hanzoai 2.2.10 → 8.5.89

package/dist/api/admin-api.d.ts

@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ export declare const AdminApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
      */
     adminApplications: (owner?: string, p?: string, pageSize?: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
     /**
-     * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-     * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+     * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+     * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
      * @param {string} [org] Org restricts the trail to one tenant.
      * @param {string} [sub] Sub restricts it to one actor (the validated subject that made the request).
      * @param {string} [action] Action restricts it to one action name, e.g. \&quot;admin.waitlist.grant\&quot;.
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ export declare const AdminApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
      */
     adminAudit: (org?: string, sub?: string, action?: string, resource?: string, resourceId?: string, result?: string, since?: string, until?: string, pageSize?: string, p?: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
     /**
-     * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-     * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+     * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+     * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      */
@@ -859,8 +859,8 @@ export declare const AdminApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
      */
     adminApplications(owner?: string, p?: string, pageSize?: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<IamRowsOut>>;
     /**
-     * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-     * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+     * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+     * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
      * @param {string} [org] Org restricts the trail to one tenant.
      * @param {string} [sub] Sub restricts it to one actor (the validated subject that made the request).
      * @param {string} [action] Action restricts it to one action name, e.g. \&quot;admin.waitlist.grant\&quot;.
@@ -876,8 +876,8 @@ export declare const AdminApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
      */
     adminAudit(org?: string, sub?: string, action?: string, resource?: string, resourceId?: string, result?: string, since?: string, until?: string, pageSize?: string, p?: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<RecordsOut>>;
     /**
-     * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-     * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+     * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+     * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      */
@@ -1585,16 +1585,16 @@ export declare const AdminApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?:
      */
     adminApplications(requestParameters?: AdminApiAdminApplicationsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<IamRowsOut>;
     /**
-     * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-     * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+     * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+     * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
      * @param {AdminApiAdminAuditRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      */
     adminAudit(requestParameters?: AdminApiAdminAuditRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<RecordsOut>;
     /**
-     * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-     * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+     * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+     * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      */
@@ -3422,8 +3422,8 @@ export declare class AdminApi extends BaseAPI {
      */
     adminApplications(requestParameters?: AdminApiAdminApplicationsRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<globalAxios.AxiosResponse<IamRowsOut, any, {}>>;
     /**
-     * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-     * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+     * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+     * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
      * @param {AdminApiAdminAuditRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -3431,8 +3431,8 @@ export declare class AdminApi extends BaseAPI {
      */
     adminAudit(requestParameters?: AdminApiAdminAuditRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<globalAxios.AxiosResponse<RecordsOut, any, {}>>;
     /**
-     * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-     * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+     * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+     * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      * @memberof AdminApi

package/dist/api/admin-api.js

@@ -134,8 +134,8 @@ const AdminApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
             };
         },
         /**
-         * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-         * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+         * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+         * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
          * @param {string} [org] Org restricts the trail to one tenant.
          * @param {string} [sub] Sub restricts it to one actor (the validated subject that made the request).
          * @param {string} [action] Action restricts it to one action name, e.g. \"admin.waitlist.grant\".
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ const AdminApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
             };
         },
         /**
-         * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-         * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+         * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+         * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
          * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
          * @throws {RequiredError}
          */
@@ -2997,8 +2997,8 @@ const AdminApiFp = function (configuration) {
             return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
         },
         /**
-         * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-         * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+         * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+         * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
          * @param {string} [org] Org restricts the trail to one tenant.
          * @param {string} [sub] Sub restricts it to one actor (the validated subject that made the request).
          * @param {string} [action] Action restricts it to one action name, e.g. \"admin.waitlist.grant\".
@@ -3019,8 +3019,8 @@ const AdminApiFp = function (configuration) {
             return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
         },
         /**
-         * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-         * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+         * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+         * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
          * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
          * @throws {RequiredError}
          */
@@ -4148,8 +4148,8 @@ const AdminApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
             return localVarFp.adminApplications(requestParameters.owner, requestParameters.p, requestParameters.pageSize, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
         },
         /**
-         * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-         * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+         * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+         * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
          * @param {AdminApiAdminAuditRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
          * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
          * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -4158,8 +4158,8 @@ const AdminApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
             return localVarFp.adminAudit(requestParameters.org, requestParameters.sub, requestParameters.action, requestParameters.resource, requestParameters.resourceId, requestParameters.result, requestParameters.since, requestParameters.until, requestParameters.pageSize, requestParameters.p, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
         },
         /**
-         * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-         * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+         * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+         * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
          * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
          * @throws {RequiredError}
          */
@@ -4998,8 +4998,8 @@ class AdminApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
         return (0, exports.AdminApiFp)(this.configuration).adminApplications(requestParameters.owner, requestParameters.p, requestParameters.pageSize, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
     }
     /**
-     * Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
-     * @summary Reads cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with the chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
+     * Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.  When cloud has no local store configured it falls back to forwarding IAM\'s own get-records trail verbatim — a DIFFERENT trail, federated so the endpoint never regresses to an empty list. Those rows carry no integrity of ours, so the field is null there.
+     * @summary Reads one chain of cloud\'s tamper-evident audit trail, newest first, with that chain\'s live integrity attached so a listing can be badged as verified.
      * @param {AdminApiAdminAuditRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
@@ -5009,8 +5009,8 @@ class AdminApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
         return (0, exports.AdminApiFp)(this.configuration).adminAudit(requestParameters.org, requestParameters.sub, requestParameters.action, requestParameters.resource, requestParameters.resourceId, requestParameters.result, requestParameters.since, requestParameters.until, requestParameters.pageSize, requestParameters.p, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
     }
     /**
-     * Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  brokenAt is -1 exactly when ok is true. An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
-     * @summary Walks the WHOLE hash chain and reports whether it is intact: how many records were checked, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when the chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
+     * Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.  The trail is a FAMILY of chains, one per process, so the answer is a set and not a boolean: `intact`, `broken` and `unread` count the three verdicts and sum to the number of chains. A chain that could not be READ is reported `unread` and is never a pass — an unreadable chain and a verified one must not render the same, which is the whole reason this is not one flag.  An unconfigured store is an honest failure here rather than a fabricated pass.
+     * @summary Walks EVERY hash chain this deployment keeps and reports each one: which chains were checked, how many records each holds, the head hash to pin externally against tail-truncation, and — when a chain is broken — the seq of the first bad record and why.
      * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
      * @throws {RequiredError}
      * @memberof AdminApi