hachure 0.2.0 → 0.2.2

package/README.md

@@ -226,6 +226,19 @@ validates TrustBundle input against these schemas via `validateTrustBundle()`.
 
 ---
 
+## Profiles
+
+The core specification covers record shapes and status semantics. Profiles are
+optional, independently adoptable conventions for interop and transport. Adopting
+a profile requires no changes to core record shapes or the status function.
+
+| Profile | File | What it covers |
+|---|---|---|
+| in-toto interop | [interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md) | Wrapping a TrustBundle as a signed in-toto Statement v1 / DSSE envelope. |
+| Verification endpoint | [verification-endpoint.md](verification-endpoint.md) | Producer-served HTTP endpoint for receivers to fetch post-export event deltas. |
+
+---
+
 ## Out of scope: future extension profiles
 
 The following producer domains are explicitly out of scope for this core specification.

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "hachure",
-  "version": "0.2.0",
-  "description": "Hachure — canonical distribution of the open trust format: normative JSON schemas, conformance test vectors, and spec constants.",
+  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "description": "Hachure \u2014 canonical distribution of the open trust format: normative JSON schemas, conformance test vectors, and spec constants.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./index.mjs",
   "exports": {
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
     "index.mjs",
     "README.md",
     "status-function.md",
-    "interop-in-toto.md"
+    "interop-in-toto.md",
+    "verification-endpoint.md"
   ],
   "scripts": {
     "test": "node --test test/index.test.mjs"
@@ -30,5 +31,9 @@
   "license": "MIT",
   "publishConfig": {
     "access": "public"
+  },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/hachure-org/spec.git"
   }
-}
+}

package/verification-endpoint.md

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+# Verification Endpoint — Extension Profile
+
+**Profile type:** OPTIONAL extension
+**Status:** draft
+**Namespace:** `hachure.org/v1`
+**Depends on:** core record shapes, [status-function.md](status-function.md), [interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md)
+
+---
+
+## Problem
+
+A TrustBundle is a point-in-time snapshot. Once exported, it carries no channel
+back to the producer. A receiver holding a bundle from last week has no way to
+learn that an authority trace was revoked yesterday, that a blocking evidence item
+was added the day after export, or that a claim has since been superseded. The
+receiver can re-run the status function as many times as it likes, but can only
+produce the same answer from the same stale inputs.
+
+This profile defines a lightweight channel for receivers to ask a producer: *what
+has changed since this bundle was issued?* The response delivers fresh inputs for
+the receiver's own status recomputation. It is testimony with a timestamp — a
+record of what the producer asserted at the moment of response. It is never a
+verdict the receiver is expected to obey.
+
+---
+
+## Discovery
+
+Producers supporting this profile expose a verification endpoint at a well-known
+path on the same host that issued the bundle:
+
+```
+GET https://<producer-host>/.well-known/hachure/verify?ref=<integrityRef>[&ref=...]
+```
+
+Multiple refs may be passed as repeated `ref` query parameters. For large sets,
+a POST variant is also allowed:
+
+```
+POST https://<producer-host>/.well-known/hachure/verify
+Content-Type: application/json
+
+{ "refs": ["<integrityRef>", ...] }
+```
+
+`integrityRef` is the integrity anchor value carried on a claim or bundle
+(`claim.integrityRef` or a bundle-level `integrityAnchor.value`).
+
+Producers MAY require authentication before serving a response. The response
+semantics defined in this profile are unchanged by the presence or absence of
+authentication; the receiver simply may not be able to reach the endpoint
+without valid credentials.
+
+---
+
+## Response shape
+
+The response body is a TrustBundle (see `schemas/trust-bundle.schema.json`)
+scoped to the records matching the requested refs, plus a `metadata` extension
+block. The bundle carries:
+
+- **`source`** — the producer identifier, matching `source` in the original bundle.
+- **`claims`** — all claims whose `integrityRef` was among the requested refs.
+  Each claim is returned in its current form as the producer knows it.
+- **`evidence`** and **`events`** — the delta since issuance where the producer
+  can supply it: new evidence items, new verification events, revocation events,
+  dispute events. Producers that do not track a delta MAY return the full current
+  set for the matched claims; receivers MUST NOT assume the absence of an item
+  means it was never present in the original bundle.
+- **`authorityTrace`** — current authority traces relevant to the matched claims,
+  including any that have been revoked since the original bundle was issued.
+- **`metadata`** — a free-form object on the bundle. This profile defines four
+  reserved keys within `metadata`:
+
+  | Key | Type | Required | Meaning |
+  |---|---|---|---|
+  | `respondedAt` | ISO 8601 string | yes | The timestamp at which the producer assembled this response. |
+  | `statusFunctionVersion` | string | yes | The status function version active at the producer at response time. |
+  | `requestedRefs` | string[] | yes | The full list of refs from the request, in order. |
+  | `unknownRefs` | string[] | yes | Refs from the request that the producer does not recognise. Must be present even if empty. |
+
+Unknown refs are reported in `unknownRefs` honestly. A producer MUST NOT silently
+omit a ref it does not recognise; it MUST include it in `unknownRefs` so the
+receiver can distinguish "no changes" from "not found."
+
+---
+
+## Assurance levels
+
+A response may be signed or unsigned. The two carry different weight.
+
+**Signed response.** A producer that wraps the response bundle in a DSSE envelope
+(per [interop-in-toto.md](interop-in-toto.md)) or attaches a `proof` block provides
+independently verifiable testimony. The receiver can verify the signature using the
+producer's public key before trusting any of the returned data. A signed response is
+as trustworthy as the key and the in-toto statement it protects.
+
+**Unsigned response.** A response delivered without a signature is producer-asserted
+only. Receivers SHOULD treat an unsigned response exactly as they would treat an
+unsigned TrustBundle received over a trusted channel: the transport provides some
+assurance, but the content itself is not independently verifiable. Do not give an
+unsigned response higher trust than the connection that delivered it.
+
+Key distribution and rotation are out of scope for this profile. The same backlog
+item that defers cryptographic signing for testimony records (ADR 0004, §Backlog)
+applies here: until key-management infrastructure exists, signing is OPTIONAL and
+unsigned responses are valid.
+
+---
+
+## Receiver rules
+
+1. **Re-run the status function.** Merge the response bundle's events and evidence
+   with the records in the held bundle, then call the status function over the
+   combined input at your own `now`. Do not treat any status value in the response
+   as a pre-computed verdict.
+
+2. **Fix `now` before evaluating.** The status function is `f(claim, evidence,
+   events, policy, authorityTrace, now)`. The response supplies updated inputs; the
+   receiver controls `now`. Two receivers evaluating the same response at different
+   instants may derive different statuses — that is expected and correct.
+
+3. **Cache by `respondedAt`; honour `max-age`.** A receiver MAY cache a response
+   keyed on the set of requested refs and the `respondedAt` timestamp. Producers MAY
+   include a standard HTTP `Cache-Control: max-age=<seconds>` header as a hint for
+   how long the response is expected to remain fresh. The hint is advisory; the
+   receiver decides its own staleness policy.
+
+4. **Retain the response as a record.** A verification response is itself a record
+   worth keeping. It is testimony: evidence of what the producer asserted at
+   `respondedAt`. A receiver that retains responses can reconstruct the history of
+   its knowledge — when it learned of a revocation, when a dispute event appeared —
+   which is useful for audit and for re-evaluating past InquiryRecords.
+
+5. **Treat signed and unsigned responses differently.** Apply the assurance-level
+   rules above before deciding how to weight the response in a combined evaluation.
+
+---
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Transport beyond HTTPS.** This profile specifies only the HTTP/HTTPS request
+  and response shape. Other transport mechanisms (gRPC, message queues, file
+  exchange) are not covered.
+- **Push and webhooks.** This profile is pull-only. Producers notify receivers
+  only when asked. Push notification channels are a separate concern.
+- **Transparency-log inclusion.** Including verification responses in a public
+  transparency log (Rekor or equivalent) is complementary and encouraged for
+  high-assurance scenarios, but it is not required by this profile and is not
+  specified here.
+- **Key management.** Public-key distribution, rotation, and revocation are out
+  of scope. See the ADR 0004 backlog note above.