grada-run 0.49.3 → 0.49.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "grada-run",
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- "version": "0.49.3",
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+ "version": "0.49.4",
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  "description": "Provision production-ready AWS infrastructure and CI/CD pipelines in seconds.",
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  "engines": {
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  "node": ">=18.0.0"
@@ -43,17 +43,21 @@ locals {
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  preview_boundary_arn = terraform.workspace == "default" ? aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn : data.aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn
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  # Shared twin resource lists: every Deny*/BoundaryDeny* pair consumes
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  # one list, so a one-sided resource edit is impossible. New pairs add
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- # their list here and reference it from both sides.
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+ # their list here and reference it from both sides. Wildcards below
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+ # anchor on prod_prefix (never on the bare project): preview names
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+ # carry -pr-<n>- where prod carries the hex suffix, so a
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+ # ${prod_prefix}-* pattern matches prod only. Anchoring also keeps
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+ # the boundary under the 6144-char managed-policy quota that broke
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+ # tier1 E2E at a 24-char prefix — prefer one anchored wildcard over
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+ # several exact ARNs when adding entries.
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  guardrail_compute_abuse_resources = ["*"]
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  guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources = ["*"]
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  guardrail_state_destruction_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
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- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
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+ "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}*",
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  ]
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  guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
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+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
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  ]
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  guardrail_image_deletion_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
@@ -62,12 +66,10 @@ locals {
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  "arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
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  ]
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  guardrail_queue_destruction_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
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- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
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+ "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-*",
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  ]
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  guardrail_database_destruction_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
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- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
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+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db*",
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  ]
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  guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
@@ -92,24 +94,21 @@ locals {
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  ]
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  guardrail_task_execution_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
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+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
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  "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
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+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
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  ]
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  guardrail_task_definition_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
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+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
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  ]
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  # String-built (not HCL refs): static trees define no IAM roles, so
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  # refs would dangle and fail validate. ECS and Lambda use identical
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  # physical role names, so one pattern covers both and matches
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- # nothing on static.
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+ # nothing on static. The wildcard also covers the CI roles (same
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+ # prefix, -github-actions-*-role): capped callers never legitimately
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+ # pass or mutate those, so the overlap only tightens the boundary.
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  guardrail_app_role_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-task-role",
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- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-execution-role",
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- "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role",
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+ "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-*-role",
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  ]
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  }
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@@ -231,8 +230,10 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "deploy_boundary" {
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  # Preview guardrails: PR-triggered runs (preview/teardown/plan) keep full
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  # build power but cannot destroy production data, mint compute, or open
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- # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names an exact production ARN —
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- # never a wildcard — so pr-suffixed preview resources keep working.
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+ # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names production only — exact ARNs
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+ # or prod_prefix-anchored wildcards (preview names carry -pr-<n>- where
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+ # prod carries the hex suffix, so anchored patterns never match preview
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+ # resources and pr-suffixed workflows keep working).
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  resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
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  name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-guardrails"
@@ -386,8 +387,8 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  ]
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  },
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  {
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- # BUG-215: close by target — deny the execution APIs on exact
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- # prod ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
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+ # BUG-215: close by target — deny the execution APIs on prod
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+ # ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
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  # refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
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  # prod is legitimate traffic.
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  Sid = "DenyProdTaskExecution"
@@ -449,10 +450,16 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  # BUG-214: capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
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  # scheduler role passes at invocation time), so PassRole is
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  # carved out here and re-gated on service + target below.
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- Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
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- Effect = "Deny"
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- NotAction = ["iam:PassRole"]
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- Resource = "*"
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+ # Explicit Action list on purpose: a Deny with NotAction would
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+ # veto every AWS service, not just IAM (tier2 E2E proved it on
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+ # secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, SES, and Bedrock). IAM reads
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+ # and cosmetic writes (UpdateRole, tagging) stay allowed: they
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+ # cannot escalate a backdoor role, and a missing entry must
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+ # weaken security instead of breaking prod tasks.
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+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
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+ Effect = "Deny"
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+ Action = ["iam:CreateRole", "iam:DeleteRole", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:CreatePolicy", "iam:DeletePolicy", "iam:CreatePolicyVersion", "iam:DeletePolicyVersion", "iam:CreateUser", "iam:DeleteUser", "iam:CreateAccessKey", "iam:DeleteAccessKey"]
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+ Resource = "*"
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  },
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  {
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  Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuditBilling"