harness-everything 0.2.0

package/scripts/lib/skills.js

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// Skill discovery, copy, and manifest-aware install/uninstall bookkeeping.
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const manifest = require('./manifest');
+
+function copyDir(src, dest) {
+  fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true });
+  const entries = fs.readdirSync(src, { withFileTypes: true });
+  for (const entry of entries) {
+    const srcPath = path.join(src, entry.name);
+    const destPath = path.join(dest, entry.name);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+      copyDir(srcPath, destPath);
+    } else {
+      fs.copyFileSync(srcPath, destPath);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function getAvailableSkills(harnessSourceDir) {
+  const dirs = fs.readdirSync(harnessSourceDir, { withFileTypes: true });
+  const skills = [];
+  for (const dir of dirs) {
+    if (dir.isDirectory() && !dir.name.startsWith('.') && !['bin', 'docs', 'hooks', 'scripts', 'node_modules'].includes(dir.name)) {
+      const skillPath = path.join(harnessSourceDir, dir.name, 'SKILL.md');
+      if (fs.existsSync(skillPath)) {
+        skills.push(dir.name);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return skills.sort();
+}
+
+function parseFrontmatter(skillMdPath) {
+  if (!fs.existsSync(skillMdPath)) return null;
+  try {
+    const content = fs.readFileSync(skillMdPath, 'utf8');
+    const match = content.match(/^---\r?\n([\s\S]*?)\r?\n---/);
+    if (!match) return null;
+    const yaml = match[1];
+    const get = (key) => {
+      const m = yaml.match(new RegExp(`^${key}:\\s*(.*)$`, 'm'));
+      return m ? m[1].trim().replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '') : '';
+    };
+    return { name: get('name'), description: get('description'), author: get('author'), version: get('version') };
+  } catch (e) {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function getSkillInfo(harnessSourceDir, skillDirName) {
+  const fm = parseFrontmatter(path.join(harnessSourceDir, skillDirName, 'SKILL.md'));
+  if (!fm) return null;
+  return { id: skillDirName, name: fm.name || skillDirName, description: fm.description || '' };
+}
+
+// The one signal that lets uninstall tell "a skill this package shipped"
+// apart from anything else living in the same shared skills folder (Cursor/
+// Copilot/Codex/Continue skills keep their platform-native location, so it's
+// still a shared folder) - including a user's own manually-installed skills
+// and self-evolve's locally-generated `skills/generated/*` skills, neither
+// of which carry this author string.
+function isHarnessSkillDir(dirPath) {
+  const fm = parseFrontmatter(path.join(dirPath, 'SKILL.md'));
+  return !!fm && fm.author === manifest.HARNESS_AUTHOR;
+}
+
+// targetDirs entries: { path, label, manifestPath } - manifestPath is that
+// target's own <platform-home>/harness-everything/manifest.json.
+function installSkillsToTargets({ chosenSkills, targetDirs, harnessSourceDir, packageVersion }) {
+  for (const target of targetDirs) {
+    fs.mkdirSync(target.path, { recursive: true });
+    for (const skillName of chosenSkills) {
+      const src = path.join(harnessSourceDir, skillName);
+      const dest = path.join(target.path, skillName);
+      if (fs.existsSync(dest)) {
+        fs.rmSync(dest, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+      copyDir(src, dest);
+      manifest.recordSkillInstall(target.manifestPath, packageVersion, skillName, dest);
+      console.log(`  ✅ Installed skill: ${target.label}${skillName}/`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function manifestTrackedSkills(manifestPath, scopeLabel) {
+  const data = manifest.readManifest(manifestPath);
+  const results = [];
+  for (const entry of data.skills || []) {
+    if (fs.existsSync(entry.dirPath) && isHarnessSkillDir(entry.dirPath)) {
+      results.push({ id: entry.id, scope: scopeLabel, dirPath: entry.dirPath, parentPath: path.dirname(entry.dirPath), manifestPath });
+    }
+  }
+  return results;
+}
+
+// Returns every skill this package can currently account for, scoped local +
+// global. Never lists a directory just because it happens to live under a
+// known skills folder - only manifest-recorded installs (or, as a fallback
+// for pre-manifest / pre-reorg installs, directories that still self-identify
+// via the author marker) qualify. This is what keeps "uninstall skills" from
+// ever touching a skill this package didn't put there.
+function getInstalledSkills(workspaceRoot, userHome) {
+  const results = [];
+  const globalAgentsDir = path.join(userHome, '.agents');
+
+  const manifestHomes = [
+    { home: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.claude'), scope: 'local (Claude)' },
+    { home: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.cursor'), scope: 'local (Cursor)' },
+    { home: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.github'), scope: 'local (Copilot)' },
+    { home: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.codex'), scope: 'local (Codex)' },
+    { home: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.continue'), scope: 'local (Continue)' },
+    { home: globalAgentsDir, scope: 'global' },
+  ];
+  for (const { home, scope } of manifestHomes) {
+    results.push(...manifestTrackedSkills(manifest.getManifestPath(home), scope));
+  }
+
+  // Legacy fallback for installs that predate per-platform manifests (or the
+  // old self-invented .harness/ local root, or - for Codex specifically - an
+  // earlier version's mistaken `.agents/skills` target; Codex's real project
+  // skills directory is `.codex/skills/`): scan the raw directories
+  // directly, but only ever list an entry that still self-identifies via the
+  // author marker - never a blind directory listing.
+  const legacyDirs = [
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.harness', 'skills'), scope: 'local (legacy .harness)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.claude')) },
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.cursor', 'skills'), scope: 'local (Cursor)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.cursor')) },
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.github', 'skills'), scope: 'local (Copilot)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.github')) },
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.codex', 'skills'), scope: 'local (Codex)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.codex')) },
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.agents', 'skills'), scope: 'local (Codex, legacy .agents path)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.codex')) },
+    { path: path.join(workspaceRoot, '.continue', 'skills'), scope: 'local (Continue)', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(path.join(workspaceRoot, '.continue')) },
+    { path: path.join(globalAgentsDir, 'skills'), scope: 'global', manifestPath: manifest.getManifestPath(globalAgentsDir) },
+  ];
+  const known = new Set(results.map(r => r.dirPath));
+  for (const item of legacyDirs) {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(item.path)) continue;
+    try {
+      const entries = fs.readdirSync(item.path, { withFileTypes: true });
+      for (const entry of entries) {
+        if (!entry.isDirectory()) continue;
+        const dirPath = path.join(item.path, entry.name);
+        if (known.has(dirPath)) continue;
+        if (isHarnessSkillDir(dirPath)) {
+          results.push({ id: entry.name, scope: item.scope, dirPath, parentPath: item.path, manifestPath: item.manifestPath });
+          known.add(dirPath);
+        }
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      // ignore unreadable dirs
+    }
+  }
+  return results;
+}
+
+function removeSkill(entry) {
+  if (fs.existsSync(entry.dirPath)) {
+    fs.rmSync(entry.dirPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+  if (entry.manifestPath) {
+    manifest.removeSkillFromManifest(entry.manifestPath, entry.dirPath);
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  copyDir,
+  getAvailableSkills,
+  getSkillInfo,
+  isHarnessSkillDir,
+  installSkillsToTargets,
+  getInstalledSkills,
+  removeSkill,
+};

package/scripts/lib/workspace.js

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+
+function getWorkspaceRoot() {
+  let dir = path.resolve(process.cwd());
+  while (dir !== path.parse(dir).root) {
+    if (fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, '.git'))) return dir;
+    dir = path.dirname(dir);
+  }
+  return process.cwd();
+}
+
+function getUserPromptsDir() {
+  if (process.env.VSCODE_USER_PROMPTS_FOLDER) {
+    return process.env.VSCODE_USER_PROMPTS_FOLDER;
+  }
+  const home = os.homedir();
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    return path.join(process.env.APPDATA || path.join(home, 'AppData', 'Roaming'), 'Code', 'User', 'prompts');
+  } else if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+    return path.join(home, 'Library', 'Application Support', 'Code', 'User', 'prompts');
+  } else {
+    return path.join(home, '.config', 'Code', 'User', 'prompts');
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { getWorkspaceRoot, getUserPromptsDir };

package/security-review/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+---
+name: security-review
+description: Use this skill when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment/sensitive features. Provides comprehensive security checklist and patterns.
+author: Miya Daniel | Harness Core Team
+version: 0.2.0
+metadata:
+  origin: ECC
+---
+
+# Security Review Skill
+
+## 📋 Skill Contract
+
+| Component | Specification |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| **Trigger / Input** | Task involves Auth, API Endpoints, File Uploads, User Input, or Secrets. Input: Target code file. |
+| **Expected Output** | Security scan commands executed in terminal. Code modified to fix vulnerabilities. |
+| **State Mutations** | Codebase hardened against injection/XSS/IDOR. |
+| **Enforcement Gate** | You MUST use grep or standard security linters in the terminal to scan for secrets (`sk-`, `password`) or raw SQL interpolations BEFORE marking the security check as complete. |
+
+This skill ensures all code follows security best practices and identifies potential vulnerabilities.
+
+## When to Activate
+
+- Implementing authentication or authorization
+- Handling user input or file uploads
+- Creating new API endpoints
+- Working with secrets or credentials
+- Implementing payment features
+- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
+- Integrating third-party APIs
+
+## Security Checklist
+
+### 1. Secrets Management
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Do This
+```typescript
+const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx"  // Hardcoded secret
+const dbPassword = "password123" // In source code
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Do This
+```typescript
+const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY
+const dbUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL
+
+// Verify secrets exist
+if (!apiKey) {
+  throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY not configured')
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or passwords
+- [ ] All secrets in environment variables
+- [ ] `.env.local` in .gitignore
+- [ ] No secrets in git history
+- [ ] Production secrets in hosting platform (Vercel, Railway)
+
+### 2. Input Validation
+
+#### Always Validate User Input
+```typescript
+import { z } from 'zod'
+
+// Define validation schema
+const CreateUserSchema = z.object({
+  email: z.string().email(),
+  name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
+  age: z.number().int().min(0).max(150)
+})
+
+// Validate before processing
+export async function createUser(input: unknown) {
+  try {
+    const validated = CreateUserSchema.parse(input)
+    return await db.users.create(validated)
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof z.ZodError) {
+      return { success: false, errors: error.issues }
+    }
+    throw error
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### File Upload Validation
+```typescript
+function validateFileUpload(file: File) {
+  // Size check (5MB max)
+  const maxSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024
+  if (file.size > maxSize) {
+    throw new Error('File too large (max 5MB)')
+  }
+
+  // Type check
+  const allowedTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif']
+  if (!allowedTypes.includes(file.type)) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid file type')
+  }
+
+  // Extension check
+  const allowedExtensions = ['.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.gif']
+  const extension = file.name.toLowerCase().match(/\.[^.]+$/)?.[0]
+  if (!extension || !allowedExtensions.includes(extension)) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid file extension')
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All user inputs validated with schemas
+- [ ] File uploads restricted (size, type, extension)
+- [ ] No direct use of user input in queries
+- [ ] Whitelist validation (not blacklist)
+- [ ] Error messages don't leak sensitive info
+
+### 3. SQL Injection Prevention
+
+#### FAIL: NEVER Concatenate SQL
+```typescript
+// DANGEROUS - SQL Injection vulnerability
+const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${userEmail}'`
+await db.query(query)
+```
+
+#### PASS: ALWAYS Use Parameterized Queries
+```typescript
+// Safe - parameterized query
+const { data } = await supabase
+  .from('users')
+  .select('*')
+  .eq('email', userEmail)
+
+// Or with raw SQL
+await db.query(
+  'SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1',
+  [userEmail]
+)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] All database queries use parameterized queries
+- [ ] No string concatenation in SQL
+- [ ] ORM/query builder used correctly
+- [ ] Supabase queries properly sanitized
+
+### 4. Authentication & Authorization
+
+#### JWT Token Handling
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: localStorage (vulnerable to XSS)
+localStorage.setItem('token', token)
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: httpOnly cookies
+res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=3600`)
+```
+
+#### Authorization Checks
+```typescript
+export async function deleteUser(userId: string, requesterId: string) {
+  // ALWAYS verify authorization first
+  const requester = await db.users.findUnique({
+    where: { id: requesterId }
+  })
+
+  if (requester.role !== 'admin') {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Unauthorized' },
+      { status: 403 }
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Proceed with deletion
+  await db.users.delete({ where: { id: userId } })
+}
+```
+
+#### Row Level Security (Supabase)
+```sql
+-- Enable RLS on all tables
+ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+-- Users can only view their own data
+CREATE POLICY "Users view own data"
+  ON users FOR SELECT
+  USING (auth.uid() = id);
+
+-- Users can only update their own data
+CREATE POLICY "Users update own data"
+  ON users FOR UPDATE
+  USING (auth.uid() = id);
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Tokens stored in httpOnly cookies (not localStorage)
+- [ ] Authorization checks before sensitive operations
+- [ ] Row Level Security enabled in Supabase
+- [ ] Role-based access control implemented
+- [ ] Session management secure
+
+### 5. XSS Prevention
+
+#### Sanitize HTML
+```typescript
+import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify'
+
+// ALWAYS sanitize user-provided HTML
+function renderUserContent(html: string) {
+  const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
+    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'p'],
+    ALLOWED_ATTR: []
+  })
+  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: clean }} />
+}
+```
+
+#### Content Security Policy
+
+Start strict and loosen only with a documented removal plan. Do not default to
+`'unsafe-inline'` or `'unsafe-eval'`; they neutralize much of CSP's protection
+and should be treated as temporary compatibility debt.
+
+```typescript
+// next.config.js
+const securityHeaders = [
+  {
+    key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
+    value: `
+      default-src 'self';
+      base-uri 'self';
+      object-src 'none';
+      frame-ancestors 'none';
+      script-src 'self';
+      style-src 'self';
+      img-src 'self' data: https:;
+      font-src 'self';
+      connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
+    `.replace(/\s{2,}/g, ' ').trim()
+  }
+]
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] User-provided HTML sanitized
+- [ ] CSP headers configured
+- [ ] No unvalidated dynamic content rendering
+- [ ] React's built-in XSS protection used
+
+### 6. CSRF Protection
+
+#### CSRF Tokens
+```typescript
+import { csrf } from '@/lib/csrf'
+
+export async function POST(request: Request) {
+  const token = request.headers.get('X-CSRF-Token')
+
+  if (!csrf.verify(token)) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Invalid CSRF token' },
+      { status: 403 }
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Process request
+}
+```
+
+#### SameSite Cookies
+```typescript
+res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
+  `session=${sessionId}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] CSRF tokens on state-changing operations
+- [ ] SameSite=Strict on all cookies
+- [ ] Double-submit cookie pattern implemented
+
+### 7. Rate Limiting
+
+#### API Rate Limiting
+```typescript
+import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit'
+
+const limiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
+  max: 100, // 100 requests per window
+  message: 'Too many requests'
+})
+
+// Apply to routes
+app.use('/api/', limiter)
+```
+
+#### Expensive Operations
+```typescript
+// Aggressive rate limiting for searches
+const searchLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 60 * 1000, // 1 minute
+  max: 10, // 10 requests per minute
+  message: 'Too many search requests'
+})
+
+app.use('/api/search', searchLimiter)
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Rate limiting on all API endpoints
+- [ ] Stricter limits on expensive operations
+- [ ] IP-based rate limiting
+- [ ] User-based rate limiting (authenticated)
+
+### 8. Sensitive Data Exposure
+
+#### Logging
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Logging sensitive data
+console.log('User login:', { email, password })
+console.log('Payment:', { cardNumber, cvv })
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Redact sensitive data
+console.log('User login:', { email, userId })
+console.log('Payment:', { last4: card.last4, userId })
+```
+
+#### Error Messages
+```typescript
+// FAIL: WRONG: Exposing internal details
+catch (error) {
+  return NextResponse.json(
+    { error: error.message, stack: error.stack },
+    { status: 500 }
+  )
+}
+
+// PASS: CORRECT: Generic error messages
+catch (error) {
+  console.error('Internal error:', error)
+  return NextResponse.json(
+    { error: 'An error occurred. Please try again.' },
+    { status: 500 }
+  )
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] No passwords, tokens, or secrets in logs
+- [ ] Error messages generic for users
+- [ ] Detailed errors only in server logs
+- [ ] No stack traces exposed to users
+
+### 9. Blockchain Security (Solana)
+
+#### Wallet Verification
+```typescript
+import { verify } from '@solana/web3.js'
+
+async function verifyWalletOwnership(
+  publicKey: string,
+  signature: string,
+  message: string
+) {
+  try {
+    const isValid = verify(
+      Buffer.from(message),
+      Buffer.from(signature, 'base64'),
+      Buffer.from(publicKey, 'base64')
+    )
+    return isValid
+  } catch (error) {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### Transaction Verification
+```typescript
+async function verifyTransaction(transaction: Transaction) {
+  // Verify recipient
+  if (transaction.to !== expectedRecipient) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid recipient')
+  }
+
+  // Verify amount
+  if (transaction.amount > maxAmount) {
+    throw new Error('Amount exceeds limit')
+  }
+
+  // Verify user has sufficient balance
+  const balance = await getBalance(transaction.from)
+  if (balance < transaction.amount) {
+    throw new Error('Insufficient balance')
+  }
+
+  return true
+}
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Wallet signatures verified
+- [ ] Transaction details validated
+- [ ] Balance checks before transactions
+- [ ] No blind transaction signing
+
+### 10. Dependency Security
+
+#### Regular Updates
+```bash
+# Check for vulnerabilities
+npm audit
+
+# Fix automatically fixable issues
+npm audit fix
+
+# Update dependencies
+npm update
+
+# Check for outdated packages
+npm outdated
+```
+
+#### Lock Files
+```bash
+# ALWAYS commit lock files
+git add package-lock.json
+
+# Use in CI/CD for reproducible builds
+npm ci  # Instead of npm install
+```
+
+#### Verification Steps
+- [ ] Dependencies up to date
+- [ ] No known vulnerabilities (npm audit clean)
+- [ ] Lock files committed
+- [ ] Dependabot enabled on GitHub
+- [ ] Regular security updates
+
+## Security Testing
+
+### Automated Security Tests
+```typescript
+// Test authentication
+test('requires authentication', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/protected')
+  expect(response.status).toBe(401)
+})
+
+// Test authorization
+test('requires admin role', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/admin', {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${userToken}` }
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(403)
+})
+
+// Test input validation
+test('rejects invalid input', async () => {
+  const response = await fetch('/api/users', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'not-an-email' })
+  })
+  expect(response.status).toBe(400)
+})
+
+// Test rate limiting
+test('enforces rate limits', async () => {
+  const requests = Array(101).fill(null).map(() =>
+    fetch('/api/endpoint')
+  )
+
+  const responses = await Promise.all(requests)
+  const tooManyRequests = responses.filter(r => r.status === 429)
+
+  expect(tooManyRequests.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
+})
+```
+
+## Pre-Deployment Security Checklist
+
+Before ANY production deployment:
+
+- [ ] **Secrets**: No hardcoded secrets, all in env vars
+- [ ] **Input Validation**: All user inputs validated
+- [ ] **SQL Injection**: All queries parameterized
+- [ ] **XSS**: User content sanitized
+- [ ] **CSRF**: Protection enabled
+- [ ] **Authentication**: Proper token handling
+- [ ] **Authorization**: Role checks in place
+- [ ] **Rate Limiting**: Enabled on all endpoints
+- [ ] **HTTPS**: Enforced in production
+- [ ] **Security Headers**: CSP, X-Frame-Options configured
+- [ ] **Error Handling**: No sensitive data in errors
+- [ ] **Logging**: No sensitive data logged
+- [ ] **Dependencies**: Up to date, no vulnerabilities
+- [ ] **Row Level Security**: Enabled in Supabase
+- [ ] **CORS**: Properly configured
+- [ ] **File Uploads**: Validated (size, type)
+- [ ] **Wallet Signatures**: Verified (if blockchain)
+
+## Resources
+
+- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
+- [Next.js Security](https://nextjs.org/docs/security)
+- [Supabase Security](https://supabase.com/docs/guides/auth)
+- [Web Security Academy](https://portswigger.net/web-security)