grada-run 0.49.11 → 0.50.1

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@@ -49,16 +49,16 @@ locals {
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  # ${prod_prefix}-* pattern matches prod only. Anchoring also keeps
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  # the boundary under the 6144-char managed-policy quota that broke
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  # tier1 E2E at a 24-char prefix — prefer one anchored wildcard over
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- # several exact ARNs when adding entries.
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+ # several exact ARNs when adding entries. Headroom is 78 chars
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+ # at 32-char prefixes (316 at 24): the shutdown-into-execution
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+ # merger paid for the lifecycle/snapshot/table data verbs, so
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+ # additions still fit — but the next one re-runs the quota probe
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+ # before extending.
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  guardrail_compute_abuse_resources = ["*"]
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  guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources = ["*"]
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  guardrail_state_destruction_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}*",
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  ]
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- guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources = [
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
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- "arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
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- ]
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  guardrail_image_deletion_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
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  ]
@@ -110,6 +110,37 @@ locals {
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  guardrail_app_role_resources = [
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  "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-*-role",
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  ]
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+ # Data-plane confinement: prod data ARNs shared by the
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+ # DenyProdAppData twins. One statement is exact here, not
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+ # lazy — every denied action only ever matches its own service's
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+ # ARNs in a real call, so the cross-product cannot over-match.
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+ guardrail_app_data_resources = [
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+ "arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
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+ "arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-*",
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+ ]
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+ # Lifecycle twin of the above, deliberately carve-free: no bounded
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+ # role ever stops or reboots a database (sleep/wake and db commands
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+ # run on user credentials), and one fewer condition keeps the pair
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+ # under the 6144-char boundary quota.
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+ guardrail_db_lifecycle_resources = [
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+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db*",
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+ "arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
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+ ]
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+ # Carve-out principal for the app-data twins: the exact prod task
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+ # role ARN (workers send/receive prod queues). Singular on purpose:
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+ # execution resolves taskdef secrets via GetSecretValue, which no
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+ # statement here denies (plan refresh requires it — provider-proven),
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+ # and nothing bounded writes secrets — so nothing else needs
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+ # carving. Exact ARN, never a wildcard: a backdoor role could match
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+ # a pattern by name since CreateRole sets its own trust inline.
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+ # String-built, so static trees (no roles at all) stay valid. The
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+ # scheduler is intentionally absent: RunTask plus PassRole only.
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+ # Length-conditional like the role itself: over-cap trees hash the
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+ # task name, and the carve-out must track the rendered name exactly
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+ # (a stale plain ARN would silently uncarve workers).
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+ guardrail_task_role_principals = [
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+ length("${local.prod_prefix}-task-role") > 64 ? "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${substr(local.prod_prefix, 0, 64 - 1 - 5 - 10)}-${substr(md5(local.prod_prefix), 0, 5)}-task-role" : "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-task-role",
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+ ]
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  }
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  # Deploy role FIRST: readTerraformOidcTrust anchors on this block so re-init
@@ -273,7 +304,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  {
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  Sid = "DenySnapshotSharing"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
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+ Action = ["rds:Modify*SnapshotAttribute"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
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  },
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  {
@@ -282,12 +313,6 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
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  },
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- {
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- Sid = "DenyProdECSShutdown"
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- Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
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- Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
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- },
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  {
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  Sid = "DenyProdImageDeletion"
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  Effect = "Deny"
@@ -319,9 +344,15 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
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  },
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  {
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- Sid = "DenyProdTableDeletion"
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+ # Item data joins the table deny: preview apps use preview
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+ # tables, so no bounded role ever reads prod items — and the
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+ # wildcard set below leaves Describe*/List* (plan refresh) and
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+ # control verbs alone. Streams stay out of reach of this
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+ # pattern (stream ARNs carry a /stream suffix): accepted, the
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+ # iterator dance is narrow and unactionable without table reads.
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+ Sid = "DenyProdTableData"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
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+ Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable", "dynamodb:Batch*", "dynamodb:*Item", "dynamodb:Query", "dynamodb:Scan", "dynamodb:Execute*", "dynamodb:Transact*"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
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  },
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  {
@@ -330,9 +361,13 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  # <db-identifier>-pre-deploy-<sha>) are directly deletable;
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  # automated snapshots can only go away via retention changes or
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  # instance deletion, both already denied above.
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- Sid = "DenyProdSnapshotDeletion"
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+ # Copies, snapshot-based restores, and S3 exports authorize
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+ # the source snapshot (service authorization reference), so
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+ # denying them here closes the copy-then-read and
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+ # export-to-attacker-bucket paths. Deletion keeps its verbs.
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+ Sid = "DenyProdSnapshotData"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
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+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot", "rds:Copy*", "rds:Restore*", "rds:StartExportTask"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
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  },
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  {
@@ -391,9 +426,15 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  # ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
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  # refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
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  # prod is legitimate traffic.
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+ # Service shutdown verbs live here (not in a separate
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+ # statement): they share the cluster+service resources below,
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+ # and a twin pair of their own would re-inline ~280 chars of
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+ # ARNs against the boundary quota. The scheduler carve-out is
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+ # a no-op for them — the scheduler role can never call
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+ # Update/DeleteService or DeleteCluster.
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  Sid = "DenyProdTaskExecution"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
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+ Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService", "ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
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  # The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
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  # definition at trigger time. A no-op on this side (the preview
@@ -430,6 +471,49 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
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  Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
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  },
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+ {
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+ # Preview CI must never write prod secrets or touch prod queue
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+ # traffic. GetSecretValue stays allowed: plan refreshes the
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+ # version resource with preview credentials, and the provider
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+ # reads it via GetSecretValue (provider source verified) — a
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+ # deny would break every PR plan. Reads stay an accepted
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+ # residual (see below), as does DeleteMessage, which needs a
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+ # Receive handle to call: with Receive denied it is unreachable.
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+ # The carve-out is mirrored here as a no-op (the preview role
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+ # is never a task role) so the twins stay identical.
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+ # Accepted residual: GetSecretValue + prod state reads (plan
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+ # refresh requires both; state additionally exposes adopted
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+ # live values), Bedrock/SES spend verbs (denying would gut
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+ # preview fidelity for AI/email apps — previews are full
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+ # copies; same-repo guard + PR review are the controls), and
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+ # DynamoDB stream reads (narrow iterator dance, unactionable
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+ # without the table reads denied below). Snapshot copy/
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+ # restore/export, point-in-time restore, DynamoDB item data,
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+ # and RDS Start all landed as denies; DeleteMessage stays
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+ # unreachable with Receive denied.
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+ Sid = "DenyProdAppData"
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+ Effect = "Deny"
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+ Action = [
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+ "secretsmanager:Put*", "secretsmanager:Update*",
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+ "sqs:Send*", "sqs:Receive*",
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+ ]
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+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_data_resources
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+ Condition = {
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+ StringNotEquals = {
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+ "aws:PrincipalArn" = local.guardrail_task_role_principals
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+ }
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+ }
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+ },
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+ {
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+ # ...nor stop, start, reboot, or point-in-time-restore prod
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+ # databases. Deliberately carve-free: no bounded role ever
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+ # calls these (sleep/wake and db commands run on user
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+ # credentials).
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+ Sid = "DenyProdDbLifecycle"
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+ Effect = "Deny"
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+ Action = ["rds:Stop*", "rds:Reboot*", "rds:Start*", "rds:Restore*"]
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+ Resource = local.guardrail_db_lifecycle_resources
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+ },
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  ]
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  })
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  }
@@ -485,7 +569,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  {
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  Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotSharing"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
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+ Action = ["rds:Modify*SnapshotAttribute"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
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  },
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  {
@@ -494,12 +578,6 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
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  },
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- {
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- Sid = "BoundaryDenyECSShutdown"
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- Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
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- Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
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- },
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  {
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  Sid = "BoundaryDenyImageDeletion"
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  Effect = "Deny"
@@ -531,15 +609,15 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
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  },
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  {
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- Sid = "BoundaryDenyTableDeletion"
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+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyTableData"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
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+ Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable", "dynamodb:Batch*", "dynamodb:*Item", "dynamodb:Query", "dynamodb:Scan", "dynamodb:Execute*", "dynamodb:Transact*"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
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  },
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  {
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- Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotDeletion"
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+ Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotData"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
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+ Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot", "rds:Copy*", "rds:Restore*", "rds:StartExportTask"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
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  },
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  {
@@ -555,9 +633,11 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
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  },
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  {
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+ # Shutdown verbs merged here; see the twin's comment (quota
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+ # economy — a separate pair would re-inline the ARNs below).
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  Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskExecution"
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  Effect = "Deny"
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- Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
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+ Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService", "ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
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  # The bounded scheduler role must RunTask its task
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  # definition at trigger time; every other capped caller stays
@@ -584,6 +664,29 @@ resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
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  Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
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  Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
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  },
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+ {
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+ # Backdoor twin of DenyProdAppData: roles born under preview
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+ # credentials get no prod vault writes or queue traffic either.
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+ # The exact-ARN carve-out keeps workers sending/receiving.
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+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyAppData"
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+ Effect = "Deny"
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+ Action = [
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+ "secretsmanager:Put*", "secretsmanager:Update*",
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+ "sqs:Send*", "sqs:Receive*",
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+ ]
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+ Resource = local.guardrail_app_data_resources
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+ Condition = {
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+ StringNotEquals = {
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+ "aws:PrincipalArn" = local.guardrail_task_role_principals
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+ }
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+ }
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+ },
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+ {
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+ Sid = "BoundaryDenyDbLifecycle"
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+ Effect = "Deny"
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+ Action = ["rds:Stop*", "rds:Reboot*", "rds:Start*", "rds:Restore*"]
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+ Resource = local.guardrail_db_lifecycle_resources
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+ },
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  {
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  # Carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
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  # service (mirrors the scheduler policy's own condition).