grada-run 0.49.2 → 0.49.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
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2
  "name": "grada-run",
3
- "version": "0.49.2",
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+ "version": "0.49.4",
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  "description": "Provision production-ready AWS infrastructure and CI/CD pipelines in seconds.",
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  "engines": {
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  "node": ">=18.0.0"
@@ -25,6 +25,31 @@ const SNAPSHOT_ALREADY_EXISTS_NAMES = new Set([
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  // wastes the timeout and misreports.
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  const TERMINAL_SNAPSHOT_STATUSES = new Set(['failed', 'deleted', 'deleting']);
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27
 
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+ // Source database of a described snapshot, by kind. Missing attributes
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+ // read as undefined (never equal to the target): ownership callers fail
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+ // closed on unattributed snapshots.
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+ function snapshotSourceDb(snapshot, isCluster) {
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+ if (!snapshot) return undefined;
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+ return isCluster ? snapshot.DBClusterIdentifier : snapshot.DBInstanceIdentifier;
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+ }
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+
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+ // BUG-204 failure: the reused id names another database's snapshot.
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+ // Shared by the wait and no-wait paths (they differ only in `waited`).
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+ function failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle, snapshotId, foreignDb, targetId, projectName, waited, dbIdentifier, region }) {
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+ spinnerHandle.stop(color.red('❌ Snapshot belongs to another database.'));
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+ return failCommand({
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+ print: () => {
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+ console.log(color.red(`\n✖ Snapshot ${snapshotId} belongs to ${foreignDb ?? 'an unknown database'}, not ${targetId} — refusing to adopt it.`));
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+ console.log(' Pass a different --id, or delete the foreign snapshot first.\n');
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+ },
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+ event: 'db_backup_run',
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+ telemetry: { projectName, waited },
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+ errorCode: 'SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH',
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+ reason: 'snapshot-mismatch',
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+ resultExtra: { dbIdentifier, region, snapshotId },
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+ });
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+ }
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+
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  export function parseDbBackupArgs(argv = []) {
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  const args = normalizeArgv(argv);
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  if (args[0] === 'db') args.shift();
@@ -177,6 +202,31 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
177
202
 
178
203
  if (noWait) {
179
204
  if (reusedExisting) {
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+ // BUG-204: verify ownership even when not waiting — one
206
+ // describe, fail closed on a foreign snapshot. A
207
+ // not-found here is transient (eventual consistency),
208
+ // so only proceed past it.
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+ let ownedSnapshot = null;
210
+ try {
211
+ if (isCluster) {
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+ const resp = await rdsClient.send(
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+ new DescribeDBClusterSnapshotsCommand({ DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier: snapshotId })
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+ );
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+ ownedSnapshot = resp.DBClusterSnapshots?.[0] ?? null;
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+ } else {
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+ const resp = await rdsClient.send(
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+ new DescribeDBSnapshotsCommand({ DBSnapshotIdentifier: snapshotId })
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+ );
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+ ownedSnapshot = resp.DBSnapshots?.[0] ?? null;
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+ }
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+ } catch (error) {
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+ const notFoundNames = isCluster ? CLUSTER_SNAPSHOT_NOT_FOUND_NAMES : SNAPSHOT_NOT_FOUND_NAMES;
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+ if (!(error && notFoundNames.has(error.name))) throw error;
225
+ }
226
+ const foreignDb = snapshotSourceDb(ownedSnapshot, isCluster);
227
+ if (ownedSnapshot && foreignDb !== target.id) {
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+ return failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle: s, snapshotId, foreignDb, targetId: target.id, projectName, waited: false, dbIdentifier, region });
229
+ }
180
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  s.stop(color.green('Snapshot already exists.'));
181
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  console.log(`\n Snapshot ${color.cyan(snapshotId)} already exists — reusing it.`);
182
232
  } else {
@@ -218,6 +268,16 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
218
268
  throw error;
219
269
  }
220
270
  const snapshot = snapshots[0] || null;
271
+ // BUG-204: an explicit --id can name another database's
272
+ // snapshot (AlreadyExists proves existence, not
273
+ // ownership) — fail closed instead of adopting a
274
+ // foreign snapshot as our safety backup. Checked
275
+ // before status handling so a foreign snapshot fails
276
+ // fast instead of burning the timeout.
277
+ const foreignDb = snapshotSourceDb(snapshot, isCluster);
278
+ if (snapshot && foreignDb !== target.id) {
279
+ return { done: true, value: { sourceMismatch: true, sourceDb: foreignDb } };
280
+ }
221
281
  if (snapshot && snapshot.Status === 'available') {
222
282
  return { done: true, value: snapshot };
223
283
  }
@@ -232,6 +292,10 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
232
292
  },
233
293
  });
234
294
 
295
+ if (outcome.value?.sourceMismatch) {
296
+ return failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle: s, snapshotId, foreignDb: outcome.value.sourceDb, targetId: target.id, projectName, waited: true, dbIdentifier, region });
297
+ }
298
+
235
299
  if (outcome.value?.terminalFailure) {
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  const failedStatus = outcome.value.status;
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  s.stop(color.red(`❌ Snapshot ${failedStatus}.`));
@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ import {
16
16
  resolveHeadless,
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  resolveCwd,
18
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  readTerraformComputeTarget,
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+ readTerraformDbKind,
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  } from '../../utils/resolvers.js';
21
+ import { resolveDbIdentifier, resolveDbClusterIdentifier } from '../../utils/rds.js';
20
22
  import { detectMigrationCommand } from '../../utils/detector.js';
21
23
  import { resolveContainer } from '../../utils/ecs.js';
22
24
  import { runEphemeralEcsTask, buildRunnerCommand, parseRunnerTimeout, guardNpmStrippedRunner, reportRunnerOutcome } from '../../utils/ecs-runner.js';
@@ -144,15 +146,20 @@ function injectGateBlock(content, { steps, anchor }) {
144
146
 
145
147
  // Idempotently injects (or refreshes) the migration gate block into a
146
148
  // deploy.yml document. Returns the updated content, or null when neither
147
- // anchor step is present. Pure and unit-tested.
148
- export function injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd, cliVersion } = {}) {
149
+ // anchor step is present. Pure and unit-tested. The snapshot id embeds
150
+ // the database identifier (BUG-205): bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids match no
151
+ // guardrail or gc name pattern, so they were never protected or retired.
152
+ export function injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd, cliVersion, dbIdentifier } = {}) {
153
+ if (typeof dbIdentifier !== 'string' || dbIdentifier.trim() === '') {
154
+ throw new Error('injectMigrationGate requires dbIdentifier for the snapshot id');
155
+ }
149
156
  const taskDefRef = '${{ steps.register-task-def.outputs.task-arn }}';
150
157
  const runner = buildRunnerInvocation(cliVersion);
151
158
  return injectGateBlock(workflowContent, {
152
159
  steps: [
153
160
  {
154
161
  stepName: 'Take pre-migration database snapshot',
155
- runLine: `${runner} db backup --id "pre-deploy-\${{ github.sha }}" --headless`,
162
+ runLine: `${runner} db backup --id "${dbIdentifier.trim()}-pre-deploy-\${{ github.sha }}" --headless`,
156
163
  },
157
164
  {
158
165
  stepName: 'Pre-Deploy Database Migration',
@@ -321,7 +328,14 @@ async function runDbMigrateMain(input = {}) {
321
328
  resultExtra: { cluster, service, region },
322
329
  });
323
330
  }
324
- const updated = injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: resolvedCmd, cliVersion: getCliVersion() });
331
+ // BUG-205: the gate always targets production (deploy.yml), so
332
+ // resolve the prod db id even with a preview workspace checked
333
+ // out locally. Aurora needs the cluster prefix: cluster
334
+ // snapshots named with the instance prefix would miss the
335
+ // cluster-snapshot guardrail pattern.
336
+ const setupDbResolver = readTerraformDbKind(cwd) === 'cluster' ? resolveDbClusterIdentifier : resolveDbIdentifier;
337
+ const setupDbIdentifier = setupDbResolver({ projectName, workspace: 'default' }, cwd);
338
+ const updated = injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: resolvedCmd, cliVersion: getCliVersion(), dbIdentifier: setupDbIdentifier });
325
339
  if (updated === null) {
326
340
  return failCommand({
327
341
  message: '\n✖ Could not find the task-definition registration or ECS deployment step in .github/workflows/deploy.yml to anchor the migration gate.\n',
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ async function discoverUnattachedEips({ ec2Client, projectName }) {
273
273
 
274
274
  // Standard target discovery: pre-destroy manual snapshots older than
275
275
  // the age threshold. Scoped by the exact `<db>-manual-<stamp>` naming
276
- // pattern destroy writes (instance AND cluster snapshots) — foreign,
276
+ // pattern destroy writes plus the `<db>-pre-deploy-<sha>` pattern the
277
+ // migration gate writes (instance AND cluster snapshots) — foreign,
277
278
  // automated, non-available, and young snapshots are never proposed.
278
279
  // Tolerant of missing clients/identifiers (programmatic callers without
279
280
  // RDS context discover nothing instead of throwing).
@@ -281,22 +282,37 @@ async function discoverOldManualSnapshots({ rdsClient, dbIdentifier, dbClusterId
281
282
  if (!rdsClient || (!dbIdentifier && !dbClusterIdentifier)) return [];
282
283
  const maxAgeDays = Number(snapshotMaxAgeDays ?? DEFAULT_SNAPSHOT_MAX_AGE_DAYS);
283
284
  const cutoffMs = Date.now() - (Number.isFinite(maxAgeDays) ? maxAgeDays : DEFAULT_SNAPSHOT_MAX_AGE_DAYS) * 86400000;
284
- const patterns = [dbIdentifier, dbClusterIdentifier]
285
+ const dbIds = [dbIdentifier, dbClusterIdentifier]
285
286
  .filter((id) => typeof id === 'string' && id.trim())
286
- .map((id) => new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(id.trim().toLowerCase())}-manual-\\d{8}-\\d{6}$`));
287
+ .map((id) => id.trim().toLowerCase());
288
+ const patterns = dbIds
289
+ .map((id) => new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(id)}-manual-\\d{8}-\\d{6}$`));
290
+ // BUG-205: the gate's pre-deploy snapshots are per-commit, so without
291
+ // a discovery rule they accumulate into the region snapshot quota.
292
+ const predeployPatterns = dbIds
293
+ .map((id) => new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(id)}-pre-deploy-[0-9a-f]{7,40}$`));
294
+ // Legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db scope: retire them
295
+ // only with a matching source-db attribute, never by name alone.
296
+ const legacyPredeployPattern = /^pre-deploy-[0-9a-f]{7,40}$/;
297
+ const knownSourceDbs = new Set(dbIds);
287
298
  if (patterns.length === 0) return [];
288
- const isRetirable = (snapshotId, status, type, createTime) => {
299
+ const isRetirable = (snapshotId, status, type, createTime, sourceDb) => {
289
300
  if (status !== 'available' || type !== 'manual') return false;
290
301
  const createdMs = createTime ? new Date(createTime).getTime() : NaN;
291
302
  if (!Number.isFinite(createdMs) || createdMs > cutoffMs) return false;
292
- return patterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(String(snapshotId).toLowerCase()));
303
+ const name = String(snapshotId).toLowerCase();
304
+ if (patterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(name))) return true;
305
+ if (predeployPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(name))) return true;
306
+ return legacyPredeployPattern.test(name)
307
+ && typeof sourceDb === 'string'
308
+ && knownSourceDbs.has(sourceDb.toLowerCase());
293
309
  };
294
310
  const snapshots = [];
295
311
  let marker;
296
312
  do {
297
313
  const resp = await rdsClient.send(new DescribeDBSnapshotsCommand({ Marker: marker, MaxRecords: 100 }));
298
314
  for (const snap of resp.DBSnapshots || []) {
299
- if (isRetirable(snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime)) {
315
+ if (isRetirable(snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime, snap.DBInstanceIdentifier)) {
300
316
  snapshots.push({ id: snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, kind: 'instance', createTime: snap.SnapshotCreateTime });
301
317
  }
302
318
  }
@@ -306,7 +322,7 @@ async function discoverOldManualSnapshots({ rdsClient, dbIdentifier, dbClusterId
306
322
  do {
307
323
  const resp = await rdsClient.send(new DescribeDBClusterSnapshotsCommand({ Marker: marker, MaxRecords: 100 }));
308
324
  for (const snap of resp.DBClusterSnapshots || []) {
309
- if (isRetirable(snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime)) {
325
+ if (isRetirable(snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime, snap.DBClusterIdentifier)) {
310
326
  snapshots.push({ id: snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, kind: 'cluster', createTime: snap.SnapshotCreateTime });
311
327
  }
312
328
  }
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import { trackEvent, flushTelemetry, getCliVersion, setActiveCommandName, resetA
33
33
  import { failCommand } from '../utils/command.js';
34
34
  import { getFrameworkWarning } from '../utils/warnings.js';
35
35
  import { provisionStateBucket, formatStateBucketName, isAuthError, printAwsAuthGuidance } from '../utils/aws.js';
36
- import { generateTemplates } from '../utils/generator.js';
36
+ import { generateTemplates, resolveDbEngineRefs } from '../utils/generator.js';
37
37
  import { planExistingFiles, executeBackup, preserveManagedFiles, restoreManagedFiles, refusalResultForPlan, writeInitManifest } from '../utils/backup.js';
38
38
  import { checkStateAdoption } from '../utils/state-adoption.js';
39
39
  import { atomicWriteFileSync } from '../utils/atomic-write.js';
@@ -1025,7 +1025,11 @@ async function mainStackMain(input = {}) {
1025
1025
  if (migrationGateEnabled && migrationCmd) {
1026
1026
  const deployYmlPath = path.join(dirConfig.targetDir, '.github', 'workflows', 'deploy.yml');
1027
1027
  const workflowContent = readFileSafe(deployYmlPath);
1028
- const gated = workflowContent ? injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: migrationCmd, cliVersion: CLI_VERSION }) : null;
1028
+ // BUG-205: scope the gate's snapshot id to the database (aurora
1029
+ // takes the cluster prefix) so guardrails and gc can name it.
1030
+ const gateDbRefs = resolveDbEngineRefs(config.dbEngine);
1031
+ const gateDbIdentifier = `${dirConfig.actualProjectName}${resourceSuffix}-db${gateDbRefs.isCluster ? '-cluster' : ''}`;
1032
+ const gated = workflowContent ? injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: migrationCmd, cliVersion: CLI_VERSION, dbIdentifier: gateDbIdentifier }) : null;
1029
1033
  if (gated) {
1030
1034
  atomicWriteFileSync(deployYmlPath, gated);
1031
1035
  console.log(color.green('✅ Wired the pre-deploy database migration gate into .github/workflows/deploy.yml (snapshot first, then migrate)'));
@@ -45,6 +45,21 @@ export function readTerraformComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd()) {
45
45
  return detectComputeTargetFromMainTf(readFileSafe(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'main.tf')));
46
46
  }
47
47
 
48
+ // Offline database-kind detection for `--setup-ci` (no AWS calls): the
49
+ // generator copies exactly one database template, so the aurora file's
50
+ // presence means cluster snapshots. Unknown/absent means instance — the
51
+ // runtime backup resolves the live kind anyway; the id prefix only
52
+ // name-scopes the snapshot for guardrails + gc.
53
+ export function readTerraformDbKind(cwd = process.cwd()) {
54
+ const base = resolveCwd({}, cwd);
55
+ try {
56
+ if (fsSync.existsSync(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'database-aurora-postgresql.tf'))) return 'cluster';
57
+ } catch {
58
+ // Fall through to the instance default
59
+ }
60
+ return 'instance';
61
+ }
62
+
48
63
  // Predicate form of the target check for commands that adapt (rather
49
64
  // than refuse) per target: `isComputeTarget(cwd, 'lambda')`.
50
65
  export function isComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd(), ...targets) {
@@ -41,6 +41,75 @@ locals {
41
41
  # task/execution/cron roles, which static trees lack.
42
42
  # tflint-ignore: terraform_unused_declarations
43
43
  preview_boundary_arn = terraform.workspace == "default" ? aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn : data.aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn
44
+ # Shared twin resource lists: every Deny*/BoundaryDeny* pair consumes
45
+ # one list, so a one-sided resource edit is impossible. New pairs add
46
+ # their list here and reference it from both sides. Wildcards below
47
+ # anchor on prod_prefix (never on the bare project): preview names
48
+ # carry -pr-<n>- where prod carries the hex suffix, so a
49
+ # ${prod_prefix}-* pattern matches prod only. Anchoring also keeps
50
+ # the boundary under the 6144-char managed-policy quota that broke
51
+ # tier1 E2E at a 24-char prefix — prefer one anchored wildcard over
52
+ # several exact ARNs when adding entries.
53
+ guardrail_compute_abuse_resources = ["*"]
54
+ guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources = ["*"]
55
+ guardrail_state_destruction_resources = [
56
+ "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}*",
57
+ ]
58
+ guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources = [
59
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
60
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
61
+ ]
62
+ guardrail_image_deletion_resources = [
63
+ "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
64
+ ]
65
+ guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources = [
66
+ "arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
67
+ ]
68
+ guardrail_queue_destruction_resources = [
69
+ "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-*",
70
+ ]
71
+ guardrail_database_destruction_resources = [
72
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db*",
73
+ ]
74
+ guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources = [
75
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
76
+ ]
77
+ guardrail_table_deletion_resources = [
78
+ "arn:aws:dynamodb:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:table/${local.prod_prefix}-table",
79
+ ]
80
+ guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources = [
81
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
82
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
83
+ # BUG-205: legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db prefix, so
84
+ # they match no prod pattern above — deny them outright. gc never
85
+ # runs under preview credentials, so nothing legitimate needs them.
86
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
87
+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
88
+ ]
89
+ guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources = [
90
+ "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
91
+ ]
92
+ guardrail_log_deletion_resources = [
93
+ "arn:aws:logs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/ecs/${local.prod_prefix}",
94
+ ]
95
+ guardrail_task_execution_resources = [
96
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
97
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
98
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
99
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
100
+ ]
101
+ guardrail_task_definition_resources = [
102
+ "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-*:*",
103
+ ]
104
+ # String-built (not HCL refs): static trees define no IAM roles, so
105
+ # refs would dangle and fail validate. ECS and Lambda use identical
106
+ # physical role names, so one pattern covers both and matches
107
+ # nothing on static. The wildcard also covers the CI roles (same
108
+ # prefix, -github-actions-*-role): capped callers never legitimately
109
+ # pass or mutate those, so the overlap only tightens the boundary.
110
+ guardrail_app_role_resources = [
111
+ "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-*-role",
112
+ ]
44
113
  }
45
114
 
46
115
  # Deploy role FIRST: readTerraformOidcTrust anchors on this block so re-init
@@ -161,8 +230,10 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "deploy_boundary" {
161
230
 
162
231
  # Preview guardrails: PR-triggered runs (preview/teardown/plan) keep full
163
232
  # build power but cannot destroy production data, mint compute, or open
164
- # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names an exact production ARN —
165
- # never a wildcard — so pr-suffixed preview resources keep working.
233
+ # IAM backdoors. Every Resource below names production only — exact ARNs
234
+ # or prod_prefix-anchored wildcards (preview names carry -pr-<n>- where
235
+ # prod carries the hex suffix, so anchored patterns never match preview
236
+ # resources and pr-suffixed workflows keep working).
166
237
  resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
167
238
  count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
168
239
  name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-guardrails"
@@ -175,7 +246,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
175
246
  Sid = "DenyComputeAbuse"
176
247
  Effect = "Deny"
177
248
  Action = ["ec2:RunInstances"]
178
- Resource = "*"
249
+ Resource = local.guardrail_compute_abuse_resources
179
250
  },
180
251
  {
181
252
  Sid = "DenyIAMBackdoors"
@@ -203,110 +274,83 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
203
274
  Sid = "DenySnapshotSharing"
204
275
  Effect = "Deny"
205
276
  Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
206
- Resource = "*"
277
+ Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
207
278
  },
208
279
  {
209
- Sid = "DenyProdStateDestruction"
210
- Effect = "Deny"
211
- Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
212
- Resource = [
213
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
214
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
215
- ]
280
+ Sid = "DenyProdStateDestruction"
281
+ Effect = "Deny"
282
+ Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
283
+ Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
216
284
  },
217
285
  {
218
- Sid = "DenyProdECSShutdown"
219
- Effect = "Deny"
220
- Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
221
- Resource = [
222
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
223
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
224
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
225
- ]
286
+ Sid = "DenyProdECSShutdown"
287
+ Effect = "Deny"
288
+ Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
289
+ Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
226
290
  },
227
291
  {
228
- Sid = "DenyProdImageDeletion"
229
- Effect = "Deny"
230
- Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
231
- Resource = [
232
- "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
233
- ]
292
+ Sid = "DenyProdImageDeletion"
293
+ Effect = "Deny"
294
+ Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
295
+ Resource = local.guardrail_image_deletion_resources
234
296
  },
235
297
  {
236
- Sid = "DenyProdLambdaRewrite"
237
- Effect = "Deny"
238
- Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
239
- Resource = [
240
- "arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
241
- ]
298
+ Sid = "DenyProdLambdaRewrite"
299
+ Effect = "Deny"
300
+ Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
301
+ Resource = local.guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources
242
302
  },
243
303
  {
244
- Sid = "DenyProdQueueDestruction"
245
- Effect = "Deny"
246
- Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
247
- Resource = [
248
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
249
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
250
- ]
304
+ Sid = "DenyProdQueueDestruction"
305
+ Effect = "Deny"
306
+ Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
307
+ Resource = local.guardrail_queue_destruction_resources
251
308
  },
252
309
  {
253
- Sid = "DenyProdDatabaseDestruction"
254
- Effect = "Deny"
255
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
256
- Resource = [
257
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
258
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
259
- ]
310
+ Sid = "DenyProdDatabaseDestruction"
311
+ Effect = "Deny"
312
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
313
+ Resource = local.guardrail_database_destruction_resources
260
314
  },
261
315
  {
262
- Sid = "DenyProdAuroraDestruction"
263
- Effect = "Deny"
264
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
265
- Resource = [
266
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
267
- ]
316
+ Sid = "DenyProdAuroraDestruction"
317
+ Effect = "Deny"
318
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
319
+ Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
268
320
  },
269
321
  {
270
- Sid = "DenyProdTableDeletion"
271
- Effect = "Deny"
272
- Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
273
- Resource = [
274
- "arn:aws:dynamodb:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:table/${local.prod_prefix}-table",
275
- ]
322
+ Sid = "DenyProdTableDeletion"
323
+ Effect = "Deny"
324
+ Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
325
+ Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
276
326
  },
277
327
  {
278
328
  # BUG-208: manual snapshots (grada names them
279
- # <db-identifier>-manual-<stamp>) are directly deletable;
329
+ # <db-identifier>-manual-<stamp> and
330
+ # <db-identifier>-pre-deploy-<sha>) are directly deletable;
280
331
  # automated snapshots can only go away via retention changes or
281
332
  # instance deletion, both already denied above.
282
- Sid = "DenyProdSnapshotDeletion"
283
- Effect = "Deny"
284
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
285
- Resource = [
286
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
287
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
288
- ]
333
+ Sid = "DenyProdSnapshotDeletion"
334
+ Effect = "Deny"
335
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
336
+ Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
289
337
  },
290
338
  {
291
339
  # The vault ARN carries a random suffix and static trees have no
292
340
  # vault at all (no secrets.tf), so match the tight name prefix —
293
341
  # on static it simply matches nothing.
294
- Sid = "DenyProdSecretsDeletion"
295
- Effect = "Deny"
296
- Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
297
- Resource = [
298
- "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
299
- ]
342
+ Sid = "DenyProdSecretsDeletion"
343
+ Effect = "Deny"
344
+ Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
345
+ Resource = local.guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources
300
346
  },
301
347
  {
302
348
  # Web and worker containers share one log group; deleting it
303
349
  # wipes the audit trail for both.
304
- Sid = "DenyProdLogDeletion"
305
- Effect = "Deny"
306
- Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
307
- Resource = [
308
- "arn:aws:logs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/ecs/${local.prod_prefix}",
309
- ]
350
+ Sid = "DenyProdLogDeletion"
351
+ Effect = "Deny"
352
+ Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
353
+ Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
310
354
  },
311
355
  {
312
356
  # BUG-212: every role preview credentials create must carry the
@@ -342,6 +386,41 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
342
386
  "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:policy/${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary",
343
387
  ]
344
388
  },
389
+ {
390
+ # BUG-215: close by target — deny the execution APIs on prod
391
+ # ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
392
+ # refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
393
+ # prod is legitimate traffic.
394
+ Sid = "DenyProdTaskExecution"
395
+ Effect = "Deny"
396
+ Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
397
+ Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
398
+ },
399
+ {
400
+ # RegisterTaskDefinition is likely resource-*-only (void half);
401
+ # the cluster-scoped RunTask deny above is the real choke.
402
+ Sid = "DenyProdTaskDefinitionRegistration"
403
+ Effect = "Deny"
404
+ Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
405
+ Resource = local.guardrail_task_definition_resources
406
+ },
407
+ {
408
+ Sid = "DenyProdPassRole"
409
+ Effect = "Deny"
410
+ Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
411
+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
412
+ },
413
+ {
414
+ # Trust writes close the assume-it-directly bypass (re-trusting
415
+ # the prod task role would defeat every execution deny);
416
+ # DeleteRole guards the roles themselves. UpdateRole and
417
+ # tagging stay allowed (cosmetic — description, session
418
+ # duration within AWS bounds, tags).
419
+ Sid = "DenyProdAppRoleMutation"
420
+ Effect = "Deny"
421
+ Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
422
+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
423
+ },
345
424
  ]
346
425
  })
347
426
  }
@@ -351,8 +430,8 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
351
430
  # carries this boundary, so a backdoor role is born capped: its
352
431
  # effective permissions are its own policies intersected with this one.
353
432
  # Deny-list shape (default-allow) on purpose: a missing entry weakens
354
- # security instead of breaking prod tasks. Keep the data denies in sync
355
- # with preview_guardrails above.
433
+ # security instead of breaking prod tasks. Twin pairs share their
434
+ # resource lists via the locals above, so one-sided edits fail loudly.
356
435
  resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
357
436
  count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
358
437
  name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary"
@@ -368,9 +447,18 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
368
447
  Resource = "*"
369
448
  },
370
449
  {
450
+ # BUG-214: capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
451
+ # scheduler role passes at invocation time), so PassRole is
452
+ # carved out here and re-gated on service + target below.
453
+ # Explicit Action list on purpose: a Deny with NotAction would
454
+ # veto every AWS service, not just IAM (tier2 E2E proved it on
455
+ # secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, SES, and Bedrock). IAM reads
456
+ # and cosmetic writes (UpdateRole, tagging) stay allowed: they
457
+ # cannot escalate a backdoor role, and a missing entry must
458
+ # weaken security instead of breaking prod tasks.
371
459
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
372
460
  Effect = "Deny"
373
- Action = ["iam:*"]
461
+ Action = ["iam:CreateRole", "iam:DeleteRole", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:CreatePolicy", "iam:DeletePolicy", "iam:CreatePolicyVersion", "iam:DeletePolicyVersion", "iam:CreateUser", "iam:DeleteUser", "iam:CreateAccessKey", "iam:DeleteAccessKey"]
374
462
  Resource = "*"
375
463
  },
376
464
  {
@@ -383,107 +471,147 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
383
471
  Sid = "BoundaryDenyComputeAbuse"
384
472
  Effect = "Deny"
385
473
  Action = ["ec2:RunInstances"]
386
- Resource = "*"
474
+ Resource = local.guardrail_compute_abuse_resources
387
475
  },
388
476
  {
389
477
  Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotSharing"
390
478
  Effect = "Deny"
391
479
  Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
392
- Resource = "*"
480
+ Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
393
481
  },
394
482
  {
395
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyStateDestruction"
396
- Effect = "Deny"
397
- Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
398
- Resource = [
399
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
400
- "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
401
- ]
483
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyStateDestruction"
484
+ Effect = "Deny"
485
+ Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
486
+ Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
402
487
  },
403
488
  {
404
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyECSShutdown"
405
- Effect = "Deny"
406
- Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
407
- Resource = [
408
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
409
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
410
- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
411
- ]
489
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyECSShutdown"
490
+ Effect = "Deny"
491
+ Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
492
+ Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
412
493
  },
413
494
  {
414
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyImageDeletion"
415
- Effect = "Deny"
416
- Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
417
- Resource = [
418
- "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
419
- ]
495
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyImageDeletion"
496
+ Effect = "Deny"
497
+ Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
498
+ Resource = local.guardrail_image_deletion_resources
420
499
  },
421
500
  {
422
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyLambdaRewrite"
423
- Effect = "Deny"
424
- Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
425
- Resource = [
426
- "arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
427
- ]
501
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyLambdaRewrite"
502
+ Effect = "Deny"
503
+ Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
504
+ Resource = local.guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources
428
505
  },
429
506
  {
430
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyQueueDestruction"
431
- Effect = "Deny"
432
- Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
433
- Resource = [
434
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
435
- "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
436
- ]
507
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyQueueDestruction"
508
+ Effect = "Deny"
509
+ Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
510
+ Resource = local.guardrail_queue_destruction_resources
437
511
  },
438
512
  {
439
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyDatabaseDestruction"
440
- Effect = "Deny"
441
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
442
- Resource = [
443
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
444
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
445
- ]
513
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyDatabaseDestruction"
514
+ Effect = "Deny"
515
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
516
+ Resource = local.guardrail_database_destruction_resources
446
517
  },
447
518
  {
448
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuroraDestruction"
449
- Effect = "Deny"
450
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
451
- Resource = [
452
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
453
- ]
519
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuroraDestruction"
520
+ Effect = "Deny"
521
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
522
+ Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
454
523
  },
455
524
  {
456
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyTableDeletion"
457
- Effect = "Deny"
458
- Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
459
- Resource = [
460
- "arn:aws:dynamodb:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:table/${local.prod_prefix}-table",
461
- ]
525
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyTableDeletion"
526
+ Effect = "Deny"
527
+ Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
528
+ Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
462
529
  },
463
530
  {
464
- Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotDeletion"
465
- Effect = "Deny"
466
- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
467
- Resource = [
468
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
469
- "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
470
- ]
531
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotDeletion"
532
+ Effect = "Deny"
533
+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
534
+ Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
471
535
  },
472
536
  {
473
- Sid = "BoundaryDenySecretsDeletion"
474
- Effect = "Deny"
475
- Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
476
- Resource = [
477
- "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
478
- ]
537
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenySecretsDeletion"
538
+ Effect = "Deny"
539
+ Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
540
+ Resource = local.guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources
541
+ },
542
+ {
543
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyLogDeletion"
544
+ Effect = "Deny"
545
+ Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
546
+ Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
547
+ },
548
+ {
549
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskExecution"
550
+ Effect = "Deny"
551
+ Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
552
+ Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
553
+ },
554
+ {
555
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskDefinitionRegistration"
556
+ Effect = "Deny"
557
+ Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
558
+ Resource = local.guardrail_task_definition_resources
559
+ },
560
+ {
561
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRole"
562
+ Effect = "Deny"
563
+ Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
564
+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
565
+ },
566
+ {
567
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyAppRoleMutation"
568
+ Effect = "Deny"
569
+ Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
570
+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
571
+ },
572
+ {
573
+ # BUG-214: carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
574
+ # service (mirrors the scheduler policy's own condition).
575
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffService"
576
+ Effect = "Deny"
577
+ Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
578
+ Resource = "*"
579
+ Condition = {
580
+ StringNotEquals = {
581
+ "iam:PassedToService" = "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com"
582
+ }
583
+ }
479
584
  },
480
585
  {
481
- Sid = "BoundaryDenyLogDeletion"
586
+ # ... and only task roles: preview patterns plus the prod pair
587
+ # (shared local, so renames flow). Preview app names put the
588
+ # workspace between the project and the collision suffix
589
+ # (<project>-pr-<n>-<suffix>), so the preview patterns key off
590
+ # {{PROJECT_NAME}}, not prod_prefix. Prod roles stay
591
+ # scheduler-only via the statement below.
592
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffTarget"
482
593
  Effect = "Deny"
483
- Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
484
- Resource = [
485
- "arn:aws:logs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/ecs/${local.prod_prefix}",
486
- ]
594
+ Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
595
+ NotResource = concat([
596
+ "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/{{PROJECT_NAME}}-pr-*-task-role",
597
+ "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/{{PROJECT_NAME}}-pr-*-execution-role",
598
+ ], local.guardrail_app_role_resources)
599
+ },
600
+ {
601
+ # Prod task roles pass only by the prod scheduler role, which
602
+ # passes them at invocation time (its own policy allows only
603
+ # those two roles, so the boundary stays a backstop). Every
604
+ # other capped caller stays denied, and the scheduler itself
605
+ # cannot pass anything outside the four roles above.
606
+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyProdPassRoleOffScheduler"
607
+ Effect = "Deny"
608
+ Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
609
+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
610
+ Condition = {
611
+ StringNotEquals = {
612
+ "aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
613
+ }
614
+ }
487
615
  },
488
616
  ]
489
617
  })