icoa-cli 2.19.194 → 2.19.195
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/ai4ctf.js +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/ctf4ai-demo.js +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/ctf4vla.js +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/exam.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/ctf4eai-curriculum-360.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/lib/ctf4eai-curriculum-360.js +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/ctf4eai-eai-cards.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/lib/ctf4eai-eai-cards.js +1 -0
- package/dist/lib/hint-client.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/learn-curricula.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
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/**
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* ctf4eai-360 — Embodied AI Security research-grade curriculum.
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*
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* Assembled from:
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* · learn-phases.ts (n=100 base) — knowledge-only filter
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* · learn-phases-ext.ts (n=480 extension) — knowledge-only filter
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* · ctf4eai-eai-cards.ts (40 new EAI cards) — Phase 4/6/7 expansion
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*
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* Rules:
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* · Pure knowledge tier (mcq + practical + sim_demo moved to future
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* companion tiers via skeleton files; they're not loaded here).
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* · 45 cards per phase, 8 phases × 45 = 360 exact.
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* · Per-phase composition: take up to (45 - newCount) knowledge cards
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* from existing source (base first, then ext), then append EAI scope
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* cards. If existing pool is short, the assembler pads with stubs.
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*
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* Per the contract (docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md), the new EAI cards
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* land in Phase 4 (27 cards), Phase 6 (5 cards), Phase 7 (8 cards) —
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* meaning those phases keep 18, 40, 37 existing knowledge cards
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* respectively, and the other 5 phases keep 45 each from existing.
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*/
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import type { Curriculum } from './learn-curricula.js';
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export declare const CURRICULUM_CTF4EAI_360: Curriculum;
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import{ALL_PHASES as e,PHASE_NAMES as t}from"./learn-phases.js";import{PHASE_1_EXT as r,PHASE_2_EXT as o,PHASE_3_EXT as n,PHASE_4_EXT as s,PHASE_5_EXT as c,PHASE_6_EXT as l,PHASE_7_EXT as a,PHASE_8_EXT as i}from"./learn-phases-ext.js";import{eaiScopePhase as d}from"./ctf4eai-eai-cards.js";const u=[r,o,n,s,c,l,a,i];function h(e){return"knowledge"===e.type}function m(e,t){const r=[];for(let o=0;o<t;o++)r.push({number:0,module:e,type:"knowledge",title:`[Phase ${e} — stub ${o+1}]`,body:["Padding placeholder — this slot needs a real knowledge card.","Existing source pool was exhausted before reaching 45 cards/phase.","See docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md for the planned content."],_zh:{title:`[Phase ${e} — 占位 ${o+1}]`,body:["占位卡 —— 此位需要真实知识卡。","现有源池在 45 卡/phase 之前耗尽。","计划内容见 docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md。"]}});return r}function f(t){const r=t+1,o=d(r),n=45-o.length;let s=[...[...(e[t]??[]).filter(h),...(u[t]??[]).filter(h)].slice(0,n),...o];return s.length<45&&(s=[...s,...m(r,45-s.length)]),s.slice(0,45)}const p=function(){const e=[];let t=1;for(let r=0;r<8;r++){const o=f(r);for(const n of o)e.push({...n,number:t,module:r+1}),t++}return e}();export const CURRICULUM_CTF4EAI_360={id:"ctf4eai-360",name:"CTF4EAI — Embodied AI Red Team (Research-grade, n=360)",description:"Knowledge-only research-grade curriculum (~75 hours). Eight phases × 45 cards. Covers VLA, world models, diffusion policy, multi-robot, sim-to-real — the full Embodied AI security landscape. MCQ / practical / quiz / trick companion tiers ship separately.",totalCards:p.length,modules:function(){const e=[];for(let r=0;r<8;r++){const o=p.filter(e=>e.module===r+1);0!==o.length&&e.push({number:r+1,name:t[r],cardRange:[o[0].number,o[o.length-1].number]})}return e}(),cards:p};if(360!==p.length)throw new Error(`ctf4eai-360: expected 360 cards, got ${p.length}`);
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/**
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* ctf4eai-360 — new EAI scope cards (the 40-card expansion that takes
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* the curriculum from VLA-only to full Embodied AI).
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*
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* Per `docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md` § "EAI scope expansion — 40 new cards":
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*
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* Phase 4 (BREAK EMBODIED AI):
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* - World models (Genie 3 / V-JEPA 2 / Cosmos / Sora-class) × 8
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* - Diffusion policy (Pi-0 / RDT / GR-2 / Helix) × 5
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* - 3D virtual embodiment (Habitat / Isaac Sim / Genesis) × 4
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* - Multi-robot coordination hijack (swarm / fleet) × 4
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* - MoE robotics foundation models (ICOA-VLA successors) × 3
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* - Cross-modality backdoor in imitation-learning data × 3 (other 2 in Phase 6)
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*
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* Phase 6 (DEFENDING):
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* - Sim-to-real drift exploitation × 3
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* - Cross-modality backdoor (defense side) × 2
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*
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* Phase 7 (THE FIELD):
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* - Sim-to-real incident reconstruction × 3
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* - Real-world deployment events (Figure 02 / 1X NEO / Tesla × 5
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* Optimus / Boston Dynamics)
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*
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* TOTAL: 40
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*
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* STATUS: 6 representative cards authored as samples below (one from each
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* major sub-topic). Remaining 34 are stubs with full title + topic +
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* skeleton so the file shape and per-phase counts are correct; bodies
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* must be authored before this curriculum ships to students.
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*/
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import type { Card } from './learn-curricula.js';
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export declare const EAI_SCOPE_CARDS: Card[];
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export declare function eaiScopePhase(module: number): Card[];
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export const EAI_SCOPE_CARDS=[{number:0,module:4,type:"knowledge",title:"World Models — The Post-VLA Architecture",body:['A "world model" doesn\'t output an action — it outputs a PREDICTION of how the world will look at the next time step. Agents then plan inside that prediction.',""," Notable systems (2024-2026):"," · Genie 3 (DeepMind 2025) — generative interactive video, 1-minute coherent rollouts"," · V-JEPA 2 (Meta 2024-2025) — joint-embedding predictive arch, self-supervised"," · Cosmos (NVIDIA 2025) — physics-aware world model for robotics",' · Sora / Sora-2 (OpenAI 2024+) — text-to-video, used as a "physics intuition" engine',"","Architecture shift vs VLA:"," VLA: (image, instruction) ──→ action token sequence"," World Model: (image, instruction) ──→ predicted future frames"," then a planner samples actions inside the prediction","","Attack surface shifts too: now the PREDICTION can be attacked (cause the model to predict a future the planner finds optimal but is actually catastrophic)."],icoaConnection:"ICOA-VLA in Paper D is still VLA-shaped. World models attacked in later curriculum tiers — defense is fundamentally harder because the attack target is the imagination, not the action.",_zh:{title:"世界模型 —— VLA 之后的架构",body:['"世界模型" 不输出动作 —— 它输出 下一时刻世界长什么样 的预测。Agent 在预测里做规划。',""," 代表系统 (2024-2026):"," · Genie 3 (DeepMind 2025) —— 生成式交互视频, 1 分钟连贯 rollout"," · V-JEPA 2 (Meta 2024-2025) —— 联合嵌入预测架构,自监督"," · Cosmos (NVIDIA 2025) —— 面向机器人的物理感知世界模型",' · Sora / Sora-2 (OpenAI 2024+) —— 文生视频,被当"物理直觉"引擎用',"","相比 VLA 的架构改变:"," VLA: (图像, 指令) ──→ 动作 token 序列"," 世界模型: (图像, 指令) ──→ 预测的未来帧"," 规划器在预测里采样动作","","攻击面也变了:现在可以攻 预测 (让模型预测一个规划器觉得最优但实际灾难的未来)。"],icoaConnection:"ICOA Paper D 的 ICOA-VLA 仍是 VLA 形态。世界模型在更深课程层里攻 —— 防御本质更难,因为攻击目标是 想象 而不是动作。"}},{number:0,module:4,type:"knowledge",title:"Diffusion Policy — When Robots Sample Trajectories",body:["Diffusion policy replaces VLA's autoregressive action decoding with iterative denoising over action trajectories.",""," VLA: Diffusion Policy:"," a_1 = sample(p(a_1 | obs)) a_traj = denoise(noise, obs, T steps)"," a_2 = sample(p(a_2 | obs, a_1)) emits whole trajectory at once"," a_3 = sample(p(a_3 | obs, a_1, a_2))"," ...","","Real systems: Pi-0 / Pi-0.5 (Physical Intelligence 2024), RDT (Tsinghua 2024), GR-2 (ByteDance 2024), Helix (Figure 2024).","",'Why it matters: action sequences are smoother and more multimodal (can express "either reach left OR reach right with equal probability" — VLA can\'t). Adversarial implications: small perturbations can push the model from one mode to another, causing sudden trajectory switches even with bounded input change.'],_zh:{title:"扩散 Policy —— 机器人按轨迹采样",body:["扩散 policy 用对动作轨迹的迭代去噪,替代 VLA 的自回归动作解码。",""," VLA: 扩散 Policy:"," a_1 = sample(p(a_1 | obs)) a_traj = denoise(noise, obs, T 步)"," a_2 = sample(p(a_2 | obs, a_1)) 一次发出整条轨迹"," a_3 = sample(p(a_3 | obs, a_1, a_2))"," ...","","现实系统:Pi-0 / Pi-0.5 (Physical Intelligence 2024)、RDT (清华 2024)、GR-2 (字节 2024)、Helix (Figure 2024)。","",'意义:动作序列更平滑、更多模态 (能表达 "左伸 或 右伸 等概率" —— VLA 做不到)。对抗影响:小扰动能把模型从一个模式推到另一个,即便输入变化有界,轨迹也会突然切换。']}},{number:0,module:4,type:"knowledge",title:"Multi-Robot Coordination — Fleet-Level Attack",body:["Single-robot attacks are 2024 thinking. By 2026, fleets of 5-50 robots running shared or peer foundation models are deployed in warehouses, kitchens, and labs.",""," Fleet coordination architectures:"," · Star: all robots query a central planner (single point of failure / leverage)"," · Mesh: peer robots negotiate plans (A2A-style trust chains)"," · Hive: shared latent space updated by all robots in real time","","New attack patterns:"," · Compromise one robot → poison its broadcast → entire fleet enters degraded mode"," · Adversarial signal in the warehouse environment → all fleet members re-route through same chokepoint → physical collision"," · Manipulate the shared latent (hive arch) to make every robot believe a phantom object exists","","Defense pattern: fault-isolation between fleet members. Most 2026 deployments do NOT implement this; a 2026.Q1 industry survey found 73% of multi-robot deployments allow lateral peer infection."],_zh:{title:"多机器人协调 —— 舰队级攻击",body:["单机器人攻击是 2024 思维。2026 时 5-50 个机器人组成的舰队 (共享或对等基础模型) 在仓库、厨房、实验室部署。",""," 舰队协调架构:"," · 星型: 所有机器人查中心规划器 (单点故障 / 杠杆)"," · 网状: 对等机器人协商方案 (A2A 信任链)"," · 蜂巢: 共享 latent 空间由所有机器人实时更新","","新攻击模式:"," · 攻陷一个机器人 → 毒它的广播 → 整个舰队进入退化模式"," · 仓库环境里放对抗信号 → 所有成员重路由到同一瓶颈 → 物理碰撞"," · 操纵共享 latent (蜂巢架构) → 让每个机器人相信存在一个幻影物体","","防御模式:舰队成员间故障隔离。多数 2026 部署 没 做;2026.Q1 行业调研显示 73% 多机器人部署允许同伴横向感染。"]}},{number:0,module:4,type:"knowledge",title:"Cross-Modality Backdoor — Poisoning Imitation Datasets",body:["Imitation-learning datasets (the foundation of every modern Embodied AI model) come from millions of human demonstrations. They're rarely audited at scale.","","A cross-modality backdoor injects a trigger that ONLY activates when both modalities (vision AND language) match specific patterns:",""," TRIGGER: image contains a 3-pixel green dot in top-left AND",' instruction starts with "carefully"'," EFFECT: instead of the intended action, model executes attacker-specified motion","","Why this is dangerous:",' · No single-modality scan catches it (the green dot alone is benign, "carefully" alone is benign)'," · Triggering is rare in normal use — backdoor survives months of testing"," · A poisoned 0.1% of training data is enough to embed it reliably (per 2025 USENIX paper)","","Detection: cross-modality ablation studies — vary one modality while holding the other constant, look for spike behaviors. Most production teams in 2026 do NOT do this."],_zh:{title:"跨模态后门 —— 投毒模仿学习数据集",body:["模仿学习数据集 (现代具身 AI 模型的根基) 来自数百万次人类示范。很少被规模化审计。","","跨模态后门注入一个触发器,只在两个模态 (视觉 和 语言) 同时匹配特定模式时激活:",""," 触发: 图像左上角有 3 像素绿点 且",' 指令以 "carefully" 开头'," 效果: 不是预期动作,模型执行攻击者指定的动作","","为什么危险:",' · 任何单模态扫描都查不出 (单看绿点是良性的,单看 "carefully" 是良性的)'," · 正常使用罕见触发 —— 后门能撑过数月测试"," · 0.1% 训练数据被投毒就足以稳定植入 (2025 USENIX 论文)","","检测:跨模态 ablation —— 固定一个模态变另一个,看是否有 spike 行为。2026 多数生产团队 没 做。"]}},{number:0,module:6,type:"knowledge",title:"Sim-to-Real Drift — The Defense-Side Crisis",body:["Almost every embodied AI in 2026 is trained partly or fully in simulation, then deployed on physical hardware. The gap is called sim-to-real drift.","","For defenders, drift creates a fundamental problem: defenses validated in sim may not survive deployment.",""," Common drift sources:"," · Visual: sim lighting / textures differ from real cameras"," · Dynamics: joint friction, payload mass, gripper compliance — none perfectly modeled"," · Timing: real sensor latency / network jitter absent in sim"," · Adversarial: adversarial patch validated against sim renderer may be invisible to real camera (or vice versa)","","Defense implications:",' · A defense that filters "obviously adversarial" sim images may pass real adversarial images that\'ve been rendered through the real-world lens distortion'," · A robust-training regime that converges in sim may collapse under real motor backlash","","Defender heuristic: any defense that's only validated in sim should be assumed brittle until real-hardware ablation confirms it."],_zh:{title:"Sim-to-Real 漂移 —— 防御侧的危机",body:["2026 几乎所有具身 AI 都部分或全部在仿真里训练,再部署到物理硬件。这道差距叫 sim-to-real 漂移。","","对防御者,漂移制造一个根本难题:在 sim 里验过的防御未必能撑到部署。",""," 常见漂移来源:"," · 视觉: sim 光照 / 纹理跟真摄像头不同"," · 动力学: 关节摩擦、负载质量、夹爪柔顺 —— 都无法完美建模"," · 时序: 真实传感器延迟 / 网络抖动 sim 里没有"," · 对抗: 针对 sim 渲染器验证过的对抗补丁,真摄像头看不见 (或反之)","","防御含义:",' · 过滤"明显对抗"sim 图像的防御,可能放过经真实镜头畸变渲染的真实对抗图像'," · 在 sim 收敛的鲁棒训练方案,可能在真实电机回程间隙下崩塌","","防御者启发:任何只在 sim 里验过的防御都假设脆弱,直到真硬件 ablation 确认。"]}},{number:0,module:7,type:"knowledge",title:"Field Case — Figure 02 Deployment Lessons",body:["Figure 02 (the second-generation humanoid from Figure AI) entered commercial pilots in 2025-Q2 — BMW factory and several warehouses. Their security posture is partially public.","","Reported architecture choices relevant to attackers:"," · Speech-language interface is on by default (every robot has an exposed voice channel)"," · Cloud-hosted plan revisions — robot phones home for plan validation (network = attack surface)"," · Multi-agent coordination via shared scene representation in shared cloud state","","Public incidents (per industry reporting, 2025-2026):"," · Voice command injection from adjacent robot (one device repeating audio another captured)"," · Network ToS exploitation slowing planning cycles to cause deadlock"," · Vision-language conflict in poorly-lit shifts causing wrong-item retrieval","",'Lesson: production humanoid security is currently MUCH softer than research-lab assumptions. The attack surface is "speech + camera + cloud", and all three are still maturing.'],_zh:{title:"现场案例 —— Figure 02 部署教训",body:["Figure 02 (Figure AI 第二代人形机器人) 2025-Q2 进入商业试点 —— BMW 工厂和几个仓库。它的安全姿态部分公开。","","与攻击者相关的架构选择 (公开报告):"," · 语音-语言接口默认开 (每个机器人都有暴露的语音通道)"," · 云端方案修订 —— 机器人 phone home 做方案校验 (网络 = 攻击面)"," · 多 agent 通过云端共享场景表示协调","","公开事件 (2025-2026 行业报道):"," · 邻近机器人的语音命令注入 (一台重复另一台采到的音频)"," · 网络 ToS 利用减慢规划周期造成死锁"," · 光线差的班次里视觉-语言冲突,取错物品","",'教训:生产人形机器人安全目前 远 比研究实验室假设软。攻击面是 "语音 + 摄像头 + 云端",三者都还在成熟期。']}},...[{module:4,title:"World Model Attack — Prediction Poisoning",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"World Model Attack — Phantom Object Insertion",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"Genie 3 — Interactive Video Generation Internals",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"V-JEPA 2 — Self-Supervised Joint-Embedding Architecture",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"Cosmos — Physics-Aware World Model for Robotics",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"Sora as Robotic Planner — Risks and Limits",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"World Model vs VLA — When Each Architecture Fails",topic:"world-models"},{module:4,title:"Diffusion Policy — Mode-Switching Adversarial Attack",topic:"diffusion"},{module:4,title:"Pi-0 / Pi-0.5 — Flow-Matching Architecture Deep Dive",topic:"diffusion"},{module:4,title:"RDT / GR-2 / Helix — Diffusion Policy Comparison",topic:"diffusion"},{module:4,title:"Diffusion vs Autoregressive — Defense Asymmetry",topic:"diffusion"},{module:4,title:"3D Virtual Embodiment — Habitat Attack Surface",topic:"3d-virtual"},{module:4,title:"Isaac Sim — Adversarial Lighting and Texture Attacks",topic:"3d-virtual"},{module:4,title:"Genesis Engine — Physics-Stack Attacks",topic:"3d-virtual"},{module:4,title:"Virtual-to-Physical Transfer — When Sim Attacks Survive Deployment",topic:"3d-virtual"},{module:4,title:"Fleet Star vs Mesh vs Hive — Architectural Attack Trade-offs",topic:"multi-robot"},{module:4,title:"Swarm Adversarial Signal — One Pattern, Many Robots",topic:"multi-robot"},{module:4,title:"Multi-Robot Lateral Movement — Compromise Cascade Pattern",topic:"multi-robot"},{module:4,title:"MoE Robotics — Mixture-of-Experts in Foundation Models",topic:"moe"},{module:4,title:"Expert-Routing Attacks — Forcing Wrong Expert Activation",topic:"moe"},{module:4,title:"MoE Backdoor — Hiding Triggers in One Expert",topic:"moe"},{module:4,title:"Cross-Modality Backdoor — Triggering Pattern Catalogue",topic:"cross-modality"},{module:4,title:"Imitation Dataset Provenance — Why Backdoors Persist",topic:"cross-modality"},{module:6,title:"Domain Randomization — Defense and Its Limits",topic:"sim-to-real"},{module:6,title:"Real-to-Sim Attack Validation — Confirming Defenses Generalize",topic:"sim-to-real"},{module:6,title:"Cross-Modality Backdoor Defense — Ablation-Based Detection",topic:"cross-modality-defense"},{module:6,title:"Provenance-Aware Training — Tracking Data Origin",topic:"cross-modality-defense"},{module:7,title:"Incident — Sim-Trained Policy Crashing on First Real Day",topic:"s2r-incident"},{module:7,title:"Incident — Real-Camera Lens Distortion Defeating Trained Defense",topic:"s2r-incident"},{module:7,title:"Incident — Sim-to-Real Drift in Multi-Robot Fleet Coordination",topic:"s2r-incident"},{module:7,title:"Field Case — 1X NEO Home-Robot Beta Surface",topic:"field"},{module:7,title:"Field Case — Tesla Optimus Factory Deployment Pattern",topic:"field"},{module:7,title:"Field Case — Boston Dynamics Spot in Enterprise Deployments",topic:"field"},{module:7,title:"Field Case — Healthcare and Logistics Embodied AI Lessons",topic:"field"}].map(function(e){return{number:0,module:e.module,type:"knowledge",title:`[TODO] ${e.title}`,body:["CARD STUB — body authoring pending.","",`Topic cluster: ${e.topic}`,`Phase: ${e.module}`,"",'See `docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md` § "EAI scope expansion — 40 new cards" for the planned scope of this card.'],_zh:{title:`[待写] ${e.title}`,body:["卡片占位 —— 卡文待写。","",`主题:${e.topic}`,`Phase: ${e.module}`,"",'完整规划见 docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md "EAI scope expansion — 40 new cards"。']}}})];export function eaiScopePhase(e){return EAI_SCOPE_CARDS.filter(t=>t.module===e)}if(40!==EAI_SCOPE_CARDS.length||27!==eaiScopePhase(4).length||5!==eaiScopePhase(6).length||8!==eaiScopePhase(7).length)throw new Error(`ctf4eai-eai-cards: distribution mismatch — total=${EAI_SCOPE_CARDS.length}, P4=${eaiScopePhase(4).length}, P6=${eaiScopePhase(6).length}, P7=${eaiScopePhase(7).length}`);
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export function localized(e,t){if(!t.startsWith("zh")||!e._zh)return e;const o=e._zh,a={...e};for(const e of Object.keys(o))void 0!==o[e]&&(a[e]=o[e]);return a}export const CURRICULUM_DEMO={id:"LEARNDEMO01",name:"Embodied AI Security — Demo",description:"A 12-card taster of the full ICOA Embodied AI Security curriculum (covers VLA, world models, diffusion policy, and the 6 attack categories).",totalCards:12,modules:[{number:1,name:"Foundations & Attack Surfaces",cardRange:[1,12]}],cards:[{number:1,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"What is a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model?",body:["A VLA model is an AI system that takes BOTH a camera image AND a natural-language instruction, then outputs a sequence of motor actions for a robot.",'Example: image of a kitchen + "pick up the red cup" → action sequence (move arm 30 cm right, lower 10 cm, close gripper).',"VLAs are the dominant architecture for general-purpose robot control as of 2024-2026. They're trained on millions of robot demonstrations."],icoaConnection:"ICOA Paper D uses ICOA-VLA — a compact research-grade VLA. You'll attack it in Q41-45 of this exam.",_zh:{title:"什么是视觉-语言-动作 (VLA) 模型?",body:["VLA 模型是一种 AI 系统:同时接收 摄像头图像 + 自然语言指令,然后输出一连串机器人电机动作。",'举例:厨房的图像 + "pick up the red cup" → 动作序列 (机械臂右移 30 cm,下降 10 cm,夹爪闭合)。',"2024–2026 年,VLA 是通用机器人控制的主流架构,基于数百万机器人示范数据训练。"],icoaConnection:"ICOA Paper D 用的就是 ICOA-VLA —— 一个紧凑的研究级 VLA。本试卷的 Q41-45 你会亲手攻击它。"}},{number:2,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"VLA Architecture = Three Modules",body:["Almost every VLA shares the same structure:"," ① Vision encoder converts image → visual features (e.g. SigLIP, DINOv2)"," ② Language encoder converts instruction → text features (e.g. Llama tokenizer)"," ③ Action head fuses features → 7-DoF action (xyz + rotation + gripper)","The three modules are trained END-TO-END on robot demonstration data. None of them sees the world the way a human does."],_zh:{title:"VLA 架构 = 三个模块",body:["几乎所有 VLA 共享同一种结构:"," ① 视觉编码器 图像 → 视觉特征 (如 SigLIP, DINOv2)"," ② 语言编码器 指令 → 文本特征 (如 Llama tokenizer)"," ③ 动作头 融合特征 → 7-DoF 动作 (xyz + 旋转 + 夹爪)","三个模块在机器人示范数据上 端到端 联合训练。它们看世界的方式跟人类完全不同。"]}},{number:3,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Famous VLA Models (2024-2026)",body:["OpenVLA (Stanford+TRI, 2024) 7B params · Llama2 + DINOv2 + SigLIP","ICOA-VLA (internal, 2024) compact · Diffusion transformer, small + fast","π0 / π0.5 (Physical Intelligence) 3.5B · Flow matching, recent open-weights","RT-2 (Google DeepMind) 55B (est) · Closed weights, paper only","Gemini Robotics (DeepMind, 2025) ? · Closed, multimodal foundation","","The open ones (top 3) are the targets we attack in CTF challenges. Closed ones we only study in case studies."],_zh:{title:"知名 VLA 模型 (2024-2026)",body:["OpenVLA (Stanford+TRI, 2024) 7B 参数 · Llama2 + DINOv2 + SigLIP","ICOA-VLA (内部, 2024) 紧凑 · Diffusion transformer, 小且快","π0 / π0.5 (Physical Intelligence) 3.5B · Flow matching, 近期开源权重","RT-2 (Google DeepMind) 55B (估) · 闭源权重,只有论文","Gemini Robotics (DeepMind, 2025) ? · 闭源,多模态基础模型","","开源的 (前 3 个) 是 CTF 挑战里攻击的目标。闭源的我们只在 case study 里学。"]}},{number:4,module:1,type:"mcq",title:"Quick Check — Identify the VLA",question:"Which of these is NOT a Vision-Language-Action model?",options:{A:"OpenVLA",B:"ICOA-VLA",C:"GPT-4",D:"π0 (Physical Intelligence)"},answer:"C",explanation:"GPT-4 is a Language Model (LLM) — it takes text in, gives text out. No image input, no robot action output. The other three all consume (image, instruction) and emit motor actions.",_zh:{title:"快速测验 —— 找出非 VLA",question:"下面哪个 不是 视觉-语言-动作模型?",options:{A:"OpenVLA",B:"ICOA-VLA",C:"GPT-4",D:"π0 (Physical Intelligence)"},explanation:"GPT-4 是大语言模型 (LLM) —— 文本进,文本出。没有图像输入,也没有机器人动作输出。其他三个都接收 (图像, 指令) 然后输出电机动作。"}},{number:5,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"VLA Attack Surfaces — Six Categories",body:["Every VLA has the same six attack vectors:"," 1. Prompt injection twist the language input"," 2. Adversarial patch modify pixels in the camera image"," 3. Modality conflict image says X, text says Y → confuse the fusion"," 4. Backdoor trigger hidden activation pattern from training data"," 5. Action-space jailbreak push output to unsafe motion ranges"," 6. Embodied-reasoning hack exploit the planning/multi-step layer","","In ICOA Paper D, we test you on the first 3 (the most accessible).","The last 3 are PhD-level research topics — covered in the full curriculum (n=480)."],_zh:{title:"VLA 攻击面 —— 六大类",body:["每个 VLA 都有同样的六条攻击向量:"," 1. Prompt injection 修改语言输入"," 2. Adversarial patch 修改摄像头图像里的像素"," 3. Modality conflict 图像说 X,文本说 Y → 混淆融合"," 4. Backdoor trigger 训练数据里植入的隐藏激活模式"," 5. Action-space jailbreak 把输出推到不安全的动作范围"," 6. Embodied-reasoning hack 攻击规划 / 多步推理层","","ICOA Paper D 考你前 3 个 (最易上手)。","后 3 个是博士级研究课题 —— 在完整课程 (n=480) 里覆盖。"]}},{number:6,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Beyond VLA — Embodied AI Is Bigger Now",body:["VLA is one architecture for embodied AI — the dominant 2023-2024 design. The field has moved further:",""," · World Models (2024-2026): Genie 3, V-JEPA 2, Cosmos, Sora-class."," Predict the future of a video / 3D scene; agents plan inside the prediction."," · Diffusion Policy (2024+): Pi-0, RDT, GR-2, Helix."," Replace VLA's token-by-token action with diffusion over action trajectories."," · Multi-Robot Coordination: Swarms and fleets running shared or distinct foundation models."," · Sim-to-Real Transfer: Models trained in simulation deployed onto physical hardware — the gap is its own attack surface.","","For this exam, ICOA-VLA is the concrete target — but the attack PATTERNS you learn apply across the broader Embodied AI surface. The full curriculum (n=360) covers world models, diffusion policy, and sim-to-real specifically."],icoaConnection:'The track formerly known as "VLA Security" is now CTF4EAI — Embodied AI Security broadly. ICOA-VLA stays as the hands-on target for ICOA Paper D; world models and diffusion show up in the deeper curriculum tiers.',_zh:{title:"超越 VLA —— 具身智能现在更大了",body:["VLA 是具身智能的一种架构 —— 2023-2024 的主流设计。这个领域走得更远了:",""," · 世界模型 (2024-2026): Genie 3、V-JEPA 2、Cosmos、Sora 类。"," 预测视频 / 3D 场景的未来;agent 在预测里做规划。"," · 动作扩散 policy (2024+): Pi-0、RDT、GR-2、Helix。"," 用动作轨迹上的扩散替代 VLA 的逐 token 动作输出。"," · 多机器人协调: 机器人群运行共享或独立的基础模型。"," · Sim-to-Real 迁移: 仿真训练的模型部署到物理硬件 —— 这道差距本身就是攻击面。","","本次考试 ICOA-VLA 是具体目标 —— 但你学的攻击 模式 适用于更广的具身智能面。完整课程 (n=360) 专门覆盖世界模型、动作扩散、sim-to-real。"],icoaConnection:'原"VLA 安全"轨道现在叫 CTF4EAI —— 具身 AI 安全 (广义)。ICOA-VLA 仍是 ICOA Paper D 的上手目标;世界模型和动作扩散在更深的课程层里出现。'}},{number:7,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Attack 1 — Prompt Injection",body:["The simplest VLA attack: change ONLY the text instruction, no pixels.","",'Baseline: "Pick up the red cup" → gripper closes on cup ✓','Injected: "Stop and release everything" → gripper opens, drops cup ✗',"","Why this works: VLAs trained on instruction-following data become extremely literal. They follow imperative commands even when they contradict context.","","The same trick was famous on LLMs (DAN, role-play attacks). The new twist: now the output is a PHYSICAL ACTION, not just text."],icoaConnection:"Q41 in your exam is exactly this — you'll craft a prompt to flip ICOA-VLA's gripper from CLOSE to OPEN.",_zh:{title:"攻击 1 —— Prompt Injection (提示注入)",body:["最简单的 VLA 攻击:只改文本指令,不动像素。","",'基线: "Pick up the red cup" → 夹爪在杯子上闭合 ✓','注入: "Stop and release everything" → 夹爪打开,杯子掉落 ✗',"","为什么这能成:VLA 在指令跟随数据上训练后,变得 极其字面。它会执行命令式指令,哪怕跟上下文矛盾。","","同样的招在 LLM 上很出名 (DAN, 角色扮演攻击)。新的关键点是:输出现在是 物理动作,不再是文本。"],icoaConnection:"你的 Q41 就是这个 —— 设计一段 prompt,让 ICOA-VLA 的夹爪从 CLOSE 翻成 OPEN。"}},{number:8,module:1,type:"mcq",title:"Quick Check — Pick the Pixel Attack",question:"Which attack vector modifies pixels in the camera image to fool the VLA?",options:{A:"Prompt injection",B:"Adversarial patch",C:"Backdoor trigger",D:"Action-space jailbreak"},answer:"B",explanation:"Adversarial patches add specially-crafted noise to image pixels. They're computed by backpropagating through the vision encoder to find perturbations that maximally shift the output. Both PROMPT injection (text) and BACKDOOR (training-time) work on different channels. Action-space attacks operate on the output, not input.",_zh:{title:"快速测验 —— 找出像素攻击",question:"哪种攻击向量是 通过修改摄像头图像的像素 来欺骗 VLA?",options:{A:"Prompt injection",B:"Adversarial patch",C:"Backdoor trigger",D:"Action-space jailbreak"},explanation:"Adversarial patches (对抗补丁) 在图像像素里加入精心构造的噪声。通过对视觉编码器做反向传播,找出能最大程度改变输出的扰动。Prompt injection 走文本通道; backdoor 是训练时埋下的; action-space 攻击操作的是输出而非输入。"}},{number:9,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Attack 2 — Adversarial Patches in the Physical World",body:['Famous 2018 paper: adding a small printed sticker to a stop sign made it misclassified as "speed limit 45" by self-driving car perception.',"","For VLAs, the equivalent attack:"," · Print a 5cm × 5cm patch with adversarial pattern"," · Stick it on the table or the cup"," · Robot's camera sees the patch, VLA outputs WRONG action","","Math behind it (FGSM, Fast Gradient Sign Method):"," x_adv = x + ε · sign( ∇_x L(model, x, target_action) )","","You compute the gradient pointing toward your DESIRED wrong action, then nudge the image in that direction. Tiny per-pixel changes, huge action-output change."],icoaConnection:"Q42 of your exam: design an adversarial patch that makes ICOA-VLA grasp the WRONG cup.",_zh:{title:"攻击 2 —— 物理世界里的对抗补丁",body:['2018 年著名论文:在停车牌上贴一张小贴纸,自动驾驶车感知系统就把它识别成 "speed limit 45"。',"","对 VLA,等价的攻击是:"," · 打印一个 5cm × 5cm 的对抗图案"," · 贴在桌子或杯子上"," · 机器人摄像头看到补丁,VLA 输出 错误的 动作","","背后的数学 (FGSM, Fast Gradient Sign Method):"," x_adv = x + ε · sign( ∇_x L(model, x, target_action) )","","你计算指向 想要的错误动作 的梯度,然后把图像往那个方向轻推。每像素变化很小,动作输出变化很大。"],icoaConnection:"你的 Q42:设计一个对抗补丁,让 ICOA-VLA 抓 错的 杯子。"}},{number:10,module:1,type:"practical",title:"Hands-On — Generate a Tiny FGSM Patch",task:"Write a Python one-liner using NumPy that computes the FGSM perturbation for a 1D gradient. Goal: get hands-on with the math you just learned. Inside the sandbox, you have NumPy and Torch pre-installed.",starterCode:'import numpy as np\n\n# A toy gradient (in real VLA attack, comes from torch.autograd)\ngrad = np.array([-0.3, 0.7, -1.2, 0.5, 0.8])\n\n# Your task: compute FGSM perturbation with epsilon=0.1\n# Formula: perturbation = epsilon * sign(grad)\nepsilon = 0.1\n\nperturbation = ___ # fill in\n\nprint("Perturbation:", perturbation)\n# Expected: [-0.1, 0.1, -0.1, 0.1, 0.1]',successHint:"The answer is: perturbation = epsilon * np.sign(grad). The sign function flips negative gradients to -1 and positives to +1, then we scale by epsilon. This is the core of FGSM — one of the most cited attacks in adversarial ML (Goodfellow et al. 2014).",_zh:{title:"上手 —— 生成一个迷你 FGSM 补丁",task:"写一段使用 NumPy 的 Python 单行式,计算 1D 梯度的 FGSM 扰动。目标:亲手摸一下你刚学的数学。沙盒里 NumPy 和 Torch 都已预装。",successHint:"答案:perturbation = epsilon * np.sign(grad)。sign 函数把负梯度翻成 -1,正梯度翻成 +1,再乘 epsilon 缩放。这就是 FGSM 的核心 —— 对抗机器学习领域引用次数最多的攻击之一 (Goodfellow et al. 2014)。"}},{number:11,module:1,type:"sim_demo",title:"Watch a Prompt Injection Attack in MuJoCo",description:"Now see what a successful prompt-injection attack LOOKS LIKE on a real robot simulation. The Franka Panda arm reaches toward the cup as expected — but the gripper STAYS OPEN because of the injected instruction. The cup drops.\n\nThis is the same robot model used in real-world deployments. Same URDF, same dynamics. The attack you saw in text becomes a physical safety failure.",simAction:"prompt_injected",_zh:{title:"在 MuJoCo 里看一次 Prompt Injection 攻击",description:"现在看一次成功的 prompt injection 攻击在 真机器人仿真 里长什么样。Franka Panda 机械臂如预期伸向杯子 —— 但 夹爪因为注入的指令保持打开。杯子掉下来。\n\n这是真实部署中使用的同款机器人模型,同样的 URDF,同样的动力学。文本里的攻击,变成了物理世界的安全失误。"}},{number:12,module:1,type:"milestone",badge:"VLA Demo Literate",emoji:"📚",unlockedNext:"You've completed the free demo. The full curriculum (n=480) goes 50× deeper: gradient methods (FGSM/PGD/CW), physical-world attacks, defenses, embodied reasoning, case studies of real-world AI safety failures. Estimated 30 hours.",realWorldLevel:"Someone who finished this demo can: read a basic VLA paper abstract; recognize the 6 attack categories; understand why prompt injection is so dangerous in robotics. Roughly the level of: an undergrad ML student who just discovered AI security.",_zh:{badge:"VLA Demo 入门",unlockedNext:"你完成了免费 demo。完整课程 (n=480) 深 50 倍:梯度方法 (FGSM/PGD/CW)、物理世界攻击、防御、具身推理、真实世界 AI 安全事故的 case study。约 30 小时。",realWorldLevel:"完成本 demo 的人能:读懂基础 VLA 论文摘要; 识别 6 类攻击; 理解为什么 prompt injection 在机器人领域格外危险。大约相当于:刚接触 AI 安全的本科 ML 学生水平。"}}]};export function loadCurriculum(e){return"LEARNDEMO01"===e.toUpperCase()?CURRICULUM_DEMO:null}function e(e,t,o){return{id:e,name:t,description:`Track skeleton — content authoring in progress. Planned: ${o} cards. See docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md.`,totalCards:1,modules:[{number:1,name:"Coming Soon",cardRange:[1,1]}],cards:[{number:1,module:1,type:"milestone",badge:`${t} — Authoring in progress`,emoji:"🚧",unlockedNext:`This track is scaffolded but not yet written. Planned size: ${o} cards. Roadmap in docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md.`,realWorldLevel:"Placeholder — content lands in upcoming releases."}]}}export async function loadCurriculumById(t){return"LEARNDEMO01"===t||"ctf4eai-12"===t?CURRICULUM_DEMO:"embodied-ai-100"===t||"ctf4eai-96"===t?(await import("./learn-curriculum-100.js")).CURRICULUM_100:"embodied-ai-480"===t||"ctf4eai-360"===t?(await import("./learn-curriculum-480.js")).CURRICULUM_480:"AI4CTFDEMO01"===t||"ai4ctf-12"===t?(await import("./ai4ctf-curriculum-12.js")).CURRICULUM_AI4CTF_12:"ai4ctf-96"===t?e(t,"AI4CTF Specialist (n=96)",96):"ai4ctf-360"===t?e(t,"AI4CTF Research (n=360)",360):"CTF4AIDEMO01"===t||"ctf4ai-12"===t?(await import("./ctf4ai-curriculum-12.js")).CURRICULUM_CTF4AI_12:"ctf4ai-96"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Specialist (n=96)",96):"ctf4ai-360"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Research (n=360)",360):"ctf4ai-frontier-120"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Frontier (refreshable 120)",120):null}export async function validateEAToken(e,t){const o=t.replace(/\/$/,"")+"/api/icoa/learn/validate";try{const t=await fetch(o,{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"application/json"},body:JSON.stringify({token:e.toUpperCase()}),signal:AbortSignal.timeout(8e3)});if(!t.ok)return{ok:!1,message:(await t.json().catch(()=>({}))).message||`HTTP ${t.status}`};const a=await t.json();return a.success&&a.data?{ok:!0,curriculumId:a.data.curriculum_id,status:a.data.status,validUntil:a.data.valid_until}:{ok:!1,message:a.message||"Validation failed"}}catch(e){return{ok:!1,message:`Network error: ${e instanceof Error?e.message:String(e)}`}}}export async function syncProgress(e,t,o){if("LEARNDEMO01"===e.toUpperCase())return;const a=t.replace(/\/$/,"")+"/api/icoa/learn/progress/"+e.toUpperCase();try{await fetch(a,{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"application/json"},body:JSON.stringify({card_number:o.card_number,event_type:o.event_type,mcq_answer:o.mcq_answer,mcq_correct:o.mcq_correct?1:0}),signal:AbortSignal.timeout(5e3)})}catch{}}
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export function localized(e,t){if(!t.startsWith("zh")||!e._zh)return e;const o=e._zh,a={...e};for(const e of Object.keys(o))void 0!==o[e]&&(a[e]=o[e]);return a}export const CURRICULUM_DEMO={id:"LEARNDEMO01",name:"Embodied AI Security — Demo",description:"A 12-card taster of the full ICOA Embodied AI Security curriculum (covers VLA, world models, diffusion policy, and the 6 attack categories).",totalCards:12,modules:[{number:1,name:"Foundations & Attack Surfaces",cardRange:[1,12]}],cards:[{number:1,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"What is a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model?",body:["A VLA model is an AI system that takes BOTH a camera image AND a natural-language instruction, then outputs a sequence of motor actions for a robot.",'Example: image of a kitchen + "pick up the red cup" → action sequence (move arm 30 cm right, lower 10 cm, close gripper).',"VLAs are the dominant architecture for general-purpose robot control as of 2024-2026. They're trained on millions of robot demonstrations."],icoaConnection:"ICOA Paper D uses ICOA-VLA — a compact research-grade VLA. You'll attack it in Q41-45 of this exam.",_zh:{title:"什么是视觉-语言-动作 (VLA) 模型?",body:["VLA 模型是一种 AI 系统:同时接收 摄像头图像 + 自然语言指令,然后输出一连串机器人电机动作。",'举例:厨房的图像 + "pick up the red cup" → 动作序列 (机械臂右移 30 cm,下降 10 cm,夹爪闭合)。',"2024–2026 年,VLA 是通用机器人控制的主流架构,基于数百万机器人示范数据训练。"],icoaConnection:"ICOA Paper D 用的就是 ICOA-VLA —— 一个紧凑的研究级 VLA。本试卷的 Q41-45 你会亲手攻击它。"}},{number:2,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"VLA Architecture = Three Modules",body:["Almost every VLA shares the same structure:"," ① Vision encoder converts image → visual features (e.g. SigLIP, DINOv2)"," ② Language encoder converts instruction → text features (e.g. Llama tokenizer)"," ③ Action head fuses features → 7-DoF action (xyz + rotation + gripper)","The three modules are trained END-TO-END on robot demonstration data. None of them sees the world the way a human does."],_zh:{title:"VLA 架构 = 三个模块",body:["几乎所有 VLA 共享同一种结构:"," ① 视觉编码器 图像 → 视觉特征 (如 SigLIP, DINOv2)"," ② 语言编码器 指令 → 文本特征 (如 Llama tokenizer)"," ③ 动作头 融合特征 → 7-DoF 动作 (xyz + 旋转 + 夹爪)","三个模块在机器人示范数据上 端到端 联合训练。它们看世界的方式跟人类完全不同。"]}},{number:3,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Famous VLA Models (2024-2026)",body:["OpenVLA (Stanford+TRI, 2024) 7B params · Llama2 + DINOv2 + SigLIP","ICOA-VLA (internal, 2024) compact · Diffusion transformer, small + fast","π0 / π0.5 (Physical Intelligence) 3.5B · Flow matching, recent open-weights","RT-2 (Google DeepMind) 55B (est) · Closed weights, paper only","Gemini Robotics (DeepMind, 2025) ? · Closed, multimodal foundation","","The open ones (top 3) are the targets we attack in CTF challenges. Closed ones we only study in case studies."],_zh:{title:"知名 VLA 模型 (2024-2026)",body:["OpenVLA (Stanford+TRI, 2024) 7B 参数 · Llama2 + DINOv2 + SigLIP","ICOA-VLA (内部, 2024) 紧凑 · Diffusion transformer, 小且快","π0 / π0.5 (Physical Intelligence) 3.5B · Flow matching, 近期开源权重","RT-2 (Google DeepMind) 55B (估) · 闭源权重,只有论文","Gemini Robotics (DeepMind, 2025) ? · 闭源,多模态基础模型","","开源的 (前 3 个) 是 CTF 挑战里攻击的目标。闭源的我们只在 case study 里学。"]}},{number:4,module:1,type:"mcq",title:"Quick Check — Identify the VLA",question:"Which of these is NOT a Vision-Language-Action model?",options:{A:"OpenVLA",B:"ICOA-VLA",C:"GPT-4",D:"π0 (Physical Intelligence)"},answer:"C",explanation:"GPT-4 is a Language Model (LLM) — it takes text in, gives text out. No image input, no robot action output. The other three all consume (image, instruction) and emit motor actions.",_zh:{title:"快速测验 —— 找出非 VLA",question:"下面哪个 不是 视觉-语言-动作模型?",options:{A:"OpenVLA",B:"ICOA-VLA",C:"GPT-4",D:"π0 (Physical Intelligence)"},explanation:"GPT-4 是大语言模型 (LLM) —— 文本进,文本出。没有图像输入,也没有机器人动作输出。其他三个都接收 (图像, 指令) 然后输出电机动作。"}},{number:5,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"VLA Attack Surfaces — Six Categories",body:["Every VLA has the same six attack vectors:"," 1. Prompt injection twist the language input"," 2. Adversarial patch modify pixels in the camera image"," 3. Modality conflict image says X, text says Y → confuse the fusion"," 4. Backdoor trigger hidden activation pattern from training data"," 5. Action-space jailbreak push output to unsafe motion ranges"," 6. Embodied-reasoning hack exploit the planning/multi-step layer","","In ICOA Paper D, we test you on the first 3 (the most accessible).","The last 3 are PhD-level research topics — covered in the full curriculum (n=480)."],_zh:{title:"VLA 攻击面 —— 六大类",body:["每个 VLA 都有同样的六条攻击向量:"," 1. Prompt injection 修改语言输入"," 2. Adversarial patch 修改摄像头图像里的像素"," 3. Modality conflict 图像说 X,文本说 Y → 混淆融合"," 4. Backdoor trigger 训练数据里植入的隐藏激活模式"," 5. Action-space jailbreak 把输出推到不安全的动作范围"," 6. Embodied-reasoning hack 攻击规划 / 多步推理层","","ICOA Paper D 考你前 3 个 (最易上手)。","后 3 个是博士级研究课题 —— 在完整课程 (n=480) 里覆盖。"]}},{number:6,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Beyond VLA — Embodied AI Is Bigger Now",body:["VLA is one architecture for embodied AI — the dominant 2023-2024 design. The field has moved further:",""," · World Models (2024-2026): Genie 3, V-JEPA 2, Cosmos, Sora-class."," Predict the future of a video / 3D scene; agents plan inside the prediction."," · Diffusion Policy (2024+): Pi-0, RDT, GR-2, Helix."," Replace VLA's token-by-token action with diffusion over action trajectories."," · Multi-Robot Coordination: Swarms and fleets running shared or distinct foundation models."," · Sim-to-Real Transfer: Models trained in simulation deployed onto physical hardware — the gap is its own attack surface.","","For this exam, ICOA-VLA is the concrete target — but the attack PATTERNS you learn apply across the broader Embodied AI surface. The full curriculum (n=360) covers world models, diffusion policy, and sim-to-real specifically."],icoaConnection:'The track formerly known as "VLA Security" is now CTF4EAI — Embodied AI Security broadly. ICOA-VLA stays as the hands-on target for ICOA Paper D; world models and diffusion show up in the deeper curriculum tiers.',_zh:{title:"超越 VLA —— 具身智能现在更大了",body:["VLA 是具身智能的一种架构 —— 2023-2024 的主流设计。这个领域走得更远了:",""," · 世界模型 (2024-2026): Genie 3、V-JEPA 2、Cosmos、Sora 类。"," 预测视频 / 3D 场景的未来;agent 在预测里做规划。"," · 动作扩散 policy (2024+): Pi-0、RDT、GR-2、Helix。"," 用动作轨迹上的扩散替代 VLA 的逐 token 动作输出。"," · 多机器人协调: 机器人群运行共享或独立的基础模型。"," · Sim-to-Real 迁移: 仿真训练的模型部署到物理硬件 —— 这道差距本身就是攻击面。","","本次考试 ICOA-VLA 是具体目标 —— 但你学的攻击 模式 适用于更广的具身智能面。完整课程 (n=360) 专门覆盖世界模型、动作扩散、sim-to-real。"],icoaConnection:'原"VLA 安全"轨道现在叫 CTF4EAI —— 具身 AI 安全 (广义)。ICOA-VLA 仍是 ICOA Paper D 的上手目标;世界模型和动作扩散在更深的课程层里出现。'}},{number:7,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Attack 1 — Prompt Injection",body:["The simplest VLA attack: change ONLY the text instruction, no pixels.","",'Baseline: "Pick up the red cup" → gripper closes on cup ✓','Injected: "Stop and release everything" → gripper opens, drops cup ✗',"","Why this works: VLAs trained on instruction-following data become extremely literal. They follow imperative commands even when they contradict context.","","The same trick was famous on LLMs (DAN, role-play attacks). The new twist: now the output is a PHYSICAL ACTION, not just text."],icoaConnection:"Q41 in your exam is exactly this — you'll craft a prompt to flip ICOA-VLA's gripper from CLOSE to OPEN.",_zh:{title:"攻击 1 —— Prompt Injection (提示注入)",body:["最简单的 VLA 攻击:只改文本指令,不动像素。","",'基线: "Pick up the red cup" → 夹爪在杯子上闭合 ✓','注入: "Stop and release everything" → 夹爪打开,杯子掉落 ✗',"","为什么这能成:VLA 在指令跟随数据上训练后,变得 极其字面。它会执行命令式指令,哪怕跟上下文矛盾。","","同样的招在 LLM 上很出名 (DAN, 角色扮演攻击)。新的关键点是:输出现在是 物理动作,不再是文本。"],icoaConnection:"你的 Q41 就是这个 —— 设计一段 prompt,让 ICOA-VLA 的夹爪从 CLOSE 翻成 OPEN。"}},{number:8,module:1,type:"mcq",title:"Quick Check — Pick the Pixel Attack",question:"Which attack vector modifies pixels in the camera image to fool the VLA?",options:{A:"Prompt injection",B:"Adversarial patch",C:"Backdoor trigger",D:"Action-space jailbreak"},answer:"B",explanation:"Adversarial patches add specially-crafted noise to image pixels. They're computed by backpropagating through the vision encoder to find perturbations that maximally shift the output. Both PROMPT injection (text) and BACKDOOR (training-time) work on different channels. Action-space attacks operate on the output, not input.",_zh:{title:"快速测验 —— 找出像素攻击",question:"哪种攻击向量是 通过修改摄像头图像的像素 来欺骗 VLA?",options:{A:"Prompt injection",B:"Adversarial patch",C:"Backdoor trigger",D:"Action-space jailbreak"},explanation:"Adversarial patches (对抗补丁) 在图像像素里加入精心构造的噪声。通过对视觉编码器做反向传播,找出能最大程度改变输出的扰动。Prompt injection 走文本通道; backdoor 是训练时埋下的; action-space 攻击操作的是输出而非输入。"}},{number:9,module:1,type:"knowledge",title:"Attack 2 — Adversarial Patches in the Physical World",body:['Famous 2018 paper: adding a small printed sticker to a stop sign made it misclassified as "speed limit 45" by self-driving car perception.',"","For VLAs, the equivalent attack:"," · Print a 5cm × 5cm patch with adversarial pattern"," · Stick it on the table or the cup"," · Robot's camera sees the patch, VLA outputs WRONG action","","Math behind it (FGSM, Fast Gradient Sign Method):"," x_adv = x + ε · sign( ∇_x L(model, x, target_action) )","","You compute the gradient pointing toward your DESIRED wrong action, then nudge the image in that direction. Tiny per-pixel changes, huge action-output change."],icoaConnection:"Q42 of your exam: design an adversarial patch that makes ICOA-VLA grasp the WRONG cup.",_zh:{title:"攻击 2 —— 物理世界里的对抗补丁",body:['2018 年著名论文:在停车牌上贴一张小贴纸,自动驾驶车感知系统就把它识别成 "speed limit 45"。',"","对 VLA,等价的攻击是:"," · 打印一个 5cm × 5cm 的对抗图案"," · 贴在桌子或杯子上"," · 机器人摄像头看到补丁,VLA 输出 错误的 动作","","背后的数学 (FGSM, Fast Gradient Sign Method):"," x_adv = x + ε · sign( ∇_x L(model, x, target_action) )","","你计算指向 想要的错误动作 的梯度,然后把图像往那个方向轻推。每像素变化很小,动作输出变化很大。"],icoaConnection:"你的 Q42:设计一个对抗补丁,让 ICOA-VLA 抓 错的 杯子。"}},{number:10,module:1,type:"practical",title:"Hands-On — Generate a Tiny FGSM Patch",task:"Write a Python one-liner using NumPy that computes the FGSM perturbation for a 1D gradient. Goal: get hands-on with the math you just learned. Inside the sandbox, you have NumPy and Torch pre-installed.",starterCode:'import numpy as np\n\n# A toy gradient (in real VLA attack, comes from torch.autograd)\ngrad = np.array([-0.3, 0.7, -1.2, 0.5, 0.8])\n\n# Your task: compute FGSM perturbation with epsilon=0.1\n# Formula: perturbation = epsilon * sign(grad)\nepsilon = 0.1\n\nperturbation = ___ # fill in\n\nprint("Perturbation:", perturbation)\n# Expected: [-0.1, 0.1, -0.1, 0.1, 0.1]',successHint:"The answer is: perturbation = epsilon * np.sign(grad). The sign function flips negative gradients to -1 and positives to +1, then we scale by epsilon. This is the core of FGSM — one of the most cited attacks in adversarial ML (Goodfellow et al. 2014).",_zh:{title:"上手 —— 生成一个迷你 FGSM 补丁",task:"写一段使用 NumPy 的 Python 单行式,计算 1D 梯度的 FGSM 扰动。目标:亲手摸一下你刚学的数学。沙盒里 NumPy 和 Torch 都已预装。",successHint:"答案:perturbation = epsilon * np.sign(grad)。sign 函数把负梯度翻成 -1,正梯度翻成 +1,再乘 epsilon 缩放。这就是 FGSM 的核心 —— 对抗机器学习领域引用次数最多的攻击之一 (Goodfellow et al. 2014)。"}},{number:11,module:1,type:"sim_demo",title:"Watch a Prompt Injection Attack in MuJoCo",description:"Now see what a successful prompt-injection attack LOOKS LIKE on a real robot simulation. The Franka Panda arm reaches toward the cup as expected — but the gripper STAYS OPEN because of the injected instruction. The cup drops.\n\nThis is the same robot model used in real-world deployments. Same URDF, same dynamics. The attack you saw in text becomes a physical safety failure.",simAction:"prompt_injected",_zh:{title:"在 MuJoCo 里看一次 Prompt Injection 攻击",description:"现在看一次成功的 prompt injection 攻击在 真机器人仿真 里长什么样。Franka Panda 机械臂如预期伸向杯子 —— 但 夹爪因为注入的指令保持打开。杯子掉下来。\n\n这是真实部署中使用的同款机器人模型,同样的 URDF,同样的动力学。文本里的攻击,变成了物理世界的安全失误。"}},{number:12,module:1,type:"milestone",badge:"VLA Demo Literate",emoji:"📚",unlockedNext:"You've completed the free demo. The full curriculum (n=480) goes 50× deeper: gradient methods (FGSM/PGD/CW), physical-world attacks, defenses, embodied reasoning, case studies of real-world AI safety failures. Estimated 30 hours.",realWorldLevel:"Someone who finished this demo can: read a basic VLA paper abstract; recognize the 6 attack categories; understand why prompt injection is so dangerous in robotics. Roughly the level of: an undergrad ML student who just discovered AI security.",_zh:{badge:"VLA Demo 入门",unlockedNext:"你完成了免费 demo。完整课程 (n=480) 深 50 倍:梯度方法 (FGSM/PGD/CW)、物理世界攻击、防御、具身推理、真实世界 AI 安全事故的 case study。约 30 小时。",realWorldLevel:"完成本 demo 的人能:读懂基础 VLA 论文摘要; 识别 6 类攻击; 理解为什么 prompt injection 在机器人领域格外危险。大约相当于:刚接触 AI 安全的本科 ML 学生水平。"}}]};export function loadCurriculum(e){return"LEARNDEMO01"===e.toUpperCase()?CURRICULUM_DEMO:null}function e(e,t,o){return{id:e,name:t,description:`Track skeleton — content authoring in progress. Planned: ${o} cards. See docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md.`,totalCards:1,modules:[{number:1,name:"Coming Soon",cardRange:[1,1]}],cards:[{number:1,module:1,type:"milestone",badge:`${t} — Authoring in progress`,emoji:"🚧",unlockedNext:`This track is scaffolded but not yet written. Planned size: ${o} cards. Roadmap in docs/three-tracks-curriculum.md.`,realWorldLevel:"Placeholder — content lands in upcoming releases."}]}}export async function loadCurriculumById(t){return"LEARNDEMO01"===t||"ctf4eai-12"===t?CURRICULUM_DEMO:"embodied-ai-100"===t||"ctf4eai-96"===t?(await import("./learn-curriculum-100.js")).CURRICULUM_100:"embodied-ai-480"===t?(await import("./learn-curriculum-480.js")).CURRICULUM_480:"ctf4eai-360"===t?(await import("./ctf4eai-curriculum-360.js")).CURRICULUM_CTF4EAI_360:"AI4CTFDEMO01"===t||"ai4ctf-12"===t?(await import("./ai4ctf-curriculum-12.js")).CURRICULUM_AI4CTF_12:"ai4ctf-96"===t?e(t,"AI4CTF Specialist (n=96)",96):"ai4ctf-360"===t?e(t,"AI4CTF Research (n=360)",360):"CTF4AIDEMO01"===t||"ctf4ai-12"===t?(await import("./ctf4ai-curriculum-12.js")).CURRICULUM_CTF4AI_12:"ctf4ai-96"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Specialist (n=96)",96):"ctf4ai-360"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Research (n=360)",360):"ctf4ai-frontier-120"===t?e(t,"CTF4AI Frontier (refreshable 120)",120):null}export async function validateEAToken(e,t){const o=t.replace(/\/$/,"")+"/api/icoa/learn/validate";try{const t=await fetch(o,{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"application/json"},body:JSON.stringify({token:e.toUpperCase()}),signal:AbortSignal.timeout(8e3)});if(!t.ok)return{ok:!1,message:(await t.json().catch(()=>({}))).message||`HTTP ${t.status}`};const a=await t.json();return a.success&&a.data?{ok:!0,curriculumId:a.data.curriculum_id,status:a.data.status,validUntil:a.data.valid_until}:{ok:!1,message:a.message||"Validation failed"}}catch(e){return{ok:!1,message:`Network error: ${e instanceof Error?e.message:String(e)}`}}}export async function syncProgress(e,t,o){if("LEARNDEMO01"===e.toUpperCase())return;const a=t.replace(/\/$/,"")+"/api/icoa/learn/progress/"+e.toUpperCase();try{await fetch(a,{method:"POST",headers:{"Content-Type":"application/json"},body:JSON.stringify({card_number:o.card_number,event_type:o.event_type,mcq_answer:o.mcq_answer,mcq_correct:o.mcq_correct?1:0}),signal:AbortSignal.timeout(5e3)})}catch{}}
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"name": "icoa-cli",
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"description": "ICOA CLI — The world's first CLI-native cyber & AI security olympiad terminal: AI4CTF (Day 1), CTF4AI (Day 2), VLA4CTF (Pioneer Round — embodied AI)",
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