harness-everything 0.2.2 → 0.4.0

package/security-review/guides/OWASP-PATTERNS.md

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+# OWASP Top 10 Hardening Reference
+
+Concrete code patterns for mitigating OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities.
+
+## 1. Injection Prevention (SQL / NoSQL / Command)
+Always parameterize database queries. Never concatenate untrusted strings into SQL/Shell commands.
+
+```typescript
+// SAFE Parameterized Query
+const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
+
+// SAFE ORM Mapping
+const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
+```
+
+## 2. Broken Authentication & Session Management
+Store tokens in `httpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Strict` cookies instead of `localStorage`.
+
+```typescript
+// SAFE httpOnly Cookie Setting
+res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Path=/; Max-Age=3600`);
+```
+
+## 3. Sensitive Data & Secrets Hygiene
+Never hardcode API keys or secrets in version control.
+
+```typescript
+// SAFE Secret Extraction
+const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY;
+if (!apiKey) throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY is required');
+```

package/security-review/guides/STRIDE-THREAT-MODEL.md

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+# STRIDE Threat Modeling Guide
+
+Apply STRIDE threat modeling at system boundaries before writing code.
+
+## 1. STRIDE Lenses & Mitigations
+
+| Threat | Definition | Typical Mitigation Pattern |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **S - Spoofing** | Impersonating an authentic user, service, or device. | Strong authentication, JWT httpOnly cookies, HMAC signatures. |
+| **T - Tampering** | Malicious alteration of data in transit or at rest. | Parameterized SQL queries, TLS/HTTPS, Zod schema validation. |
+| **R - Repudiation** | Denying having performed an action due to lack of audit trail. | Immutable audit logs for sensitive operations (payments, auth shifts). |
+| **I - Information Disclosure** | Unauthorized data leakage to external parties. | Field allowlists, generic error messages, secret management in env vars. |
+| **D - Denial of Service** | Overwhelming system resources to prevent legitimate access. | Rate limiting, request payload size limits, query pagination. |
+| **E - Elevation of Privilege** | Gaining unauthorized permissions or higher role access. | Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Row-Level Security (RLS). |
+
+## 2. Abuse Case Design
+
+For every positive Use Case, write a corresponding **Abuse Case**:
+- **Use Case**: "User uploads profile picture."
+- **Abuse Case**: "Attacker uploads 2GB executable file `.php` with fake image magic bytes."
+- **Mitigation**: Validate file extension, MIME type, max file size (5MB), and store outside web root.

package/security-review/references/security-checklist.md

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+# Security Checklist, Patterns & Testing (moved from SKILL.md)
+
+## Security Checklist & Patterns
+
+### 1. Secrets Management
+
+#### Anti-Pattern (Avoid)
+```typescript
+const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx"  // Hardcoded secret in source control
+```
+
+#### Recommended Pattern
+```typescript
+const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY
+
+if (!apiKey) {
+  throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY environment variable is missing')
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or passwords
+- [ ] All secrets in environment variables
+- [ ] `.env.local` in .gitignore
+- [ ] No secrets in git history
+- [ ] Production secrets in hosting platform (Vercel, Railway)
+
+### 2. Input Validation
+
+#### Always Validate User Input
+```typescript
+import { z } from 'zod'
+
+// Define validation schema
+const CreateUserSchema = z.object({
+  email: z.string().email(),
+  name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
+  age: z.number().int().min(0).max(150)
+})
+
+// Validate before processing
+export async function createUser(input: unknown) {
+  try {
+    const validated = CreateUserSchema.parse(input)
+    return await db.users.create(validated)
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
+      return { success: false, errors: error.issues }
+    }
+    throw error
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### File Upload Validation
+```typescript
+function validateFileUpload(file: File) {
+  // Size check (5MB max)
+  const maxSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024
+  if (file.size > maxSize) {
+    throw new Error('File too large (max 5MB)')
+  }
+
+  // Type check
+  const allowedTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif']
+  if (!allowedTypes.includes(file.type)) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid file type')
+  }
+
+  // Extension check
+  const allowedExtensions = ['.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.gif']
+  const extension = file.name.toLowerCase().match(/\.[^.]+$/)?.[0]
+  if (!extension || !allowedExtensions.includes(extension)) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid file extension')
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All user inputs validated with schemas
+- [ ] File uploads restricted (size, type, extension)
+- [ ] No direct use of user input in queries
+- [ ] Whitelist validation (not blacklist)
+- [ ] Error messages don't leak sensitive info
+
+### 3. SQL Injection Prevention
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Concatenate SQL
+```typescript
+// DANGEROUS - SQL Injection vulnerability
+const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${userEmail}'`
+await db.query(query)
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Use Parameterized Queries
+```typescript
+// Safe - parameterized query
+const { data } = await supabase
+  .from('users')
+  .select('*')
+  .eq('email', userEmail)
+
+// Or with raw SQL
+await db.query(
+  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1',
+  [userEmail]
+)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All database queries use parameterized queries
+- [ ] No string concatenation in SQL
+- [ ] ORM/query builder used correctly
+- [ ] Supabase queries properly sanitized
+
+### 4. Authentication & Authorization
+
+#### JWT Token Handling
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: localStorage (vulnerable to XSS)
+localStorage.setItem('token', token)
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: httpOnly cookies
+res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=3600`)
+```
+
+#### Authorization Checks
+```typescript
+export async function deleteUser(userId: string, requesterId: string) {
+  // ALWAYS verify authorization first
+  const requester = await db.users.findUnique({
+    where: { id: requesterId }
+  })
+
+  if (requester.role !== 'admin') {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Unauthorized' },
+      { status: 403 }
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Proceed with deletion
+  await db.users.delete({ where: { id: userId } })
+}
+```
+
+#### Row Level Security (Supabase)
+```sql
+-- Enable RLS on all tables
+ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+-- Users can only view their own data
+CREATE POLICY "Users view own data"
+  ON users FOR SELECT
+  USING (auth.uid() = id);
+
+-- Users can only update their own data
+CREATE POLICY "Users update own data"
+  ON users FOR UPDATE
+  USING (auth.uid() = id);
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not localStorage)
+- [ ] Authorization checks before sensitive operations
+- [ ] Row Level Security enabled in Supabase
+- [ ] Role-based access control implemented
+- [ ] Session management secure
+
+### 5. XSS Prevention
+
+#### Sanitize HTML
+```typescript
+import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify'
+
+// ALWAYS sanitize user-provided HTML
+function renderUserContent(html: string) {
+  const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
+    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'p'],
+    ALLOWED_ATTR: []
+  })
+  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: clean }} />
+}
+```
+
+#### Content Security Policy
+
+Start strict and loosen only with a documented removal plan. Do not default to
+`'unsafe-inline'` or `'unsafe-eval'`; they neutralize much of CSP's protection
+and should be treated as temporary compatibility debt.
+
+```typescript
+// next.config.js
+const securityHeaders = [
+  {
+    key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
+    value: `
+      default-src 'self';
+      base-uri 'self';
+      object-src 'none';
+      frame-ancestors 'none';
+      script-src 'self';
+      style-src 'self';
+      img-src 'self' data: https:;
+      font-src 'self';
+      connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
+    `.replace(/\s{2,}/g, ' ').trim()
+  }
+]
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] User-provided HTML sanitized
+- [ ] CSP headers configured
+- [ ] No unvalidated dynamic content rendering
+- [ ] React's built-in XSS protection used
+
+### 6. CSRF Protection
+
+#### CSRF Tokens
+```typescript
+import { csrf } from '@/lib/csrf'
+
+export async function POST(request: Request) {
+  const token = request.headers.get('X-CSRF-Token')
+
+  if (!csrf.verify(token)) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Invalid CSRF token' },
+      { status: 403 }
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Process request
+}
+```
+
+#### SameSite Cookies
+```typescript
+res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `session=${sessionId}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] CSRF tokens on state-changing operations
+- [ ] SameSite=Strict on all cookies
+- [ ] Double-submit cookie pattern implemented
+
+### 7. Rate Limiting
+
+#### API Rate Limiting
+```typescript
+import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit'
+
+const limiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
+  max: 100, // 100 requests per window
+  message: 'Too many requests'
+})
+
+// Apply to routes
+app.use('/api/', limiter)
+```
+
+#### Expensive Operations
+```typescript
+// Aggressive rate limiting for searches
+const searchLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute
+  max: 10, // 10 requests per minute
+  message: 'Too many search requests'
+})
+
+app.use('/api/search', searchLimiter)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Rate limiting on all API endpoints
+- [ ] Stricter limits on expensive operations
+- [ ] IP-based rate limiting
+- [ ] User-based rate limiting (authenticated)
+
+### 8. Sensitive Data Exposure
+
+#### Logging
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Logging sensitive data
+console.log('User login:', { email, password })
+console.log('Payment:', { cardNumber, cvv })
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Redact sensitive data
+console.log('User login:', { email, userId })
+console.log('Payment:', { last4: card.last4, userId })
+```
+
+#### Error Messages
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Exposing internal details
+catch (error) {
+  return NextResponse.json(
+    { error: error.message, stack: error.stack },
+    { status: 500 }
+  )
+}
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Generic error messages
+catch (error) {
+  console.error('Internal error:', error)
+  return NextResponse.json(
+    { error: 'An error occurred. Please try again.' },
+    { status: 500 }
+  )
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No passwords, tokens, or secrets in logs
+- [ ] Error messages generic for users
+- [ ] Detailed errors only in server logs
+- [ ] No stack traces exposed to users
+
+### 9. Blockchain Security (Solana)
+
+#### Wallet Verification
+```typescript
+import { verify } from '@solana/web3.js'
+
+async function verifyWalletOwnership(
+  publicKey: string,
+  signature: string,
+  message: string
+) {
+  try {
+    const isValid = verify(
+      Buffer.from(message),
+      Buffer.from(signature, 'base64'),
+      Buffer.from(publicKey, 'base64')
+    )
+    return isValid
+  } catch (error) {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Transaction Verification
+```typescript
+async function verifyTransaction(transaction: Transaction) {
+  // Verify recipient
+  if (transaction.to !== expectedRecipient) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid recipient')
+  }
+
+  // Verify amount
+  if (transaction.amount > maxAmount) {
+    throw new Error('Amount exceeds limit')
+  }
+
+  // Verify user has sufficient balance
+  const balance = await getBalance(transaction.from)
+  if (balance < transaction.amount) {
+    throw new Error('Insufficient balance')
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Wallet signatures verified
+- [ ] Transaction details validated
+- [ ] Balance checks before transactions
+- [ ] No blind transaction signing
+
+### 10. Dependency Security
+
+#### Regular Updates
+```bash
+# Check for vulnerabilities
+npm audit
+
+# Fix automatically fixable issues
+npm audit fix
+
+# Update dependencies
+npm update
+
+# Check for outdated packages
+npm outdated
+```
+
+#### Lock Files
+```bash
+# ALWAYS commit lock files
+git add package-lock.json
+
+# Use in CI/CD for reproducible builds
+npm ci  # Instead of npm install
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Dependencies up to date
+- [ ] No known vulnerabilities (npm audit clean)
+- [ ] Lock files committed
+- [ ] Dependabot enabled on GitHub
+- [ ] Regular security updates
+
+## Security Testing
+
+### Automated Security Tests
+```typescript
+// Test authentication
+test('requires authentication', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/protected')
+  expect(response.status).toBe(401)
+})
+
+// Test authorization
+test('requires admin role', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/admin', {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}` }
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(403)
+})
+
+// Test input validation
+test('rejects invalid input', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/users', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'not-an-email' })
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(400)
+})
+
+// Test rate limiting
+test('enforces rate limits', async () => {
+  const requests = Array(101).fill(null).map(() =>
+    fetch('/api/endpoint')
+  )
+
+  const responses = await Promise.all(requests)
+  const tooManyRequests = responses.filter(r => r.status === 429)
+
+  expect(tooManyRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+})
+```
+
+## Pre-Deployment Security Checklist
+
+Before ANY production deployment:
+
+- [ ] **Secrets**: No hardcoded secrets, all in env vars
+- [ ] **Input Validation**: All user inputs validated
+- [ ] **SQL Injection**: All queries parameterized
+- [ ] **XSS**: User content sanitized
+- [ ] **CSRF**: Protection enabled
+- [ ] **Authentication**: Proper token handling
+- [ ] **Authorization**: Role checks in place
+- [ ] **Rate Limiting**: Enabled on all endpoints
+- [ ] **HTTPS**: Enforced in production
+- [ ] **Security Headers**: CSP, X-Frame-Options configured
+- [ ] **Error Handling**: No sensitive data in errors
+- [ ] **Logging**: No sensitive data logged
+- [ ] **Dependencies**: Up to date, no vulnerabilities
+- [ ] **Row Level Security**: Enabled in Supabase
+- [ ] **CORS**: Properly configured
+- [ ] **File Uploads**: Validated (size, type)
+- [ ] **Wallet Signatures**: Verified (if blockchain)
+
+## Resources
+
+- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+- [Next.js Security](https://nextjs.org/docs/security)
+- [Supabase Security](https://supabase.com/docs/guides/auth)
+- [Web Security Academy](https://portswigger.net/web-security)

package/security-review/scripts/audit-secrets.js

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+/**
+ * Automated Security Scan Helper
+ * Scans the workspace for hardcoded secrets, raw SQL concatenations, unhandled innerHTML/eval, and loose CORS/HTTP configs.
+ * Usage:
+ *   node audit-secrets.js            Scan current workspace
+ *   node audit-secrets.js --json     Output JSON format
+ */
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+let getWorkspaceRoot;
+try {
+  ({ getWorkspaceRoot } = require('../../scripts/lib/workspace'));
+} catch (err) {
+  getWorkspaceRoot = () => null;
+}
+
+const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+  { name: 'Hardcoded API Key / Token', regex: /(?:sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{30,}|api[_-]?key\s*=\s*['"][a-zA-Z0-9_\-]{16,}['"])/i },
+  { name: 'Hardcoded Password', regex: /(?:password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]{6,}['"]/i },
+  { name: 'Unescaped SQL Concatenation', regex: /SELECT\s+.*\s+FROM\s+.*(?:\+|`|\${)/i },
+  { name: 'Unsafe Dynamic Code Execution', regex: /(?:eval\s*\(|dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML\s*=)/i }
+];
+
+const IGNORE_DIRS = ['node_modules', '.git', 'dist', 'build', '.next', 'coverage', '.claude', '.github', '.cursor'];
+
+function scanDir(dir, findings = []) {
+  try {
+    const entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+      if (IGNORE_DIRS.includes(entry.name)) continue;
+      const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+      if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+        scanDir(fullPath, findings);
+      } else if (entry.isFile() && /\.(js|ts|tsx|jsx|json|py|go|env|md)$/i.test(entry.name)) {
+        scanFile(fullPath, findings);
+      }
+    }
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Ignore unreadable directories
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+
+function scanFile(filePath, findings) {
+  try {
+    const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+    const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
+    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+      SECRET_PATTERNS.forEach(pattern => {
+        if (pattern.regex.test(line)) {
+          findings.push({
+            file: path.relative(process.cwd(), filePath),
+            line: index + 1,
+            issue: pattern.name,
+            snippet: line.trim().slice(0, 120)
+          });
+        }
+      });
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Ignore unreadable files
+  }
+}
+
+const wsRoot = getWorkspaceRoot();
+if (!wsRoot) {
+  console.error('[security-review] Cannot scan a workspace outside a git repository.');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+const findings = scanDir(wsRoot);
+
+if (process.argv.includes('--json')) {
+  console.log(JSON.stringify(findings, null, 2));
+} else {
+  console.log(`=== Harness Security & Secrets Scan ===`);
+  if (findings.length === 0) {
+    console.log(`✅ No obvious hardcoded secrets or raw SQL injections detected.`);
+  } else {
+    console.log(`⚠️  Found ${findings.length} potential security concern(s):\n`);
+    findings.forEach(f => {
+      console.log(`  [${f.issue}] ${f.file}:${f.line}`);
+      console.log(`    Snippet: ${f.snippet}\n`);
+    });
+  }
+}