hachure 0.2.2 → 0.4.0

package/README.md

@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ a profile requires no changes to core record shapes or the status function.
 |---|---|---|
 | in-toto interop | [interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md) | Wrapping a TrustBundle as a signed in-toto Statement v1 / DSSE envelope. |
 | Verification endpoint | [verification-endpoint.md](verification-endpoint.md) | Producer-served HTTP endpoint for receivers to fetch post-export event deltas. |
+| Assurance | [assurance.md](assurance.md) | Signing as a dial: L0/L1/L2 assurance levels, identity presentation, consumer policy, and human signing ceremony. |
 
 ---
 

package/assurance.md

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+# Assurance — Extension Profile
+
+**Profile type:** OPTIONAL extension
+**Status:** draft
+**Namespace:** `hachure.org/v1`
+**Depends on:** core record shapes, [interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md), [verification-endpoint.md](verification-endpoint.md)
+
+---
+
+## Principle: signing is a dial, not a gate
+
+Unsigned records are valid core records.  Forever.  This profile defines how
+consumers express and verify *higher* assurance, and how policies weigh the
+levels against one another.  It is never a prerequisite for producing or
+consuming a TrustBundle.
+
+The assurance model exists because some environments want non-repudiation, audit
+trails that survive producer outages, or cryptographic evidence that a specific
+human exercised a specific authority.  Signing is the mechanism that provides
+those properties — but it is layered on top of an already-valid record, not a
+precondition for record validity.  A bundle with no signatures is not a
+degraded bundle; it is an L0 bundle.
+
+---
+
+## Assurance levels
+
+Three levels are defined.  Higher levels are a strict superset of lower levels:
+an L2 record satisfies any policy that accepts L1 or L0.
+
+### L0 — producer-asserted (default)
+
+The record is unsigned.  Assurance derives entirely from the trustworthiness of
+the transport channel and the producer identity declared in the bundle's
+`source` field.  All TrustBundles that do not carry a DSSE envelope are L0.
+This is the default; no annotation or flag is required.
+
+### L1 — identity-signed (keyless / ephemeral)
+
+The record is wrapped in a DSSE envelope (per
+[interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md)).  The signing key is short-lived and
+bound to an identity asserted by an OIDC provider at signing time — a CI
+workflow identity (`sub: repo:org/repo:ref:refs/heads/main`) or a human account
+(`sub: user@example.com`).  The certificate binds the ephemeral public key to
+that OIDC identity for the lifetime of the signing event.
+
+An L1 signature MAY be submitted to a public transparency log (Rekor or
+equivalent).  When it is, the resulting log entry UUID SHOULD be stored in the
+bundle's `proof` block as an `IntegrityAnchor` of kind `transparency_log`.
+Transparency-log inclusion is encouraged but not required for L1 conformance.
+
+The OIDC issuer and subject carried in the signing certificate are the
+authoritative identity for the signing event.  Implementations that verify L1
+signatures MUST surface a human-readable identity derived from those fields (see
+[Identity presentation](#identity-presentation) below).
+
+### L2 — held-key (org-controlled KMS/HSM)
+
+The record is wrapped in a DSSE envelope and signed with a long-lived key held
+in an org-controlled key-management system (a KMS or HSM).  The key is not
+ephemeral and is not tied to a per-operation OIDC token.  Key rotation and
+revocation are producer policy; this profile imposes no rotation schedule or
+revocation mechanism.
+
+L2 is appropriate for environments that cannot use public OIDC issuers or
+public transparency logs — air-gapped deployments, highly regulated environments
+with internal PKI requirements, or organisations that maintain their own CA.
+
+Because L2 keys are long-lived, verifiers must obtain the producer's public key
+through an out-of-band channel (internal PKI, a published key-distribution
+endpoint, a previously-trusted bundle).  This profile does not specify that
+channel.
+
+---
+
+## What gets signed
+
+Producers that adopt this profile MAY sign the following record types.  Signing
+any of them does not change the record's schema; the DSSE envelope wraps the
+serialised record and is carried alongside it, not embedded in it.
+
+### TrustBundles
+
+A full TrustBundle, including release bundles, is the primary signing target.
+Signing a bundle asserts that the named producer attests to the entire contents
+at the moment the envelope was created.  The in-toto Statement `subject` array
+SHOULD identify the bundle's `integrityAnchor.value` so downstream verifiers can
+correlate the envelope with a specific bundle revision.
+
+### Attestations
+
+A human's `ReviewOutcome` record carrying an `authorizing` block (ADR 0004) is
+an identity-signed attestation.  When the human's OIDC identity signs that
+record at the moment the authority is exercised (see
+[Human signing ceremony](#human-signing-ceremony)), the result is non-repudiable
+evidence that a specific identity made a specific decision.  This signed
+attestation is the appropriate content for the `identityEvidence` field on a
+Claim: it collapses "someone in this org approved this" into "this OIDC-verified
+identity approved this, cryptographically."
+
+### Verification-endpoint responses
+
+A producer serving a verification-endpoint response (see
+[verification-endpoint.md](verification-endpoint.md)) MAY wrap the response
+bundle in a DSSE envelope before returning it.  A signed response upgrades the
+assurance level of that endpoint from L0 to L1 or L2 according to the key type
+used.  Receivers SHOULD apply the same identity-presentation rules to a signed
+response as to any other signed record.
+
+---
+
+## Identity presentation
+
+Verifiers MUST surface a human-readable identity for every signed record they
+display or log.  Raw key fingerprints are not an acceptable primary display.
+
+Derive the display identity from the DSSE envelope's signing certificate:
+
+- For L1 (OIDC-backed): present the OIDC issuer and subject in a
+  human-readable form.  Examples:
+  - CI workflow: `"signed by github.com/org/repo workflow .github/workflows/release.yml"`
+  - Human account: `"signed by alice@example.com (GitHub)"`
+- For L2 (held key): present the key's subject DN or the KMS key alias as
+  configured by the producer.  Example: `"signed by CN=kontour-release-key, O=Kontour AI"`
+
+Displaying a fingerprint alongside the human-readable identity is permitted and
+encouraged for debugging.  It is not a substitute for the identity string as the
+primary display element.
+
+---
+
+## Consumer policy
+
+Assurance requirements are policy, not wire format.  A consumer expresses its
+requirements through a `VerificationPolicy` that declares a minimum assurance
+level among its `acceptanceCriteria`.  Mismatches between a record's actual
+level and the consumer's required level are **transparency gaps** — structured
+annotations that feed the status function's inputs and surface as `proposed` or
+`assumed` status rather than silent hard failures.
+
+This mirrors the admissibility doctrine in ADR 0004 §4: heuristics emit issues
+for human review; they do not silently decide.  A bundle whose assurance level
+falls below a consumer's requirement is recorded and flagged; a human or an
+automated policy layer decides whether to accept, escalate, or re-request.
+
+Concretely:
+
+- An L0 bundle that satisfies all policy evidence requirements reaches
+  `verified` normally.  If the consumer policy also requires L1, the consumer
+  annotates the gap; the status function sees the annotation as a transparency
+  gap and surfaces the claim at `proposed` pending a signed replacement.
+- An L1 or L2 bundle that satisfies all policy evidence requirements and meets
+  the assurance requirement reaches `verified` without annotation.
+- A signed record with an unverifiable or expired certificate does not silently
+  downgrade to L0.  The verification failure is itself a transparency gap,
+  flagged for the attention queue.
+
+---
+
+## Human signing ceremony
+
+When a human exercises authority — authoring a policy-change attestation,
+signing off a release bundle, or countersigning a ReviewOutcome — the signing
+gesture MUST be interactive and co-located in time with the authorizing act.
+
+The ceremony is an interactive OIDC browser flow: the same gesture as
+sign-in-with-Google or a Stripe payment confirmation.  The human authenticates
+to the OIDC provider, the provider issues a short-lived certificate bound to
+the authenticated identity, and that certificate signs the record.  The entire
+flow completes in the same session as the authorizing act; signing a record
+retroactively from a different session is not a conforming ceremony.
+
+**Recommended mechanism for highest-assurance human ceremonies:** WebAuthn /
+passkey with user-verification (UV=1).  A device-local authenticator satisfies
+three independent assurance legs simultaneously:
+
+- **Presence** — the passkey gesture (biometric or PIN) proves the enrolled
+  device is physically present; biometric data never leaves the device.
+- **Identity** — the hardware-backed assertion composes with the OIDC
+  certificate: the certificate binds the ephemeral key to the OIDC subject;
+  the passkey attests the device-local identity enrolled at registration time.
+- **Engagement** (non-normative) — oversight metrics such as session duration
+  or interaction events can accompany the record as non-normative evidence;
+  they are not part of the conformance criteria.
+
+Because the three legs are independent, losing one (e.g., no biometric sensor
+on the device) does not forfeit the others.  An OIDC-only ceremony without a
+passkey assertion is still a conforming L1 ceremony; the passkey upgrade is
+RECOMMENDED where the platform supports it.
+
+Design intent: friction lands only where authority is exercised.  Routine
+read-only operations, status queries, and bundle consumption carry no signing
+requirement.  The ceremony surfaces once, at the moment of consequence.
+
+## Collection channels and media evidence
+
+Any collection channel defined in the reference implementation (see ADR 0004 in
+the reference implementation) MAY attach media evidence — for example,
+capture-provenance imagery conforming to C2PA — as ordinary evidence entries
+with integrity anchors.  Three rules govern such attachments:
+
+1. **Channels do not replace admissible testimony kinds.**  A photo or video of
+   a signing gesture is attached evidence, not a substitute for an `exchange` or
+   `authorized-action` block.  The admissible testimony kinds in ADR 0004 remain
+   the authoritative record; media is corroborating context.
+2. **Capture provenance determines evidence grade.**  Media accompanied by a
+   valid C2PA manifest (or equivalent capture-provenance credential) is treated
+   as integrity-anchored evidence at the level its anchor supports.  Media
+   without capture provenance is ordinary L0 evidence: present, but carrying no
+   additional assurance weight beyond the transport channel.
+3. **Integrity anchors are required for non-L0 media claims.**  If a consumer
+   policy requires L1 or higher evidence grade for media, the media item MUST
+   carry an `IntegrityAnchor` referencing the capture-provenance credential.
+
+---
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Mandating a CA or transparency log.** This profile does not require a
+  specific certificate authority, a specific OIDC issuer, or submission to any
+  particular log.  L1 signing with a private OIDC issuer and no public log is
+  valid L1.
+- **Key custody prescriptions.** How a producer acquires, stores, rotates, or
+  revokes L2 keys is producer policy.  This profile does not specify HSM vendor,
+  key-rotation schedule, or revocation-distribution mechanism.
+- **Core-format changes.** No core record schema is altered by this profile.
+  Adopting the assurance profile requires no schema migration and no changes to
+  the status derivation function.
+- **Signing every record.** Signing is always optional.  Producers that sign
+  nothing are fully conformant with the core specification.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "hachure",
-  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "version": "0.4.0",
   "description": "Hachure \u2014 canonical distribution of the open trust format: normative JSON schemas, conformance test vectors, and spec constants.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./index.mjs",
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
     "README.md",
     "status-function.md",
     "interop-in-toto.md",
-    "verification-endpoint.md"
+    "verification-endpoint.md",
+    "assurance.md"
   ],
   "scripts": {
     "test": "node --test test/index.test.mjs"
@@ -36,4 +37,4 @@
     "type": "git",
     "url": "git+https://github.com/hachure-org/spec.git"
   }
-}
+}

package/schemas/evidence.schema.json

@@ -24,9 +24,34 @@
     "collectedBy": { "type": "string" },
     "integrityRef": { "type": "string" },
     "integrityAnchor": { "$ref": "#/$defs/integrityAnchor" },
+    "passing": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "description": "Whether the check that produced this evidence passed. Omitted when the evidence is not the output of a pass/fail check."
+    },
+    "blocking": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "description": "Whether a non-passing result should block (e.g. trigger disputed status under a policy conflict rule)."
+    },
+    "execution": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/execution",
+      "description": "How the evidence was produced: the command or tool invocation, exit code, and duration — making artifacts self-describing without requiring the producer's adapter config."
+    },
     "metadata": { "type": "object" }
   },
   "$defs": {
+    "execution": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["runner", "label"],
+      "properties": {
+        "runner": { "enum": ["bash", "mcp"] },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "exitCode": { "type": "integer" },
+        "isError": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "durationMs": { "type": "number" },
+        "metadata": { "type": "object" }
+      },
+      "additionalProperties": false
+    },
     "integrityAnchor": {
       "type": "object",
       "required": ["id", "kind", "algorithm", "value", "sourceRef"],

package/verification-endpoint.md

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Producers supporting this profile expose a verification endpoint at a well-known
 path on the same host that issued the bundle:
 
 ```
-GET https://<producer-host>/.well-known/hachure/verify?ref=<integrityRef>[&ref=...]
+GET https://<producer-host>/.well-known/hachure/verify?ref=<ref>[&ref=...]
 ```
 
 Multiple refs may be passed as repeated `ref` query parameters. For large sets,
@@ -40,17 +40,39 @@ a POST variant is also allowed:
 POST https://<producer-host>/.well-known/hachure/verify
 Content-Type: application/json
 
-{ "refs": ["<integrityRef>", ...] }
+{ "refs": ["<ref>", ...] }
 ```
 
-`integrityRef` is the integrity anchor value carried on a claim or bundle
-(`claim.integrityRef` or a bundle-level `integrityAnchor.value`).
-
 Producers MAY require authentication before serving a response. The response
 semantics defined in this profile are unchanged by the presence or absence of
 authentication; the receiver simply may not be able to reach the endpoint
 without valid credentials.
 
+### Ref resolution semantics
+
+A `ref` value in the request MAY be any of the following:
+
+- **(a) A claim `id`** — the stable identifier on a claim object (`claim.id`).
+- **(b) A claim's current integrity ref** — the `currentIntegrityRef` string field
+  on a claim (`claim.currentIntegrityRef`, per `schemas/claim.schema.json`).
+  Note: the analogous full anchor object is `claim.currentIntegrityAnchor`; when
+  resolving by integrity value, match against `currentIntegrityRef` or
+  `currentIntegrityAnchor.value`.
+- **(c) A bundle-level integrity anchor value** — the `.value` field of an
+  `integrityAnchor` object carried on an `authorityTrace` or `evidence` record
+  within a bundle (`schemas/trust-bundle.schema.json` `$defs/integrityAnchor`
+  → `value`).
+
+Producers MUST support lookup by (a) and (b). Producers MAY support lookup by (c).
+Receivers SHOULD prefer (a) for stability; (b) and (c) are useful when only an
+integrity value is available from a prior bundle snapshot.
+
+**Multi-match:** a single ref value MAY match more than one claim (for example,
+two claims that share the same `currentIntegrityRef`). When a ref matches multiple
+claims, the response includes ALL matching claims. A ref is reported as unknown
+(in `unknownRefs`) only when it matches nothing — zero claims, evidence records,
+or authority traces.
+
 ---
 
 ## Response shape
@@ -60,8 +82,9 @@ scoped to the records matching the requested refs, plus a `metadata` extension
 block. The bundle carries:
 
 - **`source`** — the producer identifier, matching `source` in the original bundle.
-- **`claims`** — all claims whose `integrityRef` was among the requested refs.
-  Each claim is returned in its current form as the producer knows it.
+- **`claims`** — all claims that matched the requested refs (by id, currentIntegrityRef,
+  or anchor value as described above). When a ref matched multiple claims, all are
+  included. Each claim is returned in its current form as the producer knows it.
 - **`evidence`** and **`events`** — the delta since issuance where the producer
   can supply it: new evidence items, new verification events, revocation events,
   dispute events. Producers that do not track a delta MAY return the full current
@@ -69,20 +92,35 @@ block. The bundle carries:
   means it was never present in the original bundle.
 - **`authorityTrace`** — current authority traces relevant to the matched claims,
   including any that have been revoked since the original bundle was issued.
-- **`metadata`** — a free-form object on the bundle. This profile defines four
+- **`metadata`** — a free-form object on the bundle. This profile defines five
   reserved keys within `metadata`:
 
   | Key | Type | Required | Meaning |
   |---|---|---|---|
   | `respondedAt` | ISO 8601 string | yes | The timestamp at which the producer assembled this response. |
-  | `statusFunctionVersion` | string | yes | The status function version active at the producer at response time. |
+  | `statusFunctionVersion` | string | yes | The status function version the producer's current evaluation pipeline uses — i.e. the value the implementation exports (e.g. `statusFunctionVersion` from the reference implementation), independent of any version values stored inside served bundles. |
   | `requestedRefs` | string[] | yes | The full list of refs from the request, in order. |
-  | `unknownRefs` | string[] | yes | Refs from the request that the producer does not recognise. Must be present even if empty. |
+  | `unknownRefs` | string[] | yes | Refs from the request that matched nothing. Must be present even if empty. |
+  | `evaluatedAt` | `"response"` \| `"generation"` | no | When omitted or `"response"`, the producer evaluated claims dynamically at response time. `"generation"` indicates the producer cannot evaluate dynamically (e.g. static file serving) and the `statusFunctionVersion` reflects the version recorded when the bundle was originally generated. |
 
 Unknown refs are reported in `unknownRefs` honestly. A producer MUST NOT silently
 omit a ref it does not recognise; it MUST include it in `unknownRefs` so the
 receiver can distinguish "no changes" from "not found."
 
+**`statusFunctionVersion` source:** producers report the version their current
+evaluation pipeline uses — the value their implementation exports at response time.
+This is independent of any `statusFunctionVersion` fields stored inside the claims
+or events within served bundles. Producers that serve static bundles without
+dynamic evaluation MUST report the version that was active at generation time and
+MUST set `evaluatedAt: "generation"` in metadata.
+
+**`integrityAnchor` shape:** integrity anchor objects in responses follow the
+`integrityAnchor` definition in `schemas/claim.schema.json` (`$defs/integrityAnchor`)
+and `schemas/trust-bundle.schema.json` (`$defs/integrityAnchor`). Required fields
+are `id`, `kind`, `algorithm`, `value`, and `sourceRef`. On claims the anchor is
+carried as `currentIntegrityAnchor`; on authority-trace and evidence records it
+is carried as `integrityAnchor`.
+
 ---
 
 ## Assurance levels
@@ -150,3 +188,19 @@ unsigned responses are valid.
   specified here.
 - **Key management.** Public-key distribution, rotation, and revocation are out
   of scope. See the ADR 0004 backlog note above.
+
+---
+
+## Changelog
+
+**Amended after first independent implementation — hachure.org site function.**
+Five ambiguities resolved: (1) corrected claim integrity field names to schema
+truth (`currentIntegrityRef`, `currentIntegrityAnchor`) and noted authority-trace
+and evidence fields (`integrityRef`, `integrityAnchor`); (2) defined ref resolution
+semantics — producers MUST support id and currentIntegrityRef lookups, MAY support
+anchor-value lookups; (3) clarified multi-match: a ref matching multiple claims
+returns all of them, unknown only when nothing matches; (4) clarified
+`statusFunctionVersion` source as the producer's current pipeline export, added
+optional `evaluatedAt` metadata key (`"response"` | `"generation"`) for static
+producers; (5) added normative cross-reference to `integrityAnchor` schema
+definition in `schemas/claim.schema.json` and `schemas/trust-bundle.schema.json`.