imapflow 2.4.0 → 2.4.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +14 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +126 -55
- package/dist/cjs/package-info.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/cjs/package-info.js +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/package-info.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/package-info.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## [2.4.2](https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/compare/v2.4.1...v2.4.2) (2026-10-14)
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### Bug Fixes
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* **deps:** update libmime to 5.4.8 and mailsplit to 5.4.21 ([8eafb46](https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/commit/8eafb46f858893670dda1be115899b8b761391ab))
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## [2.4.1](https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/compare/v2.4.0...v2.4.1) (2026-10-14)
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### Bug Fixes
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* **download:** bump libbase64 to decode padded base64 parts in linear memory ([1c83261](https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/commit/1c832614dda83160de1387f08e7592add65e2779))
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## [2.4.0](https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/compare/v2.3.0...v2.4.0) (2026-10-10)
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package/SECURITY.md
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# Security Policy
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ImapFlow is a Node.js IMAP client library. It opens TLS
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IMAP servers, sends account credentials, and parses untrusted
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from
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ImapFlow is a Node.js IMAP client library. It opens TLS and cleartext
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connections to IMAP servers, sends account credentials, and parses untrusted
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protocol responses from servers that may be malicious or buggy. We welcome
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responsible reports of vulnerabilities that present a credible security risk to
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users. Please distinguish security vulnerabilities from ordinary bugs, unusual
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edge cases, and hardening suggestions.
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## Supported Versions
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Security fixes are released only against the latest version. We do not
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patches to older
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supported way to receive security updates.
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Security fixes are released only against the latest major version. We do not
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backport patches to older majors, so upgrading to the current release line is
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the supported way to receive security updates.
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| Version | Supported |
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| 2.x | :white_check_mark: |
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| < 2.0 | :x: |
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If you are on an older
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If you are on an older major, please upgrade. See the release notes at
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<https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/releases> before updating.
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## What Qualifies as a Security Vulnerability
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A security report should identify a realistic way for an attacker to cross a
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security boundary in a supported version of ImapFlow. Unexpected behavior, a
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failing test, or a technically correct proof of concept is not sufficient on its
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own to establish security impact.
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In particular, explain:
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- **Attacker capabilities:** Who is the attacker, and what inputs, systems, or
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responses can they control _without_ already having the privileges or secrets
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they are trying to gain?
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- **Attack path:** How does attacker-controlled input reach the affected code
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through a supported public API or a realistic application integration?
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- **Prerequisites:** What configuration and user actions are required? If the
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attack depends on unusual options or deliberately malformed input, explain why
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those conditions could arise in a real application.
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- **Impact:** What confidentiality, integrity, or availability boundary is
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crossed, and what can the attacker achieve as a result?
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A vulnerability involving an optional or less common feature can still qualify
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if these conditions are met. Conversely, the existence of a defensive check in
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the code does not, by itself, establish that every bypass of that check has a
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realistic security impact.
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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**
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pull requests, or discussions
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**Do not disclose suspected exploitable vulnerabilities through public GitHub
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issues, pull requests, or discussions before coordinating with the
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maintainers.**
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Report privately through one of the following channels:
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1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)
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1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred):**
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<https://github.com/postalsys/imapflow/security/advisories/new>.
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2. **Email:** **andris@postalsys.com**, as listed in
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[`SECURITY.txt`](SECURITY.txt). Encrypt sensitive details if possible.
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### Required Information
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Please provide enough information to evaluate both the defect and its security
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impact. Reports should include:
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1. The affected ImapFlow version or commit, Node.js version, and relevant
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configuration.
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2. A concise description of the issue and the affected public API or code path
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(for example the IMAP response stream and parser, literal and line handling,
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the TLS/STARTTLS upgrade, credential handling, the command compiler, or the
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public client API. A sample server response is often the most useful
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reproduction).
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3. A minimal, tested reproduction, including steps to run it, expected behavior,
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and observed behavior.
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4. A concrete threat model: attacker control, prerequisites, trust boundary, and
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resulting impact. Clearly distinguish what your reproduction proves from what
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you believe might be possible.
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5. An explanation of why the issue affects real deployments beyond a
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deliberately constructed test setup, where this is not obvious.
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A suggested fix is welcome but does not replace an explanation of
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exploitability. A complete real-world exploit is not always necessary, but the
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report must make a credible security impact clear.
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### Reports That May Be Treated as Ordinary Bugs
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The following generally do **not** qualify for private security handling unless
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you can demonstrate an additional, meaningful security boundary crossing:
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- Issues that require the attacker to control trusted application code,
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administrator-only configuration, or the secret they supposedly extract.
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- Problems caused solely by application-level misuse, exposed credentials, or
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insecure deployment choices outside ImapFlow's control.
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- Contrived proof-of-concept setups where the tester controls both sides of a
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request, without explaining how a separate attacker could trigger the issue.
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- Parser quirks, unexpected behavior, and bypasses of internal checks with no
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demonstrated security impact.
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- Speculative findings based only on static analysis or an automated tool's
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assessment, without a verified reproduction and credible attack scenario.
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These may still be valid bugs and may be considered through the normal issue
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tracker. Please coordinate before making any potentially exploitable details
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public. Classification as a bug does not guarantee a fix or a particular
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priority.
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### Automated and AI-Assisted Reports
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Automated analysis and AI tools are welcome as research aids, but the person
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submitting a report is responsible for verifying its claims. **Do not submit
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bulk, unverified, or speculative AI-generated findings.** Test each finding
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against a supported release and establish the actual security impact. Reports
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that do not meet the requirements above may be closed without further
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investigation or individual feedback; they can be resubmitted with stronger
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evidence.
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## Triage and Disclosure
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ImapFlow is maintained by a small team, and there is **no guaranteed response or
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resolution time**. Reports are prioritized based on demonstrated impact,
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exploitability, affected usage, and available maintenance resources.
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A private report does not automatically become a security advisory. Confirmed
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vulnerabilities may be fixed and disclosed through GitHub Security Advisories;
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other findings may be closed, deferred, or handled as ordinary bugs. Please do
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not disclose details of an unresolved, potentially exploitable issue publicly
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without coordinating with the maintainers.
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## CVEs and Credit
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We do not request or manage CVE identifiers. A report being acknowledged, a bug
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being fixed, or a pull request being merged does **not** mean that ImapFlow has
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confirmed a security vulnerability or endorsed a CVE assignment. We do not
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guarantee advisories, CVE identifiers, or public credit for reports. For
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confirmed vulnerabilities disclosed through an advisory, substantive reporters
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may be credited if they wish.
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## Scope
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In scope: the ImapFlow library source in this repository
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In scope: the ImapFlow library source in this repository: the IMAP response
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stream and token parser (including handling of hostile or malformed server
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responses, literals, line lengths, and resource
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responses, literals, line lengths, and resource bounds), the TLS and STARTTLS
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upgrade path and certificate handling, credential handling during
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authentication, the command compiler that builds outgoing IMAP commands, and the
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public client API.
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Out of scope:
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- Vulnerabilities in your own application code that uses ImapFlow.
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- Misconfiguration of your usage
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- Misconfiguration of your usage, for example disabling TLS certificate
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verification (`tls.rejectUnauthorized: false`), connecting over cleartext when
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TLS is available, or passing untrusted input directly into mailbox paths or
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command arguments without validation.
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- Vulnerabilities in the IMAP servers you connect to
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dependencies (please report those to their respective maintainers; we will
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upgrade once a fix is available).
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- Vulnerabilities in the IMAP servers you connect to.
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- Issues that require an already-compromised host or local access to the machine
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running ImapFlow.
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- Social-engineering reports
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concrete impact.
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- Social-engineering reports.
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Thank you for helping keep ImapFlow and its users safe.
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package/dist/cjs/package-info.js
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package/package.json
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"name": "imapflow",
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"version": "2.4.
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"version": "2.4.2",
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"description": "IMAP Client for Node",
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"type": "module",
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"main": "./dist/cjs/imap-flow.js",
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"eslint-config-prettier": "10.1.8",
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"globals": "17.13.0",
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"imapkit": "5.0.1",
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"prettier": "3.9.
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"prettier": "3.9.10",
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"tsx": "4.23.15",
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"types-node-legacy": "npm:@types/node@20.0.0",
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"typescript": "6.0.3",
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"wrangler": "4.
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"typescript-eslint": "8.71.2",
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"wrangler": "4.151.0"
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},
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"dependencies": {
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"@zone-eu/mailsplit": "5.4.
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"@zone-eu/mailsplit": "5.4.21",
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"encoding-japanese": "2.4.0",
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"iconv-lite": "0.7.3",
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"libbase64": "1.3.
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"libmime": "5.4.
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"libbase64": "1.3.3",
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"libmime": "5.4.8",
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"libqp": "2.1.2",
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"pino": "10.3.1",
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"socks": "2.8.10"
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