hazo_secure 1.4.0 → 1.6.0

package/CHANGE_LOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,87 @@
 # Change Log
 
+## Unreleased — fetch dispatcher bugfix (2026-07-22)
+
+**NOTE (extractor_asx build session):** found and fixed while wiring
+`extractor_asx`'s live dividends-extraction smoke test. Left un-numbered
+since `1.6.0` above already has substantial unrelated in-progress work
+staged in this working tree — fold into `1.6.0` or ship as `1.6.1`,
+whichever fits how you're cutting the release.
+
+### Fixed: `hazo_secure/fetch` — `createSecureDispatcher`'s DNS lookup broke EVERY real fetch
+
+- `src/fetch/dispatcher.ts`'s custom undici `Agent` `connect.lookup` ignored
+  the `options` undici actually passes (`{hints, all:true}` on every real
+  request — confirmed by logging it), always calling back with a single
+  `(address, family)` pair regardless. Node's `net` connect logic expects an
+  array of `{address,family}` records when `all:true` was requested; getting
+  a bare string instead threw `TypeError [ERR_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS]: Invalid
+  IP address: undefined` deep inside `net`, which undici's `fetch` wrapped
+  as an opaque `TypeError: fetch failed` with the real cause hidden in
+  `.cause`. **This broke every real HTTPS fetch through `safeFetch`** —
+  reproduced against multiple unrelated hosts, not specific to one site.
+- Fix: `lookup` now always resolves via `dns.lookup(hostname, {all:true},
+  cb)` internally, validates (SSRF-checks) **every** returned address (not
+  just the first — a multi-record response could mix a public and a
+  private/rebound IP), then reshapes the result to match what the caller
+  actually asked for (single pair vs array) via a new exported pure
+  function, `shapeLookupResult`, added specifically so this logic is
+  unit-testable without mocking `node:dns` (this package's `test/` has no
+  existing DNS-mocking seam).
+- New tests in `test/fetch/dispatcher.test.ts` (`describe('shapeLookupResult', ...)`)
+  cover the `all:true`/`all:false` shaping and confirm a private IP anywhere
+  in a multi-record response is caught, not just the first record.
+- Verified against the real failing case: `safeFetch('https://www.macquarie.com/...')`
+  went from throwing `fetch failed` to a real `200` with the full page body.
+
+## 1.6.0 — 2026-07-22
+
+### New: `hazo_secure/mask/display` — client-safe display masks
+
+- **`maskTFN` / `maskABN` moved to a new `hazo_secure/mask/display` subpath**
+  (`src/mask/display.ts`), a pure module with **no Node built-in imports**.
+  `hazo_secure/mask` (`src/mask/index.ts`) statically imports `node:crypto`
+  and `node:module` (`createRequire`, for the lazy `wink-nlp` load in
+  `redact_pii`), so it cannot be bundled for the browser. Consumers that only
+  need the display masks in client/browser code must import from
+  `hazo_secure/mask/display`.
+- **Back-compat:** `hazo_secure/mask` still re-exports `maskTFN`/`maskABN`
+  (via `export { maskTFN, maskABN } from './display'`), so existing
+  server-side imports are unchanged. No API surface removed.
+
+## 1.5.0 — 2026-07-21
+
+### New: `hazo_secure/mask` — `maskTFN` / `maskABN` display masks
+
+- **`maskTFN(tfn)`** — masks an Australian Tax File Number for display,
+  revealing only the last 3 digits (`"***-***-789"`). Strips whitespace
+  before masking so both `"123456789"` and `"123 456 789"` normalise the
+  same way. Returns `"***"` for inputs too short to safely reveal 3 digits,
+  `""` for null/undefined/empty.
+- **`maskABN(abn)`** — same shape for Australian Business Numbers
+  (`"**-***-***-901"`).
+- Deliberately not added to `BUILTIN_TRANSFORMS` — these take no `maskKey`
+  and aren't deterministic-by-key like the existing DB-anonymisation
+  transforms; they're pure display formatting. Ported from Hazodocs
+  `lib/formatting.ts` (`maskTFN`/`maskABN`, previously app-local per D-011).
+
+### New: `hazo_secure/crypto` — `randomCode` / `randomToken` / `hashToken` / `verifyToken`
+
+- **`randomCode(length = 16)`** — cryptographically secure code from a
+  human-readable alphabet (`[A-Z2-9]`, excludes ambiguous `0`/`O`/`1`/`I`/`L`).
+  Throws for `length < 8` (inadequate entropy).
+- **`randomToken(bytes = 32)`** — cryptographically secure base64url token
+  (43 chars at the default byte length).
+- **`hashToken(raw)`** — scrypt-hashes a raw token under a random 16-byte
+  salt for at-rest storage; returns `"<saltHex>:<hashHex>"`.
+- **`verifyToken(raw, stored)`** — recomputes the scrypt hash under the
+  embedded salt and compares in constant time via `timingSafeEqual`. Fails
+  closed (`false`, never throws) for a malformed `stored` value.
+- Added as a sibling module (`src/crypto/tokens.ts`) alongside the existing
+  `signHmac`/`verifyHmac` primitives in the same `./crypto` subpath — no new
+  subpath export. Ported from Hazodocs `lib/security/random.ts` and
+  `lib/invitations/tokens.ts`.
+
 ## 1.4.0 — 2026-07-12
 
 ### New: `hazo_secure/crypto` — generic HMAC sign/verify primitive

package/README.md

@@ -93,6 +93,33 @@ gdpr.registerExporter({
 });
 ```
 
+## New in 1.5.0
+
+### `hazo_secure/mask` — `maskTFN` / `maskABN` display masks
+
+```ts
+import { maskTFN, maskABN } from "hazo_secure/mask";
+
+maskTFN("123 456 789");    // "***-***-789"
+maskABN("12 345 678 901"); // "**-***-***-901"
+```
+
+Pure display formatting for Australian Tax File Numbers / ABNs — reveals only the last 3 digits, tolerant of space-formatted input, `""` for null/undefined/empty. Not part of `BUILTIN_TRANSFORMS` (no `maskKey`, not a DB-anonymisation transform).
+
+### `hazo_secure/crypto` — `randomCode` / `randomToken` / `hashToken` / `verifyToken`
+
+```ts
+import { randomCode, randomToken, hashToken, verifyToken } from "hazo_secure/crypto";
+
+const code = randomCode();          // "K7XQ9M2Z4RHY8VNC" — human-readable, no 0/O/1/I/L
+const token = randomToken();        // base64url, 32 random bytes by default
+
+const stored = await hashToken(token);          // "<saltHex>:<hashHex>" — store this
+const ok = await verifyToken(token, stored);     // true
+```
+
+`hashToken`/`verifyToken` use scrypt with a random per-token salt; `verifyToken` fails closed (`false`, never throws) for a malformed stored value.
+
 ## New in 1.0.0
 
 ### `hazo_secure/ratelimit` — ConnectRateLimitStore (token bucket)

package/dist/crypto/index.d.ts

@@ -55,6 +55,51 @@ type HmacVerifyResult = {
  */
 declare function verifyHmac(token: string, secret: string): HmacVerifyResult;
 
+/**
+ * Generate a cryptographically secure random code using a human-readable
+ * base32-ish alphabet. Excludes visually ambiguous characters (`0`/`O`,
+ * `1`/`I`/`L`) to minimize transcription errors — suitable for codes a
+ * person reads aloud or copies from a screen/print-out (invitation codes,
+ * short-lived verification codes, etc.).
+ *
+ * @param length - desired code length (default: 16 chars)
+ * @throws {Error} if `length < 8` (inadequate entropy)
+ * @returns a string of `length` characters drawn from `[A-Z2-9]` excluding `0`/`O`/`1`/`I`/`L`
+ */
+declare function randomCode(length?: number): string;
+/**
+ * Generate a cryptographically secure random token in base64url encoding.
+ * Suitable for session tokens, API keys, password-reset tokens, and
+ * invitation tokens.
+ *
+ * @param bytes - number of random bytes (default: 32, resulting in 43 base64url chars)
+ * @returns a base64url string (no `+`, `/`, or `=` padding)
+ */
+declare function randomToken(bytes?: number): string;
+/**
+ * Hash a raw token for at-rest storage using scrypt with a random 16-byte
+ * salt. The returned string embeds the salt so `verifyToken` doesn't need it
+ * supplied separately — store the returned string verbatim (e.g. in a
+ * `token_hash` column) and discard the raw token.
+ *
+ * Format: `<saltHex>:<hashHex>` (scrypt output is 64 bytes / 128 hex chars).
+ *
+ * @param raw - the plaintext token to hash (e.g. output of `randomToken`)
+ * @returns `"<saltHex>:<hashHex>"`
+ */
+declare function hashToken(raw: string): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verify a raw token against a hash produced by `hashToken`. Recomputes the
+ * scrypt hash under the embedded salt and compares in constant time via
+ * `timingSafeEqual`. Fails closed — returns `false` (never throws) for a
+ * malformed `stored` value (wrong shape, non-hex segments, etc.).
+ *
+ * @param raw - the plaintext token supplied by the caller
+ * @param stored - the `"<saltHex>:<hashHex>"` string previously returned by `hashToken`
+ * @returns `true` if `raw` hashes to `stored` under its embedded salt, else `false`
+ */
+declare function verifyToken(raw: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
 /**
  * Source of symmetric keys for `encryptField` / `decryptField`. The current
  * key is used for encryption; `byId` resolves any key (current or rotated-out)
@@ -201,4 +246,4 @@ declare class LookupKeyProvider implements KeyProvider {
  *  Convention: `<table>:<entityId>:<field>` — collision-free across tables. */
 declare function aadFor(table: string, entityId: string, field: string): string;
 
-export { CryptoError, type CryptoErrorCode, type EncryptedField, EnvKeyProvider, type HmacVerifyResult, HttpKeyProvider, type HttpKeyProviderOptions, type KeyProvider, LookupKeyProvider, StaticKeyProvider, aadFor, decryptField, encryptField, signHmac, verifyHmac };
+export { CryptoError, type CryptoErrorCode, type EncryptedField, EnvKeyProvider, type HmacVerifyResult, HttpKeyProvider, type HttpKeyProviderOptions, type KeyProvider, LookupKeyProvider, StaticKeyProvider, aadFor, decryptField, encryptField, hashToken, randomCode, randomToken, signHmac, verifyHmac, verifyToken };

package/dist/crypto/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // src/crypto/index.ts
-import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "crypto";
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes as randomBytes2 } from "crypto";
 import { HazoError } from "hazo_core";
 
 // src/crypto/provider-http.ts
@@ -128,6 +128,38 @@ function verifyHmac(token, secret) {
   return { valid: true, payload };
 }
 
+// src/crypto/tokens.ts
+import { randomBytes, randomInt, scryptSync, timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqual2 } from "crypto";
+var CODE_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTUVWXYZ23456789";
+var SCRYPT_KEY_LEN = 64;
+function randomCode(length = 16) {
+  if (length < 8) {
+    throw new Error(`randomCode length must be >= 8 for adequate entropy (got ${length})`);
+  }
+  let out = "";
+  for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+    out += CODE_ALPHABET[randomInt(0, CODE_ALPHABET.length)];
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function randomToken(bytes = 32) {
+  return randomBytes(bytes).toString("base64url");
+}
+async function hashToken(raw) {
+  const salt = randomBytes(16);
+  const hash = scryptSync(raw, salt, SCRYPT_KEY_LEN);
+  return `${salt.toString("hex")}:${hash.toString("hex")}`;
+}
+async function verifyToken(raw, stored) {
+  const [saltHex, hashHex] = stored.split(":");
+  if (!saltHex || !hashHex) return false;
+  const salt = Buffer.from(saltHex, "hex");
+  const expected = Buffer.from(hashHex, "hex");
+  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return false;
+  const candidate = scryptSync(raw, salt, SCRYPT_KEY_LEN);
+  return candidate.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual2(candidate, expected);
+}
+
 // src/crypto/index.ts
 var CryptoError = class extends HazoError {
   constructor(message, code) {
@@ -159,7 +191,7 @@ async function encryptField(plaintext, opts) {
       "invalid_key"
     );
   }
-  const iv = randomBytes(IV_LEN);
+  const iv = randomBytes2(IV_LEN);
   const cipher = createCipheriv(ALG, key, iv, { authTagLength: TAG_LEN });
   if (opts.aad) cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(opts.aad, "utf8"));
   const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
@@ -317,6 +349,10 @@ export {
   aadFor,
   decryptField,
   encryptField,
+  hashToken,
+  randomCode,
+  randomToken,
   signHmac,
-  verifyHmac
+  verifyHmac,
+  verifyToken
 };

package/dist/fetch/index.d.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,23 @@ declare function validateConnectIp(ip: string): void;
  * record flips after the pre-flight check, the IP is re-validated here.
  *
  * Node 18+ ships undici as a built-in; we pin an explicit dep for stability.
+ *
+ * BUGFIX (2026-07-22): undici's Agent invokes this `lookup` with
+ * `{hints, all:true}` on every real request (confirmed by logging the actual
+ * options undici passes) — the previous implementation ignored `_options`
+ * entirely and always called back with a single `(address, family)` pair.
+ * When `net`'s internal connect logic expects an array (because it asked for
+ * `all:true`) but gets a bare string instead, it throws
+ * `TypeError [ERR_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS]: Invalid IP address: undefined` —
+ * which undici's fetch wraps as a generic `TypeError: fetch failed` with no
+ * indication of the real cause. This broke EVERY real HTTPS fetch through
+ * this dispatcher (reproduced against multiple unrelated hosts, not
+ * something specific to one site) — pre-flight `validateUrl`'s DNS check
+ * passing gave false confidence that fetches would actually succeed.
+ * `dns.lookup` is now always called with `{all:true}` internally regardless
+ * of what the caller asked for, so every resolved address gets SSRF-checked
+ * (see `shapeLookupResult`'s doc comment), then reshaped to match what the
+ * caller actually requested.
  */
 declare function createSecureDispatcher(): Agent;
 

package/dist/fetch/index.js

@@ -86,18 +86,30 @@ function validateConnectIp(ip) {
     throw err;
   }
 }
+function shapeLookupResult(records, wantsAll) {
+  for (const record of records) validateConnectIp(record.address);
+  if (wantsAll) {
+    return { address: records.map((r) => ({ address: r.address, family: r.family })), family: 0 };
+  }
+  const first = records[0];
+  return { address: first.address, family: first.family };
+}
 function createSecureDispatcher() {
   return new Agent({
     connect: {
-      lookup(hostname, _options, callback) {
-        dns.lookup(hostname, (err, address, family) => {
-          if (err) return callback(err, "", 4);
+      lookup(hostname, options, callback) {
+        const wantsAll = typeof options === "object" && options !== null && options.all === true;
+        dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true }, (err, records) => {
+          if (err) return callback(err, wantsAll ? [] : "", 4);
+          if (records.length === 0) {
+            return callback(new Error(`DNS lookup for ${hostname} returned no records`), wantsAll ? [] : "", 4);
+          }
           try {
-            validateConnectIp(address);
+            const shaped = shapeLookupResult(records, wantsAll);
+            callback(null, shaped.address, shaped.family);
           } catch (ssrfErr) {
-            return callback(ssrfErr, "", 4);
+            callback(ssrfErr, wantsAll ? [] : "", 4);
           }
-          callback(null, address, family);
         });
       }
     }

package/dist/mask/display.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * maskTFN — mask an Australian Tax File Number for display, revealing only
+ * the last 3 digits.
+ *
+ * TFNs are commonly rendered/entered as `123 456 789` or `123456789`;
+ * whitespace is stripped before masking so both forms produce the same
+ * output. Returns `"***"` for inputs too short to safely reveal 3 digits,
+ * and `""` for null/undefined/empty input.
+ *
+ * @param tfn - raw or space-formatted TFN, or null/undefined
+ * @returns a `"***-***-789"`-shaped string, `"***"`, or `""`
+ */
+declare function maskTFN(tfn: string | null | undefined): string;
+/**
+ * maskABN — mask an Australian Business Number for display, revealing only
+ * the last 3 digits.
+ *
+ * ABNs are commonly rendered/entered as `12 345 678 901` or `12345678901`;
+ * whitespace is stripped before masking so both forms produce the same
+ * output. Returns `"***"` for inputs too short to safely reveal 3 digits,
+ * and `""` for null/undefined/empty input.
+ *
+ * @param abn - raw or space-formatted ABN, or null/undefined
+ * @returns a `"**-***-***-901"`-shaped string, `"***"`, or `""`
+ */
+declare function maskABN(abn: string | null | undefined): string;
+
+export { maskABN, maskTFN };

package/dist/mask/display.js

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// src/mask/display.ts
+function maskTFN(tfn) {
+  if (!tfn) return "";
+  const cleaned = tfn.replace(/\s/g, "");
+  if (cleaned.length < 3) return "***";
+  return `***-***-${cleaned.slice(-3)}`;
+}
+function maskABN(abn) {
+  if (!abn) return "";
+  const cleaned = abn.replace(/\s/g, "");
+  if (cleaned.length < 3) return "***";
+  return `**-***-***-${cleaned.slice(-3)}`;
+}
+export {
+  maskABN,
+  maskTFN
+};

package/dist/mask/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+export { maskABN, maskTFN } from './display.js';
+
 /**
  * mask_email — replace with deterministic masked email.
  * alice@example.com → a3f9b12c1d2e@masked.example
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ declare function drop(_value: unknown, _col: string, _maskKey: string): unknown;
  * nullify — replace with null (less aggressive than drop; preserves column semantics).
  */
 declare function nullify(_value: unknown, _col: string, _maskKey: string): unknown;
+
 /**
  * redact_pii — NER-based PII redaction (wink-nlp lite model).
  * Detects named entities (dates, cardinals, etc.) and replaces them with [REDACTED_TYPE].

package/dist/mask/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
 // src/mask/index.ts
 import { createHmac } from "crypto";
+
+// src/mask/display.ts
+function maskTFN(tfn) {
+  if (!tfn) return "";
+  const cleaned = tfn.replace(/\s/g, "");
+  if (cleaned.length < 3) return "***";
+  return `***-***-${cleaned.slice(-3)}`;
+}
+function maskABN(abn) {
+  if (!abn) return "";
+  const cleaned = abn.replace(/\s/g, "");
+  if (cleaned.length < 3) return "***";
+  return `**-***-***-${cleaned.slice(-3)}`;
+}
+
+// src/mask/index.ts
 import { createRequire } from "module";
 function hmacHex(value, maskKey, context) {
   return createHmac("sha256", maskKey).update(`${context}:${value}`).digest("hex");
@@ -107,6 +123,8 @@ export {
   fake_name,
   hash,
   jitter_date,
+  maskABN,
+  maskTFN,
   mask_email,
   mask_phone,
   nullify,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "hazo_secure",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.6.0",
   "description": "Security & compliance primitives — SSRF-safe fetch, rate limiting, field-level encryption, GDPR orchestration, CSRF. Five subpath modules, pick the ones you need.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@
       "import": "./dist/mask/index.js",
       "default": "./dist/mask/index.js"
     },
+    "./mask/display": {
+      "types": "./dist/mask/display.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/mask/display.js",
+      "default": "./dist/mask/display.js"
+    },
     "./secrets": {
       "types": "./dist/secrets/index.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/secrets/index.js",