grokbox 0.1.0-alpha.8 → 0.1.0-alpha.9

package/README.md

@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ This project is not affiliated with or endorsed by Anysphere, Cursor, xAI, or
 Grok Bot. Grok Bot, Cursor, and related names identify compatible products and
 remain the property of their respective owners.
 
-> **Alpha:** current source is `0.1.0-alpha.8`. npm `next` currently points to
-> `0.1.0-alpha.7`; `0.0.1` remains `latest`. Prereleases publish only after
+> **Alpha:** current source is `0.1.0-alpha.9`. npm `next` currently points to
+> `0.1.0-alpha.8`; `0.0.1` remains `latest`. Prereleases publish only after
 > release checks and explicitly scoped external acceptance.
 
 ## What it does

package/README.zh-CN.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 本项目与 Anysphere、Cursor、xAI 或 Grok Bot 没有隶属或背书关系。Grok Bot、Cursor 及相关名称仅用于标识兼容产品，其权利归各自所有者。
 
-> **Alpha：** 当前源码版本是 `0.1.0-alpha.8`。npm 的 `next` dist-tag 目前指向 `0.1.0-alpha.7`；`0.0.1` 仍是 `latest`。只有通过发布检查及明确范围的外部验收后，才会发布新的预发布版本。
+> **Alpha：** 当前源码版本是 `0.1.0-alpha.9`。npm 的 `next` dist-tag 目前指向 `0.1.0-alpha.8`；`0.0.1` 仍是 `latest`。只有通过发布检查及明确范围的外部验收后，才会发布新的预发布版本。
 
 ## 它能做什么
 

package/dist/index.js

@@ -3474,7 +3474,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 // package.json
 var package_default = {
   name: "grokbox",
-  version: "0.1.0-alpha.8",
+  version: "0.1.0-alpha.9",
   packageManager: "bun@1.3.14",
   description: "Unofficial CLI and control plane for Grok Bot cloud computers",
   license: "MIT",
@@ -4079,7 +4079,7 @@ var LEAF_COMMANDS = [
     ],
     options: options([
       { flags: "--confirm", description: "Confirm credential access/mint", required: true },
-      { flags: "--reveal-key", description: "Include the sensitive webhook key in stdout" }
+      { flags: "--reveal-key", description: "Include the webhook key and routine prompt in stdout" }
     ], { timeout: true }),
     stdin: "none",
     table: false,
@@ -15009,15 +15009,31 @@ async function readSnapshot(client2, agent, timeoutMs) {
     throw new CliError("gateway_conflict", "Gateway generation changed while reading Routines.");
   }
   try {
+    const projected = projectNativeRoutines(agent.id, response.result);
     return {
-      ...projectNativeRoutines(agent.id, response.result),
+      ...projected,
       discovery,
-      authority: authority.authority
+      authority: authority.authority,
+      prompts: nativePrompts(response.result, projected.catalog)
     };
   } catch (error) {
     throw routineCliError(error);
   }
 }
+function nativePrompts(value, catalog) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) throw new RoutineError("unsupported_shape");
+  const prompts = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const raw of value) {
+    if (!isRecord(raw) || typeof raw.id !== "string" || typeof raw.prompt !== "string" || raw.prompt.length < 1 || raw.prompt.includes("\0") || Buffer.byteLength(raw.prompt) > 128 * 1024) {
+      throw new RoutineError("unsupported_shape");
+    }
+    prompts.set(raw.id, raw.prompt);
+  }
+  for (const routine of catalog.routines) {
+    if (!prompts.has(routine.id)) throw new RoutineError("unsupported_shape");
+  }
+  return prompts;
+}
 function findRoutine(snapshot, id) {
   let rid;
   try {
@@ -15305,6 +15321,10 @@ async function showWebhookCredential(deps, client2, agentTarget, routineTarget,
   if (url.protocol !== "https:" || url.username || url.password || url.hash) {
     throw new CliError("gateway_internal", "Gateway returned an unsafe webhook URL.");
   }
+  const prompt = snapshot.prompts.get(routine.id);
+  if (prompt === void 0) {
+    throw new CliError("gateway_internal", "Gateway returned a Routine without a prompt.");
+  }
   const revealKey = raw.revealKey === true;
   writeSuccess(deps.stdout, {
     schemaVersion: 1,
@@ -15314,7 +15334,8 @@ async function showWebhookCredential(deps, client2, agentTarget, routineTarget,
     url: url.toString(),
     keyPresent: true,
     keyIncluded: revealKey,
-    ...revealKey ? { key: response.result.key } : {}
+    promptIncluded: revealKey,
+    ...revealKey ? { key: response.result.key, prompt } : {}
   }, discovery);
 }
 async function deleteRoutine(deps, client2, agentTarget, routineTarget, raw) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "grokbox",
-  "version": "0.1.0-alpha.8",
+  "version": "0.1.0-alpha.9",
   "packageManager": "bun@1.3.14",
   "description": "Unofficial CLI and control plane for Grok Bot cloud computers",
   "license": "MIT",

package/skills/core.md

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Targets accept an exact ID first, then an unambiguous case-insensitive name/titl
    `groups list/show/create/update/delete` only own product groups. Membership is only
    `groups members list/add/remove/set`; every member must resolve to a non-group agent and a group
    must retain 1-6 unique members.
-3. **Manage native Routines**: `agents routines list/show` returns bounded metadata only and never emits prompt bodies, credentials, or native paths. Box-local Bots support create/update/enable/disable/delete; create writes a disabled definition and later mutations require `--expect-revision` from a fresh read plus `--confirm`. Temporal Bots are Server-authoritative: list/show, webhook credential, enable/disable, and delete require the bounded Temporal Routine Host bridge; create/update refuse because the current official Temporal contract exposes neither mutation. `agents routines webhook credential <agent> <routine-id> --confirm` hides the key by default; `--reveal-key` is the explicit secret-output boundary. Without the bridge, Temporal reads fail closed instead of reporting the legacy local store. Native writes have no upstream CAS or idempotency guarantee; uncertain writes return `operation_outcome_unknown` and must be reconciled by another read, never automatic replay.
+3. **Manage native Routines**: `agents routines list/show` returns bounded metadata only and never emits prompt bodies, credentials, or native paths. Box-local Bots support create/update/enable/disable/delete; create writes a disabled definition and later mutations require `--expect-revision` from a fresh read plus `--confirm`. Temporal Bots are Server-authoritative: list/show, webhook credential, enable/disable, and delete require the bounded Temporal Routine Host bridge; create/update refuse because the current official Temporal contract exposes neither mutation. `agents routines webhook credential <agent> <routine-id> --confirm` returns the webhook URL and hides the key and prompt by default; `--reveal-key` is the explicit boundary that also emits both. `list` and `show` still never emit them. Without the bridge, Temporal reads fail closed instead of reporting the legacy local store. Native writes have no upstream CAS or idempotency guarantee; uncertain writes return `operation_outcome_unknown` and must be reconciled by another read, never automatic replay.
 4. **Search/read transcript**: `history search <query>`, `history tail <target>`, and
    `history thread <target> --root <entry-id>` own transcript access. Object `show` commands do
    not add transcript side projections.