igv 3.8.0 → 3.8.2

package/dist/igv.js

@@ -10612,24 +10612,65 @@
        return 1 === unique.length
    }
 
-   /*! @license DOMPurify 3.3.3 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.3.3/LICENSE */
+   /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.10 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.10/LICENSE */
 
-   const {
-     entries,
-     setPrototypeOf,
-     isFrozen,
-     getPrototypeOf,
-     getOwnPropertyDescriptor
-   } = Object;
-   let {
-     freeze,
-     seal,
-     create
-   } = Object; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
-   let {
-     apply,
-     construct
-   } = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect;
+   function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
+     (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
+     for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
+     return n;
+   }
+   function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
+     if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
+   }
+   function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
+     var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
+     if (null != t) {
+       var e,
+         n,
+         i,
+         u,
+         a = [],
+         f = true,
+         o = false;
+       try {
+         if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
+       } catch (r) {
+         o = true, n = r;
+       } finally {
+         try {
+           if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
+         } finally {
+           if (o) throw n;
+         }
+       }
+       return a;
+     }
+   }
+   function _nonIterableRest() {
+     throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
+   }
+   function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
+     return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
+   }
+   function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
+     if (r) {
+       if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
+       var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
+       return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
+     }
+   }
+
+   const entries = Object.entries,
+     setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
+     isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
+     getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
+     getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+   let freeze = Object.freeze,
+     seal = Object.seal,
+     create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
+   let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
+     apply = _ref.apply,
+     construct = _ref.construct;
    if (!freeze) {
      freeze = function freeze(x) {
        return x;
@@ -10661,13 +10702,19 @@
    const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
    const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
    const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
+   const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
    const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
    const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
    const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
    const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
    const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
    const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
+   const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
+   const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
+   const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
+   const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
    const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
+   const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
    const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
    const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
    /**
@@ -10717,6 +10764,9 @@
        // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
        setPrototypeOf(set, null);
      }
+     if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
+       return set;
+     }
      let l = array.length;
      while (l--) {
        let element = array[l];
@@ -10757,10 +10807,13 @@
     */
    function clone(object) {
      const newObject = create(null);
-     for (const [property, value] of entries(object)) {
+     for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
+       var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
+       const property = _ref3[0];
+       const value = _ref3[1];
        const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
        if (isPropertyExist) {
-         if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+         if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
            newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
          } else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
            newObject[property] = clone(value);
@@ -10771,6 +10824,58 @@
      }
      return newObject;
    }
+   /**
+    * Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
+    *
+    * @param value - The value to stringify.
+    * @returns A string representation of the provided value.
+    */
+   function stringifyValue(value) {
+     switch (typeof value) {
+       case 'string':
+         {
+           return value;
+         }
+       case 'number':
+         {
+           return numberToString(value);
+         }
+       case 'boolean':
+         {
+           return booleanToString(value);
+         }
+       case 'bigint':
+         {
+           return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
+         }
+       case 'symbol':
+         {
+           return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
+         }
+       case 'undefined':
+         {
+           return objectToString(value);
+         }
+       case 'function':
+       case 'object':
+         {
+           if (value === null) {
+             return objectToString(value);
+           }
+           const valueAsRecord = value;
+           const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
+           if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
+             const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
+             return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
+           }
+           return objectToString(value);
+         }
+       default:
+         {
+           return objectToString(value);
+         }
+     }
+   }
    /**
     * This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
     *
@@ -10796,6 +10901,14 @@
      }
      return fallbackValue;
    }
+   function isRegex(value) {
+     try {
+       regExpTest(value, '');
+       return true;
+     } catch (_unused) {
+       return false;
+     }
+   }
 
    const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
    const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
@@ -10811,15 +10924,14 @@
    const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
    const text = freeze(['#text']);
 
-   const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns', 'slot']);
+   const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
    const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
-   const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnsalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lspace', 'lquote', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
+   const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
    const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
 
-   // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/better-regex
-   const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/\{\{[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*\}\}/gm); // Specify template detection regex for SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES mode
-   const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*%>/gm);
-   const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\$\{[\w\W]*/gm); // eslint-disable-line unicorn/better-regex
+   const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
+   const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
+   const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
    const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
    const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
    const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
@@ -10829,20 +10941,13 @@
    );
    const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
    const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
-
-   var EXPRESSIONS = /*#__PURE__*/Object.freeze({
-     __proto__: null,
-     ARIA_ATTR: ARIA_ATTR,
-     ATTR_WHITESPACE: ATTR_WHITESPACE,
-     CUSTOM_ELEMENT: CUSTOM_ELEMENT,
-     DATA_ATTR: DATA_ATTR,
-     DOCTYPE_NAME: DOCTYPE_NAME,
-     ERB_EXPR: ERB_EXPR,
-     IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI,
-     IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA: IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
-     MUSTACHE_EXPR: MUSTACHE_EXPR,
-     TMPLIT_EXPR: TMPLIT_EXPR
-   });
+   // Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
+   // Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
+   // unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
+   const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
+   const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
+   const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
+   const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
 
    /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */
    // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
@@ -10855,7 +10960,7 @@
      // Deprecated
      entityNode: 6,
      // Deprecated
-     progressingInstruction: 7,
+     processingInstruction: 7,
      comment: 8,
      document: 9,
      documentType: 10,
@@ -10916,10 +11021,25 @@
        uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
      };
    };
+   /**
+    * Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
+    * cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
+    * options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
+    * the fallback set otherwise.
+    *
+    * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
+    * @param key the configuration property to read
+    * @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
+    * @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
+    * @returns the resolved set
+    */
+   const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
+     return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
+   };
    function createDOMPurify() {
      let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
      const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-     DOMPurify.version = '3.3.3';
+     DOMPurify.version = '3.4.10';
      DOMPurify.removed = [];
      if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
        // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -10927,28 +11047,29 @@
        DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
        return DOMPurify;
      }
-     let {
-       document
-     } = window;
+     let document = window.document;
      const originalDocument = document;
      const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
-     const {
-       DocumentFragment,
-       HTMLTemplateElement,
-       Node,
-       Element,
-       NodeFilter,
-       NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap,
-       HTMLFormElement,
-       DOMParser,
-       trustedTypes
-     } = window;
+     window.DocumentFragment;
+       const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
+       Node = window.Node,
+       Element = window.Element,
+       NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
+       _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
+       _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
+       window.HTMLFormElement;
+       const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
+       trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
      const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
      const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
      const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
      const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
      const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
      const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
+     const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
+     const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
+     const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
+     const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
      // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
      // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
      // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -10963,33 +11084,74 @@
      }
      let trustedTypesPolicy;
      let emptyHTML = '';
-     const {
-       implementation,
-       createNodeIterator,
-       createDocumentFragment,
-       getElementsByTagName
-     } = document;
-     const {
-       importNode
-     } = originalDocument;
+     // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
+     // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
+     // on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
+     // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
+     let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+     let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
+     // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
+     // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
+     // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
+     // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
+     // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
+     // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
+     // the same unbounded recursion.
+     let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
+     const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+       if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
+         throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
+       }
+     };
+     const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
+       _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+       IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+       try {
+         return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
+       } finally {
+         IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+       }
+     };
+     const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
+       _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+       IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+       try {
+         return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
+       } finally {
+         IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+       }
+     };
+     // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
+     // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
+     // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
+     // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
+     const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+       if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
+         defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+         defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
+       }
+       return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+     };
+     const _document = document,
+       implementation = _document.implementation,
+       createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
+       createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
+       getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
+     const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
      let hooks = _createHooksMap();
      /**
       * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
       */
      DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
-     const {
-       MUSTACHE_EXPR,
-       ERB_EXPR,
-       TMPLIT_EXPR,
-       DATA_ATTR,
-       ARIA_ATTR,
-       IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
-       ATTR_WHITESPACE,
-       CUSTOM_ELEMENT
-     } = EXPRESSIONS;
-     let {
-       IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI$1
-     } = EXPRESSIONS;
+     const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
+       ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
+       TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
+       DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
+       ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
+       IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
+       ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
+       CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
+     let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
      /**
       * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
       * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
@@ -11108,7 +11270,17 @@
      let USE_PROFILES = {};
      /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
      let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
-     const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
+     const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
+     // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
+     // the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
+     // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
+     // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
+     // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
+     // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
+     // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
+     // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
+     // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
+     'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
      /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
      let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
      const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
@@ -11124,8 +11296,10 @@
      /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
      let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
      const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
-     let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
-     let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);
+     const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
+     let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
+     const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
+     let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
      // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
      // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
      // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
@@ -11167,15 +11341,33 @@
        // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
        transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
        /* Set configuration parameters */
-       ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
-       ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
-       ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
-       URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
-       DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
-       FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
-       FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
-       FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
-       USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
+       ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
+         transform: stringToString
+       });
+       URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc,
+         base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
+       });
+       DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc,
+         base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
+       });
+       FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
+         transform: transformCaseFunc
+       });
+       USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
        ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
        ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
        ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
@@ -11191,20 +11383,22 @@
        SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
        KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
        IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
-       IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || IS_ALLOWED_URI;
-       NAMESPACE = cfg.NAMESPACE || HTML_NAMESPACE;
-       MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
-       HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS || HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
-       CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};
-       if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck)) {
-         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck;
-       }
-       if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck)) {
-         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck;
-       }
-       if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
-         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements;
-       }
+       IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
+       NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
+       MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
+       HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
+       const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
+       CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
+         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
+       }
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
+         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
+       }
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
+         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
+       }
+       seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
          ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
        }
@@ -11235,44 +11429,41 @@
            addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
          }
        }
-       /* Prevent function-based ADD_ATTR / ADD_TAGS from leaking across calls */
-       if (!objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
-         EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
-       }
-       if (!objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
-         EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
-       }
+       /* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
+        * leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
+       EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
+       EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
        /* Merge configuration parameters */
-       if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
          if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
            EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
-         } else {
+         } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
            if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
              ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
            }
            addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
          }
        }
-       if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
          if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
            EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
-         } else {
+         } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
            if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
              ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
            }
            addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
          }
        }
-       if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
          addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
        }
-       if (cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) {
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
          if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
            FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
          }
          addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
        }
-       if (cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
+       if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
          if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
            FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
          }
@@ -11291,6 +11482,13 @@
          addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
          delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
        }
+       // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
+       // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
+       // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
+       // after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
+       // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
+       // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
+       // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
        if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
          if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
            throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
@@ -11298,20 +11496,62 @@
          if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
            throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
          }
-         // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
+         // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
+         const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
          trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-         // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
-         emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+         // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
+         // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
+         // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
+         // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
+         try {
+           emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
+         } catch (error) {
+           trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
+           throw error;
+         }
+       } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
+         // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
+         // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
+         // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
+         // policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
+         // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
+         // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
+         // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+         trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
+         emptyHTML = '';
        } else {
-         // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
+         // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
+         // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
+         // calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
+         // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
+         // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
+         // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
          if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
-           trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+           trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
          }
-         // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
-         if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-           emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+         // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
+         // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
+         // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
+         // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
+         if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
+           emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
          }
        }
+       /*
+        * Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
+        * cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
+        * registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
+        * clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
+        * still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
+        * call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
+        * the top of this function.
+        */
+       if ((hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) && ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
+         ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
+       }
+       if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 && ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
+         ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
+       }
        // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
        // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
        if (freeze) {
@@ -11324,6 +11564,77 @@
       * correctly. */
      const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
      const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
+       // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+       // it should be killed.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'svg';
+       }
+       // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
+       // if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
+       // text integration point.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
+       }
+       // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
+       // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
+       return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
+       // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+       // it should be killed.
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'math';
+       }
+       // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
+       // <math> and HTML integration points
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
+         return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
+       }
+       // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
+       // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
+       return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
+     /**
+      * Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
+      *
+      * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+      * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+      * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+      * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+      */
+     const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+       // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
+       // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
+       // is via MathML text integration points
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
+       // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
+       return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+     };
      /**
       * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
       * @returns Return false if the element has a
@@ -11346,51 +11657,13 @@
          return false;
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
-         // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-         // it should be killed.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'svg';
-         }
-         // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
-         // svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
-         // text integration points.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
-         }
-         // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
-         // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
-         return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
-         // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-         // it should be killed.
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'math';
-         }
-         // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
-         // <math> and HTML integration points
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-           return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
-         }
-         // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
-         // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
-         return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-         // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
-         // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
-         // is via MathML text integration points
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-           return false;
-         }
-         if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-           return false;
-         }
-         // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
-         // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
-         return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+         return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
        }
        // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
        if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
@@ -11415,7 +11688,74 @@
          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
          getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
        } catch (_) {
+         /* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
+            (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
+            .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
+            "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
+            payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
+            the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
+            throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
+            rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
+            Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
+            on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
+            (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
+            neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
+            intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
+            getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
+            to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
+                   This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
+            in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
+            catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
          remove(node);
+         if (!getParentNode(node)) {
+           throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
+         }
+       }
+     };
+     /**
+      * _neutralizeRoot
+      *
+      * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
+      * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
+      * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
+      * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
+      * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
+      * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
+      * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
+      * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
+      * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
+      * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
+      *
+      * @param root the in-place root to empty
+      */
+     const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
+       const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
+       if (childNodes) {
+         const snapshot = [];
+         arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
+           arrayPush(snapshot, child);
+         });
+         arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
+           try {
+             remove(child);
+           } catch (_) {
+             /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
+           }
+         });
+       }
+       const attributes = getAttributes(root);
+       if (attributes) {
+         for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+           const attribute = attributes[i];
+           const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+           if (typeof name === 'string') {
+             try {
+               root.removeAttribute(name);
+             } catch (_) {
+               /* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
+             }
+           }
+         }
        }
      };
      /**
@@ -11450,6 +11790,72 @@
          }
        }
      };
+     /**
+      * _stripDisallowedAttributes
+      *
+      * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
+      * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
+      * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
+      * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
+      *
+      * @param element the element to strip
+      */
+     const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
+       const attributes = getAttributes(element);
+       if (!attributes) {
+         return;
+       }
+       for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+         const attribute = attributes[i];
+         const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+         if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
+           continue;
+         }
+         try {
+           element.removeAttribute(name);
+         } catch (_) {
+           /* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
+         }
+       }
+     };
+     /**
+      * _neutralizeSubtree
+      *
+      * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
+      * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
+      * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
+      * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
+      * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
+      * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
+      * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
+      * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
+      * the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
+      * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
+      * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
+      * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
+      * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
+      * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
+      * irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
+      * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
+      *
+      * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
+      */
+     const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
+       const stack = [root];
+       while (stack.length > 0) {
+         const node = stack.pop();
+         const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+         if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+           _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
+         }
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+         if (childNodes) {
+           for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             stack.push(childNodes[i]);
+           }
+         }
+       }
+     };
      /**
       * _initDocument
       *
@@ -11471,7 +11877,7 @@
          // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
          dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
        }
-       const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+       const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
        /*
         * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
         * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -11511,29 +11917,254 @@
        // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
        NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
      };
+     /**
+      * Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
+      * literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
+      * sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
+      *
+      * @param value the string to scrub
+      * @returns the scrubbed string
+      */
+     const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
+       value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
+       return value;
+     };
+     /**
+      * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
+      * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
+      * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
+      * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
+      * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
+      *
+      * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
+      * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
+      * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
+      * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
+      * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
+      * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
+      *
+      * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
+      * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
+      *
+      * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
+      */
+     const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+       var _node$querySelectorAl;
+       node.normalize();
+       const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
+       // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
+       NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
+       let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+       while (currentNode) {
+         currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
+         currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+       }
+       // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
+       // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
+       // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
+       const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
+       if (templates) {
+         arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
+             _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
+           }
+         });
+       }
+     };
      /**
       * _isClobbered
       *
+      * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
+      * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
+      * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
+      * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
+      * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
+      *
       * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
       * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
       */
      const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
-       return element instanceof HTMLFormElement && (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function');
+       // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
+       // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
+       // (the caller's other defences still apply).
+       const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
+       if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
+         return false;
+       }
+       if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
+         return false;
+       }
+       return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
+       // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
+       // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
+       // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
+       // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
+       // canonical NamedNodeMap.
+       element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
+       // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
+       // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
+       // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
+       // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
+       // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
+       // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
+       // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
+       element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
+       // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
+       // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
+       // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
+       // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
+       // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
+       // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
+       // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
+       // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
+       // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
+       // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
+       // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
+       element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
      };
      /**
-      * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node.
+      * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
+      *
+      * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
+      * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
+      * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
+      * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
+      *
+      * @param value object to check
+      * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
+      */
+     const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
+       if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       try {
+         return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
+       } catch (_) {
+         return false;
+       }
+     };
+     /**
+      * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
+      * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
+      * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
+      * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
+      * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
+      * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
       *
       * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
-      * @return true is object is a DOM node
+      * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
       */
      const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
-       return typeof Node === 'function' && value instanceof Node;
+       if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+         return false;
+       }
+       try {
+         return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
+       } catch (_) {
+         return false;
+       }
      };
      function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
+       if (hooks.length === 0) {
+         return;
+       }
        arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
          hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
        });
      }
+     /**
+      * Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
+      * allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
+      * processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
+      * the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
+      *
+      * @param currentNode the node to inspect
+      * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+      * @return true if the node must be removed
+      */
+     const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+       /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
+       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
+         return true;
+       }
+       /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
+       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
+         return true;
+       }
+       /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
+       if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
+         return true;
+       }
+       /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
+       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
+         return true;
+       }
+       return false;
+     };
+     /**
+      * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
+      * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
+      * early - namespace/fallback checks and the afterSanitizeElements
+      * hook are intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else
+      * hoist content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
+      *
+      * @param currentNode the disallowed node
+      * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+      * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
+      */
+     const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+       /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
+       if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
+         if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
+           return false;
+         }
+         if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
+           return false;
+         }
+       }
+       /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
+            Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
+            had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
+            fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
+            value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
+            path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
+            ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
+            parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
+       if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
+         const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
+         if (childNodes && parentNode) {
+           const childCount = childNodes.length;
+           /* In-place: hoist the *original* children so the iterator visits
+                and sanitises them through the same allowlist pass as every other
+                node. The caller built the tree in the live document, so the
+                originals carry already-queued resource events (`<img onerror>`,
+                `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …); cloning would leave
+                those originals detached but still armed, firing in page scope
+                while the returned tree looked clean. Moving is safe in-place: the
+                root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never the node
+                being removed, which keeps `parentNode` inside the iterator root
+                and the relocated child inside the serialised tree.
+                         Otherwise (string / DOM-copy paths): clone. The iterator is rooted
+                at — and the result serialised from — `body`, so a restrictive
+                ALLOWED_TAGS that removes `body` itself must leave its content in
+                place, which only cloning does; and those paths parse into an
+                inert document, so their discarded originals never had a queued
+                event to neutralise.
+                         `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
+                valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
+                the list intact). */
+           for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             const hoisted = IN_PLACE ? childNodes[i] : cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
+             parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
+           }
+         }
+       }
+       _forceRemove(currentNode);
+       return true;
+     };
      /**
       * _sanitizeElements
       *
@@ -11544,7 +12175,6 @@
       * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
       */
      const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
-       let content = null;
        /* Execute a hook if present */
        _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
        /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
@@ -11553,71 +12183,41 @@
          return true;
        }
        /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-       const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
+       const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
        /* Execute a hook if present */
        _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
          tagName,
          allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
        });
-       /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
-       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.textContent)) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
-         return true;
-       }
-       /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
-       if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
-         return true;
-       }
-       /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
-       if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.data)) {
+       /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
+       if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
          _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
        /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
-       if (!(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])) {
-         /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
-         if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
-           if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
-             return false;
-           }
-           if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
-             return false;
-           }
-         }
-         /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
-         if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-           const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
-           const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
-           if (childNodes && parentNode) {
-             const childCount = childNodes.length;
-             for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-               const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
-               childClone.__removalCount = (currentNode.__removalCount || 0) + 1;
-               parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
-             }
-           }
-         }
-         _forceRemove(currentNode);
-         return true;
-       }
-       /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
-       if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
+       if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
+         return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName);
+       }
+       /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
+          Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
+          nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
+          bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
+          realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
+          slip past the namespace check entirely. */
+       const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
+       if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
          _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
        /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
-       if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
+       if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
          _forceRemove(currentNode);
          return true;
        }
        /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
          /* Get the element's text content */
-         content = currentNode.textContent;
-         arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-           content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
-         });
+         const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
          if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
            arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
              element: currentNode.cloneNode()
@@ -11647,11 +12247,12 @@
        if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
          return false;
        }
+       const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
        /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
            (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
            XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
            We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
-       if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ; else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
+       if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted) {
          if (
          // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
          // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
@@ -11663,11 +12264,15 @@
            return false;
          }
          /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
-       } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if (value) {
+       } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
          return false;
        } else ;
        return true;
      };
+     /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
+      * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
+      * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
+     const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
      /**
       * _isBasicCustomElement
       * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
@@ -11677,7 +12282,64 @@
       * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
       */
      const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
-       return tagName !== 'annotation-xml' && stringMatch(tagName, CUSTOM_ELEMENT);
+       return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
+     };
+     /**
+      * Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
+      * the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
+      * unchanged (no TT support yet, see
+      * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
+      *
+      * @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
+      * @param lcName lowercase attribute name
+      * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+      * @param value the attribute value to wrap
+      * @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
+      */
+     const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
+       if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
+         switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
+           case 'TrustedHTML':
+             {
+               return _createTrustedHTML(value);
+             }
+           case 'TrustedScriptURL':
+             {
+               return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
+             }
+         }
+       }
+       return value;
+     };
+     /**
+      * Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
+      * success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
+      * remove the element when found; otherwise pop the removal entry
+      * recorded by the earlier _removeAttribute (long-standing pairing
+      * with the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS path - do not "fix" casually). On
+      * failure, remove the attribute instead.
+      *
+      * @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
+      * @param name the attribute name as present on the element
+      * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+      * @param value the new attribute value
+      */
+     const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
+       try {
+         if (namespaceURI) {
+           currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
+         } else {
+           /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
+           currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
+         }
+         if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
+           _forceRemove(currentNode);
+         } else {
+           arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
+         }
+       } catch (_) {
+         _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+       }
      };
      /**
       * _sanitizeAttributes
@@ -11692,9 +12354,7 @@
      const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
        /* Execute a hook if present */
        _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
-       const {
-         attributes
-       } = currentNode;
+       const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
        /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
        if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
          return;
@@ -11707,14 +12367,13 @@
          forceKeepAttr: undefined
        };
        let l = attributes.length;
+       const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
        /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
        while (l--) {
          const attr = attributes[l];
-         const {
-           name,
-           namespaceURI,
-           value: attrValue
-         } = attr;
+         const name = attr.name,
+           namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
+           attrValue = attr.value;
          const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
          const initValue = attrValue;
          let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
@@ -11728,12 +12387,14 @@
          /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
           * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
           */
-         if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name')) {
+         if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
            // Remove the attribute with this value
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
            value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
          }
+         // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
+         // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
          /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
          if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
@@ -11744,7 +12405,7 @@
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
-         /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
+         /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
          if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
            continue;
          }
@@ -11754,56 +12415,24 @@
            continue;
          }
          /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
-         if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
+         if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
          /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
          if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-           arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-             value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
-           });
+           value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
          }
          /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
-         const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
          if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
            _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
            continue;
          }
          /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
-         if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function') {
-           if (namespaceURI) ; else {
-             switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
-               case 'TrustedHTML':
-                 {
-                   value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
-                   break;
-                 }
-               case 'TrustedScriptURL':
-                 {
-                   value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);
-                   break;
-                 }
-             }
-           }
-         }
+         value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
          /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
          if (value !== initValue) {
-           try {
-             if (namespaceURI) {
-               currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
-             } else {
-               /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
-               currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
-             }
-             if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-               _forceRemove(currentNode);
-             } else {
-               arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
-             }
-           } catch (_) {
-             _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
-           }
+           _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
          }
        }
        /* Execute a hook if present */
@@ -11814,7 +12443,7 @@
       *
       * @param fragment to iterate over recursively
       */
-     const _sanitizeShadowDOM = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
+     const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
        let shadowNode = null;
        const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
        /* Execute a hook if present */
@@ -11826,14 +12455,133 @@
          _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
          /* Check attributes next */
          _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
-         /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
-         if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
-           _sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);
+         /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
+            Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
+            DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
+            recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
+         if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
+           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
+         }
+         /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
+            shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
+            trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
+            previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
+            _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
+            doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
+            above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
+            Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
+            shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
+            iterator also surfaces. */
+         const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
+         if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+           const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
+             _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
+             _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
+           }
          }
        }
        /* Execute a hook if present */
        _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
      };
+     /**
+      * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
+      *
+      * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
+      * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
+      * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
+      * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
+      *
+      * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
+      *   1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
+      *   2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
+      *      shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
+      *
+      * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
+      * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
+      * untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
+      *
+      * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
+      */
+     const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
+       /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
+          impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
+          built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
+          call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
+          throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
+          sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
+          campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
+               Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
+          `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
+          form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
+          nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
+          sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
+          desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
+          the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
+          previous recursion exactly. */
+       const stack = [{
+         node: root,
+         shadow: null
+       }];
+       while (stack.length > 0) {
+         const item = stack.pop();
+         /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
+         if (item.shadow) {
+           _sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
+           continue;
+         }
+         const node = item.node;
+         const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+         const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
+         /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
+            the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
+            hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
+         const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+         if (childNodes) {
+           for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+             stack.push({
+               node: childNodes[i],
+               shadow: null
+             });
+           }
+         }
+         /* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
+            "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
+            descend into its content. */
+         if (isElement) {
+           const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
+           if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
+             const content = node.content;
+             if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
+               stack.push({
+                 node: content,
+                 shadow: null
+               });
+             }
+           }
+         }
+         /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
+            Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+            rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
+            silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
+            iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
+         if (isElement) {
+           const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
+             /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
+                walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
+                before this one is sanitised. */
+             stack.push({
+               node: null,
+               shadow: sr
+             }, {
+               node: sr,
+               shadow: null
+             });
+           }
+         }
+       }
+     };
      // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
      DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
        let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
@@ -11850,13 +12598,9 @@
        }
        /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
        if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
-         if (typeof dirty.toString === 'function') {
-           dirty = dirty.toString();
-           if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
-             throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
-           }
-         } else {
-           throw typeErrorCreate('toString is not a function');
+         dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
+         if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
+           throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
          }
        }
        /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
@@ -11869,19 +12613,51 @@
        }
        /* Clean up removed elements */
        DOMPurify.removed = [];
-       /* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */
-       if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
-         IN_PLACE = false;
-       }
-       if (IN_PLACE) {
-         /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
-         if (dirty.nodeName) {
-           const tagName = transformCaseFunc(dirty.nodeName);
+       /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
+          Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
+          where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
+          disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
+          sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
+          keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
+       const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
+       if (inPlace) {
+         /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
+            Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
+            child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
+            the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
+            validation entirely. */
+         const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
+         if (typeof nn === 'string') {
+           const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
            if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
              throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
            }
          }
-       } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
+         /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
+            removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
+            falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
+            is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
+            then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
+            because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
+            result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
+            event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
+            the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
+            the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
+         if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
+           throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
+         }
+         /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
+            The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
+            barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
+            inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
+            which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
+         try {
+           _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
+         } catch (error) {
+           _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+           throw error;
+         }
+       } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
          /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
             elements being stripped by the parser */
          body = _initDocument('<!---->');
@@ -11895,12 +12671,18 @@
            // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
            body.appendChild(importedNode);
          }
+         /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
+            them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
+            descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
+            cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
+            cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
+         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(importedNode);
        } else {
          /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
          if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
          dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-           return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+           return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
          }
          /* Initialize the document to work on */
          body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -11914,24 +12696,60 @@
          _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
        }
        /* Get node iterator */
-       const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
-       /* Now start iterating over the created document */
-       while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
-         /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-         _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
-         /* Check attributes next */
-         _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-         /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
-         if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
-           _sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);
+       const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(inPlace ? dirty : body);
+       /* Now start iterating over the created document.
+          The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
+          engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
+          `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
+          barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
+          unvisited tail still armed. On any throw we fail closed — strip the
+          in-place root bare — then rethrow so the existing throw contract is
+          preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial body, so the
+          propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
+       try {
+         while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
+           /* Sanitize tags and elements */
+           _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
+           /* Check attributes next */
+           _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
+           /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
+              Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+              instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
+              walked correctly. */
+           if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
+             _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
+           }
          }
+       } catch (error) {
+         if (inPlace) {
+           _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+         }
+         throw error;
        }
        /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
-       if (IN_PLACE) {
+       if (inPlace) {
+         /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
+            the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
+            resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
+            move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
+            non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
+            mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
+            cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
+         arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
+           if (entry.element) {
+             _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
+           }
+         });
+         if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+           _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
+         }
          return dirty;
        }
        /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
        if (RETURN_DOM) {
+         if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+           _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
+         }
          if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
            returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
            while (body.firstChild) {
@@ -11960,11 +12778,9 @@
        }
        /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
        if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-         arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-           serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
-         });
+         serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
        }
-       return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+       return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
      };
      DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
        let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
@@ -11974,6 +12790,12 @@
      DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
        CONFIG = null;
        SET_CONFIG = false;
+       // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
+       // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
+       // never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
+       // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+       trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+       emptyHTML = '';
      };
      DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
        /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
@@ -46232,6 +47054,7 @@
            logScale: false,
            windowFunction: 'mean',
            graphType: 'bar',
+           lineWidth: 2,
            normalize: undefined,
            scaleFactor: undefined,
            overflowColor: `rgb(255, 32, 255)`,
@@ -46283,6 +47106,8 @@
            if ("heatmap" === config.graphType && !config.height) {
                this.height = 20;
            }
+
+           this.lineWidth = config.lineWidth || WigTrack.defaults.lineWidth; // Set lineWidth from config
        }
 
        async postInit() {
@@ -46504,11 +47329,11 @@
                        const color = options.alpha ? IGVColor.addAlpha(this.getColorForFeature(f), options.alpha) : this.getColorForFeature(f);
 
                        if (this.graphType === "line") {
+                           const lineWidth = this.lineWidth;
+                           const properties = {"fillStyle": color, "strokeStyle": color, "lineWidth": lineWidth};
+
                            if (lastY !== undefined) {
-                               IGVGraphics.strokeLine(ctx, lastPixelEnd, lastY, x, y, {
-                                   "fillStyle": color,
-                                   "strokeStyle": color
-                               });
+                               IGVGraphics.strokeLine(ctx, lastPixelEnd, lastY, x, y, properties);
                            }
                            IGVGraphics.strokeLine(ctx, x, y, x + width, y, {"fillStyle": color, "strokeStyle": color});
                        } else if (this.graphType === "points") {
@@ -76309,6 +77134,9 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
                    indexURL: r.getAttribute("index"),
                    order: idx
                };
+               if (r.hasAttribute("format")) {
+                   config.format = r.getAttribute("format");
+               }
                resourceMap.set(config.url, config);
                if (!hasTrackElements) {
                    tracks.push(config);
@@ -76396,6 +77224,13 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
 
        config.name = track.getAttribute("name");
 
+       if(track.hasAttribute("type")) {
+            config.type = track.getAttribute("type");
+       }
+       if(track.hasAttribute("format")) {
+           config.format = track.getAttribute("format");
+       }
+
        const color = track.getAttribute("color");
        if (color) {
            config.color = "rgb(" + color + ")";
@@ -76707,7 +77542,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
        })
    }
 
-   const _version = "3.8.0";
+   const _version = "3.8.2";
    function version() {
        return _version
    }
@@ -78334,11 +79169,11 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
 
    }
 
-   function createRegionKey$1(chr, start, end) {
+   function createRegionKey(chr, start, end) {
        return `${chr}-${start}-${end}`
    }
 
-   function parseRegionKey$1(regionKey) {
+   function parseRegionKey(regionKey) {
        let regionParts = regionKey.split('-');
        let ee = parseInt(regionParts.pop());
        let ss = parseInt(regionParts.pop());
@@ -78368,7 +79203,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
            const dom = div({ class: 'igv-roi-table-row' });
 
            const { setName, feature } = record;
-           dom.dataset.region = createRegionKey$1(feature.chr, feature.start, feature.end);
+           dom.dataset.region = createRegionKey(feature.chr, feature.start, feature.end);
 
            let strings =
                [
@@ -78440,7 +79275,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
 
                    const loci = [];
                    for (let el of selected) {
-                       const { locus } = parseRegionKey$1(el.dataset.region);
+                       const { locus } = parseRegionKey(el.dataset.region);
                        loci.push(locus);
                    }
 
@@ -78494,7 +79329,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
            const selected = this.tableDOM.querySelectorAll('.igv-roi-table-row-selected');
 
            if (selected.length > 0 && selected.length < 2) {
-               const { locus } = parseRegionKey$1(selected[ 0 ].dataset.region);
+               const { locus } = parseRegionKey(selected[ 0 ].dataset.region);
                const { chr, start, end } = parseLocusString(locus, this.browser.isSoftclipped());
                enableButton(this.copySequenceButton, (end - start) < 1e6);
            } else {
@@ -78543,7 +79378,7 @@ ${indent}columns: ${matrix.columns}
            const selected = this.tableDOM.querySelectorAll('.igv-roi-table-row-selected');
            const loci = [];
            for (let el of selected) {
-               const { locus } = parseRegionKey$1(el.dataset.region);
+               const { locus } = parseRegionKey(el.dataset.region);
                loci.push(locus);
            }