guardvibe 3.1.39 → 3.1.40

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ All notable changes to GuardVibe are documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.1.40] - 2026-06-07
+
+### Added — recall: Mongoose direct mass-assignment (no rule-count change, 438 / 36)
+- **VG953** now also flags request bodies passed *directly* as the update document to Mongoose writes — `findByIdAndUpdate(id, req.body)`, `findOneAndUpdate(q, req.body)`, `updateOne/updateMany/findOneAndReplace/replaceOne(q, req.body)` — not just the `{ ...req.body }` spread form. Explicit-field updates (`findByIdAndUpdate(id, { name, email })`) are not flagged. Zero new corpus hits (no false positives).
+
+### Internal — test coverage
+- Overall test coverage raised from ~90.6% to ~97% via 24 new offline, deterministic test files; the MCP server entry point (`src/index.ts`) is excluded from coverage (it is the stdio bootstrap, exercised via integration, not unit tests).
+
+Gate green (build / lint / test / self-audit PASS / A / 0).
+
 ## [3.1.39] - 2026-06-07
 
 ### Added — SSRF taint detection + taint-engine precision (no rule-count change, 438 / 36)

package/build/data/rules/api-security.js

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ export const apiSecurityRules = [
         severity: "high",
         owasp: "API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization",
         description: "Request body is spread directly into a database create/update operation. Attackers can inject extra fields (like role, isAdmin, price) that the API didn't intend to accept.",
-        pattern: /(?:create|update|upsert|insert)\s*\(\s*\{[\s\S]{0,100}?(?:\.\.\.(?:req\.body|body|input|data|args)|(?:data|values)\s*:\s*(?:req\.body|body|input))\s*\}/gi,
+        pattern: /(?:create|update|upsert|insert)\s*\(\s*\{[\s\S]{0,100}?(?:\.\.\.(?:req\.body|body|input|data|args)|(?:data|values)\s*:\s*(?:req\.body|body|input))\s*\}|(?:findByIdAndUpdate|findOneAndUpdate|findOneAndReplace|updateOne|updateMany|replaceOne)\s*\(\s*[^,()]+,\s*req\.(?:body|query)\s*[,)]/gi,
         languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
         fix: "Explicitly pick allowed fields instead of spreading the entire request body. Use a validation schema (zod) to define exactly which fields are accepted.",
         fixCode: '// BAD: mass assignment\nawait prisma.user.update({ where: { id }, data: { ...req.body } });\n\n// GOOD: explicit fields\nconst { name, email } = schema.parse(req.body);\nawait prisma.user.update({ where: { id }, data: { name, email } });',

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "guardvibe",
-  "version": "3.1.39",
+  "version": "3.1.40",
   "mcpName": "io.github.goklab/guardvibe",
   "description": "Security MCP for vibe coding. 438 rules, 36 tools, CLI + doctor. Host security, auth coverage mapping, LLM-powered deep scan (IDOR/business logic), taint analysis. 67 CVE rules refreshed daily from GHSA/OSV/CISA KEV — Miasma @redhat-cloud-services compromise, Next.js May 2026 13-advisory cluster, Drizzle/MikroORM/Kysely SQL injection, Axios proxy-auth redirect leak, Hono setCookie attribute injection, Clerk SSRF, tRPC prototype pollution, @tanstack supply-chain, node-ipc protestware, OpenClaude sandbox bypass, plus the full AI-generated stack (Supabase, Stripe, Prisma, Hono, GraphQL, Convex, Turso, Uploadthing, AI SDK). 68 AI-native rules including OWASP MCP Top 10 tool-description prompt injection (VG1068), model-controlled sandbox-disable flag detection (VG1063), Session messenger exfil endpoint IOC (VG1075), and CI/CD supply-chain hardening (VG1070 npm --expect-provenance / --ignore-scripts enforcement).",
   "type": "module",