guardvibe 3.1.27 → 3.1.28

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,16 @@ All notable changes to GuardVibe are documented in this file.
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.1.28] - 2026-06-06
+
+### Fixed
+- **VG010 now catches two-step SQL injection** — queries assembled into a variable (or returned) before reaching the DB sink. Previously only inline `db.query("..." + userInput)` / `db.query(\`...${userInput}\`)` fired; the classic login-bypass shape `const sql = "SELECT ... WHERE u='" + name + "'"; db.get(sql)` slipped through both the regex rules and the taint analyzer. The pattern requires a real DML statement (DML keyword at string start + structural keyword `FROM`/`INTO`/`SET`/`WHERE`/`VALUES`) built via concatenation or template interpolation, so natural-language strings that merely mention SQL (e.g. LLM prompts) are not flagged.
+
+### Validation
+- Surfaced by a labeled ground-truth benchmark (gt-sqli now detects 3/3 expected SQLi, up from 2/3)
+- Cross-baseline across 11 real-world repos: 8 unchanged (no false-positive explosion), dvna +1 / payload +3 / unkey +7 — all genuine raw-SQL-construction sites (`sql.raw(\`…${where}…\`)`, ClickHouse builders, user-input login query). An LLM-prompt false-positive class found mid-validation was eliminated by requiring the DML keyword at string start
+- 7 new unit tests (4 positive var-built shapes, 3 false-positive guards); full suite 1781 → 1788, self-audit PASS A 100, no ReDoS
+
 ## [3.1.27] - 2026-06-06
 
 ### Fixed

package/README.md

@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ If your AI agent cannot connect to GuardVibe:
 
 1. **Restart your IDE/agent.** MCP servers are started by the host application. After running `npx guardvibe init`, restart Claude Code, Cursor, or Gemini CLI for the config to take effect.
 2. **Check the config path.** Run `npx guardvibe init claude` again and verify the output shows the correct config file location (`.mcp.json` in your project root for Claude Code, `.cursor/mcp.json` for Cursor).
-3. **Re-run `init` to upgrade.** When upgrading GuardVibe, re-run `npx guardvibe init claude` — `.mcp.json` is pinned to a specific version (e.g. `guardvibe@3.1.27`) at init time for fast deterministic startup. As of v3.1.2 the re-run also rewrites stale pins automatically (`Upgraded GuardVibe pin (3.1.26 → 3.1.27)`); since v3.1.27 the PostToolUse hook command is pinned to the same version (was `@latest`) and re-run upgrades a stale hook too. The same applies to `npx guardvibe hook install` and `npx guardvibe ci github` (since v3.1.3) — both are version-pinned at install/generate time and re-run to upgrade.
+3. **Re-run `init` to upgrade.** When upgrading GuardVibe, re-run `npx guardvibe init claude` — `.mcp.json` is pinned to a specific version (e.g. `guardvibe@3.1.28`) at init time for fast deterministic startup. As of v3.1.2 the re-run also rewrites stale pins automatically (`Upgraded GuardVibe pin (3.1.27 → 3.1.28)`); since v3.1.27 the PostToolUse hook command is pinned to the same version (was `@latest`) and re-run upgrades a stale hook too. The same applies to `npx guardvibe hook install` and `npx guardvibe ci github` (since v3.1.3) — both are version-pinned at install/generate time and re-run to upgrade.
 4. **Pre-3.1.1 users won't see the auto-update banner.** GuardVibe started writing a once-per-day "newer version available" notice to stderr in v3.1.1. If your install predates that, you'll never see it — run `npx -y guardvibe@latest init <host>` once to bake in the latest pin and start receiving banners on subsequent sessions.
 5. **Verify Node.js version.** GuardVibe requires Node.js >= 18.0.0. Check with `node --version`.
 6. **Check npx cache.** If you upgraded GuardVibe and the old version is cached, run `npx -y guardvibe@latest` to force the latest version.

package/build/data/rules/core.js

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ export const coreRules = [
         name: "SQL injection risk",
         severity: "critical",
         owasp: "A02:2025 Injection",
-        description: "String concatenation, template literals, or f-strings used in SQL queries. This allows SQL injection attacks.",
-        pattern: /(?:query|execute|raw|sql|all|run|get|exec|prepare|QueryRow|QueryContext)\s*\(\s*(?:`[^`]*\$\{|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*\+\s*|f"[^"]*\{|f'[^']*\{|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*%\s*|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*\.format\s*\(|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*,\s*(?:req\.|request\.|params\.|body\.|args))/gi,
+        description: "String concatenation, template literals, or f-strings used in SQL queries — whether inline in the DB call or assembled in a variable/return first. This allows SQL injection attacks.",
+        pattern: /(?:query|execute|raw|sql|all|run|get|exec|prepare|QueryRow|QueryContext)\s*\(\s*(?:`[^`]*\$\{|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*\+\s*|f"[^"]*\{|f'[^']*\{|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*%\s*|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*\.format\s*\(|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*,\s*(?:req\.|request\.|params\.|body\.|args))|(?:=|return)\s*(?:`\s*(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b[^`]*\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|WHERE|VALUES)\b[^`]*\$\{|['"]\s*(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b[^\n]*?\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|WHERE|VALUES)\b[^\n]*?['"]\s*\+\s*\w)/gi,
         languages: ["javascript", "typescript", "python", "go"],
         fix: "Use parameterized queries: db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]). Python: cursor.execute('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s', (user_id,)). Never concatenate user input into SQL strings.",
         fixCode: "// Use parameterized queries\ndb.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);\n// Python: cursor.execute('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s', (user_id,))",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "guardvibe",
-  "version": "3.1.27",
+  "version": "3.1.28",
   "mcpName": "io.github.goklab/guardvibe",
   "description": "Security MCP for vibe coding. 429 rules, 36 tools, CLI + doctor. Host security, auth coverage mapping, LLM-powered deep scan (IDOR/business logic), taint analysis. 63 CVE rules refreshed daily from GHSA/OSV/CISA KEV — Miasma @redhat-cloud-services compromise, Next.js May 2026 13-advisory cluster, Drizzle/MikroORM/Kysely SQL injection, Axios proxy-auth redirect leak, Hono setCookie attribute injection, Clerk SSRF, tRPC prototype pollution, @tanstack supply-chain, node-ipc protestware, OpenClaude sandbox bypass, plus the full AI-generated stack (Supabase, Stripe, Prisma, Hono, GraphQL, Convex, Turso, Uploadthing, AI SDK). 68 AI-native rules including OWASP MCP Top 10 tool-description prompt injection (VG1068), model-controlled sandbox-disable flag detection (VG1063), Session messenger exfil endpoint IOC (VG1075), and CI/CD supply-chain hardening (VG1070 npm --expect-provenance / --ignore-scripts enforcement).",
   "type": "module",