handoffprobe 0.1.0

package/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+# HandoffProbe
+
+Open-source adversarial security testing for AI agent handoffs.
+
+HandoffProbe tests whether security properties survive when an AI-agent action crosses protocol and execution boundaries.
+
+Current deterministic protocol baseline:
+
+**A2A 1.0 → MCP 2026-07-28**
+
+The bundled developer experience is local-first, deterministic and synthetic.
+It requires no paid AI service, no telemetry and no signup.
+
+## Why HandoffProbe exists
+
+A system can look secure at each individual protocol layer while becoming insecure at the handoff between those layers.
+
+```text
+Human / calling service
+        |
+        v
+     Agent A
+        | A2A 1.0
+        v
+     Agent B / translation layer
+        | MCP 2026-07-28
+        v
+       Tool
+```
+
+HandoffProbe checks security properties such as:
+
+- delegated authority;
+- principal identity;
+- tenant continuity;
+- resource binding;
+- approval and consent;
+- credential audience;
+- replay protection;
+- cancellation;
+- retry identity;
+- audit lineage.
+
+## Current status
+
+The developer CLI currently includes:
+
+- 12 stable P0 attacks;
+- 10 stable P1 attacks;
+- 22 stable attacks total;
+- secure and intentionally vulnerable bundled fixtures;
+- terminal, JSON and Markdown reporters;
+- deterministic CI exit codes;
+- secret redaction and safe runtime diagnostics;
+- reusable source-backed composite GitHub Action;
+- pull-request summaries and machine-readable artifacts;
+- repository gates for dependency review and secret safety.
+
+The npm package is **not publicly released yet**.
+
+The release-candidate package version is `0.1.0`. Public npm commands remain documentation-only until registry verification succeeds during Phase 7.
+
+## Requirements
+
+- Node.js `>=24 <25`
+- npm
+
+## Installation
+
+Detailed installation instructions are in [`docs/INSTALLATION.md`](docs/INSTALLATION.md).
+The complete CLI and automation guide is in [`docs/USAGE.md`](docs/USAGE.md).
+
+Until the npm publication gate succeeds, use the source checkout or locally packed tarball below.
+
+After `handoffprobe@0.1.0` is verified on npm, the canonical exact-version checks are:
+
+```bash
+npx --yes --package=handoffprobe@0.1.0 handoffprobe --version
+npx --yes --package=handoffprobe@0.1.0 handoffprobe test
+```
+
+## Quick start from source
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Heaviside479/handoffprobe.git
+cd handoffprobe
+npm ci
+npm run build
+node dist/cli.js test
+```
+
+The default target is the bundled `secure` target.
+
+Expected high-level result:
+
+```text
+Target: secure
+Protocols: A2A 1.0 | MCP 2026-07-28
+Selected attacks: 22
+
+Summary:
+  PASS: 22
+  FAIL: 0
+  ERROR: 0
+  TOTAL: 22
+
+Security gate: PASS
+```
+
+## Packaged-artifact demo
+
+Before the public npm release, create the npm tarball locally:
+
+```bash
+PACKAGE_TARBALL="$(npm pack --silent)"
+```
+
+Run the packaged CLI through `npx`:
+
+```bash
+npx --yes --package="./$PACKAGE_TARBALL" handoffprobe test
+```
+
+After `handoffprobe@0.1.0` is verified on the public npm registry, the canonical exact-version commands are:
+
+```bash
+npx --yes --package=handoffprobe@0.1.0 handoffprobe --version
+npx --yes --package=handoffprobe@0.1.0 handoffprobe test
+```
+
+The shorter convenience command is:
+
+```bash
+npx handoffprobe test
+```
+
+## GitHub Action
+
+HandoffProbe includes a reusable source-backed composite GitHub Action in
+[`action.yml`](action.yml).
+
+The action installs and builds HandoffProbe from its own `GITHUB_ACTION_PATH`.
+It therefore does not require the calling repository to contain the HandoffProbe
+source tree or depend on the npm package already being publicly released.
+
+A single action invocation executes the scanner exactly once. The canonical
+machine-readable JSON report and the Markdown/GitHub summary are derived from
+that same completed scan.
+
+The repository self-test uses:
+
+```yaml
+- uses: ./
+  with:
+    target: secure
+    fail-on: high
+    artifact-name: handoffprobe-report
+```
+
+For another repository, pin HandoffProbe to a reviewed commit SHA until a
+versioned public release exists:
+
+```yaml
+name: HandoffProbe
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  handoffprobe:
+    name: HandoffProbe
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - uses: Heaviside479/handoffprobe@<pinned-handoffprobe-commit-sha>
+        with:
+          target: secure
+          fail-on: high
+          artifact-name: handoffprobe-report
+```
+
+Replace `<pinned-handoffprobe-commit-sha>` with a reviewed HandoffProbe commit.
+Do not use the placeholder as a literal revision.
+
+Supported inputs:
+
+| Input           | Default               | Meaning                                               |
+| --------------- | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |
+| `target`        | `secure`              | bundled `secure` or intentionally `vulnerable` target |
+| `tests`         | all stable attacks    | optional comma-separated stable `HP-` IDs             |
+| `fail-on`       | `high`                | `info`, `low`, `medium`, `high` or `critical`         |
+| `artifact-name` | `handoffprobe-report` | validated artifact name                               |
+
+Action outputs:
+
+| Output         | Meaning                                   |
+| -------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
+| `exit-code`    | deterministic HandoffProbe exit code      |
+| `result`       | `pass`, `fail` or `error`                 |
+| `report-path`  | canonical JSON report path when available |
+| `summary-path` | generated Markdown summary path           |
+
+Security behavior:
+
+- exit code `0` means the security gate passed;
+- exit code `1` means the scan completed correctly and found a qualifying vulnerability;
+- exit code `2` means usage or configuration failure;
+- exit code `3` means scanner, runtime or output failure;
+- a security exit code `1` still uploads its safe report artifact before the GitHub check fails;
+- reports contain redacted finding data plus safe evidence counts and sequence references;
+- the reference pull-request workflow uses `contents: read`;
+- the reference workflow does not use `pull_request_target`.
+
+The protected `main` branch of this repository currently requires:
+
+- `HandoffProbe`;
+- `Quality`;
+- `Dependency Review`.
+
+The Phase 6 merge-gate demonstration proved that a qualifying HandoffProbe
+security failure blocks a non-draft pull request while Quality and Dependency
+Review remain successful.
+
+## Vulnerable demo
+
+HandoffProbe includes intentionally vulnerable synthetic fixtures for defensive testing.
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --target vulnerable --test HP-AUTH-001
+```
+
+Expected result:
+
+```text
+FAIL           HP-AUTH-001 Delegated authority amplification [HIGH]
+
+Security gate: FAIL
+```
+
+This exits with code `1`.
+
+## Run the complete corpus
+
+Secure reference target:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test
+```
+
+Intentionally vulnerable target:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --target vulnerable
+```
+
+## Select attacks
+
+Run one attack:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001
+```
+
+Run multiple attacks:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001 --test HP-CRED-001
+```
+
+Repeated IDs are deduplicated and execution order remains deterministic.
+
+## Discover attacks
+
+List all 22 stable attacks:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js list
+```
+
+Explain one attack without executing it:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js explain HP-AUTH-001
+```
+
+## Severity gate
+
+Supported thresholds:
+
+```text
+info < low < medium < high < critical
+```
+
+The default threshold is `high`.
+
+Example:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --target vulnerable --test HP-CRED-001 --fail-on medium
+```
+
+All findings remain visible.
+The threshold controls the process exit code, not finding visibility.
+
+## Reporters
+
+HandoffProbe supports three deterministic reporters:
+
+- `terminal`
+- `json`
+- `markdown`
+
+Terminal:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001 --reporter terminal
+```
+
+JSON:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001 --reporter json
+```
+
+Markdown:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001 --reporter markdown
+```
+
+JSON writes only the JSON document to stdout.
+Markdown is suitable for CI artifacts and pull-request summaries.
+
+Reports expose safe evidence counts and sequence references instead of raw EvidenceEvent context/details.
+
+## Configuration
+
+HandoffProbe reads an optional `handoffprobe.config.json` from the current working directory.
+
+Example:
+
+```json
+{
+  "target": "vulnerable",
+  "tests": ["HP-AUTH-001", "HP-CRED-001"],
+  "failOn": "high",
+  "reporter": "json",
+  "output": "handoffprobe-report.json"
+}
+```
+
+Supported keys:
+
+- `target`
+- `tests`
+- `failOn`
+- `reporter`
+- `output`
+
+The config file is optional.
+Unknown keys, malformed JSON and invalid values are rejected.
+CLI flags override config values.
+
+## Output files
+
+Write a JSON report to a file:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js test --test HP-AUTH-001 --reporter json --output handoffprobe-report.json
+```
+
+When `--output` is supplied, the selected report is written to that path instead of stdout.
+An output write failure is a runtime error and returns exit code `3`.
+
+## Exit codes
+
+| Exit | Meaning                                                                   |
+| ---: | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+|  `0` | scan completed correctly and no qualifying vulnerability FAIL exists      |
+|  `1` | at least one vulnerability FAIL meets or exceeds the configured threshold |
+|  `2` | usage or configuration error                                              |
+|  `3` | scanner, runtime or output error                                          |
+
+**ERROR is never converted into vulnerability exit code `1`.**
+
+Exit code `1` means HandoffProbe executed correctly and detected a qualifying security failure.
+Exit code `3` means the operation could not complete trustworthily.
+
+## Security and redaction
+
+The CLI includes:
+
+- recursive structured secret redaction;
+- free-text bearer/basic credential redaction;
+- sensitive key/value redaction;
+- redacted terminal finding text;
+- redacted JSON finding text;
+- redacted Markdown finding text;
+- deterministic runtime diagnostics;
+- no raw OS path in output-write diagnostics;
+- no raw runtime `error.message`;
+- no environment dump;
+- no telemetry or signup requirement.
+
+Reports use safe evidence counts and sequence references instead of raw EvidenceEvent context/details.
+Bundled fixtures are synthetic and perform no real external destructive actions.
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### Invalid configuration
+
+Check that `handoffprobe.config.json` contains valid JSON and only supported keys.
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js --help
+```
+
+### Unknown attack ID
+
+List the stable attack IDs:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js list
+```
+
+Then inspect one attack:
+
+```bash
+node dist/cli.js explain HP-AUTH-001
+```
+
+### Report file cannot be written
+
+Ensure the parent directory exists and is writable.
+
+```bash
+mkdir -p reports
+node dist/cli.js test --reporter json --output reports/handoffprobe.json
+```
+
+Output-write failures return exit code `3`.
+
+### Exit code 1
+
+This is a detected vulnerability, not a scanner crash.
+
+### Exit code 3
+
+This indicates a scanner, runtime or output problem rather than a vulnerability finding.
+Use the deterministic troubleshooting message written to stderr and rerun the same command.
+
+## Command reference
+
+```text
+handoffprobe test [options]
+handoffprobe list
+handoffprobe explain <HP-ID>
+handoffprobe --version
+handoffprobe --help
+```
+
+Test options:
+
+```text
+--target secure|vulnerable
+--test <HP-ID>                 repeatable
+--fail-on info|low|medium|high|critical
+--reporter terminal|json|markdown
+--output <path>
+```
+
+## What HandoffProbe is not
+
+HandoffProbe is not intended to replace:
+
+- official A2A conformance or inspection tooling;
+- the official MCP Inspector;
+- generic LLM red-team platforms;
+- a production runtime firewall or gateway;
+- an identity provider.
+
+The core admission rule remains:
+
+> A core test must exercise a security property that can be lost because an agent handoff composes or translates protocol/security context.
+
+## Principles
+
+- Open-source core under Apache-2.0.
+- Local-first.
+- Safe and authorized testing only.
+- Synthetic bundled targets.
+- No paid AI API required for bundled tests.
+- Deterministic attacks before AI-assisted heuristics.
+- Evidence before UI.
+- No hidden external side effects.
+- No telemetry or signup requirement.
+- Initial protocol wedge remains A2A → MCP.
+
+## Project documents
+
+- [`PROJECT_CONTEXT.md`](PROJECT_CONTEXT.md) — canonical project context
+- [`docs/PRODUCT.md`](docs/PRODUCT.md) — product definition
+- [`docs/ROADMAP.md`](docs/ROADMAP.md) — implementation and launch roadmap
+- [`docs/INSTALLATION.md`](docs/INSTALLATION.md) — installation and release-candidate execution
+- [`docs/USAGE.md`](docs/USAGE.md) — CLI commands, reporters, configuration and exit codes
+- [`docs/RESEARCH_ARTICLE.md`](docs/RESEARCH_ARTICLE.md) — v0.1 composition-security research article
+- [`docs/LAUNCH_EXAMPLES.md`](docs/LAUNCH_EXAMPLES.md) — reproducible v0.1 launch examples
+- [`docs/RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md`](docs/RELEASE_CHECKLIST.md) — evidence-backed v0.1 release checklist
+- [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) — architecture
+- [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) — threat model
+- [`docs/ATTACK_CATALOG.md`](docs/ATTACK_CATALOG.md) — attack catalog
+- [`docs/P0_TEST_SPECIFICATION.md`](docs/P0_TEST_SPECIFICATION.md) — P0 acceptance contract
+- [`docs/P1_TEST_SPECIFICATION.md`](docs/P1_TEST_SPECIFICATION.md) — P1 acceptance contract
+- [`docs/CLI_SPECIFICATION.md`](docs/CLI_SPECIFICATION.md) — CLI contract
+- [`docs/GITHUB_INTEGRATION_SPECIFICATION.md`](docs/GITHUB_INTEGRATION_SPECIFICATION.md) — GitHub Action and CI contract
+- [`docs/TECHNICAL_BASELINE.md`](docs/TECHNICAL_BASELINE.md) — technical baseline
+- [`docs/FINAL_PRODUCT_DEFINITION.md`](docs/FINAL_PRODUCT_DEFINITION.md) — mature-product definition
+- [`docs/RESEARCH_BASELINE.md`](docs/RESEARCH_BASELINE.md) — protocol and research baseline
+- [`docs/COMPETITIVE_LANDSCAPE.md`](docs/COMPETITIVE_LANDSCAPE.md) — competitive landscape
+- [`docs/SEVERITY.md`](docs/SEVERITY.md) — severity policy
+- [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) — authorized-use and disclosure policy
+- [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md) — contribution guidelines
+
+## License
+
+Apache License 2.0. See [`LICENSE`](LICENSE).

package/dist/attacks/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export * from './p0/index.js';
+export * from './p1/index.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/attacks/index.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/attacks/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+export * from './p0/index.js';
+export * from './p1/index.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/attacks/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/attacks/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,cAAc,eAAe,CAAC;AAC9B,cAAc,eAAe,CAAC"}

package/dist/attacks/p0/approval.d.ts

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+import type { P0AttackPlan } from './types.js';
+export declare const HP_APPROVAL_001_AMOUNT: P0AttackPlan;
+export declare const HP_APPROVAL_001: P0AttackPlan;
+export declare const P0_APPROVAL_001_VARIANTS: readonly P0AttackPlan[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=approval.d.ts.map

package/dist/attacks/p0/approval.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/attacks/p0/approval.js

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+import { P0_APPROVAL_ID, P0_CAPABILITY_REFUND, P0IdentityHandoffAdapter, createP0ReferenceContext, } from '../../p0-fixture/index.js';
+function createRefundContext() {
+    const context = createP0ReferenceContext();
+    if (context.upstreamAuthority === undefined || context.effectiveAuthority === undefined) {
+        throw new Error('HP-APPROVAL-001 requires authority bindings.');
+    }
+    context.capabilities = [P0_CAPABILITY_REFUND];
+    context.upstreamAuthority.capabilities = [P0_CAPABILITY_REFUND];
+    context.effectiveAuthority.capabilities = [P0_CAPABILITY_REFUND];
+    return context;
+}
+function createMutationScenario(id, amount, recipient) {
+    return {
+        id,
+        tool: 'refund_payment',
+        buildArguments(context) {
+            return {
+                resource: context.resource,
+                amount,
+                recipient,
+                approvalId: P0_APPROVAL_ID,
+            };
+        },
+    };
+}
+function evaluate(result) {
+    const output = result.output;
+    const envelope = output.mcpResult.envelope;
+    const auth = envelope.authorization;
+    const before = envelope.before.sideEffectCounter;
+    const after = envelope.after.sideEffectCounter;
+    const evidenceSequences = result.evidence
+        .filter((event) => ['handoff.translate', 'p0.authorization', 'p0.tool.result'].includes(event.event))
+        .map((event) => event.sequence);
+    if (auth.approvalMatches !== false) {
+        return {
+            status: 'inconclusive',
+            observedBehavior: 'The payload mutation did not create the required approval mismatch.',
+            evidenceSequences,
+        };
+    }
+    if (!auth.executed && after === before) {
+        return {
+            status: 'pass',
+            observedBehavior: 'The mutated refund request was rejected and the synthetic ledger remained unchanged.',
+            evidenceSequences,
+        };
+    }
+    if (auth.executed && after > before) {
+        return {
+            status: 'fail',
+            observedBehavior: 'The mutated synthetic refund executed using the original approval.',
+            evidenceSequences,
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        status: 'inconclusive',
+        observedBehavior: 'Approval evidence could not establish PASS or FAIL.',
+        evidenceSequences,
+    };
+}
+const DEFINITION = {
+    id: 'HP-APPROVAL-001',
+    name: 'Payload mutation after consent',
+    category: 'approval',
+    defaultSeverity: 'high',
+    priority: 'P0',
+    preconditions: [
+        'A synthetic refund for amount 20 and recipient acct:A has been approved.',
+        'The approval is bound to a deterministic payload hash.',
+    ],
+    mutationSteps: [
+        'Variant A changes amount 20 to 200 after approval.',
+        'Variant B changes recipient acct:A to acct:B after approval.',
+        'Reuse the original approval identifier.',
+    ],
+    expectedInvariant: 'Security-sensitive fields covered by approval must remain bound to the executed action.',
+    evidenceRequirements: [
+        'approved payload',
+        'approved payload hash',
+        'approval identifier',
+        'executed payload',
+        'synthetic ledger before',
+        'synthetic ledger after',
+    ],
+    applicability: {
+        a2a: ['1.0'],
+        mcp: ['2026-07-28'],
+    },
+    propertyClass: 'composition_responsibility',
+    sourceReferences: [
+        {
+            kind: 'project',
+            title: 'P0 Security Test Specification',
+            locator: 'docs/P0_TEST_SPECIFICATION.md#hp-approval-001--payload-mutation-after-consent',
+        },
+    ],
+    sideEffectClass: 'synthetic',
+    destructive: false,
+};
+const ATTACK = {
+    definition: DEFINITION,
+    evaluate,
+};
+export const HP_APPROVAL_001_AMOUNT = {
+    attack: ATTACK,
+    scenario: createMutationScenario('approval-mutate-amount', 200, 'acct:A'),
+    handoffAdapter: new P0IdentityHandoffAdapter(),
+    createContext: createRefundContext,
+};
+export const HP_APPROVAL_001 = {
+    attack: ATTACK,
+    scenario: createMutationScenario('approval-mutate-recipient', 20, 'acct:B'),
+    handoffAdapter: new P0IdentityHandoffAdapter(),
+    createContext: createRefundContext,
+};
+export const P0_APPROVAL_001_VARIANTS = [
+    HP_APPROVAL_001_AMOUNT,
+    HP_APPROVAL_001,
+];
+//# sourceMappingURL=approval.js.map

package/dist/attacks/p0/approval.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/attacks/p0/authorization.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import type { P0AttackPlan } from './types.js';
+export declare const HP_AUTH_001: P0AttackPlan;
+export declare const HP_AUTH_002: P0AttackPlan;
+export declare const HP_AUTH_003: P0AttackPlan;
+export declare const P0_AUTHORIZATION_ATTACKS: readonly P0AttackPlan[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=authorization.d.ts.map

package/dist/attacks/p0/authorization.d.ts.map

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