grada-run 0.49.4 → 0.49.6
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +2 -1
- package/src/commands/add.js +1 -1
- package/src/commands/alerts.js +1 -1
- package/src/commands/apply.js +84 -5
- package/src/commands/db/backup.js +3 -3
- package/src/commands/db/connect.js +2 -2
- package/src/commands/db/enable-vector.js +1 -1
- package/src/commands/db/import.js +2 -2
- package/src/commands/db/migrate.js +7 -6
- package/src/commands/destroy.js +116 -10
- package/src/commands/diagnose.js +18 -5
- package/src/commands/domain.js +51 -4
- package/src/commands/exec.js +1 -1
- package/src/commands/gc.js +2 -2
- package/src/commands/init.js +7 -7
- package/src/commands/logs.js +20 -7
- package/src/commands/rollback.js +21 -6
- package/src/commands/secrets.js +19 -19
- package/src/commands/status.js +3 -3
- package/src/commands/wake.js +2 -2
- package/src/utils/addons.js +1 -1
- package/src/utils/backup.js +1 -1
- package/src/utils/ecs-runner.js +3 -3
- package/src/utils/generator.js +3 -3
- package/src/utils/prompts.js +1 -1
- package/src/utils/resolvers.js +8 -10
- package/src/utils/terraform-errors.js +47 -0
- package/src/utils/terraform.js +1 -1
- package/templates/README.md +2 -2
- package/templates/github/deploy-lambda.yml +2 -2
- package/templates/github/deploy-static.yml +1 -1
- package/templates/github/deploy.yml +2 -2
- package/templates/github/drift.yml +1 -1
- package/templates/github/plan.yml +2 -2
- package/templates/github/preview-lambda.yml +4 -4
- package/templates/github/preview.yml +4 -4
- package/templates/github/teardown.yml +3 -3
- package/templates/terraform/addons/bedrock.tf +1 -1
- package/templates/terraform/backend.tf +1 -1
- package/templates/terraform/cloudfront-lambda.tf +2 -2
- package/templates/terraform/cloudfront.tf +3 -3
- package/templates/terraform/database-aurora-postgresql.tf +1 -1
- package/templates/terraform/main.tf +3 -3
- package/templates/terraform/oidc.tf +29 -14
- package/templates/terraform/secrets.tf +1 -1
package/src/utils/resolvers.js
CHANGED
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@@ -46,17 +46,15 @@ export function readTerraformComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd()) {
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}
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// Offline database-kind detection for `--setup-ci` (no AWS calls): the
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// generator
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//
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//
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//
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// generator and `add` always render to database.tf regardless of engine,
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// so the kind comes from the rendered content — an aurora tree declares
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// an rds cluster. Unknown/absent means instance — the runtime backup
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// resolves the live kind anyway; the id prefix only name-scopes the
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// snapshot for guardrails + gc.
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export function readTerraformDbKind(cwd = process.cwd()) {
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const base = resolveCwd({}, cwd);
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-
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} catch {
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// Fall through to the instance default
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}
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const databaseTf = readFileSafe(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'database.tf'));
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if (typeof databaseTf === 'string' && databaseTf.includes('resource "aws_rds_cluster"')) return 'cluster';
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return 'instance';
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}
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@@ -210,7 +208,7 @@ function scanBracketBlock(content, openIdx) {
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// reference, so it never matches; the shape filter drops resource names
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// (`${...}`, hyphens, paths). Sorted, deduplicated, [] when unreadable.
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//
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// Scoped to secret-receiving containers
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// Scoped to secret-receiving containers: ECS collides secrets
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// with environment per container definition, so sidecar `environment`
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// arrays (whose containers get no secrets) must not contribute names —
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// parsing them would falsely render same-named secrets undeployable.
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ export const ERROR_CODES = [
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'OIDC_PROVIDER_CONFLICT',
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'CLOUDFRONT_IN_PROGRESS',
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'BUCKET_NOT_EMPTY',
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'SECRET_PENDING_DELETION',
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];
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// AWS AlreadyExists family: every create-path "reality has what state
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@@ -34,6 +35,40 @@ export function countRecreateCollisions(stderr) {
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return stderr.match(new RegExp(RECREATE_COLLISION_RE.source, 'gi'))?.length ?? 0;
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}
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const COLLISION_NAME_RE = /creating [A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9 ]*?\(([^)]+)\)/;
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const COLLISION_WITH_RE = /^\s*[│|]?\s*with ([A-Za-z0-9_."[\]-]+),/;
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const COLLISION_ERROR_RE = /^\s*[╷╵│]?\s*Error:/;
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// Guided-import pairs for recreate collisions: each AlreadyExists-style
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// marker carries the provider name in parens, and the resource address
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// follows on a `with <addr>,` context line. Markers without either are
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// skipped — the caller falls back to the manual runbook. Capped so a
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// pathological stderr cannot queue unbounded imports.
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export function parseCollisionImports(stderr, limit = 20) {
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if (typeof stderr !== 'string' || stderr === '') return [];
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const lines = stderr.split('\n');
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const pairs = [];
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const seen = new Set();
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for (let i = 0; i < lines.length && pairs.length < limit; i++) {
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if (!RECREATE_COLLISION_RE.test(lines[i])) continue;
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const nameMatch = COLLISION_NAME_RE.exec(lines[i]);
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if (!nameMatch) continue;
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for (let j = i + 1; j < Math.min(i + 9, lines.length); j++) {
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if (COLLISION_ERROR_RE.test(lines[j])) break;
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const withMatch = COLLISION_WITH_RE.exec(lines[j]);
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if (withMatch) {
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const address = withMatch[1].replace(/"/g, '');
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if (!seen.has(address)) {
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seen.add(address);
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pairs.push({ address, id: nameMatch[1] });
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return pairs;
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}
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// Pure classifier over stderr text. Returns `{ code, lockId }` or null.
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export function classifyTerraformError(stderr, ctx = {}) {
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const text = typeof stderr === 'string' ? stderr : '';
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@@ -49,6 +84,13 @@ export function classifyTerraformError(stderr, ctx = {}) {
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if (RECREATE_COLLISION_RE.test(text)) {
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return { code: 'RECREATE_COLLISION', lockId: null };
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}
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// Re-apply inside the Secrets Manager recovery window: the committed
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// suffix reuses the secret name while deletion is still pending.
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// Disjoint from the collision family ("already scheduled for
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// deletion" carries no AlreadyExists marker).
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if (/scheduled for deletion/i.test(text)) {
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return { code: 'SECRET_PENDING_DELETION', lockId: null };
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}
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if (/NoSuchBucket/i.test(text) || /does not exist/i.test(text)) {
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return { code: 'STATE_BUCKET_MISSING', lockId: null };
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}
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@@ -116,6 +158,11 @@ const RUNBOOKS = {
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headless: 'Re-run destroy — drained buckets usually read empty within a minute; if it persists, empty the bucket by hand in the AWS Console.',
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interactive: 'Re-run destroy — drained buckets usually read empty within a minute; if it persists, empty the bucket by hand in the AWS Console.',
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},
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SECRET_PENDING_DELETION: {
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message: 'A Secrets Manager secret is scheduled for deletion.',
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headless: 'Restore it (aws secretsmanager restore-secret --secret-id <name>, then cd terraform && terraform import <address> <id>) or force-delete without recovery and re-apply + push — grada never force-deletes, the window protects against accidental loss.',
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interactive: 'Restore it (aws secretsmanager restore-secret --secret-id <name>, then cd terraform && terraform import <address> <id>) or force-delete without recovery and re-apply + push — grada never force-deletes, the window protects against accidental loss.',
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},
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};
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// Returns `{ message, hint }` for a named code, or null for unknown
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package/src/utils/terraform.js
CHANGED
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if (timer && typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref();
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}
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//
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// Pipe chunks split lines at arbitrary byte offsets, so
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// each chunk's trailing fragment is carried over and only
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// newline-terminated lines are delivered. Splitting per chunk
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// injects newlines into giant single-line JSON (show -json),
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package/templates/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ This infrastructure provisions a highly available Application Load Balancer (ALB
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```
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3. **Automated CI/CD:**
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Push this repository to GitHub. Your deployment pipeline uses the official [Grada GitHub Action](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/deploy-stack-aws-fargate-terraform-deploy). Every push to `{{DEPLOY_BRANCH}}` will automatically
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Push this repository to GitHub. Your deployment pipeline uses the official [Grada GitHub Action](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/deploy-stack-aws-fargate-terraform-deploy). Every push to `{{DEPLOY_BRANCH}}` will automatically build your container, run your infrastructure changes, and deploy your application.
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### 📟 Day-2 Operations
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Once live, manage the stack without opening the AWS console:
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```bash
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npx grada-run destroy
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```
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*
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*Confirm when prompted. This will execute a safe Terraform teardown of your Load Balancer, ECS cluster, and networking components. You will then be asked whether to also empty and delete your remote S3 state bucket (kept by default, so you can re-provision later with `npx grada-run apply`).*
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## ⚠️ Critical Application Prerequisites
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aws-region: ${{ env.AWS_REGION }}
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# Deploy never skips: a failed assume fails the run with the
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# bootstrap pointer
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# bootstrap pointer.
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- name: Interpret credential failure
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run: |
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# at recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
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#. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
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# follow-up run's own error.
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if: cancelled()
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# bootstrap pointer.
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run: |
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# at recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
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# follow-up run's own error.
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if: cancelled()
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# message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
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# assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
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# pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
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types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
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# the bootstrap pointer (deploy shape) — never green-silent.
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# One sticky comment per PR (updated in place), never a new
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# instead of leaving it standing as truth
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# instead of leaving it standing as truth.
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- name: Comment PR
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uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
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# One sticky comment per PR (updated in place), never a new
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# comment per push — and a failed run overwrites the green URL
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# instead of leaving it standing as truth
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# instead of leaving it standing as truth.
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- name: Comment PR
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if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'success'
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uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
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# A cancelled apply can strand the S3 state lockfile: point at
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# recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
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#. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
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# follow-up run's own error.
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- name: Cancellation recovery note
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if: cancelled()
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: Destroy PR Preview
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on:
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# pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
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# branch, so a fork PR cannot smuggle privileged steps into its own
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# teardown run
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# teardown run. The PR head is checked out explicitly by SHA
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# in the guarded step instead.
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pull_request_target:
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types: [closed]
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# STS denies a missing role and a trust mismatch with the same
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# message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
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# assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
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# named
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# named.
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- name: Interpret credential failure
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if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
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run: |
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# A cancelled destroy can strand the S3 state lockfile: point at
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# recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
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#. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
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# follow-up run's own error.
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if: cancelled()
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# chosen model in the AWS Bedrock console first.
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# --- Least-Privilege IAM Policy for the ECS Task Role ---
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# Scoped to the chosen model in the deploy region
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# Scoped to the chosen model in the deploy region: the
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# foundation-model ARN names the model exactly, and the
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# inference-profile line stays (profile-style model IDs invoke through
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# profiles) but pinned to the region.
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source = "hashicorp/tls"
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version = "~> 4.0"
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}
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# Declared unconditionally
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# Declared unconditionally: the conditional injection left
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# pre-existing trees without the pin when the DB arrived via
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# `add database`. Unused on DB-less trees; init installs it anyway.
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random = {
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# is wrong for an app server — one slot per path gets shared by HTML docs,
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# API/RSC variants, redirects, and errors, so a cacheable variant poisons
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# every other viewer of that path. Each traffic class below gets its own
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# key instead
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# key instead.
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data "aws_cloudfront_cache_policy" "disabled" {
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name = "Managed-CachingDisabled"
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}
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# Managed security headers (HSTS, frame/clickjacking guards, content-type
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# sniffing) on every behavior
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# sniffing) on every behavior.
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data "aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy" "security" {
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name = "Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy"
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}
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# API/RSC variants, redirects, and errors, so a cacheable variant poisons
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# every other viewer of that path. Each traffic class below gets its own
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# key instead
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# key instead.
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data "aws_cloudfront_cache_policy" "disabled" {
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# Managed security headers (HSTS, frame/clickjacking guards, content-type
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# sniffing) on every behavior
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# sniffing) on every behavior.
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data "aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy" "security" {
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name = "Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy"
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domain_name = aws_lb.main.dns_name
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origin_id = "ALBOrigin"
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# Origin secret
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# Origin secret: proves to the ALB that the request came
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# through THIS distribution — any other tenant's distro, or a direct
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# ALB hit, lacks the header and gets a 403 from the listener rule.
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custom_header {
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storage_encrypted = true
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# Match the instance engines: 7-day retention with explicit off-peak
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# UTC windows instead of AWS-assigned ones
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# UTC windows instead of AWS-assigned ones.
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backup_retention_period = 7
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preferred_backup_window = "03:00-04:00"
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preferred_maintenance_window = "sun:04:00-sun:05:00"
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# Safely read the keys generated by the CLI, default to empty list if file doesn't exist.
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# distinct() collapses hand-duplicated entries (duplicates render the
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# same RegisterTaskDefinition 400 as a name collision) while preserving
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# file order, so upgrading trees get no task-definition churn
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# file order, so upgrading trees get no task-definition churn.
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secret_keys = fileexists("${path.module}/secret_keys.json") ? distinct(jsondecode(file("${path.module}/secret_keys.json"))) : []
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# Exact container env + static-secret names (union over app and worker
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# Origin secret: only requests bearing the header CloudFront
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# cannot prove WHICH distribution sent a request — any tenant's distro
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# State-only alarm: visible in the console, notifies nobody. There is no
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# notification destination at scaffold time; `grada alerts` provisions
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# separate alarms wired to SNS, and this one stays as a console signal so
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# quiet trees still show red
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# quiet trees still show red.
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resource "aws_cloudwatch_metric_alarm" "alb_5xx_errors" {
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alarm_name = "${local.app_name}-high-5xx-errors"
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comparison_operator = "GreaterThanThreshold"
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guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources = [
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"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
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"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
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# Legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db prefix, so
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# runs under preview credentials, so nothing legitimate needs them.
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"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
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},
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{
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#
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# The preview role carries IAMFullAccess, so without this
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# role, or widen trust in one call. Scoped to the CI role ARNs
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# (not *): preview stacks legitimately manage their own
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{
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# Manual snapshots (grada names them
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# <db-identifier>-pre-deploy-<sha>) are directly deletable;
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# automated snapshots can only go away via retention changes or
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},
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{
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#
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# Every role preview credentials create must carry the
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# creation is denied and born-capped roles cannot escalate.
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Sid = "DenyRoleWithoutBoundary"
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]
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},
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{
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#
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# Close by target — deny the execution APIs on prod
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# ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
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# refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
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# prod is legitimate traffic.
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@@ -395,6 +395,15 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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Effect = "Deny"
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Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
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Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
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# The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
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# definition at trigger time. A no-op on this side (the preview
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# role is never the scheduler, assumable only by the scheduler
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# service) but kept so the twins stay identical.
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Condition = {
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StringNotEquals = {
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"aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
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}
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}
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},
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{
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# RegisterTaskDefinition is likely resource-*-only (void half);
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})
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}
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#
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# Permissions boundary capping every role preview credentials
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# can create. The guardrail above denies CreateRole unless the request
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# carries this boundary, so a backdoor role is born capped: its
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# effective permissions are its own policies intersected with this one.
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@@ -447,7 +456,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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Resource = "*"
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},
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{
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#
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# Capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
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# scheduler role passes at invocation time), so PassRole is
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# carved out here and re-gated on service + target below.
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# Explicit Action list on purpose: a Deny with NotAction would
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Effect = "Deny"
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Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
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Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
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# The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
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# definition at trigger time; every other capped caller stays
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# denied. Mirrors the twin's condition above.
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Condition = {
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StringNotEquals = {
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"aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
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}
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}
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},
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{
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Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskDefinitionRegistration"
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@@ -557,12 +574,10 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
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Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
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},
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+
# No flat BoundaryDenyPassRole twin: it denied the scheduler's
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# own PassRole unconditionally, defeating the OffScheduler
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# carve-out (any Deny wins). The OffService/OffTarget/
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# OffScheduler trio below gates PassRole alone.
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{
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Sid = "BoundaryDenyAppRoleMutation"
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Effect = "Deny"
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@@ -570,7 +585,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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{
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#
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# Carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
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# service (mirrors the scheduler policy's own condition).
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Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffService"
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Effect = "Deny"
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "app_secrets" {
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5
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count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
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name = "{{PROJECT_NAME}}{{RESOURCE_SUFFIX}}-secrets"
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description = "Environment variables for {{PROJECT_NAME}}"
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-
# 30-day recovery
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# 30-day recovery: an instant-delete vault turns any destroy
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# bug into unrecoverable secret loss. Lower per-tree if you must.
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recovery_window_in_days = 30
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}
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