grada-run 0.49.3 → 0.49.5

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (43) hide show
  1. package/package.json +1 -1
  2. package/src/commands/add.js +1 -1
  3. package/src/commands/alerts.js +1 -1
  4. package/src/commands/apply.js +2 -2
  5. package/src/commands/db/backup.js +3 -3
  6. package/src/commands/db/connect.js +2 -2
  7. package/src/commands/db/enable-vector.js +1 -1
  8. package/src/commands/db/import.js +2 -2
  9. package/src/commands/db/migrate.js +7 -6
  10. package/src/commands/destroy.js +6 -6
  11. package/src/commands/diagnose.js +1 -1
  12. package/src/commands/domain.js +2 -2
  13. package/src/commands/exec.js +1 -1
  14. package/src/commands/gc.js +2 -2
  15. package/src/commands/init.js +7 -7
  16. package/src/commands/logs.js +3 -3
  17. package/src/commands/rollback.js +4 -4
  18. package/src/commands/secrets.js +18 -18
  19. package/src/commands/status.js +3 -3
  20. package/src/commands/wake.js +2 -2
  21. package/src/utils/addons.js +1 -1
  22. package/src/utils/backup.js +1 -1
  23. package/src/utils/ecs-runner.js +3 -3
  24. package/src/utils/generator.js +3 -3
  25. package/src/utils/prompts.js +1 -1
  26. package/src/utils/resolvers.js +8 -10
  27. package/src/utils/terraform.js +1 -1
  28. package/templates/github/deploy-lambda.yml +2 -2
  29. package/templates/github/deploy-static.yml +1 -1
  30. package/templates/github/deploy.yml +2 -2
  31. package/templates/github/drift.yml +1 -1
  32. package/templates/github/plan.yml +2 -2
  33. package/templates/github/preview-lambda.yml +4 -4
  34. package/templates/github/preview.yml +4 -4
  35. package/templates/github/teardown.yml +3 -3
  36. package/templates/terraform/addons/bedrock.tf +1 -1
  37. package/templates/terraform/backend.tf +1 -1
  38. package/templates/terraform/cloudfront-lambda.tf +2 -2
  39. package/templates/terraform/cloudfront.tf +3 -3
  40. package/templates/terraform/database-aurora-postgresql.tf +1 -1
  41. package/templates/terraform/main.tf +3 -3
  42. package/templates/terraform/oidc.tf +62 -40
  43. package/templates/terraform/secrets.tf +1 -1
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ export async function runEphemeralEcsTask({
311
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  // Sniffs the URL scheme from discrete credentials. Explicit values win;
312
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  // when DB_ENGINE/DB_PORT are secrets-sourced (valueFrom, values unknown
313
313
  // to the CLI) the reference text is sniffed for engine/port hints
314
- // instead (BUG-171). Indeterminate stays postgresql (back-compat).
314
+ // instead. Indeterminate stays postgresql (back-compat).
315
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  function sniffRunnerScheme(entries, values) {
316
316
  const engine = values.get('DB_ENGINE');
317
317
  if (typeof engine === 'string' && engine !== '') {
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ function sniffRunnerScheme(entries, values) {
326
326
  return 'postgresql';
327
327
  }
328
328
 
329
- // Runtime userinfo encoder for the synthesized URL (BUG-139): node sees
329
+ // Runtime userinfo encoder for the synthesized URL: node sees
330
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  // only shell references, never the values, so the encoding ladder ships
331
331
  // inside the script — node (encodeURIComponent) → sed (the URL-breaking
332
332
  // subset: %, ?, #, @, :, /) → warned raw. Quoting alone cannot save a
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ export async function reportRunnerOutcome({
510
510
  if (exitCode === 0) {
511
511
  // Owner pairs its own start/stop: the runner usually stops
512
512
  // first (idempotent no-op then), but success must never
513
- // depend on a callee for the spinner lifecycle (BUG-202).
513
+ // depend on a callee for the spinner lifecycle.
514
514
  try { s.stop(color.green(`${label} succeeded.`)); } catch { /* already stopped */ }
515
515
  console.log(color.green(`\n✅ ${label} succeeded.`));
516
516
  await trackSuccess(event, { ...telemetry });
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
17
17
  // name stays a writable candidate so pre-rebrand docs keep updating.
18
18
  export const MANAGED_DOC_FALLBACK = 'GRADA.md';
19
19
  export const LEGACY_MANAGED_DOC_FALLBACK = 'DEPLOY-STACK.md';
20
- // Greppable, boot-failing Rails master-key seed (BUG-146): Rails cannot
20
+ // Greppable, boot-failing Rails master-key seed: Rails cannot
21
21
  // boot on it, so a tree that never pushes the real key fails closed.
22
22
  export const RAILS_MASTER_KEY_PLACEHOLDER = 'REPLACE_ME_PUSH_REAL_RAILS_MASTER_KEY';
23
23
 
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ export async function generateTemplates(targetDir, config) {
505
505
  // Build the initial HCL map for AWS Secrets Manager
506
506
  let initialSecretMap = `{\n EXAMPLE_API_KEY = "replace_me_in_aws_console"`;
507
507
 
508
- // 4.1. Seed a placeholder for the Rails master key (BUG-146): the
508
+ // 4.1. Seed a placeholder for the Rails master key: the
509
509
  // live key must never render into committed .tf (or linger in
510
510
  // state), and no constant dummy may boot prod. The placeholder is
511
511
  // greppable and boot-failing; the loud instruction tells the
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ resource "aws_lb_listener_rule" "vercel_redirect_${index}" {
587
587
 
588
588
  // Inject variables. Replacement FUNCTION (not string): `$&`/`$'`/
589
589
  // `$$` in values (Procfile commands, compose env vars) must land
590
- // byte-identical, not interpolate match text (BUG-156).
590
+ // byte-identical, not interpolate match text.
591
591
  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(config)) {
592
592
  const literal = String(value ?? '');
593
593
  content = content.replace(new RegExp(`{{${key}}}`, 'g'), () => literal);
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ export async function getProjectConfig(isHeadless, headlessOptions, targetDir, d
90
90
  const skipsContainerSizing = hints && typeof hints === 'object'
91
91
  && (hints.target === 'lambda' || hints.target === 'static');
92
92
  if (isHeadless) {
93
- // BUG-211: an undetectable framework with a package.json present is
93
+ // An undetectable framework with a package.json present is
94
94
  // a plain-Node project, not a static site — defaulting to 'static'
95
95
  // renders an nginx Dockerfile that can neither build scriptless
96
96
  // projects nor run node payloads. No package.json keeps 'static'.
@@ -46,17 +46,15 @@ export function readTerraformComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd()) {
46
46
  }
47
47
 
48
48
  // Offline database-kind detection for `--setup-ci` (no AWS calls): the
49
- // generator copies exactly one database template, so the aurora file's
50
- // presence means cluster snapshots. Unknown/absent means instance — the
51
- // runtime backup resolves the live kind anyway; the id prefix only
52
- // name-scopes the snapshot for guardrails + gc.
49
+ // generator and `add` always render to database.tf regardless of engine,
50
+ // so the kind comes from the rendered content — an aurora tree declares
51
+ // an rds cluster. Unknown/absent means instance — the runtime backup
52
+ // resolves the live kind anyway; the id prefix only name-scopes the
53
+ // snapshot for guardrails + gc.
53
54
  export function readTerraformDbKind(cwd = process.cwd()) {
54
55
  const base = resolveCwd({}, cwd);
55
- try {
56
- if (fsSync.existsSync(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'database-aurora-postgresql.tf'))) return 'cluster';
57
- } catch {
58
- // Fall through to the instance default
59
- }
56
+ const databaseTf = readFileSafe(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'database.tf'));
57
+ if (typeof databaseTf === 'string' && databaseTf.includes('resource "aws_rds_cluster"')) return 'cluster';
60
58
  return 'instance';
61
59
  }
62
60
 
@@ -210,7 +208,7 @@ function scanBracketBlock(content, openIdx) {
210
208
  // reference, so it never matches; the shape filter drops resource names
211
209
  // (`${...}`, hyphens, paths). Sorted, deduplicated, [] when unreadable.
212
210
  //
213
- // Scoped to secret-receiving containers (BUG-93): ECS collides secrets
211
+ // Scoped to secret-receiving containers: ECS collides secrets
214
212
  // with environment per container definition, so sidecar `environment`
215
213
  // arrays (whose containers get no secrets) must not contribute names —
216
214
  // parsing them would falsely render same-named secrets undeployable.
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ export function runTerraformCommand(args, cwd, spin, loadingPrefix, options = {}
218
218
  if (timer && typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref();
219
219
  }
220
220
 
221
- // BUG-213: pipe chunks split lines at arbitrary byte offsets, so
221
+ // Pipe chunks split lines at arbitrary byte offsets, so
222
222
  // each chunk's trailing fragment is carried over and only
223
223
  // newline-terminated lines are delivered. Splitting per chunk
224
224
  // injects newlines into giant single-line JSON (show -json),
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ jobs:
64
64
  aws-region: ${{ env.AWS_REGION }}
65
65
 
66
66
  # Deploy never skips: a failed assume fails the run with the
67
- # bootstrap pointer (BUG-138).
67
+ # bootstrap pointer.
68
68
  - name: Interpret credential failure
69
69
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
70
70
  run: |
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ jobs:
179
179
 
180
180
  # A cancelled apply/destroy can strand the S3 state lockfile: point
181
181
  # at recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
182
- # (BUG-194). Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
182
+ #. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
183
183
  # follow-up run's own error.
184
184
  - name: Cancellation recovery note
185
185
  if: cancelled()
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ jobs:
64
64
  aws-region: ${{ env.AWS_REGION }}
65
65
 
66
66
  # Deploy never skips: a failed assume fails the run with the
67
- # bootstrap pointer (BUG-201).
67
+ # bootstrap pointer.
68
68
  - name: Interpret credential failure
69
69
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
70
70
  run: |
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ jobs:
68
68
  aws-region: ${{ env.AWS_REGION }}
69
69
 
70
70
  # Deploy never skips: a failed assume fails the run with the
71
- # bootstrap pointer (BUG-138).
71
+ # bootstrap pointer.
72
72
  - name: Interpret credential failure
73
73
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
74
74
  run: |
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ jobs:
272
272
 
273
273
  # A cancelled apply/destroy can strand the S3 state lockfile: point
274
274
  # at recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
275
- # (BUG-194). Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
275
+ #. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
276
276
  # follow-up run's own error.
277
277
  - name: Cancellation recovery note
278
278
  if: cancelled()
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ jobs:
34
34
  # STS denies a missing role and a trust mismatch with the same
35
35
  # message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
36
36
  # assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
37
- # named (BUG-199).
37
+ # named.
38
38
  - name: Interpret credential failure
39
39
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
40
40
  run: |
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: Terraform Plan on PR
3
3
  on:
4
4
  # pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
5
5
  # branch, so a fork PR cannot delete the same-repo guard below to reach
6
- # the privileged CI roles (BUG-140). The PR head is checked out explicitly by
6
+ # the privileged CI roles. The PR head is checked out explicitly by
7
7
  # SHA in the guarded step instead.
8
8
  pull_request_target:
9
9
  types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
53
53
  aws-region: ${{ env.AWS_REGION }}
54
54
 
55
55
  # Plan-on-PR is a merge signal: a failed assume fails the run with
56
- # the bootstrap pointer (deploy shape, BUG-138) — never green-silent.
56
+ # the bootstrap pointer (deploy shape) — never green-silent.
57
57
  - name: Interpret credential failure
58
58
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
59
59
  run: |
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: Ephemeral PR Preview
3
3
  on:
4
4
  # pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
5
5
  # branch, so a fork PR cannot delete the same-repo guard below to reach
6
- # the privileged CI roles (BUG-140). The PR head is checked out explicitly by
6
+ # the privileged CI roles. The PR head is checked out explicitly by
7
7
  # SHA in the guarded step instead.
8
8
  pull_request_target:
9
9
  types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
58
58
  # STS denies a missing role and a trust mismatch with the same
59
59
  # message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
60
60
  # assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
61
- # named (BUG-199).
61
+ # named.
62
62
  - name: Interpret credential failure
63
63
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
64
64
  run: |
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ jobs:
137
137
 
138
138
  # One sticky comment per PR (updated in place), never a new
139
139
  # comment per push — and a failed run overwrites the green URL
140
- # instead of leaving it standing as truth (BUG-190).
140
+ # instead of leaving it standing as truth.
141
141
  - name: Comment PR
142
142
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'success'
143
143
  uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ jobs:
199
199
 
200
200
  # A cancelled apply can strand the S3 state lockfile: point at
201
201
  # recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
202
- # (BUG-194). Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
202
+ #. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
203
203
  # follow-up run's own error.
204
204
  - name: Cancellation recovery note
205
205
  if: cancelled()
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: Ephemeral PR Preview
3
3
  on:
4
4
  # pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
5
5
  # branch, so a fork PR cannot delete the same-repo guard below to reach
6
- # the privileged CI roles (BUG-140). The PR head is checked out explicitly by
6
+ # the privileged CI roles. The PR head is checked out explicitly by
7
7
  # SHA in the guarded step instead.
8
8
  pull_request_target:
9
9
  types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ jobs:
58
58
  # STS denies a missing role and a trust mismatch with the same
59
59
  # message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
60
60
  # assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
61
- # named (BUG-199).
61
+ # named.
62
62
  - name: Interpret credential failure
63
63
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
64
64
  run: |
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ jobs:
119
119
 
120
120
  # One sticky comment per PR (updated in place), never a new
121
121
  # comment per push — and a failed run overwrites the green URL
122
- # instead of leaving it standing as truth (BUG-190).
122
+ # instead of leaving it standing as truth.
123
123
  - name: Comment PR
124
124
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'success'
125
125
  uses: actions/github-script@f28e40c7f34bde8b3046d885e986cb6290c5673b # v7
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ jobs:
183
183
 
184
184
  # A cancelled apply can strand the S3 state lockfile: point at
185
185
  # recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
186
- # (BUG-194). Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
186
+ #. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
187
187
  # follow-up run's own error.
188
188
  - name: Cancellation recovery note
189
189
  if: cancelled()
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: Destroy PR Preview
3
3
  on:
4
4
  # pull_request_target (not pull_request): this file comes from the base
5
5
  # branch, so a fork PR cannot smuggle privileged steps into its own
6
- # teardown run (BUG-140). The PR head is checked out explicitly by SHA
6
+ # teardown run. The PR head is checked out explicitly by SHA
7
7
  # in the guarded step instead.
8
8
  pull_request_target:
9
9
  types: [closed]
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ jobs:
52
52
  # STS denies a missing role and a trust mismatch with the same
53
53
  # message, so the API won't support distinguishing them: every
54
54
  # assume failure skips loud (green) with both cases + pointers
55
- # named (BUG-199).
55
+ # named.
56
56
  - name: Interpret credential failure
57
57
  if: steps.aws-creds.outcome == 'failure'
58
58
  run: |
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ jobs:
109
109
 
110
110
  # A cancelled destroy can strand the S3 state lockfile: point at
111
111
  # recovery instead of leaving the next run to fail obscurely
112
- # (BUG-194). Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
112
+ #. Generic by necessity — the lock ID only exists in the
113
113
  # follow-up run's own error.
114
114
  - name: Cancellation recovery note
115
115
  if: cancelled()
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
7
7
  # chosen model in the AWS Bedrock console first.
8
8
 
9
9
  # --- Least-Privilege IAM Policy for the ECS Task Role ---
10
- # Scoped to the chosen model in the deploy region (BUG-102): the
10
+ # Scoped to the chosen model in the deploy region: the
11
11
  # foundation-model ARN names the model exactly, and the
12
12
  # inference-profile line stays (profile-style model IDs invoke through
13
13
  # profiles) but pinned to the region.
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ terraform {
10
10
  source = "hashicorp/tls"
11
11
  version = "~> 4.0"
12
12
  }
13
- # Declared unconditionally (BUG-137): the conditional injection left
13
+ # Declared unconditionally: the conditional injection left
14
14
  # pre-existing trees without the pin when the DB arrived via
15
15
  # `add database`. Unused on DB-less trees; init installs it anyway.
16
16
  random = {
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
  # is wrong for an app server — one slot per path gets shared by HTML docs,
3
3
  # API/RSC variants, redirects, and errors, so a cacheable variant poisons
4
4
  # every other viewer of that path. Each traffic class below gets its own
5
- # key instead (BUG-82).
5
+ # key instead.
6
6
  data "aws_cloudfront_cache_policy" "disabled" {
7
7
  name = "Managed-CachingDisabled"
8
8
  }
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ data "aws_cloudfront_origin_request_policy" "all_viewer" {
63
63
  }
64
64
 
65
65
  # Managed security headers (HSTS, frame/clickjacking guards, content-type
66
- # sniffing) on every behavior (BUG-92).
66
+ # sniffing) on every behavior.
67
67
  data "aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy" "security" {
68
68
  name = "Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy"
69
69
  }
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
  # is wrong for an app server — one slot per path gets shared by HTML docs,
3
3
  # API/RSC variants, redirects, and errors, so a cacheable variant poisons
4
4
  # every other viewer of that path. Each traffic class below gets its own
5
- # key instead (BUG-82).
5
+ # key instead.
6
6
  data "aws_cloudfront_cache_policy" "disabled" {
7
7
  name = "Managed-CachingDisabled"
8
8
  }
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ data "aws_cloudfront_origin_request_policy" "all_viewer" {
63
63
  }
64
64
 
65
65
  # Managed security headers (HSTS, frame/clickjacking guards, content-type
66
- # sniffing) on every behavior (BUG-92).
66
+ # sniffing) on every behavior.
67
67
  data "aws_cloudfront_response_headers_policy" "security" {
68
68
  name = "Managed-SecurityHeadersPolicy"
69
69
  }
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ resource "aws_cloudfront_distribution" "cdn" {
81
81
  domain_name = aws_lb.main.dns_name
82
82
  origin_id = "ALBOrigin"
83
83
 
84
- # Origin secret (BUG-91): proves to the ALB that the request came
84
+ # Origin secret: proves to the ALB that the request came
85
85
  # through THIS distribution — any other tenant's distro, or a direct
86
86
  # ALB hit, lacks the header and gets a 403 from the listener rule.
87
87
  custom_header {
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ resource "aws_rds_cluster" "postgres" {
41
41
  storage_encrypted = true
42
42
 
43
43
  # Match the instance engines: 7-day retention with explicit off-peak
44
- # UTC windows instead of AWS-assigned ones (BUG-203).
44
+ # UTC windows instead of AWS-assigned ones.
45
45
  backup_retention_period = 7
46
46
  preferred_backup_window = "03:00-04:00"
47
47
  preferred_maintenance_window = "sun:04:00-sun:05:00"
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ locals {
30
30
  # Safely read the keys generated by the CLI, default to empty list if file doesn't exist.
31
31
  # distinct() collapses hand-duplicated entries (duplicates render the
32
32
  # same RegisterTaskDefinition 400 as a name collision) while preserving
33
- # file order, so upgrading trees get no task-definition churn (BUG-81).
33
+ # file order, so upgrading trees get no task-definition churn.
34
34
  secret_keys = fileexists("${path.module}/secret_keys.json") ? distinct(jsondecode(file("${path.module}/secret_keys.json"))) : []
35
35
 
36
36
  # Exact container env + static-secret names (union over app and worker
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ resource "aws_lb_target_group" "app" {
230
230
  }
231
231
  }
232
232
 
233
- # Origin secret (BUG-91): only requests bearing the header CloudFront
233
+ # Origin secret: only requests bearing the header CloudFront
234
234
  # injects may reach the app. The CloudFront edge-IP security group alone
235
235
  # cannot prove WHICH distribution sent a request — any tenant's distro
236
236
  # could point at this ALB — so the listener forwards solely on a header
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ output "ecs_task_role_arn" {
348
348
  # State-only alarm: visible in the console, notifies nobody. There is no
349
349
  # notification destination at scaffold time; `grada alerts` provisions
350
350
  # separate alarms wired to SNS, and this one stays as a console signal so
351
- # quiet trees still show red (BUG-101).
351
+ # quiet trees still show red.
352
352
  resource "aws_cloudwatch_metric_alarm" "alb_5xx_errors" {
353
353
  alarm_name = "${local.app_name}-high-5xx-errors"
354
354
  comparison_operator = "GreaterThanThreshold"
@@ -43,17 +43,21 @@ locals {
43
43
  preview_boundary_arn = terraform.workspace == "default" ? aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn : data.aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn
44
44
  # Shared twin resource lists: every Deny*/BoundaryDeny* pair consumes
45
45
  # one list, so a one-sided resource edit is impossible. New pairs add
46
- # their list here and reference it from both sides.
46
+ # their list here and reference it from both sides. Wildcards below
47
+ # anchor on prod_prefix (never on the bare project): preview names
48
+ # carry -pr-<n>- where prod carries the hex suffix, so a
49
+ # ${prod_prefix}-* pattern matches prod only. Anchoring also keeps
50
+ # the boundary under the 6144-char managed-policy quota that broke
51
+ # tier1 E2E at a 24-char prefix — prefer one anchored wildcard over
52
+ # several exact ARNs when adding entries.
47
53
  guardrail_compute_abuse_resources = ["*"]
48
54
  guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources = ["*"]
49
55
  guardrail_state_destruction_resources = [
50
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
51
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
56
+ "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}*",
52
57
  ]
53
58
  guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources = [
54
59
  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
55
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
56
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
60
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
57
61
  ]
58
62
  guardrail_image_deletion_resources = [
59
63
  "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
@@ -62,12 +66,10 @@ locals {
62
66
  "arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
63
67
  ]
64
68
  guardrail_queue_destruction_resources = [
65
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
66
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
69
+ "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-*",
67
70
  ]
68
71
  guardrail_database_destruction_resources = [
69
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
70
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
72
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db*",
71
73
  ]
72
74
  guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources = [
73
75
  "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ locals {
78
80
  guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources = [
79
81
  "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
80
82
  "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
81
- # BUG-205: legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db prefix, so
83
+ # Legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db prefix, so
82
84
  # they match no prod pattern above — deny them outright. gc never
83
85
  # runs under preview credentials, so nothing legitimate needs them.
84
86
  "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
@@ -92,24 +94,21 @@ locals {
92
94
  ]
93
95
  guardrail_task_execution_resources = [
94
96
  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
95
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
96
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
97
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
97
98
  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
98
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
99
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
99
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
100
100
  ]
101
101
  guardrail_task_definition_resources = [
102
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
103
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
102
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
104
103
  ]
105
104
  # String-built (not HCL refs): static trees define no IAM roles, so
106
105
  # refs would dangle and fail validate. ECS and Lambda use identical
107
106
  # physical role names, so one pattern covers both and matches
108
- # nothing on static.
107
+ # nothing on static. The wildcard also covers the CI roles (same
108
+ # prefix, -github-actions-*-role): capped callers never legitimately
109
+ # pass or mutate those, so the overlap only tightens the boundary.
109
110
  guardrail_app_role_resources = [
110
- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-task-role",
111
- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-execution-role",
112
- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role",
111
+ "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-*-role",
113
112
  ]
114
113
  }
115
114
 
@@ -231,8 +230,10 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "deploy_boundary" {
231
230
 
232
231
  # Preview guardrails: PR-triggered runs (preview/teardown/plan) keep full
233
232
  # build power but cannot destroy production data, mint compute, or open
234
- # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names an exact production ARN —
235
- # never a wildcard — so pr-suffixed preview resources keep working.
233
+ # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names production only — exact ARNs
234
+ # or prod_prefix-anchored wildcards (preview names carry -pr-<n>- where
235
+ # prod carries the hex suffix, so anchored patterns never match preview
236
+ # resources and pr-suffixed workflows keep working).
236
237
  resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
237
238
  count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
238
239
  name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-guardrails"
@@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
254
255
  Resource = "*"
255
256
  },
256
257
  {
257
- # BUG-207: the preview role carries IAMFullAccess, so without this
258
+ # The preview role carries IAMFullAccess, so without this
258
259
  # statement it can delete its own guardrails, delete the deploy
259
260
  # role, or widen trust in one call. Scoped to the CI role ARNs
260
261
  # (not *): preview stacks legitimately manage their own
@@ -324,7 +325,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
324
325
  Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
325
326
  },
326
327
  {
327
- # BUG-208: manual snapshots (grada names them
328
+ # Manual snapshots (grada names them
328
329
  # <db-identifier>-manual-<stamp> and
329
330
  # <db-identifier>-pre-deploy-<sha>) are directly deletable;
330
331
  # automated snapshots can only go away via retention changes or
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
352
353
  Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
353
354
  },
354
355
  {
355
- # BUG-212: every role preview credentials create must carry the
356
+ # Every role preview credentials create must carry the
356
357
  # boundary — a missing key fails StringNotEquals, so unbounded
357
358
  # creation is denied and born-capped roles cannot escalate.
358
359
  Sid = "DenyRoleWithoutBoundary"
@@ -386,14 +387,23 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
386
387
  ]
387
388
  },
388
389
  {
389
- # BUG-215: close by target — deny the execution APIs on exact
390
- # prod ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
390
+ # Close by target — deny the execution APIs on prod
391
+ # ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
391
392
  # refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
392
393
  # prod is legitimate traffic.
393
394
  Sid = "DenyProdTaskExecution"
394
395
  Effect = "Deny"
395
396
  Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
396
397
  Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
398
+ # The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
399
+ # definition at trigger time. A no-op on this side (the preview
400
+ # role is never the scheduler, assumable only by the scheduler
401
+ # service) but kept so the twins stay identical.
402
+ Condition = {
403
+ StringNotEquals = {
404
+ "aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
405
+ }
406
+ }
397
407
  },
398
408
  {
399
409
  # RegisterTaskDefinition is likely resource-*-only (void half);
@@ -424,7 +434,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
424
434
  })
425
435
  }
426
436
 
427
- # BUG-212: permissions boundary capping every role preview credentials
437
+ # Permissions boundary capping every role preview credentials
428
438
  # can create. The guardrail above denies CreateRole unless the request
429
439
  # carries this boundary, so a backdoor role is born capped: its
430
440
  # effective permissions are its own policies intersected with this one.
@@ -446,13 +456,19 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
446
456
  Resource = "*"
447
457
  },
448
458
  {
449
- # BUG-214: capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
459
+ # Capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
450
460
  # scheduler role passes at invocation time), so PassRole is
451
461
  # carved out here and re-gated on service + target below.
452
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
453
- Effect = "Deny"
454
- NotAction = ["iam:PassRole"]
455
- Resource = "*"
462
+ # Explicit Action list on purpose: a Deny with NotAction would
463
+ # veto every AWS service, not just IAM (tier2 E2E proved it on
464
+ # secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, SES, and Bedrock). IAM reads
465
+ # and cosmetic writes (UpdateRole, tagging) stay allowed: they
466
+ # cannot escalate a backdoor role, and a missing entry must
467
+ # weaken security instead of breaking prod tasks.
468
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
469
+ Effect = "Deny"
470
+ Action = ["iam:CreateRole", "iam:DeleteRole", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:CreatePolicy", "iam:DeletePolicy", "iam:CreatePolicyVersion", "iam:DeletePolicyVersion", "iam:CreateUser", "iam:DeleteUser", "iam:CreateAccessKey", "iam:DeleteAccessKey"]
471
+ Resource = "*"
456
472
  },
457
473
  {
458
474
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuditBilling"
@@ -543,6 +559,14 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
543
559
  Effect = "Deny"
544
560
  Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
545
561
  Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
562
+ # The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
563
+ # definition at trigger time; every other capped caller stays
564
+ # denied. Mirrors the twin's condition above.
565
+ Condition = {
566
+ StringNotEquals = {
567
+ "aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
568
+ }
569
+ }
546
570
  },
547
571
  {
548
572
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskDefinitionRegistration"
@@ -550,12 +574,10 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
550
574
  Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
551
575
  Resource = local.guardrail_task_definition_resources
552
576
  },
553
- {
554
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRole"
555
- Effect = "Deny"
556
- Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
557
- Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
558
- },
577
+ # No flat BoundaryDenyPassRole twin: it denied the scheduler's
578
+ # own PassRole unconditionally, defeating the OffScheduler
579
+ # carve-out (any Deny wins). The OffService/OffTarget/
580
+ # OffScheduler trio below gates PassRole alone.
559
581
  {
560
582
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyAppRoleMutation"
561
583
  Effect = "Deny"
@@ -563,7 +585,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
563
585
  Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
564
586
  },
565
587
  {
566
- # BUG-214: carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
588
+ # Carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
567
589
  # service (mirrors the scheduler policy's own condition).
568
590
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffService"
569
591
  Effect = "Deny"
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "app_secrets" {
5
5
  count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
6
6
  name = "{{PROJECT_NAME}}{{RESOURCE_SUFFIX}}-secrets"
7
7
  description = "Environment variables for {{PROJECT_NAME}}"
8
- # 30-day recovery (BUG-163): an instant-delete vault turns any destroy
8
+ # 30-day recovery: an instant-delete vault turns any destroy
9
9
  # bug into unrecoverable secret loss. Lower per-tree if you must.
10
10
  recovery_window_in_days = 30
11
11
  }