hivecode-mcp 0.12.4 → 0.13.0

package/hive-mcp-http.js

@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+// hive-mcp-http — Hivecode as a REMOTE MCP server, so Slackbot can drive a room.
+//
+//   node hive-mcp-http.js "<relay|room>" --port 8790 [--name Hivecode] [--auth slack|none] [--trust-proxy]
+//   env: SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET (required for --auth slack), HIVE_TOKEN, HIVE_TRUST_PROXY=1 (behind a proxy)
+//
+// WHY A SECOND MCP SERVER. hive-mcp.js speaks stdio, which is what a local agent needs and what
+// Slack explicitly does not accept: the Slackbot MCP Client connects OUT over Streamable HTTP,
+// and the deprecated HTTP+SSE transport and stdio are both refused. So this is not a rewrite of
+// hive-mcp.js, it is the other transport, deliberately kept to a small surface.
+//
+// WHAT IS EXPOSED, AND WHY IT IS NOT ALL 26 TOOLS.
+// Slack aborts any tool that has not returned in 60 SECONDS. hive_wait is a long poll whose whole
+// purpose is to block until work arrives -- it would time out every time and surface an error to
+// the user, so it is not here. Nor are the editing tools: a person typing into Slackbot is asking
+// "what is happening" and "stop that", not writing code from their phone. Every tool below
+// returns in milliseconds.
+//
+// TRUST. Slack attaches the caller's identity as `_meta.slack.user_id` on every tools/call. That
+// is ordinary request JSON and anybody who can reach this endpoint can forge it, so nothing reads
+// it until the request signature has been verified. In `--auth slack` mode an unsigned request is
+// refused before it is parsed as a call at all.
+
+import fs from 'fs'
+import http from 'http'
+import crypto from 'crypto'
+import { startSync, parseLink } from './sync.js'
+import { attachRateLimit } from './limits.js'
+import { makeSlackActorCheck, formatSlackSender, slackPost } from './hive-slack.js'
+
+import { VERSION } from "./hive-version.js"
+export { VERSION }
+
+const PROTOCOL = '2025-06-18'
+const MAX_BODY = 1 << 20           // a control-plane request is never a megabyte
+const SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000      // Slack's own replay window
+const MAX_SESSIONS = 1000          // LRU bound on tracked MCP session IDs
+
+/** Slack's v0 request signature.
+ *
+ *  Two things here are load-bearing and easy to get wrong: the comparison must be timing-safe,
+ *  and the timestamp window must be checked SEPARATELY -- a valid signature on an hour-old body
+ *  is a replay, and it verifies perfectly. */
+export function verifySlack({ raw, timestamp, signature, secret, now = Date.now() }) {
+  if (!secret) return { ok: false, why: 'Q510 no signing secret configured' }
+  if (!timestamp || !signature) return { ok: false, why: 'Q511 request is not signed' }
+  const ts = Number(timestamp)
+  if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) return { ok: false, why: 'Q511 request is not signed' }
+  if (Math.abs(now - ts * 1000) > SKEW_MS) return { ok: false, why: 'Q512 signature is outside the replay window' }
+  const mine = 'v0=' + crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(`v0:${timestamp}:${raw}`).digest('hex')
+  const a = Buffer.from(mine), b = Buffer.from(String(signature))
+  if (a.length !== b.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)) return { ok: false, why: 'Q513 signature does not match' }
+  return { ok: true }
+}
+
+const text = (s) => ({ content: [{ type: 'text', text: s }] })
+
+/** Resolve a typed name to the room's real spelling. An unmatched name must REFUSE rather than
+ *  write a control entry nothing reads -- see the same bug and comment in hive-agent.js. */
+export function resolveName(hive, who) {
+  const want = String(who || '').toLowerCase()
+  for (const p of (hive.members ? hive.members() : [])) if (String(p.name).toLowerCase() === want) return p.name
+  return null
+}
+
+const pausedOf = (hive, who) => { const c = hive.doc.getMap('controls').get(who); return !!(c && c.state === 'paused') }
+
+// `room` is passed in: startSync returns no room field, so `hive.room` is undefined and the
+// status tool reported "room: undefined" to whoever asked Slackbot what was going on.
+export function makeTools(hive, room = '', { actorCheck = null, allow = [] } = {}) {
+  const ai = () => (hive.members ? hive.members() : []).filter((p) => p.kind === 'ai')
+  const userIdOf = (actor) => {
+    const s = String(actor || '')
+    return s.startsWith('slack:') ? s.slice(6) : ''
+  }
+  return [
+    {
+      name: 'hive_status',
+      description: 'What is happening in the Hivecode room right now: how many agents are running or paused, how many tasks are open, and what is awaiting a human. Ask this first.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
+      run: () => {
+        const people = hive.members ? hive.members() : []
+        const tasks = [...hive.doc.getMap('tasks').values()]
+        const paused = people.filter((p) => pausedOf(hive, p.name))
+        return text([
+          `room: ${room || '(unnamed)'}`,
+          `${people.length} in the room (${people.filter((p) => p.kind === 'ai').length} agents, ${paused.length} paused)`,
+          `${tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'accepted').length} in progress, ${tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'pending').length} awaiting approval, ${tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'done').length} done`,
+          paused.length ? `paused: ${paused.map((p) => p.name).join(', ')}` : 'nothing is paused',
+        ].join('\n'))
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_members',
+      description: 'Who is in the room, whether each one is a human or an AI agent, and whether it is running or paused.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
+      run: () => {
+        const people = hive.members ? hive.members() : []
+        if (!people.length) return text('nobody is in the room')
+        return text(people.map((p) => `${p.name} (${p.kind})${pausedOf(hive, p.name) ? ' — PAUSED' : ''}`).join('\n'))
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_tasks',
+      description: 'The task board: who was asked to do what, and where each task stands (pending approval, accepted, done, denied).',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
+      run: () => {
+        const all = [...hive.doc.getMap('tasks').values()]
+        if (!all.length) return text('no tasks')
+        return text(all.map((t) => `[${t.status}] ${t.by} -> ${t.to}: ${t.text}`).join('\n'))
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_claims',
+      description: 'Which files each agent is holding right now. This is what to read before asking whether it is safe to stop someone.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
+      run: () => {
+        const c = hive.doc.getMap('claims')
+        const rows = [...c.entries()].map(([region, v]) => `${region} — ${(v && v.by) || 'unknown'}`)
+        return text(rows.length ? rows.join('\n') : 'nothing is claimed')
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_recent',
+      description: 'The last things said in the room, newest last. Use this to answer "what happened overnight".',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: { limit: { type: 'number', description: 'how many messages, default 20' } } },
+      run: ({ limit }) => {
+        const n = Math.max(1, Math.min(100, Number(limit) || 20))
+        const all = hive.doc.getArray('chat').toArray().slice(-n)
+        return text(all.length ? all.map((m) => `${m.by}: ${m.text}`).join('\n') : 'the room has said nothing')
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_pause',
+      description: 'STOP an agent: it finishes its current step and is then refused any new work until resumed. Pass who="all" to stop every agent in the room. This is the control to reach for when something is going wrong and nobody is at a desk.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: { who: { type: 'string', description: 'an agent name, or "all"' } }, required: ['who'] },
+      run: async ({ who }, actor) => {
+        let by = actor
+        let unverifiedNote = ''
+        const uid = userIdOf(actor)
+        if (actorCheck && uid) {
+          const resolved = await actorCheck.resolve(uid)
+          const check = actorCheck.mayAct(resolved, 'stop', allow)
+          if (!check.ok) return text(check.reply || 'Q521 refused by Slack actor check')
+          by = (resolved.ok && resolved.handle && resolved.handle !== uid) ? check.by : (actor || check.by)
+          if (check.unverified && check.reply) unverifiedNote = ` (${check.reply})`
+        }
+        if (String(who).toLowerCase() === 'all') {
+          const names = ai().map((p) => p.name)
+          for (const n of names) hive.control(n, 'paused', by)
+          return text(names.length ? `paused ${names.join(', ')} — nothing new will be picked up${unverifiedNote}` : 'there are no agents to pause')
+        }
+        const real = resolveName(hive, who)
+        if (!real) return text(`Q514 there is nobody called "${who}" in this room. Here now: ${(hive.members ? hive.members() : []).map((p) => p.name).join(', ') || 'nobody'}`)
+        hive.control(real, 'paused', by)
+        return text(`paused ${real} — it will finish its current step and then stop picking up work${unverifiedNote}`)
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_resume',
+      description: 'Let a paused agent pick up work again. Pass who="all" to resume every agent.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: { who: { type: 'string', description: 'an agent name, or "all"' } }, required: ['who'] },
+      run: async ({ who }, actor) => {
+        let by = actor
+        if (actorCheck) {
+          const uid = userIdOf(actor)
+          const resolved = await actorCheck.resolve(uid)
+          const check = actorCheck.mayAct(resolved, 'resume', allow)
+          if (!check.ok) return text(check.reply || 'Q521 refused: not in --allow')
+          by = check.by || actor
+        }
+        if (String(who).toLowerCase() === 'all') {
+          const names = ai().map((p) => p.name)
+          for (const n of names) hive.control(n, 'running', by)
+          return text(names.length ? `resumed ${names.join(', ')}` : 'there are no agents to resume')
+        }
+        const real = resolveName(hive, who)
+        if (!real) return text(`Q514 there is nobody called "${who}" in this room`)
+        hive.control(real, 'running', by)
+        return text(`resumed ${real}`)
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'hive_say',
+      description: 'Send a message into the room. Address an agent with @Name so it lands as mail rather than ambient chatter — an agent only acts on what names it.',
+      inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: { text: { type: 'string' } }, required: ['text'] },
+      run: async ({ text: t }, actor) => {
+        let by = formatSlackSender(userIdOf(actor) || actor || 'user')
+        if (actorCheck) {
+          const uid = userIdOf(actor)
+          const resolved = await actorCheck.resolve(uid)
+          const check = actorCheck.mayAct(resolved, 'reply', allow)
+          if (!check.ok) return text(check.reply || 'Q521 refused: not in --allow')
+          by = check.by || by
+        }
+        if (hive && hive.doc && typeof hive.doc.getArray === 'function') {
+          hive.doc.getArray('chat').push([{
+            by,
+            kind: 'say',
+            at: Date.now() * 1000,
+            text: String(t || '').trim(),
+            viaSlack: true,
+          }])
+        } else if (hive && typeof hive.say === 'function') {
+          hive.say(`${t}`, { by })
+        }
+        return text(`sent to the room as ${by}`)
+      },
+    },
+  ]
+}
+
+/** JSON-RPC dispatch. Returns the response object, or null for a notification (which takes 202). */
+export async function dispatch({ msg, tools, actor }) {
+  const reply = (result) => ({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: msg.id, result })
+  const fail = (code, message) => ({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: msg.id, error: { code, message } })
+
+  if (msg.method === 'initialize') {
+    return reply({
+      protocolVersion: PROTOCOL,
+      capabilities: { tools: { listChanged: false } },
+      serverInfo: { name: 'hivecode', version: VERSION },
+    })
+  }
+  // Notifications carry no id and MUST NOT be answered with a result.
+  if (typeof msg.id === 'undefined') return null
+  if (msg.method === 'tools/list') {
+    return reply({ tools: tools.map(({ name, description, inputSchema }) => ({ name, description, inputSchema })) })
+  }
+  if (msg.method === 'tools/call') {
+    const t = tools.find((x) => x.name === (msg.params || {}).name)
+    if (!t) return fail(-32602, `Q515 unknown tool: ${(msg.params || {}).name}`)
+    try {
+      return reply(await t.run((msg.params || {}).arguments || {}, actor))
+    } catch (e) {
+      // A thrown tool is a tool ERROR, not a protocol error: the model should see the text and
+      // be able to try something else, rather than the whole session failing.
+      return reply({ ...text(`Q516 ${t.name} failed: ${e.message}`), isError: true })
+    }
+  }
+  return fail(-32601, `Q517 method not supported: ${msg.method}`)
+}
+
+/** Who is making this call. Slack attaches it under params._meta.slack, and it is only read
+ *  after the signature has been verified -- the field is forgeable by anyone who can reach us. */
+export function actorOf(msg, verified) {
+  const s = ((msg.params || {})._meta || {}).slack || {}
+  if (verified && s.user_id) return `slack:${s.user_id}`
+  return 'slack'
+}
+
+// WHOSE ADDRESS IS IT (27 Sep 2026). The per-IP limit keyed on the FIRST X-Forwarded-For entry,
+// which is whatever the caller wrote: a flood that sent a different made-up address on every
+// request got a fresh budget every time, and each made-up address was a new entry in a map that
+// never shrank. X-Forwarded-For is now read only when this sits behind a proxy the operator
+// names (HIVE_TRUST_PROXY=1 or --trust-proxy), and then its LAST entry -- the hop that proxy
+// appended, not one the client typed. Otherwise the socket's own address.
+const TRUST_PROXY = /^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(process.env.HIVE_TRUST_PROXY || '')
+const MAX_LIMITERS = 10000
+export function clientAddress(req, trustProxy = TRUST_PROXY) {
+  const sock = String((req.socket && req.socket.remoteAddress) || '127.0.0.1')
+  if (!trustProxy) return sock
+  const hops = String(req.headers['x-forwarded-for'] || '').split(',').map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)
+  return hops.length ? hops[hops.length - 1] : sock
+}
+
+export function makeHandler({
+  hive,
+  room = '',
+  auth = 'slack',
+  signingSecret = '',
+  now = Date.now,
+  tier = null,
+  trustProxy = TRUST_PROXY,
+  allow = [],
+  token = '',
+  teamId = '',
+  lookupUser = null,
+  api = undefined,
+  fetchImpl = undefined,
+  actorCheck = null,
+}) {
+  const effectiveActorCheck = actorCheck || (auth === 'slack'
+    ? makeSlackActorCheck({ token, teamId, api, fetchImpl, lookupUser, now })
+    : null)
+  const tools = makeTools(hive, room, { actorCheck: effectiveActorCheck, allow })
+  const sessions = new Set() // insertion order = LRU order (oldest first, most-recently-used last)
+  const limiters = new Map() // insertion order = age, so the oldest address is the first key
+
+  function touchSession(sid) {
+    if (!sid) return
+    if (sessions.has(sid)) sessions.delete(sid)
+    sessions.add(sid)
+    if (sessions.size > MAX_SESSIONS) {
+      sessions.delete(sessions.values().next().value)
+    }
+  }
+
+  function limiterFor(ip) {
+    let l = limiters.get(ip)
+    if (!l) {
+      const conn = {}
+      l = attachRateLimit(conn, tier)
+      limiters.set(ip, l)
+      if (limiters.size > MAX_LIMITERS) limiters.delete(limiters.keys().next().value)
+    }
+    return l
+  }
+
+  handle.limiterCount = () => limiters.size
+  handle.sessionCount = () => sessions.size
+  handle.hasSession = (sid) => sessions.has(sid)
+  return handle
+  async function handle(req, res) {
+    const send = (code, obj, headers = {}) => {
+      const body = obj === null ? '' : JSON.stringify(obj)
+      res.writeHead(code, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...headers })
+      res.end(body)
+    }
+    if (req.method === 'GET') return send(405, { error: 'Q518 this endpoint takes POST' })
+    if (req.method !== 'POST') return send(405, { error: 'Q518 this endpoint takes POST' })
+
+    // Rate limiting (HIV-15): per-IP rate limit applied BEFORE signature verification
+    const ip = clientAddress(req, trustProxy)
+    const limiter = limiterFor(ip)
+    const rateRefusal = limiter.check(1)
+    if (rateRefusal) {
+      return send(429, { error: rateRefusal.reason })
+    }
+
+    let raw = ''
+    let tooBig = false
+    for await (const chunk of req) {
+      raw += chunk
+      if (raw.length > MAX_BODY) { tooBig = true; break }
+    }
+    if (tooBig) return send(413, { error: 'Q519 body too large' })
+
+    let verified = auth !== 'slack'
+    if (auth === 'slack') {
+      const v = verifySlack({
+        raw,
+        timestamp: req.headers['x-slack-request-timestamp'],
+        signature: req.headers['x-slack-signature'],
+        secret: signingSecret,
+        now: now(),
+      })
+      // Refuse BEFORE parsing: an unsigned body should never reach the dispatcher at all.
+      if (!v.ok) return send(401, { jsonrpc: '2.0', id: null, error: { code: -32001, message: v.why } })
+      verified = true
+    }
+
+    let msg
+    try { msg = JSON.parse(raw || '{}') } catch { return send(400, { jsonrpc: '2.0', id: null, error: { code: -32700, message: 'Q520 body is not JSON' } }) }
+
+    const batch = Array.isArray(msg) ? msg : [msg]
+    const out = []
+    for (const m of batch) {
+      const r = await dispatch({ msg: m, tools, actor: actorOf(m, verified) })
+      if (r) out.push(r)
+    }
+    if (!out.length) return send(202, null)      // notifications only
+
+    const payload = Array.isArray(msg) ? out : out[0]
+    const sid = req.headers['mcp-session-id'] || crypto.randomUUID()
+    touchSession(sid)
+
+    // Streamable HTTP: the client says which framing it can read. Slack accepts either, but a
+    // client that asked ONLY for an event stream will not parse a plain JSON body.
+    const accept = String(req.headers.accept || '')
+    if (/text\/event-stream/.test(accept) && !/application\/json/.test(accept)) {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache', Connection: 'keep-alive', 'Mcp-Session-Id': sid })
+      res.end(`event: message\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n\n`)
+      return
+    }
+    return send(200, payload, { 'Mcp-Session-Id': sid })
+  }
+}
+
+/** Verify SLACK_BOT_TOKEN and resolve workspace team_id via auth.test when --team is not given (Q630, Q634). */
+export async function preflightMcpSlack({ token = '', teamId = '', api = undefined, fetchImpl = undefined } = {}) {
+  if (!token || !String(token).trim()) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'Q630',
+      error: 'Q630 --auth slack needs SLACK_BOT_TOKEN. Set SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=xoxb-… in your environment (docs/SLACK_SETUP.md).',
+    }
+  }
+  if (teamId && String(teamId).trim()) {
+    return { ok: true, teamId: String(teamId).trim() }
+  }
+  let auth
+  try {
+    auth = await slackPost('auth.test', {}, token, fetchImpl, api)
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (!e || !e.slackError) {
+      const why = (e && e.message) || 'network error'
+      return { ok: false, transient: true, code: 'Q636', error: `Q636 could not reach Slack (${why}). The token was not checked; check this machine's network and try again.` }
+    }
+    const why = (e && (e.slackError || e.code || e.message)) || 'auth_failed'
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'Q630',
+      error: `Q630 SLACK_BOT_TOKEN was rejected by Slack (${why}). Check SLACK_BOT_TOKEN or reinstall the Slack app (docs/SLACK_SETUP.md).`,
+    }
+  }
+  if (!auth || !auth.team_id) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'Q634',
+      error: 'Q634 Slack did not say which workspace the bot is in (auth.test returned no team_id), so external workspaces could not be refused. Pass --team <T…> (or SLACK_TEAM_ID) or reinstall the Slack app.',
+    }
+  }
+  const scopes = Array.isArray(auth._scopes) ? auth._scopes : null
+  if (Array.isArray(scopes) && !scopes.includes('users:read')) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      code: 'Q634',
+      error: 'Q634 SLACK_BOT_TOKEN is missing the users:read scope required to verify Slack callers. Reinstall your Slack app with slack-app-manifest-inbound.json (docs/SLACK_SETUP.md Section 5).',
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    teamId: String(auth.team_id),
+    scopes: scopes || [],
+    botUser: auth.user || 'Hivecode',
+    botUserId: auth.user_id || '',
+  }
+}
+
+export async function serve({
+  hive,
+  room = '',
+  port,
+  auth = 'slack',
+  signingSecret,
+  now,
+  tier = null,
+  trustProxy = TRUST_PROXY,
+  allow = [],
+  token = '',
+  teamId = '',
+  lookupUser = null,
+  api = undefined,
+  fetchImpl = undefined,
+  actorCheck = null,
+}) {
+  let resolvedTeamId = teamId
+  if (auth === 'slack' && !actorCheck) {
+    const pf = await preflightMcpSlack({ token, teamId, api, fetchImpl })
+    if (!pf.ok) throw new Error(pf.error)
+    resolvedTeamId = pf.teamId
+  }
+  const handle = makeHandler({
+    hive,
+    room,
+    auth,
+    signingSecret,
+    now,
+    tier,
+    trustProxy,
+    allow,
+    token,
+    teamId: resolvedTeamId,
+    lookupUser,
+    api,
+    fetchImpl,
+    actorCheck,
+  })
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    handle(req, res).catch(() => { try { res.writeHead(500); res.end('{}') } catch { /* already sent */ } })
+  })
+  return new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(port, () => resolve(server)))
+}
+
+export function resolveConfig(argv = process.argv.slice(2), env = process.env) {
+  const flag = (k, d = '') => { const i = argv.indexOf('--' + k); return i === -1 ? d : (argv[i + 1] || '') }
+  const link = argv.find((a) => !a.startsWith('--')) || ''
+  const port = Number(flag('port', '') || env.PORT || '8790')
+  const auth = flag('auth', 'slack')
+  const secret = env.SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET || ''
+  const allow = flag('allow', env.SLACK_ALLOW || '')
+  const token = env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN || ''
+  const teamId = flag('team', env.SLACK_TEAM_ID || '')
+  const name = flag('name', 'Hivecode')
+  const trustProxy = /^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(env.HIVE_TRUST_PROXY || '') || argv.includes('--trust-proxy')
+  const parsed = link ? parseLink(link) : { relay: '', room: '', token: null }
+  const hiveToken = parsed.token || env.HIVE_TOKEN || ''
+  return { link, relay: parsed.relay, room: parsed.room, port, auth, secret, allow, token, teamId, name, trustProxy, hiveToken }
+}
+
+// ---- main -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+export const USAGE = `usage:
+  SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET=… SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=xoxb-… npx -y hivecode-mcp@latest slack mcp-server "<relay|room>" [--port 8790] [--auth slack|none] [--allow <U123,U456>] [--trust-proxy]`
+
+export async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2), {
+  log = console.log,
+  logErr = console.error,
+  env = process.env,
+  fetchImpl = fetch,
+} = {}) {
+  if (argv.includes('--help') || argv.includes('-h') || argv.includes('help')) {
+    log(USAGE)
+    return 0
+  }
+  const cfg = resolveConfig(argv, env)
+  if (!cfg.link) {
+    logErr(USAGE)
+    return 2
+  }
+  // Fail closed. Starting in `slack` mode without a secret would silently serve an OPEN control
+  // plane for a room -- anybody who found the URL could stop every agent in it.
+  if (cfg.auth === 'slack' && !cfg.secret) {
+    logErr('Q510 --auth slack needs SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET. Use --auth none only on localhost.')
+    return 2
+  }
+  if (cfg.auth === 'slack' && !cfg.token) {
+    logErr('Q630 --auth slack needs SLACK_BOT_TOKEN. Set SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=xoxb-… in your environment (docs/SLACK_SETUP.md).')
+    return 2
+  }
+  let resolvedTeamId = cfg.teamId
+  if (cfg.auth === 'slack') {
+    const pf = await preflightMcpSlack({ token: cfg.token, teamId: cfg.teamId, fetchImpl })
+    if (!pf.ok) {
+      logErr(pf.error)
+      return 1
+    }
+    resolvedTeamId = pf.teamId
+  }
+  const hive = startSync({
+    relay: cfg.relay,
+    room: cfg.room,
+    dir: (env.TEMP || '.') + '/hive-mcp-http-' + cfg.room,
+    name: cfg.name,
+    kind: 'human',
+    token: cfg.hiveToken,
+    syncFiles: false,
+    log: () => {},
+  })
+  let server
+  try {
+    server = await serve({
+      hive,
+      room: cfg.room,
+      port: cfg.port,
+      auth: cfg.auth,
+      signingSecret: cfg.secret,
+      allow: cfg.allow,
+      token: cfg.token,
+      teamId: resolvedTeamId,
+      trustProxy: cfg.trustProxy,
+    })
+    log(`[hive-mcp-http] room ${cfg.room} on :${cfg.port}/  auth=${cfg.auth}`)
+    if (cfg.auth === 'none') log('  auth=none: do NOT expose this beyond localhost.')
+  } catch (e) {
+    logErr((e && e.message) || String(e))
+    try { hive.stop() } catch {}
+    return 1
+  }
+
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    let done = false
+    const finish = (code = 0) => {
+      if (done) return
+      done = true
+      process.removeListener('SIGINT', onSignal)
+      process.removeListener('SIGTERM', onSignal)
+      try { server.close() } catch {}
+      try { hive.stop() } catch {}
+      resolve(code)
+    }
+    const onSignal = () => finish(0)
+    process.once('SIGINT', onSignal)
+    process.once('SIGTERM', onSignal)
+    server.on('close', () => finish(0))
+  })
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === `file:///${process.argv[1].replace(/\\/g, '/')}`) {
+  main().then((code) => { if (code !== 0) process.exit(code) })
+}