hippo-memory 1.62.0 → 1.63.0

package/dist/connectors/github/signature.d.ts

@@ -8,24 +8,11 @@ export interface VerifyOpts {
 }
 export declare function verifyGitHubSignature(opts: VerifyOpts): boolean;
 /**
- * Source-aware idempotency key. v1.3.1 hotfix (codex round 1 P0 #3 + claude
- * round 2 P0 #3).
- *
- * Round 1 design: sha256(eventName + ':' + rawBody) so an attacker rotating
- * X-GitHub-Delivery cannot bypass dedupe.
- *
- * Round 2 found that key produced different hashes for the SAME source event
- * delivered via webhook vs via REST backfill, because backfill rawBody is the
- * REST list-item shape while webhook rawBody is the envelope. Result:
- * backfill + later webhook of the same issue created two `kind='raw'` rows
- * with the same artifact_ref. Combined with the deletion bug, deletion could
- * not archive both.
- *
- * v1.3.1 fix: key from the SOURCE-NORMALIZED identifier — artifact_ref plus
- * the source-side updated_at timestamp. Same artifact + same revision = same
- * key, regardless of which path delivered it. Different revisions of the same
- * issue (an edit) get different keys, which is correct: each edit IS a new
- * memory revision.
+ * Source-aware idempotency key: artifact_ref plus the source-side updated_at.
+ * A raw-body key would hash a webhook envelope and a REST backfill item of the
+ * SAME source event differently and ingest it twice. Same artifact + same
+ * revision = same key, whichever path delivered it; an edit gets a new key,
+ * which is correct because each edit IS a new memory revision.
  *
  * Both inputs are upstream-derived from the parsed event, not from the
  * unsigned delivery header — replay attacks still cannot bypass dedupe.
@@ -36,30 +23,13 @@ export declare function verifyGitHubSignature(opts: VerifyOpts): boolean;
  *   - updatedAt: source-side ISO timestamp (issue.updated_at,
  *     comment.updated_at, pull_request.updated_at). Empty string when the
  *     payload omits it (rare; older REST shapes).
- *
- * Migration note for v1.3.0 → v1.3.1: existing github_event_log rows from
- * v1.3.0 used the round-1 key shape and will not collide with v1.3.1 keys.
- * The first webhook delivery after upgrading creates a new log row with the
- * new key. This is acceptable for a hotfix (no production users on v1.3.0)
- * and correct semantics going forward.
  */
 export declare function computeIdempotencyKey(artifactRef: string, updatedAt: string | null | undefined): string;
 /**
- * v1.3.2: deletion-specific idempotency key. Distinct namespace from
- * computeIdempotencyKey so an ingest's row in github_event_log doesn't make
- * a deletion event return 'duplicate' before it gets a chance to archive.
- *
- * The codex round 3 P0 fix on server.ts was to call computeIdempotencyKey
- * with the right (artifactRef, updatedAt) shape for deletions. That made
- * the deletion key MATCH the ingest key — which collapsed to a "deletion
- * always returns duplicate" bug because both shared github_event_log.
- *
- * v1.3.2 splits the namespace: deletion key = sha256('deleted:' +
- * artifactRef + ':' + updatedAt). Two retries of the SAME deletion event
- * still dedupe (same artifact + same updatedAt + same prefix → same key).
- * Ingest of the same artifact + same updatedAt produces a DIFFERENT key,
- * so a deletion event does not get short-circuited by the ingest's prior
- * log row.
+ * Deletion-specific idempotency key: sha256('deleted:' + artifactRef + ':' +
+ * updatedAt). Distinct namespace from computeIdempotencyKey so an ingest's row
+ * in github_event_log doesn't make a deletion return 'duplicate' before it
+ * gets a chance to archive; retries of the SAME deletion still dedupe.
  *
  * Kept as a separate exported function so the namespace prefix is explicit
  * at every call site (server.ts deletion branches, deletion.ts, DLQ replay).

package/dist/connectors/github/signature.js

@@ -17,24 +17,11 @@ export function verifyGitHubSignature(opts) {
     return false;
 }
 /**
- * Source-aware idempotency key. v1.3.1 hotfix (codex round 1 P0 #3 + claude
- * round 2 P0 #3).
- *
- * Round 1 design: sha256(eventName + ':' + rawBody) so an attacker rotating
- * X-GitHub-Delivery cannot bypass dedupe.
- *
- * Round 2 found that key produced different hashes for the SAME source event
- * delivered via webhook vs via REST backfill, because backfill rawBody is the
- * REST list-item shape while webhook rawBody is the envelope. Result:
- * backfill + later webhook of the same issue created two `kind='raw'` rows
- * with the same artifact_ref. Combined with the deletion bug, deletion could
- * not archive both.
- *
- * v1.3.1 fix: key from the SOURCE-NORMALIZED identifier — artifact_ref plus
- * the source-side updated_at timestamp. Same artifact + same revision = same
- * key, regardless of which path delivered it. Different revisions of the same
- * issue (an edit) get different keys, which is correct: each edit IS a new
- * memory revision.
+ * Source-aware idempotency key: artifact_ref plus the source-side updated_at.
+ * A raw-body key would hash a webhook envelope and a REST backfill item of the
+ * SAME source event differently and ingest it twice. Same artifact + same
+ * revision = same key, whichever path delivered it; an edit gets a new key,
+ * which is correct because each edit IS a new memory revision.
  *
  * Both inputs are upstream-derived from the parsed event, not from the
  * unsigned delivery header — replay attacks still cannot bypass dedupe.
@@ -45,32 +32,15 @@ export function verifyGitHubSignature(opts) {
  *   - updatedAt: source-side ISO timestamp (issue.updated_at,
  *     comment.updated_at, pull_request.updated_at). Empty string when the
  *     payload omits it (rare; older REST shapes).
- *
- * Migration note for v1.3.0 → v1.3.1: existing github_event_log rows from
- * v1.3.0 used the round-1 key shape and will not collide with v1.3.1 keys.
- * The first webhook delivery after upgrading creates a new log row with the
- * new key. This is acceptable for a hotfix (no production users on v1.3.0)
- * and correct semantics going forward.
  */
 export function computeIdempotencyKey(artifactRef, updatedAt) {
     return createHash('sha256').update(`${artifactRef}:${updatedAt ?? ''}`).digest('hex');
 }
 /**
- * v1.3.2: deletion-specific idempotency key. Distinct namespace from
- * computeIdempotencyKey so an ingest's row in github_event_log doesn't make
- * a deletion event return 'duplicate' before it gets a chance to archive.
- *
- * The codex round 3 P0 fix on server.ts was to call computeIdempotencyKey
- * with the right (artifactRef, updatedAt) shape for deletions. That made
- * the deletion key MATCH the ingest key — which collapsed to a "deletion
- * always returns duplicate" bug because both shared github_event_log.
- *
- * v1.3.2 splits the namespace: deletion key = sha256('deleted:' +
- * artifactRef + ':' + updatedAt). Two retries of the SAME deletion event
- * still dedupe (same artifact + same updatedAt + same prefix → same key).
- * Ingest of the same artifact + same updatedAt produces a DIFFERENT key,
- * so a deletion event does not get short-circuited by the ingest's prior
- * log row.
+ * Deletion-specific idempotency key: sha256('deleted:' + artifactRef + ':' +
+ * updatedAt). Distinct namespace from computeIdempotencyKey so an ingest's row
+ * in github_event_log doesn't make a deletion return 'duplicate' before it
+ * gets a chance to archive; retries of the SAME deletion still dedupe.
  *
  * Kept as a separate exported function so the namespace prefix is explicit
  * at every call site (server.ts deletion branches, deletion.ts, DLQ replay).

package/dist/connectors/github/tenant-routing.d.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export interface ResolveArgs {
  *         is non-empty (multi-tenant install with foreign installation)
  *       - `installationId` is missing AND either routing table is non-empty
  *         AND no `repository.full_name` match (PAT-mode webhook from a foreign
- *         account — codex P0 #4 regression target)
+ *         account)
  *
  * Escape hatch: `GITHUB_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_INSTALLATION_FALLBACK=1` restores the
  * env fallback for emergency rollback only. Mirrors the Slack equivalent

package/dist/connectors/github/tenant-routing.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { envGithubAllowUnknownInstallationFallback, envTenant } from '../../env.
  *         is non-empty (multi-tenant install with foreign installation)
  *       - `installationId` is missing AND either routing table is non-empty
  *         AND no `repository.full_name` match (PAT-mode webhook from a foreign
- *         account — codex P0 #4 regression target)
+ *         account)
  *
  * Escape hatch: `GITHUB_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_INSTALLATION_FALLBACK=1` restores the
  * env fallback for emergency rollback only. Mirrors the Slack equivalent

package/dist/connectors/github/transform.js

@@ -5,13 +5,13 @@ import { scopeFromRepository } from './scope.js';
  * caller can mark the delivery seen for idempotency and skip the insert.
  *
  * Contract (mirrors src/connectors/slack/transform.ts):
- * - kind is the literal 'raw' (E1.x connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
+ * - kind is the literal 'raw' (connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
  * - artifact_ref formats are stable; deletion paths look up by these strings.
  *   - issue:               github://<owner/repo>/issue/<number>
  *   - issue_comment:       github://<owner/repo>/issue/<number>/comment/<id>
  *   - pull_request:        github://<owner/repo>/pull/<number>
  *   - pr_review_comment:   github://<owner/repo>/pull/<number>/review_comment/<id>
- * - owner is `user:github:<login>`. Required by the v0.40.0 provenance gate.
+ * - owner is `user:github:<login>`. Required by the provenance gate.
  * - scope is derived from repository.private via scopeFromRepository (default
  *   private when undetermined).
  */

package/dist/connectors/github/types.d.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,9 @@
  * header value so a malicious or misrouted payload cannot satisfy a guard
  * for the wrong event type.
  */
+import { type JsonValue } from '../../json.js';
 /**
- * Codex P1 #7: `private` MUST be optional, not required. The Slack-style
+ * `private` MUST be optional, not required. The Slack-style
  * fail-safe in scope.ts requires an envelope with `private: undefined` to
  * map to private; a strict boolean type would reject the payload before
  * scope can fail closed.
@@ -79,15 +80,6 @@ export interface GitHubPullRequestReviewCommentEvent extends GitHubWebhookEnvelo
         updated_at?: string;
     };
 }
-/**
- * The full value space `JSON.parse` can produce. Boundary-guard functions in
- * this file accept `JsonValue` (never `unknown`) so a value's origin as
- * unparsed external JSON stays visible in its type, then narrow it via the
- * `isJson*` predicates below.
- */
-export type JsonValue = string | number | boolean | null | JsonValue[] | {
-    [key: string]: JsonValue;
-};
 export declare function isGitHubWebhookEnvelope(x: JsonValue): x is JsonValue & GitHubWebhookEnvelope;
 export declare function isGitHubIssueEvent(x: JsonValue, evtHeader: string): x is JsonValue & GitHubIssueEvent;
 export declare function isGitHubIssueCommentEvent(x: JsonValue, evtHeader: string): x is JsonValue & GitHubIssueCommentEvent;

package/dist/connectors/github/types.js

@@ -7,12 +7,10 @@
  * header value so a malicious or misrouted payload cannot satisfy a guard
  * for the wrong event type.
  */
+import { isJsonString } from '../../json.js';
 function isJsonObject(x) {
     return x !== null && typeof x === 'object';
 }
-function isJsonString(x) {
-    return typeof x === 'string';
-}
 function isJsonNumber(x) {
     return typeof x === 'number';
 }

package/dist/connectors/slack/deletion.d.ts

@@ -11,14 +11,9 @@ export interface DeletionResult {
     memoryId: string | null;
 }
 /**
- * Handle Slack `message_deleted`. v0.39 commit 3 closes the prior race where
- * the archive committed but `markEventSeen` ran on a second db handle — a
- * crash between them left the deletion event un-acked, and the next retry
- * hit a now-archived row and returned `not_found` instead of `duplicate`.
- *
- * Fix: pass `afterArchive` to `archiveRaw`, which runs inside the same
- * SAVEPOINT as the archive itself. The slack_event_log row commits with the
- * archive or not at all.
+ * Handle Slack `message_deleted`. `afterArchive` runs inside the archive's own
+ * SAVEPOINT, so the slack_event_log row commits with the archive or not at all
+ * and a crash cannot leave a retry hitting `not_found` instead of `duplicate`.
  */
 export declare function handleMessageDeleted(ctx: Context, input: DeletionInput): DeletionResult;
 //# sourceMappingURL=deletion.d.ts.map

package/dist/connectors/slack/deletion.js

@@ -2,14 +2,9 @@ import { archiveRaw } from '../../api.js';
 import { openHippoDb, closeHippoDb } from '../../db.js';
 import { markEventSeen, hasSeenEvent } from './idempotency.js';
 /**
- * Handle Slack `message_deleted`. v0.39 commit 3 closes the prior race where
- * the archive committed but `markEventSeen` ran on a second db handle — a
- * crash between them left the deletion event un-acked, and the next retry
- * hit a now-archived row and returned `not_found` instead of `duplicate`.
- *
- * Fix: pass `afterArchive` to `archiveRaw`, which runs inside the same
- * SAVEPOINT as the archive itself. The slack_event_log row commits with the
- * archive or not at all.
+ * Handle Slack `message_deleted`. `afterArchive` runs inside the archive's own
+ * SAVEPOINT, so the slack_event_log row commits with the archive or not at all
+ * and a crash cannot leave a retry hitting `not_found` instead of `duplicate`.
  */
 export function handleMessageDeleted(ctx, input) {
     const db = openHippoDb(ctx.hippoRoot);

package/dist/connectors/slack/dlq.d.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export interface DlqItem {
     slackTimestamp: string | null;
 }
 /**
- * v0.39 commit 3: writeToDlq is now bucket-aware. `bucket` defaults to
+ * writeToDlq is bucket-aware. `bucket` defaults to
  * 'parse_error' to preserve the legacy single-arg call sites while letting
  * new callers tag rows for `hippo slack dlq replay` triage.
  *

package/dist/connectors/slack/ingest.d.ts

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ export interface IngestResult {
  *   and the SAVEPOINT, we throw `DuplicateEventError` to roll back the memory
  *   write. The pre-check `hasSeenEvent` stays as a fast path for the common
  *   already-seen case, but the afterWrite throw is what makes idempotency
- *   correct under two-worker concurrency (v0.39 commit 3 fix).
+ *   correct under two-worker concurrency.
  * - Empty-body messages return 'skipped' but still mark seen so a replay
  *   returns 'duplicate' rather than re-running the transform.
  */

package/dist/connectors/slack/ingest.js

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { messageToRememberOpts } from './transform.js';
  *   and the SAVEPOINT, we throw `DuplicateEventError` to roll back the memory
  *   write. The pre-check `hasSeenEvent` stays as a fast path for the common
  *   already-seen case, but the afterWrite throw is what makes idempotency
- *   correct under two-worker concurrency (v0.39 commit 3 fix).
+ *   correct under two-worker concurrency.
  * - Empty-body messages return 'skipped' but still mark seen so a replay
  *   returns 'duplicate' rather than re-running the transform.
  */
@@ -25,12 +25,8 @@ export function ingestMessage(ctx, input) {
     const db = openHippoDb(ctx.hippoRoot);
     try {
         if (hasSeenEvent(db, input.eventId)) {
-            // v1.12.6 fix (B3): empty-body events mark seen with memory_id=NULL on
-            // first call (see line further down). Their replay should return the
-            // same 'skipped' status they originally returned, not 'duplicate' —
-            // the asymmetry was a paper-cut for callers that switch/case on
-            // status. memory_id=NULL is the discriminator. Non-NULL memory_id
-            // means an actual memory was ingested before, so 'duplicate' is correct.
+            // Empty-body events are marked seen with memory_id=NULL, so their replay returns the same 'skipped'
+            // they first returned; a non-NULL memory_id means a memory was ingested, so 'duplicate'.
             const cachedId = lookupMemoryByEvent(db, input.eventId);
             return { status: cachedId === null ? 'skipped' : 'duplicate', memoryId: cachedId };
         }
@@ -65,11 +61,8 @@ export function ingestMessage(ctx, input) {
     }
 }
 function rememberWithEventLog(ctx, eventId, opts) {
-    // v1.12.0: drop the legacy `|| 'connector:slack'` fallback — ctx is always
-    // provided by server.ts:1039 which constructs it with the connector subject.
-    // Under the new object-shaped Context.actor, an OR-fallback would evaluate
-    // an object as truthy and skip the fallback anyway (logic bug if ctx were
-    // ever missing); explicit reliance on the caller is safer.
+    // No `|| 'connector:slack'` fallback: the caller always builds ctx with the connector subject, and with
+    // an object-shaped Context.actor an OR-fallback would never fire anyway.
     const result = remember(ctx, {
         ...opts,
         untrusted: true,
@@ -101,10 +94,8 @@ function lostRaceResult(ctx, eventId) {
     }
 }
 function rejectedValueResult(ctx, eventId) {
-    // AT1 (plan §3 containment): a tombstone hit is a PERMANENT skip, not
-    // a transient failure — never DLQ-retry it (retrying would just hit
-    // the same refusal forever). Mark the event seen exactly like the
-    // empty-body branch above so a Slack retry acks as done, not error.
+    // A tombstone hit is a PERMANENT skip: a DLQ retry would hit the same refusal forever, so mark the
+    // event seen like the empty-body branch above and let a Slack retry ack as done, not error.
     const db4 = openHippoDb(ctx.hippoRoot);
     try {
         markEventSeen(db4, eventId, null);

package/dist/connectors/slack/signature.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ export interface VerifyOpts {
     signature: string;
     signingSecret: string;
     /**
-     * Previous signing secret during a rotation. v0.39 commit 3: deploy with
+     * Previous signing secret during a rotation. Deploy with
      * both `SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET` (new) and `SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET_PREVIOUS` (old)
      * set, verify both work, drop previous after rollover. The verifier tries
      * `signingSecret` first, then `previousSecret` if that fails.

package/dist/connectors/slack/tenant-routing.d.ts

@@ -11,11 +11,9 @@ import type { DatabaseSyncLike } from '../../db.js';
  *     deployment's tenant). Escape hatch: SLACK_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_TEAM_FALLBACK=1
  *     restores the env fallback for emergency rollback only.
  *
- * v0.39 commit 3 (CRITICAL #5): the previous version returned null on miss
- * unconditionally, and the route handler then fell back to HIPPO_TENANT —
- * which silently routed events from a foreign workspace into the deployment
- * tenant. The fail-closed contract lives here so every caller (route handler,
- * CLI replay, future MCP) gets the same protection.
+ * The fail-closed contract lives here so every caller (route handler, CLI
+ * replay, future MCP) gets the same protection against routing a foreign
+ * workspace's events into the deployment tenant.
  */
 export declare function resolveTenantForTeam(db: DatabaseSyncLike, teamId: string): string | null;
 //# sourceMappingURL=tenant-routing.d.ts.map

package/dist/connectors/slack/tenant-routing.js

@@ -11,11 +11,9 @@ import { envSlackAllowUnknownTeamFallback, envTenant } from '../../env.js';
  *     deployment's tenant). Escape hatch: SLACK_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_TEAM_FALLBACK=1
  *     restores the env fallback for emergency rollback only.
  *
- * v0.39 commit 3 (CRITICAL #5): the previous version returned null on miss
- * unconditionally, and the route handler then fell back to HIPPO_TENANT —
- * which silently routed events from a foreign workspace into the deployment
- * tenant. The fail-closed contract lives here so every caller (route handler,
- * CLI replay, future MCP) gets the same protection.
+ * The fail-closed contract lives here so every caller (route handler, CLI
+ * replay, future MCP) gets the same protection against routing a foreign
+ * workspace's events into the deployment tenant.
  */
 export function resolveTenantForTeam(db, teamId) {
     // SAFETY: query selects only `tenant_id`, so a returned row has that shape;

package/dist/connectors/slack/transform.d.ts

@@ -12,18 +12,17 @@ export interface TransformInput {
  * without text). Caller treats null as "skip but mark idempotency seen".
  *
  * Contract:
- * - kind is the literal 'raw' (E1.x connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
+ * - kind is the literal 'raw' (connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
  * - artifact_ref format MUST be exactly `slack://${teamId}/${channelId}/${ts}`;
- *   the deletion path (Task 9) looks up by this string.
- * - owner is non-null whenever a row is written. Required by the v0.40.0
+ *   the deletion path looks up by this string.
+ * - owner is non-null whenever a row is written. Required by the
  *   provenance gate (`hippo provenance --strict`).
  *   - `user:<slack_user_id>` when the event carries a `user`.
  *   - `bot:<bot_id>` for the `bot_message` subtype (or any userless+text event
  *     that supplies bot_id).
  *   - `bot:unknown` only as a last-resort sentinel so the gate never sees null.
- *     Codex round 1 P1: skipping userless messages instead of stamping a bot
- *     owner would silently drop existing bot ingestion via the
- *     "skipped but seen" path at ingest.ts:54-65.
+ *     Skipping userless messages instead would silently drop bot ingestion
+ *     via the "skipped but seen" path in ingest.ts.
  */
 export declare function messageToRememberOpts(input: TransformInput): RememberOpts | null;
 //# sourceMappingURL=transform.d.ts.map

package/dist/connectors/slack/transform.js

@@ -5,18 +5,17 @@ import { scopeFromChannel } from './scope.js';
  * without text). Caller treats null as "skip but mark idempotency seen".
  *
  * Contract:
- * - kind is the literal 'raw' (E1.x connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
+ * - kind is the literal 'raw' (connector boundary, see src/importers.ts).
  * - artifact_ref format MUST be exactly `slack://${teamId}/${channelId}/${ts}`;
- *   the deletion path (Task 9) looks up by this string.
- * - owner is non-null whenever a row is written. Required by the v0.40.0
+ *   the deletion path looks up by this string.
+ * - owner is non-null whenever a row is written. Required by the
  *   provenance gate (`hippo provenance --strict`).
  *   - `user:<slack_user_id>` when the event carries a `user`.
  *   - `bot:<bot_id>` for the `bot_message` subtype (or any userless+text event
  *     that supplies bot_id).
  *   - `bot:unknown` only as a last-resort sentinel so the gate never sees null.
- *     Codex round 1 P1: skipping userless messages instead of stamping a bot
- *     owner would silently drop existing bot ingestion via the
- *     "skipped but seen" path at ingest.ts:54-65.
+ *     Skipping userless messages instead would silently drop bot ingestion
+ *     via the "skipped but seen" path in ingest.ts.
  */
 export function messageToRememberOpts(input) {
     const text = input.message.text?.trim();

package/dist/connectors/slack/types.d.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
  * Slack Events API envelope shapes used by the ingestion connector.
  * Spec: https://api.slack.com/events-api
  */
+import { type JsonValue } from '../../json.js';
 export interface SlackUrlVerification {
     type: 'url_verification';
     challenge: string;
@@ -18,18 +19,13 @@ export interface SlackMessageEvent {
     thread_ts?: string;
     /**
      * Slack `bot_message` subtype carries `bot_id` instead of `user`. The
-     * v0.40.0 provenance gate requires a non-null `owner`, so transform.ts
+     * provenance gate requires a non-null `owner`, so transform.ts
      * derives `owner: bot:<bot_id>` when `user` is absent.
      */
     bot_id?: string;
     /** Present on subtype='message_deleted'. */
     deleted_ts?: string;
 }
-/** JSON value shape for the parts of an inbound Slack payload not yet
- *  narrowed to a known envelope/event shape. */
-export type JsonValue = string | number | boolean | null | JsonValue[] | {
-    [key: string]: JsonValue;
-};
 export interface SlackEventEnvelope {
     type: 'event_callback';
     team_id: string;

package/dist/connectors/slack/types.js

@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@
  * Slack Events API envelope shapes used by the ingestion connector.
  * Spec: https://api.slack.com/events-api
  */
-function isJsonString(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'string';
-}
+import { isJsonString } from '../../json.js';
 function isJsonNumber(value) {
     return typeof value === 'number';
 }

package/dist/connectors/slack/web-client.js

@@ -1,7 +1,14 @@
 import { fetchWithRetry, isRetryableStatus } from '../../http-retry.js';
-function isJsonString(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'string';
-}
+import { isJsonString } from '../../json.js';
+/**
+ * Build a SlackHistoryFetcher that pages `conversations.history` over real
+ * HTTP. Wraps `fetchWithRetry` so 429 and 5xx handling is automatic. The returned
+ * fetcher is the one `backfillChannel` consumes.
+ *
+ * Slack omits `channel` from messages in the history response, so we stamp
+ * the request channel id onto each parsed message — downstream ingest needs
+ * it on every event.
+ */
 const SLACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
 export function slackHistoryFetcher(token, fetchImpl) {
     return async ({ channelId, cursor, oldest }) => {

package/dist/connectors/slack/workspaces.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
 /**
- * Slack workspace registration helpers (T2B follow-up, 2026-05-24).
+ * Slack workspace registration helpers.
  *
  * The `slack_workspaces` table maps Slack `team_id` → hippo `tenant_id`.
  * Empty table = single-tenant install (HIPPO_TENANT fallback).
  * Non-empty = multi-workspace install (fail-closed routing via
  * `resolveTenantForTeam`).
  *
- * Before T2B, populating this table required direct SQL — fine for a
- * single-machine deployment, awkward for operators with multiple
- * workspaces. These helpers give the CLI (`hippo slack workspaces
- * add|list|remove`) a clean surface.
+ * These helpers give the CLI (`hippo slack workspaces add|list|remove`) a
+ * surface, so operators with multiple workspaces need no direct SQL.
  *
  * Design choices:
  *   - `add` is an upsert (ON CONFLICT UPDATE). Re-registering an

package/dist/connectors/slack/workspaces.js

@@ -1,15 +1,13 @@
 /**
- * Slack workspace registration helpers (T2B follow-up, 2026-05-24).
+ * Slack workspace registration helpers.
  *
  * The `slack_workspaces` table maps Slack `team_id` → hippo `tenant_id`.
  * Empty table = single-tenant install (HIPPO_TENANT fallback).
  * Non-empty = multi-workspace install (fail-closed routing via
  * `resolveTenantForTeam`).
  *
- * Before T2B, populating this table required direct SQL — fine for a
- * single-machine deployment, awkward for operators with multiple
- * workspaces. These helpers give the CLI (`hippo slack workspaces
- * add|list|remove`) a clean surface.
+ * These helpers give the CLI (`hippo slack workspaces add|list|remove`) a
+ * surface, so operators with multiple workspaces need no direct SQL.
  *
  * Design choices:
  *   - `add` is an upsert (ON CONFLICT UPDATE). Re-registering an

package/dist/consolidate/conflicts.js

@@ -28,15 +28,11 @@ const CONFLICT_STOPWORDS = new Set([
 ]);
 /** Pairs of live non-semantic memories that contradict each other, in survivor order. */
 export function detectConflicts(entries, now, decayOpts = {}, 
-// LC2-E3 (opt-in, default off): ids rescued by this cycle's decay pass.
-// detectConflicts recomputes its own strength>=DECAY_THRESHOLD survivor
-// filter independently of the decay pass above; without this bypass,
-// rescued entries would be silently re-excluded from conflict detection
-// every cycle even though the decay pass just decided to keep them.
-// Default empty set: flag-off behavior is unchanged.
+// Ids this cycle's decay pass rescued: the survivor filter below is recomputed independently, so
+// without this bypass rescued entries would be silently re-excluded from conflict detection.
 rescuedIds = new Set()) {
     const survivors = entries.filter((entry) => entry.layer !== Layer.Semantic
-        // CD5: an unreviewed quarantined row must not taint a visible memory as conflicted.
+        // An unreviewed quarantined row must not taint a visible memory as conflicted.
         && !isQuarantineScope(entry.scope ?? null)
         && (rescuedIds.has(entry.id) || calculateStrength(entry, now, decayOpts) >= DECAY_THRESHOLD));
     const detected = [];
@@ -165,13 +161,6 @@ function inferConflictPolarity(text) {
         return 'positive';
     return 'neutral';
 }
-function stripConflictPolarity(text) {
-    return text
-        .toLowerCase()
-        .replace(/\b(?:not|never|no|don['’]?t|do\s+not|doesn['’]?t|does\s+not|can['’]?t|cannot|shouldn['’]?t|should\s+not|enabled|enable|disabled|disable|on|off|true|false|always|must|must\s+not|works?|working|missing|broken|failed|available|present)\b/g, ' ')
-        .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
-        .trim();
-}
 function containsAny(text, needles) {
     return needles.some((needle) => text.includes(needle));
 }

package/dist/consolidate/decay.js

@@ -38,17 +38,8 @@ function keepSurvivor(run, entry, strength) {
 // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // 1. Decay pass
 // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// LC2-E3 (opt-in, default off; docs/plans/2026-08-10-lc2-e3-mv-wiring.md):
-// flag OFF keeps the single-phase loop below byte-identical to pre-E3
-// behavior (pre-registered gate G2). Flag ON restructures into two phases:
-// phase 1 classifies every entry (condemned vs survivor) with ZERO
-// commits; phase 2 runs rescueSet over the per-tenant candidate groups,
-// then commits — rescued entries get the standard survivor bookkeeping
-// refresh (stored strength + effective confidence; no half-life edits, no
-// rank-derived writes) and are pushed to survivors so they fully
-// participate in this cycle's merge/physics/conflict passes; non-rescued
-// condemned entries follow the existing pendingDeletes/result.removed/
-// details path.
+// Memory-value flag OFF runs the single-phase loop below. Flag ON classifies every entry with ZERO commits,
+// runs rescueSet per tenant, then commits; rescued entries stay full survivors for this cycle's later passes.
 export function decayPass(run) {
     if (run.config.memoryValue.enabled)
         return decayWithMemoryValue(run);
@@ -76,10 +67,8 @@ function reportNonFiniteScores(result, rankById) {
 }
 function decayWithMemoryValue(run) {
     const { all, now, result } = run;
-    // Carried forward to logRun, where the mv_rescue audit rows are actually
-    // written (code-review fix: writing them here, before batchWriteAndDelete,
-    // would assert rescues for a cycle whose effects might never land if a
-    // later phase throws).
+    // Carried forward to logRun, where the mv_rescue audit rows are written: writing them here, before
+    // batchWriteAndDelete, would assert rescues whose effects might never land if a later phase throws.
     const rescuedEntries = [];
     let rescuedIds = new Set();
     let rankById = new Map();
@@ -98,31 +87,22 @@ function decayWithMemoryValue(run) {
     // logRun stay !dryRun-gated), so the preview matches what a
     // real run would decide.
     const condemnedIds = new Set(condemned.map((e) => e.id));
-    // Fail-loud must not depend on condemnation traffic (round-2 code-review
-    // P2-2): validate the frozen weights constant unconditionally, even on a
-    // sleep with nothing condemned.
+    // Fail-loud must not depend on condemnation traffic: validate the frozen weights even when nothing is condemned.
     validateWeights();
     if (condemnedIds.size > 0) {
-        // Compute the per-tenant ranking ONCE (round-2 code-review P2-2):
-        // rankById feeds both rescueSet's decision (via precomputedRanks,
-        // skipping its own internal rankNonPinnedByTenant call) and the
-        // detail/audit rank context below, so the whole-store ranking pass
-        // runs a single time per sleep instead of twice, and only when there
-        // is actually something condemned to rank against.
+        // Rank per tenant ONCE: rankById feeds both rescueSet (via precomputedRanks) and the detail/audit
+        // context below, so the whole-store ranking runs once per sleep and only when something is condemned.
         rankById = rankNonPinnedByTenant(all, now);
         rescuedIds = rescueSet(all, condemnedIds, now, MEMORY_VALUE_WEIGHTS, SOURCE_ARTIFACT_SHA256, rankById);
         reportNonFiniteScores(result, rankById);
     }
     // --- Phase 2b: commit, one pass over `all` in ITS ORIGINAL ORDER ---
-    // (review-round F4: rescued entries used to be appended at the tail of
-    // survivors, systematically starving them in downstream order-sensitive
-    // passes like extraction's slice(0,20) — a single pass over `all`
-    // preserves flag-off's ordering semantics exactly.)
+    // Rescued entries appended at the tail would be starved by order-sensitive passes like extraction's slice(0,20).
     for (const entry of all) {
         const strength = strengthById.get(entry.id);
         if (run.retirable(entry) && strength < DECAY_THRESHOLD) {
             if (rescuedIds.has(entry.id)) {
-                // Rescued (D1): standard survivor stored-strength refresh (P2-1).
+                // Rescued: standard survivor stored-strength refresh.
                 // Confidence is left alone here: it is an epistemic tier, not a
                 // cached computation, so resolveConfidence derives it on read.
                 rescuedEntries.push(keepSurvivor(run, entry, strength));