent more than once is an error
+ *
+ * @param {URLSearchParams} input Query or form parameters
+ * @return {Object} `{ values, duplicates }`
+ */
+function readParams(input) {
+    const values = Object.create(null);
+    const duplicates = new Set();
+    for (const [key, value] of input) {
+        if (value === '') {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (key in values) {
+            duplicates.add(key);
+        }
+        values[key] = value;
+    }
+    return { values, duplicates: [...duplicates] };
+}
+/**
+ * Checks a registered redirect URI against the one a request sent
+ *
+ * @param {String} registered Registered URI, a trailing `*` matches any rest
+ * @param {String} given URI of the request
+ * @return {Boolean} true if they match
+ */
+function redirectMatches(registered, given) {
+    const wildcard = registered.endsWith('*');
+    const base = wildcard ? registered.slice(0, -1) : registered;
+    const same = (a, b) => (wildcard ? a.startsWith(b) : a === b);
+    let baseUrl;
+    let givenUrl;
+    try {
+        baseUrl = new URL(base);
+        givenUrl = new URL(given);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // RFC 8252 section 7.3: a loopback IP redirect URI matches with any port, the client picks it when it runs
+    if (baseUrl.protocol === 'http:' && (0, rest_js_1.isLoopback)(baseUrl.hostname) && !baseUrl.port) {
+        return (givenUrl.protocol === 'http:' &&
+            givenUrl.hostname === baseUrl.hostname &&
+            same(givenUrl.pathname + givenUrl.search, baseUrl.pathname + baseUrl.search));
+    }
+    // RFC 6749 section 3.1.2.3: otherwise a simple string comparison
+    return same(given, base);
+}
+/**
+ * Checks the clients of the options
+ *
+ * @param {Object} clients Client ID to options
+ * @return {Map} client ID to client
+ */
+function loadClients(clients) {
+    const result = new Map();
+    for (const id of Object.keys(clients)) {
+        result.set(id, makeClient(id, clients[id]));
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+/**
+ * Checks the options of a client
+ *
+ * @param {String} id Client ID
+ * @param {Object} options Client options
+ * @return {Object} client
+ * @throws {ImapKitError} INVALID for bad options
+ */
+function makeClient(id, options) {
+    // RFC 6749 appendix A.1: client-id = *VSCHAR
+    if (typeof id !== 'string' || !/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/.test(id)) {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('OAuth client ID must be a non-empty string of printable ASCII', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    const what = 'OAuth client ' + JSON.stringify(id);
+    if (!options || typeof options !== 'object') {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(what + ' must be an object', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    const { name, secret, redirectUris, consent } = options;
+    if (name !== undefined && (typeof name !== 'string' || !name)) {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(what + ': name must be a non-empty string', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    if (secret !== undefined && (typeof secret !== 'string' || !/^[\x20-\x7e]+$/.test(secret))) {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(what + ': secret must be a non-empty string of printable ASCII', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    const uris = redirectUris === undefined ? LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS : redirectUris;
+    if (!Array.isArray(uris) || !uris.length) {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(what + ': redirectUris must be a non-empty list', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    for (const uri of uris) {
+        const base = typeof uri === 'string' ? uri.replace(/\*$/, '') : '';
+        let valid = !!base && !base.includes('#');
+        try {
+            new URL(base);
+        }
+        catch {
+            valid = false;
+        }
+        if (!valid) {
+            // RFC 6749 section 3.1.2: an absolute URI without a fragment
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(what + ': redirect URI ' + JSON.stringify(uri) + ' must be an absolute URI without a fragment', 'INVALID');
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        id,
+        name: name || id,
+        secret: secret === undefined ? null : secret,
+        redirectUris: uris.slice(),
+        consent: consent === undefined || consent === null ? null : (0, policy_js_1.checkOutcome)(consent, what + ': consent')
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Reads a positive number option
+ *
+ * @param {*} value Option value
+ * @param {Number} fallback Default
+ * @param {String} what Option name
+ * @param {Number} [max] Largest allowed value
+ * @return {Number} value
+ */
+function positiveNumber(value, fallback, what, max = Infinity) {
+    if (value === undefined) {
+        return fallback;
+    }
+    if (typeof value !== 'number' || !(value > 0) || value > max) {
+        throw new Error(what + ' must be a positive number' + (max < Infinity ? ' of at most ' + max : ''));
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+class OAuthProvider {
+    constructor(server, options) {
+        this.server = server;
+        this.options = options && typeof options === 'object' ? options : {};
+        this.issuer = this.options.issuer ? this.checkIssuer(this.options.issuer) : '';
+        this.mailScope = this.options.mailScope === undefined ? 'mail' : this.options.mailScope;
+        if (typeof this.mailScope !== 'string' || !SCOPE_TOKEN.test(this.mailScope)) {
+            throw new Error('oauth.mailScope must be a scope token (RFC 6749 section 3.3)');
+        }
+        this.scopes = Object.assign({}, STANDARD_SCOPES, { [this.mailScope]: 'Read, send and manage your mail over IMAP and SMTP' });
+        for (const [name, description] of Object.entries(this.options.scopes || {})) {
+            if (!SCOPE_TOKEN.test(name) || typeof description !== 'string') {
+                throw new Error('oauth.scopes maps scope tokens (RFC 6749 section 3.3) to descriptions, ' + JSON.stringify(name) + ' is not one');
+            }
+            this.scopes[name] = description;
+        }
+        this.accessTokenTtl = positiveNumber(this.options.accessTokenTtl, 3600, 'oauth.accessTokenTtl');
+        this.codeTtl = positiveNumber(this.options.codeTtl, 60, 'oauth.codeTtl', 600);
+        const { unknownScopes, refreshTokens } = this.options;
+        if (unknownScopes !== undefined && unknownScopes !== 'refuse' && unknownScopes !== 'drop') {
+            throw new Error('oauth.unknownScopes must be "refuse" or "drop"');
+        }
+        if (refreshTokens !== undefined && refreshTokens !== 'offline_access' && refreshTokens !== 'always') {
+            throw new Error('oauth.refreshTokens must be "offline_access" or "always"');
+        }
+        this.queueCounter = 0;
+        // without the option, every provider shares one key, see defaultSigningKey()
+        this.key = this.options.signingKey ? (0, jwt_js_1.loadSigningKey)(this.options.signingKey) : null;
+        this.reset();
+        server.on('reset', () => this.reset());
+        this.registerControl();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Checks an issuer URL of the options: http or https, no query or fragment (RFC 8414 section 2)
+     *
+     * @param {String} issuer URL
+     * @return {String} the URL without a trailing slash
+     */
+    checkIssuer(issuer) {
+        let url = null;
+        try {
+            url = new URL(String(issuer));
+        }
+        catch {
+            // not a URL
+        }
+        if (!url || !/^https?:$/.test(url.protocol) || url.search || url.hash || typeof issuer !== 'string') {
+            throw new Error('oauth.issuer must be an http or https URL without a query or fragment');
+        }
+        return issuer.replace(/\/+$/, '');
+    }
+    /** Restores the clients and the default policy of the options and forgets every token, request and queue */
+    reset() {
+        this.clients = loadClients(this.options.clients || DEFAULT_CLIENTS);
+        this.consent = this.options.consent === undefined ? 'prompt' : (0, policy_js_1.checkOutcome)(this.options.consent, 'oauth.consent');
+        this.decisions = [];
+        this.tokenFaults = [];
+        this.pending = new Map();
+        this.codes = new Map();
+        this.tokens = new Map();
+    }
+    /** Milliseconds since the epoch, from the `now` option */
+    nowMs() {
+        return this.server.now().getTime();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Sets the issuer from the address the HTTP server listens on, unless the `issuer` option gave one
+     *
+     * @param {String} host Address
+     * @param {Number} port Port
+     */
+    listening(host, port) {
+        if (!this.options.issuer) {
+            // a wildcard address is reached on the loopback address, the bundled certificate covers 127.0.0.1 too
+            const name = host === '0.0.0.0' || host === '::' ? '127.0.0.1' : host.includes(':') ? '[' + host + ']' : host;
+            this.issuer = (this.options.secure ? 'https' : 'http') + '://' + name + ':' + port;
+        }
+    }
+    /** The URL of the discovery document */
+    discoveryUrl() {
+        return this.issuer + '/.well-known/openid-configuration';
+    }
+    /** The users as the consent and index pages show them, the default user first */
+    pageUsers() {
+        return this.userNames().map(name => {
+            const data = this.server.getUser(name) || {};
+            return { name, displayName: data.displayName || undefined, consent: data.oauth && data.oauth.consent };
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Marks a token as revoked or replaced by rotation
+     *
+     * @param {Object} record Token
+     * @param {String} how "revoked" or "rotated"
+     */
+    endToken(record, how) {
+        record[how] = true;
+        record.endedAt = record.endedAt === null ? this.nowMs() : record.endedAt;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Emits an `oauth` event, `{ type, ... }`, and logs it with the debug option
+     *
+     * @param {String} type Event type
+     * @param {Object} data Event data
+     */
+    emit(type, data) {
+        const event = Object.assign({ type }, data);
+        if (this.server.options.debug) {
+            console.log('[OAuth] %s %s', type, JSON.stringify(data));
+        }
+        this.server.emit('oauth', event);
+    }
+    // Authorization endpoint
+    /**
+     * Answers an authorization request (RFC 6749 section 4.1.1, OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 3.1.2.1)
+     *
+     * @param {URLSearchParams} input Query (GET) or form (POST) parameters
+     * @return {Object} a redirect, a page, or a request for the consent page
+     */
+    authorize(input) {
+        this.prune();
+        const { values: p, duplicates } = readParams(input);
+        // RFC 6749 section 4.1.2.1: without a valid client and redirect URI there is nowhere safe to redirect to
+        if (duplicates.includes('client_id') || duplicates.includes('redirect_uri')) {
+            return this.errorPage('client_id or redirect_uri is sent more than once', 'Every parameter may only be sent once (RFC 6749 section 3.1).');
+        }
+        if (!p.client_id) {
+            return this.errorPage('The request has no client_id', 'Add the client_id of a registered client.', this.clientList());
+        }
+        const client = this.clients.get(p.client_id);
+        if (!client) {
+            return this.errorPage('Unknown client_id ' + JSON.stringify(p.client_id), 'This client is not registered.', this.clientList());
+        }
+        const redirect = this.resolveRedirect(client, p.redirect_uri);
+        if (typeof redirect !== 'string') {
+            return redirect;
+        }
+        const target = { redirectUri: redirect, state: p.state };
+        const fail = (error, description) => {
+            this.emit('authorize', { client: client.id, result: error, description });
+            return this.redirectError(target, error, description);
+        };
+        const request = this.checkRequest(client, redirect, p, duplicates, fail);
+        if ('type' in request) {
+            return request;
+        }
+        const { outcome, source } = this.decide(request);
+        this.emit('authorize', { client: client.id, user: request.hintUser || null, decision: (0, policy_js_1.describeOutcome)(outcome), source, prompt: request.prompt });
+        return this.finish(request, outcome, source);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Checks the parameters of an authorization request after the client and the redirect URI
+     *
+     * @return {Object} the request, or the error redirect
+     */
+    checkRequest(client, redirectUri, p, duplicates, fail) {
+        if (duplicates.length) {
+            return fail('invalid_request', duplicates.join(', ') + ' sent more than once (RFC 6749 section 3.1)');
+        }
+        // OpenID Connect Core 1.0 sections 6.1 and 6.2
+        if (p.request) {
+            return fail('request_not_supported', 'Request objects are not supported (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 6.1)');
+        }
+        if (p.request_uri) {
+            return fail('request_uri_not_supported', 'request_uri is not supported (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 6.2)');
+        }
+        if (!p.response_type) {
+            return fail('invalid_request', 'response_type is missing (RFC 6749 section 4.1.1)');
+        }
+        if (p.response_type !== 'code') {
+            return fail('unsupported_response_type', 'Only the authorization code flow, response_type=code, is supported');
+        }
+        if (p.response_mode && p.response_mode !== 'query') {
+            return fail('invalid_request', 'Only response_mode=query is supported');
+        }
+        const checks = [];
+        const scope = this.checkScope(p.scope, checks);
+        if (typeof scope === 'string') {
+            return fail('invalid_scope', scope);
+        }
+        const pkce = this.checkPkce(client, p, checks);
+        if (pkce) {
+            return fail('invalid_request', pkce);
+        }
+        const prompt = p.prompt ? p.prompt.split(' ') : [];
+        const badPrompt = prompt.find(value => !PROMPT_VALUES.includes(value));
+        if (badPrompt !== undefined) {
+            return fail('invalid_request', 'Unknown prompt value ' + JSON.stringify(badPrompt) + ' (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 3.1.2.1)');
+        }
+        if (prompt.includes('none') && prompt.length > 1) {
+            return fail('invalid_request', 'prompt=none can not be combined with other values (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 3.1.2.1)');
+        }
+        checks.push(p.state
+            ? { level: 'ok', text: 'state is present (' + p.state.length + ' characters)' }
+            : { level: 'warn', text: 'no state: the client can not tell this redirect from a forged one (RFC 6749 section 10.12)' });
+        if (scope.includes('openid')) {
+            checks.push(p.nonce
+                ? { level: 'ok', text: 'nonce is present, the ID token carries it' }
+                : { level: 'note', text: 'no nonce: allowed for the code flow, the ID token carries none' });
+        }
+        const hintUser = p.login_hint === undefined ? undefined : this.server.getUser(p.login_hint) ? p.login_hint : null;
+        if (hintUser === null) {
+            checks.push({ level: 'warn', text: 'login_hint ' + JSON.stringify(p.login_hint) + ' is not a user of this server' });
+        }
+        else if (hintUser) {
+            checks.push({ level: 'ok', text: 'login_hint matches the user ' + hintUser });
+        }
+        return {
+            client,
+            redirectUri,
+            redirectUriSent: p.redirect_uri !== undefined,
+            state: p.state,
+            scope,
+            codeChallenge: p.code_challenge,
+            codeChallengeMethod: p.code_challenge ? p.code_challenge_method || 'plain' : undefined,
+            nonce: p.nonce,
+            loginHint: p.login_hint,
+            hintUser,
+            prompt,
+            checks,
+            ignored: Object.keys(p).filter(key => !KNOWN_PARAMS.has(key))
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Finds the redirect URI of a request
+     *
+     * @return {String|Object} the URI, or the error page
+     */
+    resolveRedirect(client, given) {
+        const registered = client.redirectUris.map(uri => '  ' + uri).join('\n');
+        if (given === undefined) {
+            // RFC 6749 section 4.1.1: OPTIONAL only when the client has a single registered URI
+            const only = client.redirectUris.length === 1 && !client.redirectUris[0].endsWith('*') ? client.redirectUris[0] : null;
+            if (only) {
+                return only;
+            }
+            return this.errorPage('The request has no redirect_uri', 'Client ' + client.id + ' has more than one possible redirect URI, the request must name one.', ['Registered for ' + client.id + ':\n' + registered]);
+        }
+        if (given.includes('#')) {
+            return this.errorPage('redirect_uri has a fragment', 'A redirect URI must not include a fragment (RFC 6749 section 3.1.2).', [
+                'Received: ' + given
+            ]);
+        }
+        if (!client.redirectUris.some(uri => redirectMatches(uri, given))) {
+            return this.errorPage('redirect_uri is not registered for ' + client.id, 'The authorization server must not redirect to it (RFC 6749 section 4.1.2.1).', ['Received: ' + given, 'Registered (a loopback http URI matches any port, RFC 8252 section 7.3):\n' + registered]);
+        }
+        return given;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Checks the scope parameter
+     *
+     * @return {Array|String} the granted scopes, or the error description
+     */
+    checkScope(value, checks) {
+        if (!value) {
+            // RFC 6749 section 3.3: without a default scope the server fails the request
+            return 'scope is missing, ImapKit has no default scope (RFC 6749 section 3.3)';
+        }
+        const requested = [...new Set(value.split(' ').filter(Boolean))];
+        const bad = requested.find(token => !SCOPE_TOKEN.test(token));
+        if (bad !== undefined || !requested.length) {
+            return 'Invalid scope ' + JSON.stringify(bad === undefined ? value : bad) + ' (RFC 6749 section 3.3)';
+        }
+        const unknown = requested.filter(token => !Object.hasOwn(this.scopes, token));
+        if (unknown.length && this.options.unknownScopes !== 'drop') {
+            return 'Unknown scope ' + unknown.join(' ') + ', known: ' + Object.keys(this.scopes).join(' ');
+        }
+        const scope = requested.filter(token => Object.hasOwn(this.scopes, token));
+        if (!scope.length) {
+            return 'None of the requested scopes is known, known: ' + Object.keys(this.scopes).join(' ');
+        }
+        checks.push(unknown.length
+            ? { level: 'warn', text: 'unknown scopes are left out of the grant: ' + unknown.join(' ') }
+            : { level: 'ok', text: 'every scope is known' });
+        if (!scope.includes(this.mailScope)) {
+            checks.push({ level: 'warn', text: 'the ' + this.mailScope + ' scope is missing: IMAP and SMTP will refuse the token' });
+        }
+        return scope;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Checks the PKCE parameters (RFC 7636 section 4.3, RFC 9700 section 2.1.1)
+     *
+     * @return {String|null} the error description, null if they are fine
+     */
+    checkPkce(client, p, checks) {
+        const challenge = p.code_challenge;
+        if (!challenge) {
+            if (p.code_challenge_method) {
+                return 'code_challenge_method without code_challenge (RFC 7636 section 4.3)';
+            }
+            if (!client.secret) {
+                return 'code_challenge is missing, public clients must use PKCE (RFC 9700 section 2.1.1)';
+            }
+            checks.push({ level: 'warn', text: 'no PKCE: confidential clients should use it too (RFC 9700 section 2.1.1)' });
+            return null;
+        }
+        // RFC 7636 section 4.3: the method defaults to plain
+        const method = p.code_challenge_method || 'plain';
+        if (method !== 'S256' && method !== 'plain') {
+            return 'Unknown code_challenge_method ' + JSON.stringify(method) + ' (RFC 7636 section 4.3)';
+        }
+        if (method === 'plain' && !this.options.allowPlainPkce) {
+            return ((p.code_challenge_method ? 'code_challenge_method=plain' : 'code_challenge_method is missing, which means plain,') +
+                ' but a client that can use S256 must use it (RFC 7636 section 4.2)');
+        }
+        if (!PKCE_VALUE.test(challenge) || (method === 'S256' && challenge.length !== 43)) {
+            return ('Invalid code_challenge, ' +
+                (method === 'S256' ? 'S256 gives 43 base64url characters' : 'it must be 43 to 128 unreserved characters') +
+                ' (RFC 7636 section 4.2)');
+        }
+        checks.push({ level: method === 'S256' ? 'ok' : 'warn', text: 'PKCE ' + method + ' code challenge' });
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Finds the decision of a request: a queued decision, the user of login_hint, the client, the server default
+     *
+     * @param {Object} request Checked request
+     * @return {Object} `{ outcome, source }`
+     */
+    decide(request) {
+        const queued = this.decisions.find(item => (item.client === undefined || item.client === request.client.id) && (item.user === undefined || item.user === request.hintUser));
+        if (queued) {
+            if (--queued.remaining <= 0) {
+                this.decisions.splice(this.decisions.indexOf(queued), 1);
+            }
+            return { outcome: queued.decision, source: 'queued decision ' + queued.id };
+        }
+        const user = request.hintUser ? this.server.getUser(request.hintUser) : false;
+        const userConsent = user && user.oauth && user.oauth.consent;
+        if (userConsent) {
+            return { outcome: userConsent, source: 'user ' + request.hintUser };
+        }
+        if (request.client.consent) {
+            return { outcome: request.client.consent, source: 'client ' + request.client.id };
+        }
+        return { outcome: this.consent, source: 'server default' };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Carries out a decision
+     *
+     * @param {Object} request Checked request
+     * @param {String|Object} outcome Decision
+     * @param {String} source Where the decision came from
+     * @param {String} [user] The user picked on the consent page
+     * @return {Object} redirect, page or consent request
+     */
+    finish(request, outcome, source, user) {
+        const fail = (error, description) => this.redirectError(request, error, description);
+        if (outcome === 'prompt') {
+            if (request.prompt.includes('none')) {
+                // OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 3.1.2.1: no page for prompt=none
+                return fail('consent_required', 'prompt=none, but the consent policy (' + source + ') shows the consent page');
+            }
+            const pending = Object.assign({}, request, { id: randomToken(18), expiresAt: this.nowMs() + PENDING_TTL, source });
+            this.pending.set(pending.id, pending);
+            return { type: 'consent', request: pending };
+        }
+        if (outcome === 'deny') {
+            return fail('access_denied', 'The sign-in was denied (' + source + ')');
+        }
+        if (typeof outcome === 'object') {
+            return fail(outcome.error, outcome.description || 'Answered by ' + source);
+        }
+        if (outcome === 'no-redirect') {
+            return {
+                type: 'page',
+                page: {
+                    status: 200,
+                    tone: 'info',
+                    title: 'Not redirecting',
+                    message: 'The decision (' +
+                        source +
+                        ') leaves this sign-in unanswered, so the client never gets its redirect. Use it to test how the client times out.'
+                }
+            };
+        }
+        const name = user || this.pickUser(request);
+        if (!name) {
+            return fail('access_denied', request.loginHint === undefined
+                ? 'The server has no users'
+                : 'login_hint ' + JSON.stringify(request.loginHint) + ' is not a user of this server');
+        }
+        const code = this.issueCode(request, name);
+        this.emit('code', { client: request.client.id, user: name, scope: request.scope.join(' '), source, fault: outcome === 'approve' ? null : outcome });
+        const params = { code };
+        if (request.state !== undefined || outcome === 'wrong-state') {
+            params.state = outcome === 'wrong-state' ? (request.state || '') + 'x-wrong-state' : request.state;
+        }
+        return { type: 'redirect', location: this.redirectUrl(request.redirectUri, params, outcome === 'wrong-iss') };
+    }
+    /**
+     * The user an approved request signs in: the user of login_hint, or the first user
+     *
+     * @return {String|null} user name, null if there is none
+     */
+    pickUser(request) {
+        if (request.loginHint !== undefined) {
+            return request.hintUser || null;
+        }
+        return this.userNames()[0] || null;
+    }
+    /** Sorted user names, the default user first */
+    userNames() {
+        return Object.keys(this.server.users).sort((a, b) => (a === 'testuser' ? -1 : b === 'testuser' ? 1 : a.localeCompare(b)));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Answers the form of the consent page
+     *
+     * @param {URLSearchParams} form Form fields: request, action (allow, deny, outcome), user, remember, outcome, description
+     * @return {Object} redirect or page
+     */
+    answerConsent(form) {
+        this.prune();
+        const id = form.get('request') || '';
+        const request = this.pending.get(id);
+        if (!request) {
+            return this.errorPage('This sign-in is no longer open', 'It was answered already, it expired after 10 minutes, or the server was reset or restarted. Start the sign-in again from the client.');
+        }
+        const action = form.get('action');
+        const user = form.get('user') || '';
+        if (action !== 'allow' && action !== 'deny' && action !== 'outcome') {
+            return this.errorPage('Unknown action', 'The form sent action ' + JSON.stringify(action) + '.');
+        }
+        if (action !== 'deny' && !this.server.getUser(user)) {
+            return this.errorPage('Choose an account', 'User ' + JSON.stringify(user) + ' does not exist. Go back and pick an account.');
+        }
+        let outcome = action === 'allow' ? 'approve' : 'deny';
+        if (action === 'outcome') {
+            const value = form.get('outcome') || '';
+            const description = form.get('description') || undefined;
+            try {
+                outcome = (0, policy_js_1.checkOutcome)(value.startsWith('error:') ? { error: value.slice(6), description } : value, 'outcome', true);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                return this.errorPage('Unknown outcome', err.message);
+            }
+        }
+        this.pending.delete(id);
+        if (form.get('remember') === 'on' && (outcome === 'approve' || outcome === 'deny')) {
+            request.client.consent = outcome;
+            this.emit('remember', { client: request.client.id, consent: outcome });
+        }
+        this.emit('consent', { client: request.client.id, user: action === 'deny' ? null : user, decision: (0, policy_js_1.describeOutcome)(outcome) });
+        return this.finish(request, outcome, 'consent page', user);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Drops expired consent requests and codes, and tokens a day after they expired or ended. Until then a login with
+     * one is refused as expired or revoked, after that as unknown
+     */
+    prune() {
+        const now = this.nowMs();
+        this.tokens.forEach((record, token) => {
+            const ended = record.endedAt !== null ? record.endedAt : record.expiresAt;
+            if (ended !== null && ended + TOKEN_MEMORY <= now) {
+                this.tokens.delete(token);
+            }
+        });
+        this.pending.forEach((request, id) => request.expiresAt <= now && this.pending.delete(id));
+        // an expired code is still known for a while, so its exchange fails as expired
+        this.codes.forEach((code, id) => code.expiresAt + PENDING_TTL <= now && this.codes.delete(id));
+    }
+    issueCode(request, user) {
+        const code = randomToken();
+        this.codes.set(code, {
+            clientId: request.client.id,
+            user,
+            redirectUri: request.redirectUri,
+            redirectUriSent: request.redirectUriSent,
+            scope: request.scope,
+            challenge: request.codeChallenge,
+            method: request.codeChallengeMethod,
+            nonce: request.nonce,
+            expiresAt: this.nowMs() + this.codeTtl * 1000,
+            authTime: Math.floor(this.nowMs() / 1000),
+            grantId: randomToken(12),
+            used: false
+        });
+        return code;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Builds a redirect to the client, with `iss` (RFC 9207 section 2)
+     *
+     * @param {String} redirectUri Redirect URI, its query is kept (RFC 6749 section 3.1.2)
+     * @param {Object} params Response parameters
+     * @param {Boolean} [wrongIss] true sends another issuer, the wrong-iss fault
+     * @return {String} URL
+     */
+    redirectUrl(redirectUri, params, wrongIss = false) {
+        const url = new URL(redirectUri);
+        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
+            url.searchParams.set(key, value);
+        }
+        url.searchParams.set('iss', wrongIss ? 'https://wrong-issuer.invalid' : this.issuer);
+        return url.toString();
+    }
+    redirectError(target, error, description) {
+        const params = { error, error_description: (0, policy_js_1.errorText)(description) };
+        if (target.state !== undefined) {
+            // RFC 6749 section 4.1.2.1: REQUIRED if the request had it
+            params.state = target.state;
+        }
+        return { type: 'redirect', location: this.redirectUrl(target.redirectUri, params) };
+    }
+    errorPage(title, message, details) {
+        this.emit('authorize', { client: null, result: 'error page', description: title });
+        return { type: 'page', page: { status: 400, tone: 'error', title, message, details } };
+    }
+    clientList() {
+        return ['Registered clients:\n' + [...this.clients.values()].map(client => '  ' + client.id + ' (' + client.name + ')').join('\n')];
+    }
+    // Token endpoint
+    /**
+     * Answers a token request (RFC 6749 sections 4.1.3 and 6)
+     *
+     * @param {URLSearchParams} form Form parameters
+     * @param {String} [authorization] Authorization header
+     * @return {Promise<Object>} JSON answer
+     */
+    async token(form, authorization) {
+        this.prune();
+        const { values: p, duplicates } = readParams(form);
+        if (duplicates.length) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', duplicates.join(', ') + ' sent more than once (RFC 6749 section 3.2)');
+        }
+        const grant = p.grant_type;
+        const fault = this.takeTokenFault(grant);
+        if (fault && fault.delay) {
+            await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, fault.delay));
+        }
+        if (fault && (fault.error || fault.html || fault.status)) {
+            this.emit('token', { grant: grant || null, result: 'fault', fault: fault.id });
+            if (fault.html) {
+                return { status: fault.status || 500, body: null, htmlError: true };
+            }
+            return tokenError(fault.error || 'server_error', fault.description || 'Queued token fault ' + fault.id, fault.status || 400);
+        }
+        const auth = this.authenticateClient(p, authorization);
+        if ('status' in auth) {
+            return auth;
+        }
+        const client = auth.client;
+        let result;
+        if (!grant) {
+            result = tokenError('invalid_request', 'grant_type is missing (RFC 6749 section 4.1.3)');
+        }
+        else if (grant === 'authorization_code') {
+            result = this.exchangeCode(client, p, fault);
+        }
+        else if (grant === 'refresh_token') {
+            result = this.refresh(client, p);
+        }
+        else {
+            result = tokenError('unsupported_grant_type', 'Supported grant types: authorization_code, refresh_token');
+        }
+        const body = result.body;
+        this.emit('token', { grant: grant || null, client: client.id, result: result.status === 200 ? 'ok' : body.error, description: body.error_description });
+        return result;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Authenticates the client of a token or revocation request (RFC 6749 section 2.3)
+     *
+     * @return {Object} `{ client }` or the error answer
+     */
+    authenticateClient(p, authorization) {
+        let id = p.client_id;
+        let secret = p.client_secret;
+        const basic = /^Basic +([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)$/i.exec(authorization || '');
+        if (authorization && !basic) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', 'Only Basic authentication is supported in the Authorization header (RFC 6749 section 2.3.1)');
+        }
+        if (basic) {
+            if (secret !== undefined) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_request', 'The client used Basic authentication and client_secret, only one method is allowed (RFC 6749 section 2.3)');
+            }
+            const decoded = Buffer.from(basic[1], 'base64').toString('utf-8');
+            const colon = decoded.indexOf(':');
+            // RFC 6749 section 2.3.1: client ID and secret are form encoded before they go into the header
+            const decode = (value) => {
+                try {
+                    return decodeURIComponent(value.replace(/\+/g, ' '));
+                }
+                catch {
+                    return null;
+                }
+            };
+            const basicId = colon < 0 ? null : decode(decoded.slice(0, colon));
+            const basicSecret = colon < 0 ? null : decode(decoded.slice(colon + 1));
+            if (basicId === null || basicSecret === null) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_client', 'Malformed Basic credentials', 401, { 'WWW-Authenticate': 'Basic realm="imapkit"' });
+            }
+            if (id !== undefined && id !== basicId) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_request', 'client_id differs from the client of the Authorization header');
+            }
+            id = basicId;
+            secret = basicSecret;
+        }
+        const challenge = basic ? { 'WWW-Authenticate': 'Basic realm="imapkit"' } : undefined;
+        if (!id) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_client', 'No client authentication and no client_id (RFC 6749 section 4.1.3)', 401, challenge);
+        }
+        const client = this.clients.get(id);
+        if (!client) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_client', 'Unknown client ' + JSON.stringify(id), 401, challenge);
+        }
+        if (client.secret === null) {
+            if (secret !== undefined) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_client', 'Client ' + id + ' is a public client without a secret, leave client_secret out', 401, challenge);
+            }
+            return { client };
+        }
+        if (secret === undefined || !(0, rest_js_1.safeEqual)(secret, client.secret)) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_client', secret === undefined ? 'Client ' + id + ' is confidential, it must send its secret' : 'Wrong client secret', 401, challenge);
+        }
+        return { client };
+    }
+    exchangeCode(client, p, fault) {
+        if (!p.code) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', 'code is missing (RFC 6749 section 4.1.3)');
+        }
+        const code = this.codes.get(p.code);
+        if (!code || code.expiresAt <= this.nowMs()) {
+            if (code) {
+                this.codes.delete(p.code);
+            }
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', code ? 'The authorization code expired (' + this.codeTtl + ' seconds, RFC 6749 section 4.1.2)' : 'Unknown authorization code');
+        }
+        if (code.clientId !== client.id) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'The authorization code was issued to another client (RFC 6749 section 4.1.3)');
+        }
+        if (code.used) {
+            // RFC 6749 section 4.1.2: a second use fails, and the tokens of the first use are revoked
+            const revoked = this.revokeGrant(code.grantId);
+            this.emit('revoke', { client: client.id, user: code.user, reason: 'authorization code reused', tokens: revoked });
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'The authorization code was used already, its tokens are revoked now (RFC 6749 section 4.1.2)');
+        }
+        if (code.redirectUriSent ? p.redirect_uri !== code.redirectUri : p.redirect_uri !== undefined && p.redirect_uri !== code.redirectUri) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', (p.redirect_uri === undefined ? 'redirect_uri is missing' : 'redirect_uri differs from the authorization request') +
+                ', it must be identical (RFC 6749 section 4.1.3)');
+        }
+        const verifier = p.code_verifier;
+        if (code.challenge) {
+            if (!verifier) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'code_verifier is missing, the authorization request had a code_challenge (RFC 7636 section 4.5)');
+            }
+            if (!PKCE_VALUE.test(verifier)) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'Invalid code_verifier, it must be 43 to 128 unreserved characters (RFC 7636 section 4.1)');
+            }
+            const computed = code.method === 'S256' ? node_crypto_1.default.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url') : verifier;
+            if (!(0, rest_js_1.safeEqual)(computed, code.challenge)) {
+                return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'code_verifier does not match the code_challenge (RFC 7636 section 4.6)');
+            }
+        }
+        else if (verifier !== undefined) {
+            // RFC 9700 section 2.1.1: a code_verifier without a code_challenge is a PKCE downgrade
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'code_verifier without a code_challenge in the authorization request (RFC 9700 section 2.1.1)');
+        }
+        if (!this.server.getUser(code.user)) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'User ' + code.user + ' does not exist any more');
+        }
+        code.used = true;
+        return { status: 200, body: this.issueTokens(client, code.user, code.scope, code.grantId, { nonce: code.nonce, authTime: code.authTime, fault }) };
+    }
+    refresh(client, p) {
+        if (!p.refresh_token) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', 'refresh_token is missing (RFC 6749 section 6)');
+        }
+        const record = this.tokens.get(p.refresh_token);
+        if (!record || record.type !== 'refresh' || record.revoked) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', record && record.revoked ? 'The refresh token was revoked' : 'Unknown refresh token');
+        }
+        if (record.clientId !== client.id) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'The refresh token was issued to another client (RFC 6749 section 6)');
+        }
+        if (record.rotated) {
+            // RFC 9700 section 4.14.2: reuse of a rotated refresh token revokes the grant
+            const revoked = this.revokeGrant(record.grantId);
+            this.emit('revoke', { client: client.id, user: record.user, reason: 'rotated refresh token reused', tokens: revoked });
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'This refresh token was replaced by rotation, using it again revoked the grant (RFC 9700 section 4.14.2)');
+        }
+        if (!this.server.getUser(record.user)) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_grant', 'User ' + record.user + ' does not exist any more');
+        }
+        let scope = record.scope;
+        if (p.scope) {
+            const requested = [...new Set(p.scope.split(' ').filter(Boolean))];
+            const extra = requested.filter(token => !record.scope.includes(token));
+            if (extra.length || !requested.length) {
+                // RFC 6749 section 6: no scope beyond the original grant
+                return tokenError('invalid_scope', 'Scope beyond the original grant: ' + (extra.join(' ') || p.scope) + ' (RFC 6749 section 6)');
+            }
+            scope = requested;
+        }
+        const body = this.issueTokens(client, record.user, scope, record.grantId, { refresh: record });
+        return { status: 200, body };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Issues an access token, and a refresh token and an ID token when the grant calls for them
+     *
+     * @return {Object} token response (RFC 6749 section 5.1)
+     */
+    issueTokens(client, user, scope, grantId, extra) {
+        const now = this.nowMs();
+        const accessToken = randomToken();
+        this.tokens.set(accessToken, {
+            token: accessToken,
+            type: 'access',
+            clientId: client.id,
+            user,
+            scope,
+            grantId,
+            expiresAt: now + this.accessTokenTtl * 1000,
+            revoked: false,
+            rotated: false,
+            endedAt: null
+        });
+        const body = { access_token: accessToken, token_type: 'Bearer', expires_in: this.accessTokenTtl, scope: scope.join(' ') };
+        if (extra.refresh) {
+            if (this.options.rotateRefreshTokens) {
+                this.endToken(extra.refresh, 'rotated');
+                body.refresh_token = this.newRefreshToken(client, user, extra.refresh.scope, grantId);
+            }
+        }
+        else if (this.options.refreshTokens === 'always' || scope.includes('offline_access')) {
+            // OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 11: offline_access asks for a refresh token
+            body.refresh_token = this.newRefreshToken(client, user, scope, grantId);
+        }
+        if (!extra.refresh && scope.includes('openid')) {
+            body.id_token = this.idToken(client, user, scope, extra.nonce, extra.authTime, extra.fault ? extra.fault.claims : undefined);
+        }
+        return body;
+    }
+    newRefreshToken(client, user, scope, grantId) {
+        const token = randomToken();
+        this.tokens.set(token, {
+            token,
+            type: 'refresh',
+            clientId: client.id,
+            user,
+            scope,
+            grantId,
+            expiresAt: null,
+            revoked: false,
+            rotated: false,
+            endedAt: null
+        });
+        return token;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Signs an ID token (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 2). The user name is the email address
+     *
+     * @return {String} JWT
+     */
+    idToken(client, user, scope, nonce, authTime, changes) {
+        const iat = Math.floor(this.nowMs() / 1000);
+        const claims = Object.assign({ iss: this.issuer, sub: user, aud: client.id, azp: client.id, iat, exp: iat + this.accessTokenTtl, auth_time: authTime || iat }, nonce === undefined ? {} : { nonce }, this.userClaims(user, scope));
+        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(changes || {})) {
+            if (value === null) {
+                delete claims[key];
+            }
+            else {
+                claims[key] = value;
+            }
+        }
+        return (0, jwt_js_1.signJwt)(this.key || (0, jwt_js_1.defaultSigningKey)(), claims);
+    }
+    /** The claims of the email and profile scopes */
+    userClaims(user, scope) {
+        const claims = {};
+        if (scope.includes('email')) {
+            claims.email = user;
+            claims.email_verified = true;
+        }
+        const data = this.server.getUser(user);
+        if (scope.includes('profile') && data && typeof data.displayName === 'string' && data.displayName) {
+            claims.name = data.displayName;
+        }
+        return claims;
+    }
+    /** The public key of the ID tokens (RFC 7517) */
+    jwks() {
+        return { keys: [(this.key || (0, jwt_js_1.defaultSigningKey)()).jwk] };
+    }
+    takeTokenFault(grant) {
+        const fault = this.tokenFaults.find(item => item.grant === undefined || item.grant === grant);
+        if (!fault) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        if (--fault.remaining <= 0) {
+            this.tokenFaults.splice(this.tokenFaults.indexOf(fault), 1);
+        }
+        return fault;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Revokes every token of a grant
+     *
+     * @return {Number} how many tokens were revoked
+     */
+    revokeGrant(grantId) {
+        let count = 0;
+        this.tokens.forEach(record => {
+            if (record.grantId === grantId && !record.revoked) {
+                this.endToken(record, 'revoked');
+                count++;
+            }
+        });
+        return count;
+    }
+    // Revocation and userinfo
+    /**
+     * Answers a revocation request (RFC 7009 section 2)
+     *
+     * @return {Object} JSON answer
+     */
+    revoke(form, authorization) {
+        const { values: p, duplicates } = readParams(form);
+        if (duplicates.length) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', duplicates.join(', ') + ' sent more than once');
+        }
+        const auth = this.authenticateClient(p, authorization);
+        if ('status' in auth) {
+            return auth;
+        }
+        if (!p.token) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', 'token is missing (RFC 7009 section 2.1)');
+        }
+        const record = this.tokens.get(p.token);
+        if (!record) {
+            // RFC 7009 section 2.2: an invalid token is not an error
+            return { status: 200, body: {} };
+        }
+        if (record.clientId !== auth.client.id) {
+            return tokenError('invalid_request', 'The token was issued to another client (RFC 7009 section 2.1)');
+        }
+        // RFC 7009 section 2.1: revoking a refresh token SHOULD also revoke the access tokens of the grant
+        const count = record.type === 'refresh' ? this.revokeGrant(record.grantId) : Number(!record.revoked);
+        this.endToken(record, 'revoked');
+        this.emit('revoke', { client: auth.client.id, user: record.user, reason: record.type + ' token revoked by the client', tokens: count });
+        return { status: 200, body: {} };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Answers a UserInfo request (OpenID Connect Core 1.0 section 5.3)
+     *
+     * @param {String} [authorization] Authorization header with the access token
+     * @return {Object} JSON answer
+     */
+    userinfo(authorization) {
+        const bearer = /^Bearer +([A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*)$/i.exec(authorization || '');
+        const challenge = (error, description, status) => ({
+            status,
+            body: { error, error_description: description },
+            // RFC 6750 section 3
+            headers: { 'WWW-Authenticate': 'Bearer' + (error ? ' error="' + error + '", error_description="' + description + '"' : '') }
+        });
+        if (!bearer) {
+            return challenge('invalid_request', 'Send the access token as Authorization: Bearer <token> (RFC 6750 section 2.1)', 401);
+        }
+        const record = this.tokens.get(bearer[1]);
+        const reason = this.tokenProblem(record);
+        if (reason || !record) {
+            return challenge('invalid_token', 'The access token is ' + (reason || 'unknown'), 401);
+        }
+        if (!record.scope.includes('openid')) {
+            return challenge('insufficient_scope', 'The access token has no openid scope', 403);
+        }
+        return { status: 200, body: Object.assign({ sub: record.user }, this.userClaims(record.user, record.scope)) };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Why an access token can not be used
+     *
+     * @return {String|null} "expired", "revoked" ..., null for a usable token
+     */
+    tokenProblem(record) {
+        if (!record || record.type !== 'access') {
+            return record ? 'a refresh token, not an access token' : 'unknown';
+        }
+        if (record.revoked) {
+            return 'revoked';
+        }
+        if (record.expiresAt !== null && record.expiresAt <= this.nowMs()) {
+            return 'expired';
+        }
+        if (!this.server.getUser(record.user)) {
+            return 'for a user that does not exist any more';
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Checks an access token for an IMAP or SMTP login
+     *
+     * @param {String} token Access token
+     * @param {String} [username] The user the client logs in as, any if not set
+     * @param {String} via "imap" or "smtp", for the event
+     * @return {Object|null} `{ user }` or `{ error, reason }`, null for a token the provider did not issue
+     */
+    verifyAccessToken(token, username, via) {
+        const record = this.tokens.get(token);
+        if (!record || record.type !== 'access') {
+            return null;
+        }
+        let result;
+        const problem = this.tokenProblem(record);
+        if (problem) {
+            result = { error: 'invalid_token', reason: 'the access token is ' + problem };
+        }
+        else if (username !== undefined && username !== record.user) {
+            result = { error: 'invalid_token', reason: 'the access token is for ' + record.user + ', not ' + username };
+        }
+        else if (!record.scope.includes(this.mailScope)) {
+            result = { error: 'insufficient_scope', reason: 'the access token has no ' + this.mailScope + ' scope' };
+        }
+        else {
+            result = { user: record.user };
+        }
+        this.emit('access', {
+            via,
+            client: record.clientId,
+            user: record.user,
+            result: 'user' in result ? 'ok' : result.error,
+            reason: 'user' in result ? null : result.reason
+        });
+        return result;
+    }
+    /** The discovery document (OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 section 3, RFC 8414 section 2) */
+    metadata() {
+        const authMethods = ['none', 'client_secret_basic', 'client_secret_post'];
+        return {
+            issuer: this.issuer,
+            authorization_endpoint: this.issuer + '/authorize',
+            token_endpoint: this.issuer + '/token',
+            userinfo_endpoint: this.issuer + '/userinfo',
+            jwks_uri: this.issuer + '/jwks',
+            revocation_endpoint: this.issuer + '/revoke',
+            scopes_supported: Object.keys(this.scopes),
+            response_types_supported: ['code'],
+            response_modes_supported: ['query'],
+            grant_types_supported: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
+            subject_types_supported: ['public'],
+            id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['RS256'],
+            token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: authMethods,
+            revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: authMethods,
+            code_challenge_methods_supported: this.options.allowPlainPkce ? ['S256', 'plain'] : ['S256'],
+            claims_supported: ['iss', 'sub', 'aud', 'azp', 'exp', 'iat', 'auth_time', 'nonce', 'email', 'email_verified', 'name'],
+            prompt_values_supported: PROMPT_VALUES,
+            authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true,
+            request_parameter_supported: false,
+            request_uri_parameter_supported: false
+        };
+    }
+    // Control API
+    describeClient(client) {
+        return { id: client.id, name: client.name, confidential: client.secret !== null, redirectUris: client.redirectUris.slice(), consent: client.consent };
+    }
+    describeToken(record) {
+        return {
+            type: record.type,
+            token: record.token,
+            user: record.user,
+            client: record.clientId,
+            scope: record.scope.join(' '),
+            expiresAt: record.expiresAt === null ? null : new Date(record.expiresAt).toISOString(),
+            expired: record.expiresAt !== null && record.expiresAt <= this.nowMs(),
+            revoked: record.revoked,
+            rotated: record.rotated
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Selects tokens for the control API
+     *
+     * @param {Object} [filter] `{ user, client, token, type }`
+     * @return {Array} token records
+     */
+    findTokens(filter) {
+        const f = filter || {};
+        optionalStrings(f, ['user', 'client', 'token']);
+        if (f.type !== undefined && f.type !== 'access' && f.type !== 'refresh') {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('type must be "access" or "refresh"', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        return [...this.tokens.values()].filter(record => (f.user === undefined || record.user === f.user) &&
+            (f.client === undefined || record.clientId === f.client) &&
+            (f.token === undefined || record.token === f.token) &&
+            (f.type === undefined || record.type === f.type));
+    }
+    queueDecision(options) {
+        const o = options || {};
+        const decision = (0, policy_js_1.checkOutcome)(o.decision, 'decision', true);
+        optionalStrings(o, ['client', 'user']);
+        const id = ++this.queueCounter;
+        this.decisions.push({ id, decision, client: o.client, user: o.user, remaining: countOption(o.count) });
+        return { id };
+    }
+    queueTokenFault(options) {
+        const o = options || {};
+        const { grant, error, status, html, delay, claims } = o;
+        optionalStrings(o, ['description']);
+        if (grant !== undefined && grant !== 'authorization_code' && grant !== 'refresh_token') {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('grant must be "authorization_code" or "refresh_token"', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        if (error !== undefined && !(0, policy_js_1.isErrorCode)(error)) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('error must be an OAuth error code', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        if (status !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(status) || status < 400 || status > 599)) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('status must be an HTTP error status, 400 to 599', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        if (delay !== undefined && (typeof delay !== 'number' || !(delay >= 0) || delay > 600000)) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('delay must be milliseconds, at most 600000', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        if (claims !== undefined && (!claims || typeof claims !== 'object' || Array.isArray(claims))) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('claims must be an object, null values remove claims', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        if (error === undefined && !html && status === undefined && delay === undefined && claims === undefined) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('A token fault needs error, status, html, delay or claims', 'INVALID');
+        }
+        const id = ++this.queueCounter;
+        this.tokenFaults.push({
+            id,
+            grant: grant,
+            error: error,
+            description: o.description,
+            status: status,
+            html: !!html,
+            delay: delay || 0,
+            claims: claims,
+            remaining: countOption(o.count)
+        });
+        return { id };
+    }
+    listClients() {
+        return [...this.clients.values()].map(client => this.describeClient(client));
+    }
+    setClient(id, options) {
+        const client = makeClient(id, options);
+        this.clients.set(client.id, client);
+        return this.describeClient(client);
+    }
+    deleteClient(id) {
+        if (!this.clients.delete(id)) {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('OAuth client ' + JSON.stringify(id) + ' does not exist', 'NONEXISTENT');
+        }
+    }
+    setConsent(consent) {
+        this.consent = (0, policy_js_1.checkOutcome)(consent, 'consent');
+        return { consent: this.consent };
+    }
+    listTokens(filter) {
+        return this.findTokens(filter).map(record => this.describeToken(record));
+    }
+    expireTokens(filter) {
+        const records = this.findTokens(Object.assign({}, filter, { type: 'access' })).filter(record => !this.tokenProblem(record));
+        const now = this.nowMs();
+        records.forEach(record => (record.expiresAt = now));
+        return { expired: records.length };
+    }
+    revokeTokens(filter) {
+        const records = this.findTokens(filter).filter(record => !record.revoked);
+        records.forEach(record => this.endToken(record, 'revoked'));
+        if (records.length) {
+            this.emit('revoke', { reason: 'control API', tokens: records.length });
+        }
+        return { revoked: records.length };
+    }
+    info() {
+        return {
+            issuer: this.issuer,
+            discovery: this.issuer ? this.discoveryUrl() : null,
+            consent: this.consent,
+            mailScope: this.mailScope,
+            scopes: Object.keys(this.scopes),
+            clients: this.listClients(),
+            decisions: this.decisions.map(item => Object.assign({}, item)),
+            tokenFaults: this.tokenFaults.map(item => Object.assign({}, item))
+        };
+    }
+    /** Adds the control operations and their REST routes, see README "Control API" */
+    registerControl() {
+        const control = this.server.control;
+        const created = (body) => ({ status: 201, body });
+        const deleted = () => ({ deleted: true });
+        const tokenFilter = (query) => {
+            const filter = {};
+            for (const key of ['user', 'client', 'type']) {
+                const value = query.get(key);
+                if (value !== null) {
+                    filter[key] = value;
+                }
+            }
+            return filter;
+        };
+        // name, operation, then the REST route: method, path, summary and how a request calls the operation
+        const operations = [
+            ['getOAuthInfo', () => this.info(), 'GET', '/v1/oauth', 'OAuth provider: issuer, default consent, clients, queues', () => control.getOAuthInfo()],
+            [
+                'listOAuthClients',
+                () => this.listClients(),
+                'GET',
+                '/v1/oauth/clients',
+                'Registered OAuth clients, without secrets',
+                () => control.listOAuthClients()
+            ],
+            [
+                'setOAuthClient',
+                (id, options) => this.setClient(id, options),
+                'PUT',
+                '/v1/oauth/clients/{id}',
+                'Registers or replaces an OAuth client ({ name, secret, redirectUris, consent })',
+                ({ params, body }) => control.setOAuthClient(params.id, body)
+            ],
+            [
+                'deleteOAuthClient',
+                (id) => this.deleteClient(id),
+                'DELETE',
+                '/v1/oauth/clients/{id}',
+                'Removes an OAuth client',
+                ({ params }) => (control.deleteOAuthClient(params.id), deleted())
+            ],
+            [
+                'setOAuthConsent',
+                (consent) => this.setConsent(consent),
+                'PUT',
+                '/v1/oauth/consent',
+                'Sets the default consent policy ({ consent }: prompt, approve, deny or { error, description })',
+                ({ body }) => control.setOAuthConsent(body.consent)
+            ],
+            [
+                'queueOAuthDecision',
+                (options) => this.queueDecision(options),
+                'POST',
+                '/v1/oauth/decisions',
+                'Queues the decision of the next sign-ins ({ decision, client, user, count })',
+                ({ body }) => created(control.queueOAuthDecision(body))
+            ],
+            [
+                'listOAuthDecisions',
+                () => this.decisions.map(item => Object.assign({}, item)),
+                'GET',
+                '/v1/oauth/decisions',
+                'Queued sign-in decisions',
+                () => control.listOAuthDecisions()
+            ],
+            [
+                'clearOAuthDecisions',
+                () => void (this.decisions = []),
+                'DELETE',
+                '/v1/oauth/decisions',
+                'Removes the queued sign-in decisions',
+                () => (control.clearOAuthDecisions(), deleted())
+            ],
+            [
+                'queueOAuthTokenFault',
+                (options) => this.queueTokenFault(options),
+                'POST',
+                '/v1/oauth/token-faults',
+                'Queues a fault of the token endpoint ({ grant, error, description, status, html, delay, claims, count })',
+                ({ body }) => created(control.queueOAuthTokenFault(body))
+            ],
+            [
+                'clearOAuthTokenFaults',
+                () => void (this.tokenFaults = []),
+                'DELETE',
+                '/v1/oauth/token-faults',
+                'Removes the queued token endpoint faults',
+                () => (control.clearOAuthTokenFaults(), deleted())
+            ],
+            [
+                'listOAuthTokens',
+                (filter) => this.listTokens(filter),
+                'GET',
+                '/v1/oauth/tokens',
+                'Issued tokens (?user=&client=&type=access|refresh to choose)',
+                ({ query }) => control.listOAuthTokens(tokenFilter(query))
+            ],
+            [
+                'expireOAuthTokens',
+                (filter) => this.expireTokens(filter),
+                'POST',
+                '/v1/oauth/tokens/expire',
+                'Lets access tokens expire now ({ user, client, token })',
+                ({ body }) => control.expireOAuthTokens(body)
+            ],
+            [
+                'revokeOAuthTokens',
+                (filter) => this.revokeTokens(filter),
+                'POST',
+                '/v1/oauth/tokens/revoke',
+                'Revokes access and refresh tokens ({ user, client, token, type })',
+                ({ body }) => control.revokeOAuthTokens(body)
+            ]
+        ];
+        for (const [name, fn, method, path, summary, handler] of operations) {
+            control.register(name, fn, [{ method, path, summary, handler }]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+exports.OAuthProvider = OAuthProvider;
+/**
+ * Checks that the listed keys of an object are strings when they are set
+ *
+ * @param {Object} object Options
+ * @param {Array} keys Keys to check
+ * @throws {ImapKitError} INVALID for a value that is not a string
+ */
+function optionalStrings(object, keys) {
+    for (const key of keys) {
+        if (object[key] !== undefined && typeof object[key] !== 'string') {
+            throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError(key + ' must be a string', 'INVALID');
+        }
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Reads the count of a queued item
+ *
+ * @param {*} value Count, 1 if not set
+ * @return {Number} count
+ */
+function countOption(value) {
+    if (value === undefined) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (!Number.isInteger(value) || value < 1) {
+        throw new store_operations_js_1.ImapKitError('count must be a positive integer', 'INVALID');
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+/**
+ * An error answer of the token endpoint (RFC 6749 section 5.2)
+ *
+ * @return {Object} JSON answer
+ */
+function tokenError(error, description, status = 400, headers) {
+    return { status, body: { error, error_description: (0, policy_js_1.errorText)(description) }, headers };
+}