grada-run 0.49.1 → 0.49.3
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/commands/db/backup.js +64 -0
- package/src/commands/db/migrate.js +18 -4
- package/src/commands/gc.js +23 -7
- package/src/commands/init.js +6 -2
- package/src/utils/resolvers.js +15 -0
- package/src/utils/terraform-errors.js +1 -1
- package/src/utils/terraform.js +23 -3
- package/templates/docker/django.Dockerfile +3 -2
- package/templates/docker/go.Dockerfile +4 -0
- package/templates/docker/nestjs.Dockerfile +4 -2
- package/templates/docker/nextjs.Dockerfile +1 -0
- package/templates/docker/node.Dockerfile +4 -2
- package/templates/docker/nuxt.Dockerfile +1 -0
- package/templates/docker/python.Dockerfile +3 -2
- package/templates/docker/rails.Dockerfile +1 -1
- package/templates/docker/svelte.Dockerfile +4 -2
- package/templates/terraform/addons/cron-lambda.tf +2 -1
- package/templates/terraform/addons/cron.tf +2 -1
- package/templates/terraform/main-lambda.tf +6 -4
- package/templates/terraform/main.tf +6 -4
- package/templates/terraform/oidc.tf +383 -72
package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -25,6 +25,31 @@ const SNAPSHOT_ALREADY_EXISTS_NAMES = new Set([
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// wastes the timeout and misreports.
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const TERMINAL_SNAPSHOT_STATUSES = new Set(['failed', 'deleted', 'deleting']);
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// Source database of a described snapshot, by kind. Missing attributes
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// read as undefined (never equal to the target): ownership callers fail
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// closed on unattributed snapshots.
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function snapshotSourceDb(snapshot, isCluster) {
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if (!snapshot) return undefined;
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return isCluster ? snapshot.DBClusterIdentifier : snapshot.DBInstanceIdentifier;
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}
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// BUG-204 failure: the reused id names another database's snapshot.
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// Shared by the wait and no-wait paths (they differ only in `waited`).
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function failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle, snapshotId, foreignDb, targetId, projectName, waited, dbIdentifier, region }) {
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spinnerHandle.stop(color.red('❌ Snapshot belongs to another database.'));
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return failCommand({
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print: () => {
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console.log(color.red(`\n✖ Snapshot ${snapshotId} belongs to ${foreignDb ?? 'an unknown database'}, not ${targetId} — refusing to adopt it.`));
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console.log(' Pass a different --id, or delete the foreign snapshot first.\n');
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},
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event: 'db_backup_run',
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telemetry: { projectName, waited },
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errorCode: 'SNAPSHOT_MISMATCH',
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reason: 'snapshot-mismatch',
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resultExtra: { dbIdentifier, region, snapshotId },
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});
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}
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export function parseDbBackupArgs(argv = []) {
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const args = normalizeArgv(argv);
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if (args[0] === 'db') args.shift();
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@@ -177,6 +202,31 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
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if (noWait) {
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if (reusedExisting) {
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// BUG-204: verify ownership even when not waiting — one
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// describe, fail closed on a foreign snapshot. A
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// not-found here is transient (eventual consistency),
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// so only proceed past it.
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let ownedSnapshot = null;
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try {
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if (isCluster) {
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const resp = await rdsClient.send(
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new DescribeDBClusterSnapshotsCommand({ DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier: snapshotId })
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);
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ownedSnapshot = resp.DBClusterSnapshots?.[0] ?? null;
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} else {
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const resp = await rdsClient.send(
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new DescribeDBSnapshotsCommand({ DBSnapshotIdentifier: snapshotId })
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);
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ownedSnapshot = resp.DBSnapshots?.[0] ?? null;
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}
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} catch (error) {
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const notFoundNames = isCluster ? CLUSTER_SNAPSHOT_NOT_FOUND_NAMES : SNAPSHOT_NOT_FOUND_NAMES;
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if (!(error && notFoundNames.has(error.name))) throw error;
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}
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const foreignDb = snapshotSourceDb(ownedSnapshot, isCluster);
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if (ownedSnapshot && foreignDb !== target.id) {
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return failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle: s, snapshotId, foreignDb, targetId: target.id, projectName, waited: false, dbIdentifier, region });
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}
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s.stop(color.green('Snapshot already exists.'));
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console.log(`\n Snapshot ${color.cyan(snapshotId)} already exists — reusing it.`);
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} else {
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@@ -218,6 +268,16 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
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throw error;
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}
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const snapshot = snapshots[0] || null;
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// BUG-204: an explicit --id can name another database's
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// snapshot (AlreadyExists proves existence, not
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// ownership) — fail closed instead of adopting a
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// foreign snapshot as our safety backup. Checked
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// before status handling so a foreign snapshot fails
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// fast instead of burning the timeout.
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const foreignDb = snapshotSourceDb(snapshot, isCluster);
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if (snapshot && foreignDb !== target.id) {
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return { done: true, value: { sourceMismatch: true, sourceDb: foreignDb } };
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}
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if (snapshot && snapshot.Status === 'available') {
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return { done: true, value: snapshot };
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}
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@@ -232,6 +292,10 @@ async function runDbBackupMain(input = {}) {
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},
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});
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if (outcome.value?.sourceMismatch) {
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return failSnapshotMismatch({ spinnerHandle: s, snapshotId, foreignDb: outcome.value.sourceDb, targetId: target.id, projectName, waited: true, dbIdentifier, region });
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}
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if (outcome.value?.terminalFailure) {
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const failedStatus = outcome.value.status;
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s.stop(color.red(`❌ Snapshot ${failedStatus}.`));
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@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ import {
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resolveHeadless,
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resolveCwd,
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readTerraformComputeTarget,
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readTerraformDbKind,
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} from '../../utils/resolvers.js';
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import { resolveDbIdentifier, resolveDbClusterIdentifier } from '../../utils/rds.js';
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import { detectMigrationCommand } from '../../utils/detector.js';
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import { resolveContainer } from '../../utils/ecs.js';
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import { runEphemeralEcsTask, buildRunnerCommand, parseRunnerTimeout, guardNpmStrippedRunner, reportRunnerOutcome } from '../../utils/ecs-runner.js';
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@@ -144,15 +146,20 @@ function injectGateBlock(content, { steps, anchor }) {
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// Idempotently injects (or refreshes) the migration gate block into a
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// deploy.yml document. Returns the updated content, or null when neither
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// anchor step is present. Pure and unit-tested.
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-
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// anchor step is present. Pure and unit-tested. The snapshot id embeds
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// the database identifier (BUG-205): bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids match no
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// guardrail or gc name pattern, so they were never protected or retired.
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export function injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd, cliVersion, dbIdentifier } = {}) {
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if (typeof dbIdentifier !== 'string' || dbIdentifier.trim() === '') {
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throw new Error('injectMigrationGate requires dbIdentifier for the snapshot id');
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}
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const taskDefRef = '${{ steps.register-task-def.outputs.task-arn }}';
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const runner = buildRunnerInvocation(cliVersion);
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return injectGateBlock(workflowContent, {
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steps: [
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{
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stepName: 'Take pre-migration database snapshot',
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-
runLine: `${runner} db backup --id "pre-deploy-\${{ github.sha }}" --headless`,
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runLine: `${runner} db backup --id "${dbIdentifier.trim()}-pre-deploy-\${{ github.sha }}" --headless`,
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},
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{
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stepName: 'Pre-Deploy Database Migration',
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@@ -321,7 +328,14 @@ async function runDbMigrateMain(input = {}) {
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resultExtra: { cluster, service, region },
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});
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}
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-
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// BUG-205: the gate always targets production (deploy.yml), so
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// resolve the prod db id even with a preview workspace checked
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// out locally. Aurora needs the cluster prefix: cluster
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// snapshots named with the instance prefix would miss the
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// cluster-snapshot guardrail pattern.
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const setupDbResolver = readTerraformDbKind(cwd) === 'cluster' ? resolveDbClusterIdentifier : resolveDbIdentifier;
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const setupDbIdentifier = setupDbResolver({ projectName, workspace: 'default' }, cwd);
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const updated = injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: resolvedCmd, cliVersion: getCliVersion(), dbIdentifier: setupDbIdentifier });
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if (updated === null) {
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return failCommand({
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message: '\n✖ Could not find the task-definition registration or ECS deployment step in .github/workflows/deploy.yml to anchor the migration gate.\n',
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package/src/commands/gc.js
CHANGED
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@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ async function discoverUnattachedEips({ ec2Client, projectName }) {
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// Standard target discovery: pre-destroy manual snapshots older than
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// the age threshold. Scoped by the exact `<db>-manual-<stamp>` naming
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// pattern destroy writes
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// pattern destroy writes plus the `<db>-pre-deploy-<sha>` pattern the
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// migration gate writes (instance AND cluster snapshots) — foreign,
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// automated, non-available, and young snapshots are never proposed.
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// Tolerant of missing clients/identifiers (programmatic callers without
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// RDS context discover nothing instead of throwing).
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@@ -281,22 +282,37 @@ async function discoverOldManualSnapshots({ rdsClient, dbIdentifier, dbClusterId
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if (!rdsClient || (!dbIdentifier && !dbClusterIdentifier)) return [];
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const maxAgeDays = Number(snapshotMaxAgeDays ?? DEFAULT_SNAPSHOT_MAX_AGE_DAYS);
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const cutoffMs = Date.now() - (Number.isFinite(maxAgeDays) ? maxAgeDays : DEFAULT_SNAPSHOT_MAX_AGE_DAYS) * 86400000;
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-
const
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const dbIds = [dbIdentifier, dbClusterIdentifier]
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.filter((id) => typeof id === 'string' && id.trim())
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-
.map((id) =>
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.map((id) => id.trim().toLowerCase());
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const patterns = dbIds
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.map((id) => new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(id)}-manual-\\d{8}-\\d{6}$`));
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// BUG-205: the gate's pre-deploy snapshots are per-commit, so without
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// a discovery rule they accumulate into the region snapshot quota.
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const predeployPatterns = dbIds
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.map((id) => new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(id)}-pre-deploy-[0-9a-f]{7,40}$`));
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// Legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db scope: retire them
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// only with a matching source-db attribute, never by name alone.
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const legacyPredeployPattern = /^pre-deploy-[0-9a-f]{7,40}$/;
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const knownSourceDbs = new Set(dbIds);
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if (patterns.length === 0) return [];
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-
const isRetirable = (snapshotId, status, type, createTime) => {
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const isRetirable = (snapshotId, status, type, createTime, sourceDb) => {
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if (status !== 'available' || type !== 'manual') return false;
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const createdMs = createTime ? new Date(createTime).getTime() : NaN;
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if (!Number.isFinite(createdMs) || createdMs > cutoffMs) return false;
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-
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const name = String(snapshotId).toLowerCase();
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if (patterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(name))) return true;
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if (predeployPatterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(name))) return true;
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return legacyPredeployPattern.test(name)
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&& typeof sourceDb === 'string'
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&& knownSourceDbs.has(sourceDb.toLowerCase());
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};
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const snapshots = [];
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let marker;
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do {
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const resp = await rdsClient.send(new DescribeDBSnapshotsCommand({ Marker: marker, MaxRecords: 100 }));
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for (const snap of resp.DBSnapshots || []) {
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-
if (isRetirable(snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime)) {
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if (isRetirable(snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime, snap.DBInstanceIdentifier)) {
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snapshots.push({ id: snap.DBSnapshotIdentifier, kind: 'instance', createTime: snap.SnapshotCreateTime });
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}
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}
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@@ -306,7 +322,7 @@ async function discoverOldManualSnapshots({ rdsClient, dbIdentifier, dbClusterId
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do {
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const resp = await rdsClient.send(new DescribeDBClusterSnapshotsCommand({ Marker: marker, MaxRecords: 100 }));
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for (const snap of resp.DBClusterSnapshots || []) {
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309
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-
if (isRetirable(snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime)) {
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if (isRetirable(snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, snap.Status, snap.SnapshotType, snap.SnapshotCreateTime, snap.DBClusterIdentifier)) {
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snapshots.push({ id: snap.DBClusterSnapshotIdentifier, kind: 'cluster', createTime: snap.SnapshotCreateTime });
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}
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}
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package/src/commands/init.js
CHANGED
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import { trackEvent, flushTelemetry, getCliVersion, setActiveCommandName, resetA
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33
33
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import { failCommand } from '../utils/command.js';
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34
34
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import { getFrameworkWarning } from '../utils/warnings.js';
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35
35
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import { provisionStateBucket, formatStateBucketName, isAuthError, printAwsAuthGuidance } from '../utils/aws.js';
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36
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-
import { generateTemplates } from '../utils/generator.js';
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36
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+
import { generateTemplates, resolveDbEngineRefs } from '../utils/generator.js';
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37
37
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import { planExistingFiles, executeBackup, preserveManagedFiles, restoreManagedFiles, refusalResultForPlan, writeInitManifest } from '../utils/backup.js';
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38
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import { checkStateAdoption } from '../utils/state-adoption.js';
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39
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import { atomicWriteFileSync } from '../utils/atomic-write.js';
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@@ -1025,7 +1025,11 @@ async function mainStackMain(input = {}) {
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1025
1025
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if (migrationGateEnabled && migrationCmd) {
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1026
1026
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const deployYmlPath = path.join(dirConfig.targetDir, '.github', 'workflows', 'deploy.yml');
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1027
1027
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const workflowContent = readFileSafe(deployYmlPath);
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1028
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-
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+
// BUG-205: scope the gate's snapshot id to the database (aurora
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1029
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+
// takes the cluster prefix) so guardrails and gc can name it.
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1030
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+
const gateDbRefs = resolveDbEngineRefs(config.dbEngine);
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1031
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+
const gateDbIdentifier = `${dirConfig.actualProjectName}${resourceSuffix}-db${gateDbRefs.isCluster ? '-cluster' : ''}`;
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1032
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+
const gated = workflowContent ? injectMigrationGate(workflowContent, { cmd: migrationCmd, cliVersion: CLI_VERSION, dbIdentifier: gateDbIdentifier }) : null;
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1029
1033
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if (gated) {
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1030
1034
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atomicWriteFileSync(deployYmlPath, gated);
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1031
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console.log(color.green('✅ Wired the pre-deploy database migration gate into .github/workflows/deploy.yml (snapshot first, then migrate)'));
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package/src/utils/resolvers.js
CHANGED
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@@ -45,6 +45,21 @@ export function readTerraformComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd()) {
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45
45
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return detectComputeTargetFromMainTf(readFileSafe(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'main.tf')));
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46
46
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}
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47
47
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48
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+
// Offline database-kind detection for `--setup-ci` (no AWS calls): the
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49
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+
// generator copies exactly one database template, so the aurora file's
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50
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+
// presence means cluster snapshots. Unknown/absent means instance — the
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51
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+
// runtime backup resolves the live kind anyway; the id prefix only
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52
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+
// name-scopes the snapshot for guardrails + gc.
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53
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+
export function readTerraformDbKind(cwd = process.cwd()) {
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54
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+
const base = resolveCwd({}, cwd);
|
|
55
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+
try {
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|
56
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+
if (fsSync.existsSync(path.join(base, 'terraform', 'database-aurora-postgresql.tf'))) return 'cluster';
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|
57
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+
} catch {
|
|
58
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+
// Fall through to the instance default
|
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59
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+
}
|
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60
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+
return 'instance';
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61
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+
}
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62
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+
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48
63
|
// Predicate form of the target check for commands that adapt (rather
|
|
49
64
|
// than refuse) per target: `isComputeTarget(cwd, 'lambda')`.
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50
65
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export function isComputeTarget(cwd = process.cwd(), ...targets) {
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|
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ const RUNBOOKS = {
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|
112
112
|
interactive: 'Wait 5–15 minutes for the distribution to settle, then re-run the same command.',
|
|
113
113
|
},
|
|
114
114
|
BUCKET_NOT_EMPTY: {
|
|
115
|
-
message: 'S3
|
|
115
|
+
message: 'Terraform destroy failed twice: an S3 bucket still holds object versions.',
|
|
116
116
|
headless: 'Re-run destroy — drained buckets usually read empty within a minute; if it persists, empty the bucket by hand in the AWS Console.',
|
|
117
117
|
interactive: 'Re-run destroy — drained buckets usually read empty within a minute; if it persists, empty the bucket by hand in the AWS Console.',
|
|
118
118
|
},
|
package/src/utils/terraform.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -218,9 +218,13 @@ export function runTerraformCommand(args, cwd, spin, loadingPrefix, options = {}
|
|
|
218
218
|
if (timer && typeof timer.unref === 'function') timer.unref();
|
|
219
219
|
}
|
|
220
220
|
|
|
221
|
-
|
|
222
|
-
|
|
223
|
-
|
|
221
|
+
// BUG-213: pipe chunks split lines at arbitrary byte offsets, so
|
|
222
|
+
// each chunk's trailing fragment is carried over and only
|
|
223
|
+
// newline-terminated lines are delivered. Splitting per chunk
|
|
224
|
+
// injects newlines into giant single-line JSON (show -json),
|
|
225
|
+
// which breaks parsing downstream.
|
|
226
|
+
let pendingFragment = '';
|
|
227
|
+
const handleLines = (lines) => {
|
|
224
228
|
if (typeof onStdoutLine === 'function') {
|
|
225
229
|
for (const line of lines) onStdoutLine(line);
|
|
226
230
|
}
|
|
@@ -237,6 +241,21 @@ export function runTerraformCommand(args, cwd, spin, loadingPrefix, options = {}
|
|
|
237
241
|
const latestLine = lines[lines.length - 1].trim();
|
|
238
242
|
emit(`${loadingPrefix} - ${color.dim(truncateSpinnerText(latestLine, { fixedOverhead: lineOverhead }))}`);
|
|
239
243
|
}
|
|
244
|
+
};
|
|
245
|
+
const flushFragment = () => {
|
|
246
|
+
if (pendingFragment.trim() === '') {
|
|
247
|
+
pendingFragment = '';
|
|
248
|
+
return;
|
|
249
|
+
}
|
|
250
|
+
const trailing = pendingFragment;
|
|
251
|
+
pendingFragment = '';
|
|
252
|
+
handleLines([trailing]);
|
|
253
|
+
};
|
|
254
|
+
child.stdout.on('data', (data) => {
|
|
255
|
+
if (isDone) return;
|
|
256
|
+
const parts = (pendingFragment + data.toString()).split('\n');
|
|
257
|
+
pendingFragment = parts.pop() ?? '';
|
|
258
|
+
handleLines(parts.filter(line => line.trim() !== ''));
|
|
240
259
|
});
|
|
241
260
|
|
|
242
261
|
child.stderr.on('data', (data) => {
|
|
@@ -247,6 +266,7 @@ export function runTerraformCommand(args, cwd, spin, loadingPrefix, options = {}
|
|
|
247
266
|
if (isDone) return;
|
|
248
267
|
isDone = true;
|
|
249
268
|
cleanup();
|
|
269
|
+
flushFragment();
|
|
250
270
|
if (code === 0) {
|
|
251
271
|
settleMarker('completed', { exitCode: code });
|
|
252
272
|
resolve();
|
|
@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ WORKDIR /app
|
|
|
34
34
|
RUN addgroup -g 1001 appgroup && \
|
|
35
35
|
adduser -u 1001 -G appgroup -s /bin/sh -D appuser
|
|
36
36
|
|
|
37
|
-
# Runtime libraries only (native wheels arrive inside the venv)
|
|
37
|
+
# Runtime libraries only (native wheels arrive inside the venv), plus a
|
|
38
|
+
# CA bundle: without it no verified TLS egress works (RDS, AWS APIs).
|
|
38
39
|
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && \
|
|
39
|
-
apk add --no-cache libpq
|
|
40
|
+
apk add --no-cache libpq ca-certificates
|
|
40
41
|
|
|
41
42
|
# Strip the base image's system pip (the venv already ships without one)
|
|
42
43
|
RUN /usr/local/bin/python -m pip uninstall -y setuptools wheel pip && \
|
|
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build -o /main .
|
|
|
10
10
|
FROM alpine:3.20@sha256:d9e853e87e55526f6b2917df91a2115c36dd7c696a35be12163d44e6e2a4b6bc
|
|
11
11
|
WORKDIR /app
|
|
12
12
|
|
|
13
|
+
# Ship a CA bundle: without it the static binary cannot verify any TLS
|
|
14
|
+
# egress (RDS, AWS APIs, webhooks).
|
|
15
|
+
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
13
17
|
# Create unprivileged user
|
|
14
18
|
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S appgroup && \
|
|
15
19
|
adduser -S appuser -u 1001 -G appgroup
|
|
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ RUN npm run build
|
|
|
9
9
|
# --- Stage 2: Production ---
|
|
10
10
|
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:fe4f6d74e20370acb04ad889077d14d0f64a9c8ea6a42bc60cddf1e844699914
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
|
-
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch Alpine OS
|
|
13
|
-
|
|
12
|
+
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch Alpine OS, and ship a CA bundle: without it no
|
|
13
|
+
# verified TLS egress works (RDS, AWS APIs, webhooks) from runtimes
|
|
14
|
+
# using the system store.
|
|
15
|
+
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
|
|
14
16
|
|
|
15
17
|
ENV NODE_ENV=production
|
|
16
18
|
WORKDIR /app
|
|
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ WORKDIR /app
|
|
|
24
24
|
# FIX 2: Upgrade Alpine packages and absolutely destroy npm, yarn, and corepack
|
|
25
25
|
# to eliminate all remaining Critical/High container vulnerabilities.
|
|
26
26
|
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
|
|
27
|
+
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates && \
|
|
27
28
|
rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm \
|
|
28
29
|
/usr/local/bin/npm \
|
|
29
30
|
/usr/local/bin/npx \
|
|
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ RUN npm ci --omit=dev && npm cache clean --force && mkdir -p node_modules
|
|
|
9
9
|
# --- Stage 2: Production runner (no package managers) ---
|
|
10
10
|
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:fe4f6d74e20370acb04ad889077d14d0f64a9c8ea6a42bc60cddf1e844699914 AS runner
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
|
-
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch underlying Alpine OS vulnerabilities
|
|
13
|
-
|
|
12
|
+
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch underlying Alpine OS vulnerabilities, and ship a
|
|
13
|
+
# CA bundle: without it no verified TLS egress works (RDS, AWS APIs,
|
|
14
|
+
# webhooks) from runtimes using the system store.
|
|
15
|
+
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
|
|
14
16
|
|
|
15
17
|
# 2. Set production environment (optimizes Node and prevents dev dependencies)
|
|
16
18
|
ENV NODE_ENV=production
|
|
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ ENV NITRO_HOST="0.0.0.0"
|
|
|
26
26
|
# 1. Upgrade Alpine OS packages to clear OpenSSL/crypto CVEs
|
|
27
27
|
# 2. Vaporize Node package managers (npm, yarn, corepack) to clear ghost CVEs
|
|
28
28
|
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && \
|
|
29
|
+
apk add --no-cache ca-certificates && \
|
|
29
30
|
rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules \
|
|
30
31
|
/usr/local/bin/npm \
|
|
31
32
|
/usr/local/bin/npx \
|
|
@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ WORKDIR /app
|
|
|
34
34
|
RUN addgroup -S appgroup && \
|
|
35
35
|
adduser -S appuser -G appgroup -D -s /bin/sh
|
|
36
36
|
|
|
37
|
-
# Runtime libraries only (native wheels arrive inside the venv)
|
|
37
|
+
# Runtime libraries only (native wheels arrive inside the venv), plus a
|
|
38
|
+
# CA bundle: without it no verified TLS egress works (RDS, AWS APIs).
|
|
38
39
|
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && \
|
|
39
|
-
apk add --no-cache libpq
|
|
40
|
+
apk add --no-cache libpq ca-certificates
|
|
40
41
|
|
|
41
42
|
# Strip the base image's system pip (the venv already ships without one)
|
|
42
43
|
RUN /usr/local/bin/python -m pip uninstall -y setuptools wheel pip && \
|
|
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ ENV RAILS_ENV=production \
|
|
|
33
33
|
# Upgrade Alpine OS to patch system CVEs and install runtime libs
|
|
34
34
|
# Explicitly patch Ruby's default gems and remove their legacy gemspecs so Trivy ignores them
|
|
35
35
|
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && \
|
|
36
|
-
apk add --no-cache postgresql-libs tzdata && \
|
|
36
|
+
apk add --no-cache postgresql-libs tzdata ca-certificates && \
|
|
37
37
|
apk add --no-cache --virtual .build-deps build-base zlib-dev && \
|
|
38
38
|
gem install erb net-imap resolv rexml uri zlib && \
|
|
39
39
|
rm -f /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/*/specifications/default/erb-*.gemspec \
|
|
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ RUN GRADA_BYPASS=true npm run build
|
|
|
26
26
|
# ==========================================
|
|
27
27
|
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:fe4f6d74e20370acb04ad889077d14d0f64a9c8ea6a42bc60cddf1e844699914
|
|
28
28
|
|
|
29
|
-
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch underlying Alpine OS vulnerabilities
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
29
|
+
# 1. DevSecOps: Patch underlying Alpine OS vulnerabilities, and ship a
|
|
30
|
+
# CA bundle: without it no verified TLS egress works (RDS, AWS APIs,
|
|
31
|
+
# webhooks) from runtimes using the system store.
|
|
32
|
+
RUN apk update && apk upgrade --no-cache && apk add --no-cache ca-certificates
|
|
31
33
|
|
|
32
34
|
# 2. Set production environment
|
|
33
35
|
ENV NODE_ENV=production
|
|
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
|
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
14
|
# --- IAM Role assumed by EventBridge Scheduler ---
|
|
15
15
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "scheduler_cron_role" {
|
|
16
|
-
name
|
|
16
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-cron-scheduler-role"
|
|
17
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
17
18
|
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
|
|
18
19
|
Version = "2012-10-17"
|
|
19
20
|
Statement = [
|
|
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
|
|
|
7
7
|
|
|
8
8
|
# --- IAM Role assumed by EventBridge Scheduler ---
|
|
9
9
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "scheduler_cron_role" {
|
|
10
|
-
name
|
|
10
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-cron-scheduler-role"
|
|
11
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
11
12
|
assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
|
|
12
13
|
Version = "2012-10-17"
|
|
13
14
|
Statement = [
|
|
@@ -85,8 +85,9 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "ecs_trust" {
|
|
|
85
85
|
}
|
|
86
86
|
|
|
87
87
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "execution_role" {
|
|
88
|
-
name
|
|
89
|
-
assume_role_policy
|
|
88
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-execution-role"
|
|
89
|
+
assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ecs_trust.json
|
|
90
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
90
91
|
}
|
|
91
92
|
|
|
92
93
|
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "execution_role_policy" {
|
|
@@ -109,8 +110,9 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "lambda_task_trust" {
|
|
|
109
110
|
}
|
|
110
111
|
|
|
111
112
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "task_role" {
|
|
112
|
-
name
|
|
113
|
-
assume_role_policy
|
|
113
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-task-role"
|
|
114
|
+
assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.lambda_task_trust.json
|
|
115
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
114
116
|
}
|
|
115
117
|
|
|
116
118
|
# VPC ENI management plus CloudWatch Logs delivery (this single managed
|
|
@@ -94,8 +94,9 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "ecs_trust" {
|
|
|
94
94
|
}
|
|
95
95
|
|
|
96
96
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "execution_role" {
|
|
97
|
-
name
|
|
98
|
-
assume_role_policy
|
|
97
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-execution-role"
|
|
98
|
+
assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ecs_trust.json
|
|
99
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
99
100
|
}
|
|
100
101
|
|
|
101
102
|
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "execution_role_policy" {
|
|
@@ -106,8 +107,9 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "execution_role_policy" {
|
|
|
106
107
|
# --- IAM: Task Role ---
|
|
107
108
|
# Allows your application code running INSIDE the container to access AWS services
|
|
108
109
|
resource "aws_iam_role" "task_role" {
|
|
109
|
-
name
|
|
110
|
-
assume_role_policy
|
|
110
|
+
name = "${local.app_name}-task-role"
|
|
111
|
+
assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ecs_trust.json
|
|
112
|
+
permissions_boundary = local.preview_boundary_arn
|
|
111
113
|
}
|
|
112
114
|
|
|
113
115
|
# --- IAM: ECS Exec (SSM) permissions for the task role ---
|
|
@@ -36,6 +36,81 @@ locals {
|
|
|
36
36
|
# (not local.app_name): app_name carries the workspace suffix in preview
|
|
37
37
|
# workspaces, while these denies must always name production.
|
|
38
38
|
prod_prefix = "{{PROJECT_NAME}}{{RESOURCE_SUFFIX}}"
|
|
39
|
+
# Boundary ARN resolving in every workspace: created in default, read
|
|
40
|
+
# everywhere else (mirrors the secrets-vault pattern). Consumed by the
|
|
41
|
+
# task/execution/cron roles, which static trees lack.
|
|
42
|
+
# tflint-ignore: terraform_unused_declarations
|
|
43
|
+
preview_boundary_arn = terraform.workspace == "default" ? aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn : data.aws_iam_policy.preview_boundary[0].arn
|
|
44
|
+
# Shared twin resource lists: every Deny*/BoundaryDeny* pair consumes
|
|
45
|
+
# one list, so a one-sided resource edit is impossible. New pairs add
|
|
46
|
+
# their list here and reference it from both sides.
|
|
47
|
+
guardrail_compute_abuse_resources = ["*"]
|
|
48
|
+
guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources = ["*"]
|
|
49
|
+
guardrail_state_destruction_resources = [
|
|
50
|
+
"arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
|
|
51
|
+
"arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
|
|
52
|
+
]
|
|
53
|
+
guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources = [
|
|
54
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
|
|
55
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
|
|
56
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
|
|
57
|
+
]
|
|
58
|
+
guardrail_image_deletion_resources = [
|
|
59
|
+
"arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
|
|
60
|
+
]
|
|
61
|
+
guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources = [
|
|
62
|
+
"arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
|
|
63
|
+
]
|
|
64
|
+
guardrail_queue_destruction_resources = [
|
|
65
|
+
"arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
|
|
66
|
+
"arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
|
|
67
|
+
]
|
|
68
|
+
guardrail_database_destruction_resources = [
|
|
69
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
|
|
70
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
|
|
71
|
+
]
|
|
72
|
+
guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources = [
|
|
73
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
|
|
74
|
+
]
|
|
75
|
+
guardrail_table_deletion_resources = [
|
|
76
|
+
"arn:aws:dynamodb:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:table/${local.prod_prefix}-table",
|
|
77
|
+
]
|
|
78
|
+
guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources = [
|
|
79
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
|
|
80
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
|
|
81
|
+
# BUG-205: legacy bare pre-deploy-<sha> ids carry no db prefix, so
|
|
82
|
+
# they match no prod pattern above — deny them outright. gc never
|
|
83
|
+
# runs under preview credentials, so nothing legitimate needs them.
|
|
84
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
|
|
85
|
+
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:pre-deploy-*",
|
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86
|
+
]
|
|
87
|
+
guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources = [
|
|
88
|
+
"arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
|
|
89
|
+
]
|
|
90
|
+
guardrail_log_deletion_resources = [
|
|
91
|
+
"arn:aws:logs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:log-group:/ecs/${local.prod_prefix}",
|
|
92
|
+
]
|
|
93
|
+
guardrail_task_execution_resources = [
|
|
94
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
|
|
95
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
|
|
96
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
|
|
97
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/*",
|
|
98
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
|
|
99
|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
|
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+
]
|
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|
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guardrail_task_definition_resources = [
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"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-task:*",
|
|
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|
+
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:task-definition/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-task:*",
|
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|
+
]
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+
# String-built (not HCL refs): static trees define no IAM roles, so
|
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+
# refs would dangle and fail validate. ECS and Lambda use identical
|
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|
+
# physical role names, so one pattern covers both and matches
|
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|
+
# nothing on static.
|
|
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|
+
guardrail_app_role_resources = [
|
|
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|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-task-role",
|
|
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|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-execution-role",
|
|
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|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role",
|
|
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|
+
]
|
|
39
114
|
}
|
|
40
115
|
|
|
41
116
|
# Deploy role FIRST: readTerraformOidcTrust anchors on this block so re-init
|
|
@@ -170,7 +245,7 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
|
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170
245
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Sid = "DenyComputeAbuse"
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Effect = "Deny"
|
|
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247
|
Action = ["ec2:RunInstances"]
|
|
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|
-
Resource =
|
|
248
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_compute_abuse_resources
|
|
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249
|
},
|
|
175
250
|
{
|
|
176
251
|
Sid = "DenyIAMBackdoors"
|
|
@@ -198,111 +273,347 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "preview_guardrails" {
|
|
|
198
273
|
Sid = "DenySnapshotSharing"
|
|
199
274
|
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
200
275
|
Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
|
|
201
|
-
Resource =
|
|
276
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
|
|
202
277
|
},
|
|
203
278
|
{
|
|
204
|
-
Sid
|
|
205
|
-
Effect
|
|
206
|
-
Action
|
|
207
|
-
Resource =
|
|
208
|
-
"arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}",
|
|
209
|
-
"arn:aws:s3:::{{STATE_BUCKET}}/*",
|
|
210
|
-
]
|
|
279
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdStateDestruction"
|
|
280
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
281
|
+
Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
|
|
282
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
|
|
211
283
|
},
|
|
212
284
|
{
|
|
213
|
-
Sid
|
|
214
|
-
Effect
|
|
215
|
-
Action
|
|
216
|
-
Resource =
|
|
217
|
-
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster",
|
|
218
|
-
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-service",
|
|
219
|
-
"arn:aws:ecs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:service/${local.prod_prefix}-cluster/${local.prod_prefix}-worker-service",
|
|
220
|
-
]
|
|
285
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdECSShutdown"
|
|
286
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
287
|
+
Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
|
|
288
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
|
|
221
289
|
},
|
|
222
290
|
{
|
|
223
|
-
Sid
|
|
224
|
-
Effect
|
|
225
|
-
Action
|
|
226
|
-
Resource =
|
|
227
|
-
"arn:aws:ecr:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:repository/${local.prod_prefix}-repo",
|
|
228
|
-
]
|
|
291
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdImageDeletion"
|
|
292
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
293
|
+
Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
|
|
294
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_image_deletion_resources
|
|
229
295
|
},
|
|
230
296
|
{
|
|
231
|
-
Sid
|
|
232
|
-
Effect
|
|
233
|
-
Action
|
|
234
|
-
Resource =
|
|
235
|
-
"arn:aws:lambda:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:function:${local.prod_prefix}-fn",
|
|
236
|
-
]
|
|
297
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdLambdaRewrite"
|
|
298
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
299
|
+
Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
|
|
300
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources
|
|
237
301
|
},
|
|
238
302
|
{
|
|
239
|
-
Sid
|
|
240
|
-
Effect
|
|
241
|
-
Action
|
|
242
|
-
Resource =
|
|
243
|
-
"arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-queue",
|
|
244
|
-
"arn:aws:sqs:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:${local.prod_prefix}-dlq",
|
|
245
|
-
]
|
|
303
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdQueueDestruction"
|
|
304
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
305
|
+
Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
|
|
306
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_queue_destruction_resources
|
|
246
307
|
},
|
|
247
308
|
{
|
|
248
|
-
Sid
|
|
249
|
-
Effect
|
|
250
|
-
Action
|
|
251
|
-
Resource =
|
|
252
|
-
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db",
|
|
253
|
-
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:db:${local.prod_prefix}-db-instance-1",
|
|
254
|
-
]
|
|
309
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdDatabaseDestruction"
|
|
310
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
311
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
|
|
312
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_database_destruction_resources
|
|
255
313
|
},
|
|
256
314
|
{
|
|
257
|
-
Sid
|
|
258
|
-
Effect
|
|
259
|
-
Action
|
|
260
|
-
Resource =
|
|
261
|
-
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster",
|
|
262
|
-
]
|
|
315
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdAuroraDestruction"
|
|
316
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
317
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
|
|
318
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
|
|
263
319
|
},
|
|
264
320
|
{
|
|
265
|
-
Sid
|
|
266
|
-
Effect
|
|
267
|
-
Action
|
|
268
|
-
Resource =
|
|
269
|
-
"arn:aws:dynamodb:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:table/${local.prod_prefix}-table",
|
|
270
|
-
]
|
|
321
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdTableDeletion"
|
|
322
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
323
|
+
Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
|
|
324
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
|
|
271
325
|
},
|
|
272
326
|
{
|
|
273
327
|
# BUG-208: manual snapshots (grada names them
|
|
274
|
-
# <db-identifier>-manual-<stamp>
|
|
328
|
+
# <db-identifier>-manual-<stamp> and
|
|
329
|
+
# <db-identifier>-pre-deploy-<sha>) are directly deletable;
|
|
275
330
|
# automated snapshots can only go away via retention changes or
|
|
276
331
|
# instance deletion, both already denied above.
|
|
277
|
-
Sid
|
|
278
|
-
Effect
|
|
279
|
-
Action
|
|
280
|
-
Resource =
|
|
281
|
-
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-*",
|
|
282
|
-
"arn:aws:rds:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:cluster-snapshot:${local.prod_prefix}-db-cluster-*",
|
|
283
|
-
]
|
|
332
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdSnapshotDeletion"
|
|
333
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
334
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
|
|
335
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
|
|
284
336
|
},
|
|
285
337
|
{
|
|
286
338
|
# The vault ARN carries a random suffix and static trees have no
|
|
287
339
|
# vault at all (no secrets.tf), so match the tight name prefix —
|
|
288
340
|
# on static it simply matches nothing.
|
|
289
|
-
Sid
|
|
290
|
-
Effect
|
|
291
|
-
Action
|
|
292
|
-
Resource =
|
|
293
|
-
"arn:aws:secretsmanager:${data.aws_region.current.name}:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:secret:${local.prod_prefix}-secrets-*",
|
|
294
|
-
]
|
|
341
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdSecretsDeletion"
|
|
342
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
343
|
+
Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
|
|
344
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources
|
|
295
345
|
},
|
|
296
346
|
{
|
|
297
347
|
# Web and worker containers share one log group; deleting it
|
|
298
348
|
# wipes the audit trail for both.
|
|
299
|
-
Sid
|
|
349
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdLogDeletion"
|
|
350
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
351
|
+
Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
|
|
352
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
|
|
353
|
+
},
|
|
354
|
+
{
|
|
355
|
+
# BUG-212: every role preview credentials create must carry the
|
|
356
|
+
# boundary — a missing key fails StringNotEquals, so unbounded
|
|
357
|
+
# creation is denied and born-capped roles cannot escalate.
|
|
358
|
+
Sid = "DenyRoleWithoutBoundary"
|
|
359
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
360
|
+
Action = ["iam:CreateRole"]
|
|
361
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
362
|
+
Condition = {
|
|
363
|
+
StringNotEquals = {
|
|
364
|
+
"iam:PermissionsBoundary" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:policy/${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary"
|
|
365
|
+
}
|
|
366
|
+
}
|
|
367
|
+
},
|
|
368
|
+
{
|
|
369
|
+
# The boundary cannot be swapped or removed after creation:
|
|
370
|
+
# legitimate Terraform never touches it (stable ARN, and
|
|
371
|
+
# deleting a role needs no boundary call).
|
|
372
|
+
Sid = "DenyBoundarySwap"
|
|
373
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
374
|
+
Action = ["iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary", "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary"]
|
|
375
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
376
|
+
},
|
|
377
|
+
{
|
|
378
|
+
# The boundary policy itself cannot be neutered (preview
|
|
379
|
+
# Terraform never manages it: this file is
|
|
380
|
+
# default-workspace-only).
|
|
381
|
+
Sid = "DenyBoundaryMutation"
|
|
300
382
|
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
301
|
-
Action = ["
|
|
383
|
+
Action = ["iam:*"]
|
|
302
384
|
Resource = [
|
|
303
|
-
"arn:aws:
|
|
385
|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:policy/${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary",
|
|
304
386
|
]
|
|
305
387
|
},
|
|
388
|
+
{
|
|
389
|
+
# BUG-215: close by target — deny the execution APIs on exact
|
|
390
|
+
# prod ARNs while pr-* stays allowed. No describes: plan.yml
|
|
391
|
+
# refreshes prod state with preview credentials, so describing
|
|
392
|
+
# prod is legitimate traffic.
|
|
393
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdTaskExecution"
|
|
394
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
395
|
+
Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
|
|
396
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
|
|
397
|
+
},
|
|
398
|
+
{
|
|
399
|
+
# RegisterTaskDefinition is likely resource-*-only (void half);
|
|
400
|
+
# the cluster-scoped RunTask deny above is the real choke.
|
|
401
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdTaskDefinitionRegistration"
|
|
402
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
403
|
+
Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
|
|
404
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_task_definition_resources
|
|
405
|
+
},
|
|
406
|
+
{
|
|
407
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdPassRole"
|
|
408
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
409
|
+
Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
410
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
|
|
411
|
+
},
|
|
412
|
+
{
|
|
413
|
+
# Trust writes close the assume-it-directly bypass (re-trusting
|
|
414
|
+
# the prod task role would defeat every execution deny);
|
|
415
|
+
# DeleteRole guards the roles themselves. UpdateRole and
|
|
416
|
+
# tagging stay allowed (cosmetic — description, session
|
|
417
|
+
# duration within AWS bounds, tags).
|
|
418
|
+
Sid = "DenyProdAppRoleMutation"
|
|
419
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
420
|
+
Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
|
|
421
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
|
|
422
|
+
},
|
|
306
423
|
]
|
|
307
424
|
})
|
|
308
425
|
}
|
|
426
|
+
|
|
427
|
+
# BUG-212: permissions boundary capping every role preview credentials
|
|
428
|
+
# can create. The guardrail above denies CreateRole unless the request
|
|
429
|
+
# carries this boundary, so a backdoor role is born capped: its
|
|
430
|
+
# effective permissions are its own policies intersected with this one.
|
|
431
|
+
# Deny-list shape (default-allow) on purpose: a missing entry weakens
|
|
432
|
+
# security instead of breaking prod tasks. Twin pairs share their
|
|
433
|
+
# resource lists via the locals above, so one-sided edits fail loudly.
|
|
434
|
+
resource "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
|
|
435
|
+
count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 1 : 0
|
|
436
|
+
name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary"
|
|
437
|
+
description = "Permissions boundary capping roles created by preview CI runs"
|
|
438
|
+
|
|
439
|
+
policy = jsonencode({
|
|
440
|
+
Version = "2012-10-17"
|
|
441
|
+
Statement = [
|
|
442
|
+
{
|
|
443
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryBaseAllow"
|
|
444
|
+
Effect = "Allow"
|
|
445
|
+
Action = "*"
|
|
446
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
447
|
+
},
|
|
448
|
+
{
|
|
449
|
+
# BUG-214: capped roles must pass their task roles to ECS (the
|
|
450
|
+
# scheduler role passes at invocation time), so PassRole is
|
|
451
|
+
# carved out here and re-gated on service + target below.
|
|
452
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyIAM"
|
|
453
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
454
|
+
NotAction = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
455
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
456
|
+
},
|
|
457
|
+
{
|
|
458
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuditBilling"
|
|
459
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
460
|
+
Action = ["cloudtrail:*", "organizations:*", "aws-portal:*", "billing:*"]
|
|
461
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
462
|
+
},
|
|
463
|
+
{
|
|
464
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyComputeAbuse"
|
|
465
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
466
|
+
Action = ["ec2:RunInstances"]
|
|
467
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_compute_abuse_resources
|
|
468
|
+
},
|
|
469
|
+
{
|
|
470
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotSharing"
|
|
471
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
472
|
+
Action = ["rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute"]
|
|
473
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_sharing_resources
|
|
474
|
+
},
|
|
475
|
+
{
|
|
476
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyStateDestruction"
|
|
477
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
478
|
+
Action = ["s3:DeleteBucket", "s3:DeleteObjectVersion"]
|
|
479
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_state_destruction_resources
|
|
480
|
+
},
|
|
481
|
+
{
|
|
482
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyECSShutdown"
|
|
483
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
484
|
+
Action = ["ecs:UpdateService", "ecs:DeleteService", "ecs:DeleteCluster"]
|
|
485
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_ecs_shutdown_resources
|
|
486
|
+
},
|
|
487
|
+
{
|
|
488
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyImageDeletion"
|
|
489
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
490
|
+
Action = ["ecr:BatchDeleteImage"]
|
|
491
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_image_deletion_resources
|
|
492
|
+
},
|
|
493
|
+
{
|
|
494
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyLambdaRewrite"
|
|
495
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
496
|
+
Action = ["lambda:UpdateFunctionCode", "lambda:DeleteFunction"]
|
|
497
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_lambda_rewrite_resources
|
|
498
|
+
},
|
|
499
|
+
{
|
|
500
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyQueueDestruction"
|
|
501
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
502
|
+
Action = ["sqs:PurgeQueue", "sqs:DeleteQueue"]
|
|
503
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_queue_destruction_resources
|
|
504
|
+
},
|
|
505
|
+
{
|
|
506
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyDatabaseDestruction"
|
|
507
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
508
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBInstance", "rds:ModifyDBInstance"]
|
|
509
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_database_destruction_resources
|
|
510
|
+
},
|
|
511
|
+
{
|
|
512
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyAuroraDestruction"
|
|
513
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
514
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBCluster", "rds:ModifyDBCluster"]
|
|
515
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_aurora_destruction_resources
|
|
516
|
+
},
|
|
517
|
+
{
|
|
518
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyTableDeletion"
|
|
519
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
520
|
+
Action = ["dynamodb:DeleteTable"]
|
|
521
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_table_deletion_resources
|
|
522
|
+
},
|
|
523
|
+
{
|
|
524
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenySnapshotDeletion"
|
|
525
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
526
|
+
Action = ["rds:DeleteDBSnapshot", "rds:DeleteDBClusterSnapshot"]
|
|
527
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_snapshot_deletion_resources
|
|
528
|
+
},
|
|
529
|
+
{
|
|
530
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenySecretsDeletion"
|
|
531
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
532
|
+
Action = ["secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"]
|
|
533
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_secrets_deletion_resources
|
|
534
|
+
},
|
|
535
|
+
{
|
|
536
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyLogDeletion"
|
|
537
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
538
|
+
Action = ["logs:DeleteLogGroup"]
|
|
539
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_log_deletion_resources
|
|
540
|
+
},
|
|
541
|
+
{
|
|
542
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskExecution"
|
|
543
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
544
|
+
Action = ["ecs:RunTask", "ecs:StopTask", "ecs:ExecuteCommand", "ecs:CreateService"]
|
|
545
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_task_execution_resources
|
|
546
|
+
},
|
|
547
|
+
{
|
|
548
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyTaskDefinitionRegistration"
|
|
549
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
550
|
+
Action = ["ecs:RegisterTaskDefinition", "ecs:DeregisterTaskDefinition"]
|
|
551
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_task_definition_resources
|
|
552
|
+
},
|
|
553
|
+
{
|
|
554
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRole"
|
|
555
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
556
|
+
Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
557
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
|
|
558
|
+
},
|
|
559
|
+
{
|
|
560
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyAppRoleMutation"
|
|
561
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
562
|
+
Action = ["iam:AttachRolePolicy", "iam:DetachRolePolicy", "iam:PutRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRolePolicy", "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", "iam:DeleteRole"]
|
|
563
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
|
|
564
|
+
},
|
|
565
|
+
{
|
|
566
|
+
# BUG-214: carved PassRole may only pass to the ECS tasks
|
|
567
|
+
# service (mirrors the scheduler policy's own condition).
|
|
568
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffService"
|
|
569
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
570
|
+
Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
571
|
+
Resource = "*"
|
|
572
|
+
Condition = {
|
|
573
|
+
StringNotEquals = {
|
|
574
|
+
"iam:PassedToService" = "ecs-tasks.amazonaws.com"
|
|
575
|
+
}
|
|
576
|
+
}
|
|
577
|
+
},
|
|
578
|
+
{
|
|
579
|
+
# ... and only task roles: preview patterns plus the prod pair
|
|
580
|
+
# (shared local, so renames flow). Preview app names put the
|
|
581
|
+
# workspace between the project and the collision suffix
|
|
582
|
+
# (<project>-pr-<n>-<suffix>), so the preview patterns key off
|
|
583
|
+
# {{PROJECT_NAME}}, not prod_prefix. Prod roles stay
|
|
584
|
+
# scheduler-only via the statement below.
|
|
585
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyPassRoleOffTarget"
|
|
586
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
587
|
+
Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
588
|
+
NotResource = concat([
|
|
589
|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/{{PROJECT_NAME}}-pr-*-task-role",
|
|
590
|
+
"arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/{{PROJECT_NAME}}-pr-*-execution-role",
|
|
591
|
+
], local.guardrail_app_role_resources)
|
|
592
|
+
},
|
|
593
|
+
{
|
|
594
|
+
# Prod task roles pass only by the prod scheduler role, which
|
|
595
|
+
# passes them at invocation time (its own policy allows only
|
|
596
|
+
# those two roles, so the boundary stays a backstop). Every
|
|
597
|
+
# other capped caller stays denied, and the scheduler itself
|
|
598
|
+
# cannot pass anything outside the four roles above.
|
|
599
|
+
Sid = "BoundaryDenyProdPassRoleOffScheduler"
|
|
600
|
+
Effect = "Deny"
|
|
601
|
+
Action = ["iam:PassRole"]
|
|
602
|
+
Resource = local.guardrail_app_role_resources
|
|
603
|
+
Condition = {
|
|
604
|
+
StringNotEquals = {
|
|
605
|
+
"aws:PrincipalArn" = "arn:aws:iam::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:role/${local.prod_prefix}-cron-scheduler-role"
|
|
606
|
+
}
|
|
607
|
+
}
|
|
608
|
+
},
|
|
609
|
+
]
|
|
610
|
+
})
|
|
611
|
+
}
|
|
612
|
+
|
|
613
|
+
# Preview workspaces create pr-suffixed roles through the same templates,
|
|
614
|
+
# so they read the default workspace's boundary instead of creating one
|
|
615
|
+
# (IAM names are account-global).
|
|
616
|
+
data "aws_iam_policy" "preview_boundary" {
|
|
617
|
+
count = terraform.workspace == "default" ? 0 : 1
|
|
618
|
+
name = "${local.prod_prefix}-preview-boundary"
|
|
619
|
+
}
|