igv 3.8.1 → 3.8.2

package/dist/igv.js

@@ -10612,7 +10612,7 @@
        return 1 === unique.length
    }
 
-   /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.7 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.7/LICENSE */
+   /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.10 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.10/LICENSE */
 
    function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
      (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
@@ -10941,6 +10941,13 @@
    );
    const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
    const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
+   // Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
+   // Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
+   // unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
+   const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
+   const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
+   const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
+   const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
 
    /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */
    // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
@@ -10953,7 +10960,7 @@
      // Deprecated
      entityNode: 6,
      // Deprecated
-     progressingInstruction: 7,
+     processingInstruction: 7,
      comment: 8,
      document: 9,
      documentType: 10,
@@ -11014,10 +11021,25 @@
        uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
      };
    };
+   /**
+    * Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
+    * cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
+    * options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
+    * the fallback set otherwise.
+    *
+    * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
+    * @param key the configuration property to read
+    * @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
+    * @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
+    * @returns the resolved set
+    */
+   const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
+     return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
+   };
    function createDOMPurify() {
      let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
      const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-     DOMPurify.version = '3.4.7';
+     DOMPurify.version = '3.4.10';
      DOMPurify.removed = [];
      if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
        // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -11062,6 +11084,54 @@
      }
      let trustedTypesPolicy;
      let emptyHTML = '';
+     // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
+     // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
+     // on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
+     // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
+     let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+     let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
+     // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
+     // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
+     // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
+     // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
+     // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
+     // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
+     // the same unbounded recursion.
+     let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
+     const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+       if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
+         throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
+       }
+     };
+     const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
+       _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+       IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+       try {
+         return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
+       } finally {
+         IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+       }
+     };
+     const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
+       _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+       IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+       try {
+         return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
+       } finally {
+         IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+       }
+     };
+     // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
+     // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
+     // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
+     // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
+     const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+       if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
+         defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+         defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
+       }
+       return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+     };
      const _document = document,
        implementation = _document.implementation,
        createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
@@ -11200,7 +11270,17 @@
      let USE_PROFILES = {};
      /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
      let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
-     const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
+     const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
+     // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
+     // the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
+     // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
+     // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
+     // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
+     // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
+     // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
+     // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
+     // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
+     'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
      /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
      let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
      const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
@@ -11216,8 +11296,10 @@
      /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
      let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
      const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
-     let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
-     let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);
+     const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
+     let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
+     const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
+     let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
      // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
      // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
      // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
@@ -11259,14 +11341,32 @@
        // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
        transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
        /* Set configuration parameters */
-       ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
-       ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
-       ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
-       URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
-       DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
-       FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
-       FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
-       FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
+       ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
+         transform: stringToString
+       });
+       URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc,
+         base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
+       });
+       DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc,
+         base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
+       });
+       FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
        USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
        ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
        ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
@@ -11285,8 +11385,8 @@
        IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
        IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
        NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
-       MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']); // Default built-in map
-       HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']); // Default built-in map
+       MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
+       HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
        const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
        CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
        if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
@@ -11298,6 +11398,7 @@
        if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
        }
+       seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
          ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
        }
@@ -11381,6 +11482,13 @@
          addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
          delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
        }
+       // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
+       // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
+       // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
+       // after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
+       // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
+       // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
+       // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
        if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
          if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
            throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
@@ -11388,18 +11496,45 @@
          if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
            throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
          }
-         // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
+         // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
+         const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
          trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-         // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
-         emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+         // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
+         // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
+         // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
+         // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
+         try {
+           emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
+         } catch (error) {
+           trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
+           throw error;
+         }
+       } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
+         // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
+         // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
+         // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
+         // policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
+         // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
+         // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
+         // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+         trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
+         emptyHTML = '';
        } else {
-         // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
+         // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
+         // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
+         // calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
+         // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
+         // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
+         // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
          if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
-           trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+           trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
          }
-         // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
-         if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-           emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+         // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
+         // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
+         // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
+         // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
+         if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
+           emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
          }
        }
        /*
@@ -11429,6 +11564,77 @@
       * correctly. */
      const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
      const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
+       // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+       // it should be killed.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'svg';
+       }
+       // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
+       // if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
+       // text integration point.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
+       }
+       // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
+       // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
+       return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
+       // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+       // it should be killed.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'math';
+       }
+       // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
+       // <math> and HTML integration points
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
+       }
+       // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
+       // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
+       return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
+       // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
+       // is via MathML text integration points
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
+       // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
+       return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
      /**
       * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
       * @returns Return false if the element has a
@@ -11451,51 +11657,13 @@
          return false;
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
-         // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-         // it should be killed.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'svg';
-         }
-         // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
-         // svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
-         // text integration points.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
-         }
-         // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
-         // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
-         return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
-         // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-         // it should be killed.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'math';
-         }
-         // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
-         // <math> and HTML integration points
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
-         }
-         // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
-         // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
-         return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
-         // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
-         // is via MathML text integration points
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-           return false;
-         }
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-           return false;
-         }
-         // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
-         // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
-         return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
        if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
@@ -11520,7 +11688,74 @@
          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
          getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
        } catch (_) {
+         /* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
+            (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
+            .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
+            "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
+            payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
+            the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
+            throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
+            rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
+            Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
+            on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
+            (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
+            neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
+            intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
+            getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
+            to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
+                   This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
+            in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
+            catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
          remove(node);
+         if (!getParentNode(node)) {
+           throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
+         }
+       }
+     };
+     /**
+      * _neutralizeRoot
+      *
+      * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
+      * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
+      * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
+      * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
+      * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
+      * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
+      * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
+      * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
+      * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
+      * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
+      *
+      * @param root the in-place root to empty
+      */
+     const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
+       const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
+       if (childNodes) {
+         const snapshot = [];
+         arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
+           arrayPush(snapshot, child);
+         });
+         arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
+           try {
+             remove(child);
+           } catch (_) {
+             /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
+           }
+         });
+       }
+       const attributes = getAttributes(root);
+       if (attributes) {
+         for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+           const attribute = attributes[i];
+           const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+           if (typeof name === 'string') {
+             try {
+               root.removeAttribute(name);
+             } catch (_) {
+               /* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
+             }
+           }
+         }
        }
      };
      /**
@@ -11555,6 +11790,72 @@
          }
        }
      };
+     /**
+      * _stripDisallowedAttributes
+      *
+      * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
+      * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
+      * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
+      * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
+      *
+      * @param element the element to strip
+      */
+     const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
+       const attributes = getAttributes(element);
+       if (!attributes) {
+         return;
+       }
+       for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+         const attribute = attributes[i];
+         const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+         if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
+           continue;
+         }
+         try {
+           element.removeAttribute(name);
+         } catch (_) {
+           /* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
+         }
+       }
+     };
+     /**
+      * _neutralizeSubtree
+      *
+      * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
+      * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
+      * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
+      * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
+      * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
+      * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
+      * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
+      * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
+      * the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
+      * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
+      * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
+      * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
+      * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
+      * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
+      * irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
+      * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
+      *
+      * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
+      */
+     const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
+       const stack = [root];
+       while (stack.length > 0) {
+         const node = stack.pop();
+         const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+         if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+           _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
+         }
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+         if (childNodes) {
+           for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             stack.push(childNodes[i]);
+           }
+         }
+       }
+     };
      /**
       * _initDocument
       *
@@ -11576,7 +11877,7 @@
          // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
          dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
        }
-       const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+       const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
        /*
         * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
         * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -11616,6 +11917,20 @@
        // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
        NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
      };
+     /**
+      * Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
+      * literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
+      * sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
+      *
+      * @param value the string to scrub
+      * @returns the scrubbed string
+      */
+     const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
+       value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       return value;
+     };
      /**
       * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
       * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
@@ -11635,20 +11950,28 @@
       *
       * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
       */
-     const _scrubTemplateExpressions = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+     const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+       var _node$querySelectorAl;
        node.normalize();
        const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
        // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
        NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
        let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
        while (currentNode) {
-         let data = currentNode.data;
-         arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
-           data = stringReplace(data, expr, ' ');
-         });
-         currentNode.data = data;
+         currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
          currentNode = walker.nextNode();
        }
+       // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
+       // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
+       // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
+       const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
+       if (templates) {
+         arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
+             _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
+           }
+         });
+       }
      };
      /**
       * _isClobbered
@@ -11744,67 +12067,64 @@
        }
      };
      function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
+       if (hooks.length === 0) {
+         return;
+       }
        arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
          hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
        });
      }
      /**
-      * _sanitizeElements
+      * Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
+      * allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
+      * processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
+      * the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
       *
-      * @protect nodeName
-      * @protect textContent
-      * @protect removeChild
-      * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
-      * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
+      * @param currentNode the node to inspect
+      * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+      * @return true if the node must be removed
       */
-     const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
-       let content = null;
-       /* Execute a hook if present */
-       _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
-       /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
-       if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
-         return true;
-       }
-       /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-       const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
-       /* Execute a hook if present */
-       _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
-         tagName,
-         allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
-       });
+     const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
        /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
-       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.textContent)) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
+       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
          return true;
        }
        /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
        if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
        /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
-       if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
+       if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
          return true;
        }
        /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
-       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.data)) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
+       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
          return true;
        }
-       /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
-       if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
-         /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
-         if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
-           if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
-             return false;
-           }
-           if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
-             return false;
-           }
+       return false;
+     };
+     /**
+      * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
+      * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
+      * early - namespace/fallback checks and the afterSanitizeElements
+      * hook are intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else
+      * hoist content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
+      *
+      * @param currentNode the disallowed node
+      * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+      * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
+      */
+     const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+       /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
+       if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
+         if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
+           return false;
          }
-         /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
+         if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
+           return false;
+         }
+       }
+       /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
             Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
             had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
             fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
@@ -11812,20 +12132,72 @@
             path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
             ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
             parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
-         if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-           const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
-           const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
-           if (childNodes && parentNode) {
-             const childCount = childNodes.length;
-             for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-               const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
-               parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
-             }
+       if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
+         const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
+         if (childNodes && parentNode) {
+           const childCount = childNodes.length;
+           /* In-place: hoist the *original* children so the iterator visits
+                and sanitises them through the same allowlist pass as every other
+                node. The caller built the tree in the live document, so the
+                originals carry already-queued resource events (`<img onerror>`,
+                `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …); cloning would leave
+                those originals detached but still armed, firing in page scope
+                while the returned tree looked clean. Moving is safe in-place: the
+                root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never the node
+                being removed, which keeps `parentNode` inside the iterator root
+                and the relocated child inside the serialised tree.
+                         Otherwise (string / DOM-copy paths): clone. The iterator is rooted
+                at — and the result serialised from — `body`, so a restrictive
+                ALLOWED_TAGS that removes `body` itself must leave its content in
+                place, which only cloning does; and those paths parse into an
+                inert document, so their discarded originals never had a queued
+                event to neutralise.
+                         `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
+                valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
+                the list intact). */
+           for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             const hoisted = IN_PLACE ? childNodes[i] : cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
+             parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
            }
          }
+       }
+       _forceRemove(currentNode);
+       return true;
+     };
+     /**
+      * _sanitizeElements
+      *
+      * @protect nodeName
+      * @protect textContent
+      * @protect removeChild
+      * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
+      * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
+      */
+     const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
+       /* Execute a hook if present */
+       _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
+       /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
+       if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
+         _forceRemove(currentNode);
+         return true;
+       }
+       /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
+       const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
+       /* Execute a hook if present */
+       _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
+         tagName,
+         allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
+       });
+       /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
+       if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
          _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
+       /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
+       if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
+         return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName);
+       }
        /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
           nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
@@ -11838,17 +12210,14 @@
          return true;
        }
        /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
-       if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
+       if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
          _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
        /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
          /* Get the element's text content */
-         content = currentNode.textContent;
-         arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
-           content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
-         });
+         const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
          if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
            arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
              element: currentNode.cloneNode()
@@ -11883,7 +12252,7 @@
            (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
            XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
            We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
-       if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
+       if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted) {
          if (
          // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
          // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
@@ -11915,6 +12284,63 @@
      const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
        return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
      };
+     /**
+      * Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
+      * the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
+      * unchanged (no TT support yet, see
+      * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
+      *
+      * @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
+      * @param lcName lowercase attribute name
+      * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+      * @param value the attribute value to wrap
+      * @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
+      */
+     const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
+       if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
+         switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
+           case 'TrustedHTML':
+             {
+               return _createTrustedHTML(value);
+             }
+           case 'TrustedScriptURL':
+             {
+               return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
+             }
+         }
+       }
+       return value;
+     };
+     /**
+      * Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
+      * success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
+      * remove the element when found; otherwise pop the removal entry
+      * recorded by the earlier _removeAttribute (long-standing pairing
+      * with the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS path - do not "fix" casually). On
+      * failure, remove the attribute instead.
+      *
+      * @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
+      * @param name the attribute name as present on the element
+      * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+      * @param value the new attribute value
+      */
+     const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
+       try {
+         if (namespaceURI) {
+           currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
+         } else {
+           /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
+           currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
+         }
+         if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
+           _forceRemove(currentNode);
+         } else {
+           arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
+         }
+       } catch (_) {
+         _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+       }
+     };
      /**
       * _sanitizeAttributes
       *
@@ -11941,6 +12367,7 @@
          forceKeepAttr: undefined
        };
        let l = attributes.length;
+       const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
        /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
        while (l--) {
          const attr = attributes[l];
@@ -11978,7 +12405,7 @@
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
-         /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
+         /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
          if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
            continue;
          }
@@ -11988,56 +12415,24 @@
            continue;
          }
          /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
-         if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
+         if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
          /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
          if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-           arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
-             value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
-           });
+           value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
          }
          /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
-         const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
          if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
          /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
-         if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function') {
-           if (namespaceURI) ; else {
-             switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
-               case 'TrustedHTML':
-                 {
-                   value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
-                   break;
-                 }
-               case 'TrustedScriptURL':
-                 {
-                   value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);
-                   break;
-                 }
-             }
-           }
-         }
+         value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
          /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
          if (value !== initValue) {
-           try {
-             if (namespaceURI) {
-               currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
-             } else {
-               /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
-               currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
-             }
-             if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-               _forceRemove(currentNode);
-             } else {
-               arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
-             }
-           } catch (_) {
-             _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
-           }
+           _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
          }
        }
        /* Execute a hook if present */
@@ -12079,9 +12474,9 @@
             iterator also surfaces. */
          const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
          if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-           const innerSr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode) : shadowNode.shadowRoot;
+           const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
            if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
-             _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(innerSr);
+             _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
              _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
            }
          }
@@ -12108,46 +12503,81 @@
       *
       * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
       */
-     const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2 = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
-       const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(root) : root.nodeType;
-       if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-         const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : root.shadowRoot;
-         // Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType-based
-         // detection rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is
-         // realm-bound and silently skipped shadow roots whose host element
-         // belonged to a foreign realm (e.g. iframe.contentDocument
-         // attachShadow). A foreign-realm ShadowRoot extends the foreign
-         // realm's DocumentFragment, not ours, so the old instanceof check
-         // returned false and the shadow subtree was never walked.
-         if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
-           // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
-           // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
-           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
-           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
+     const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
+       /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
+          impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
+          built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
+          call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
+          throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
+          sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
+          campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
+               Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
+          `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
+          form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
+          nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
+          sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
+          desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
+          the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
+          previous recursion exactly. */
+       const stack = [{
+         node: root,
+         shadow: null
+       }];
+       while (stack.length > 0) {
+         const item = stack.pop();
+         /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
+         if (item.shadow) {
+           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
+           continue;
          }
-       }
-       // Snapshot children before recursing. Sanitization of one subtree
-       // (e.g. via an uponSanitizeShadowNode hook) may detach siblings,
-       // and naive nextSibling traversal would silently skip the rest of
-       // the list once a node is detached.
-       const childNodes = getChildNodes ? getChildNodes(root) : root.childNodes;
-       if (!childNodes) {
-         return;
-       }
-       const snapshot = [];
-       arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
-         arrayPush(snapshot, child);
-       });
-       for (const child of snapshot) {
-         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(child);
-       }
-       /* When the root is a <template>, also descend into root.content */
-       if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
-         const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(root) : null;
-         if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
-           const content = root.content;
-           if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
-             _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(content);
+         const node = item.node;
+         const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+         const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
+         /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
+            the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
+            hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+         if (childNodes) {
+           for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             stack.push({
+               node: childNodes[i],
+               shadow: null
+             });
+           }
+         }
+         /* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
+            "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
+            descend into its content. */
+         if (isElement) {
+           const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
+           if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
+             const content = node.content;
+             if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
+               stack.push({
+                 node: content,
+                 shadow: null
+               });
+             }
+           }
+         }
+         /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
+            Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+            rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
+            silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
+            iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
+         if (isElement) {
+           const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
+             /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
+                walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
+                before this one is sanitised. */
+             stack.push({
+               node: null,
+               shadow: sr
+             }, {
+               node: sr,
+               shadow: null
+             });
            }
          }
        }
@@ -12183,11 +12613,14 @@
        }
        /* Clean up removed elements */
        DOMPurify.removed = [];
-       /* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */
-       if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
-         IN_PLACE = false;
-       }
-       if (IN_PLACE) {
+       /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
+          Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
+          where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
+          disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
+          sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
+          keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
+       const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
+       if (inPlace) {
          /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
             Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
             child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
@@ -12214,8 +12647,16 @@
            throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
          }
          /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
-            The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. */
-         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(dirty);
+            The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
+            barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
+            inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
+            which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
+         try {
+           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
+         } catch (error) {
+           _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+           throw error;
+         }
        } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
          /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
             elements being stripped by the parser */
@@ -12235,13 +12676,13 @@
             descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
             cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
             cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
-         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(importedNode);
+         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(importedNode);
        } else {
          /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
          if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
          dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-           return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+           return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
          }
          /* Initialize the document to work on */
          body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -12255,32 +12696,59 @@
          _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
        }
        /* Get node iterator */
-       const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
-       /* Now start iterating over the created document */
-       while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
-         /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-         _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
-         /* Check attributes next */
-         _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-         /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
-            Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
-            instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
-            walked correctly. */
-         if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
-           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
+       const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(inPlace ? dirty : body);
+       /* Now start iterating over the created document.
+          The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
+          engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
+          `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
+          barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
+          unvisited tail still armed. On any throw we fail closed — strip the
+          in-place root bare — then rethrow so the existing throw contract is
+          preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial body, so the
+          propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
+       try {
+         while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
+           /* Sanitize tags and elements */
+           _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
+           /* Check attributes next */
+           _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
+           /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
+              Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+              instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
+              walked correctly. */
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
+             _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
+           }
+         }
+       } catch (error) {
+         if (inPlace) {
+           _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
          }
+         throw error;
        }
        /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
-       if (IN_PLACE) {
+       if (inPlace) {
+         /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
+            the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
+            resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
+            move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
+            non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
+            mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
+            cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
+         arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
+           if (entry.element) {
+             _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
+           }
+         });
          if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-           _scrubTemplateExpressions(dirty);
+           _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
          }
          return dirty;
        }
        /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
        if (RETURN_DOM) {
          if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-           _scrubTemplateExpressions(body);
+           _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
          }
          if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
            returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
@@ -12310,11 +12778,9 @@
        }
        /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-         arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
-           serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
-         });
+         serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
        }
-       return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+       return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
      };
      DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
        let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
@@ -12324,6 +12790,12 @@
      DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
        CONFIG = null;
        SET_CONFIG = false;
+       // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
+       // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
+       // never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
+       // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+       trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+       emptyHTML = '';
      };
      DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
        /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
@@ -76662,6 +77134,9 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
                    indexURL: r.getAttribute("index"),
                    order: idx
                };
+               if (r.hasAttribute("format")) {
+                   config.format = r.getAttribute("format");
+               }
                resourceMap.set(config.url, config);
                if (!hasTrackElements) {
                    tracks.push(config);
@@ -76749,6 +77224,13 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
 
        config.name = track.getAttribute("name");
 
+       if(track.hasAttribute("type")) {
+            config.type = track.getAttribute("type");
+       }
+       if(track.hasAttribute("format")) {
+           config.format = track.getAttribute("format");
+       }
+
        const color = track.getAttribute("color");
        if (color) {
            config.color = "rgb(" + color + ")";
@@ -77060,7 +77542,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
        })
    }
 
-   const _version = "3.8.1";
+   const _version = "3.8.2";
    function version() {
        return _version
    }