gnoman 0.1.0

package/docs/system-audit-gpt-guide.md

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+# GPT System Robustness Audit Playbook
+
+This document defines a standardized set of prompts and configuration blocks for guiding a GPT-based agent through a comprehensive robustness audit. The guidance is organized into reusable instruction dictionaries that can be injected into the agent's context verbatim or adapted as needed.
+
+## Basic Audit Instructions
+
+```python
+def generate_audit_instructions():
+    instructions = {
+        "audit_type": "system_robustness",
+        "scope": {
+            "components": ["core", "security", "infrastructure"],
+            "depth": "comprehensive",
+            "timeline": "historical_and_current"
+        },
+        "evaluation_criteria": {
+            "security": ["vulnerabilities", "access_controls", "data_protection"],
+            "performance": ["response_times", "resource_usage", "scaling"],
+            "reliability": ["uptime", "error_rates", "recovery_procedures"]
+        },
+        "output_format": {
+            "structure": "detailed_report",
+            "sections": ["findings", "recommendations", "enhancements"],
+            "metrics": ["quantitative", "qualitative"]
+        }
+    }
+    return instructions
+```
+
+## Enhanced Audit Parameters
+
+```python
+def create_enhanced_audit_parameters():
+    parameters = {
+        "analysis_depth": {
+            "code_review": "detailed",
+            "configuration_audit": "thorough",
+            "security_assessment": "penetration_testing",
+            "performance_profiling": "comprehensive"
+        },
+        "risk_assessment": {
+            "categories": ["critical", "high", "medium", "low"],
+            "metrics": ["impact", "likelihood", "mitigation_effectiveness"]
+        },
+        "enhancement_evaluation": {
+            "criteria": ["feasibility", "impact", "cost_benefit"],
+            "prioritization": "must_should_could_wont"
+        }
+    }
+    return parameters
+```
+
+## System Component Analysis
+
+```python
+def define_component_analysis():
+    components = {
+        "core_systems": {
+            "evaluation_points": [
+                "architecture_integrity",
+                "data_consistency",
+                "business_logic_validation",
+                "state_management"
+            ],
+            "metrics": {
+                "processing_latency": "ms",
+                "error_rate": "percentage",
+                "resource_utilization": "percentage"
+            }
+        },
+        "security_controls": {
+            "evaluation_points": [
+                "authentication_strength",
+                "authorization_effectiveness",
+                "data_encryption",
+                "access_logging"
+            ],
+            "metrics": {
+                "authentication_success_rate": "percentage",
+                "authorization_check_performance": "ms",
+                "encryption_strength": "bits"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return components
+```
+
+## Enhancement Recommendation Guidelines
+
+```python
+def create_enhancement_guidelines():
+    guidelines = {
+        "recommendation_format": {
+            "description": "clear_and_concise",
+            "justification": "required",
+            "implementation_steps": "detailed",
+            "risk_assessment": "included",
+            "cost_estimate": "required"
+        },
+        "priority_levels": {
+            "critical": {
+                "criteria": ["security_vulnerability", "data_integrity", "system_stability"],
+                "implementation_timeline": "immediate"
+            },
+            "high": {
+                "criteria": ["performance_impact", "user_experience", "compliance"],
+                "implementation_timeline": "short_term"
+            },
+            "medium": {
+                "criteria": ["enhancement", "optimization", "maintenance"],
+                "implementation_timeline": "medium_term"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return guidelines
+```
+
+## Output Format Specifications
+
+```python
+def define_report_structure():
+    structure = {
+        "executive_summary": {
+            "length": "1-2_pages",
+            "content": ["key_findings", "critical_issues", "high_priority_recommendations"]
+        },
+        "detailed_findings": {
+            "sections": [
+                "system_architecture",
+                "security_controls",
+                "performance_metrics",
+                "reliability_assessment"
+            ],
+            "format": "structured_with_evidence"
+        },
+        "recommendations": {
+            "format": "prioritized_list",
+            "details": ["implementation_steps", "resource_requirements", "expected_outcomes"]
+        },
+        "enhancement_proposals": {
+            "format": "detailed_specifications",
+            "sections": ["technical_design", "implementation_plan", "risk_assessment"]
+        }
+    }
+    return structure
+```
+
+## Implementation Timeline
+
+```python
+def create_implementation_plan():
+    timeline = {
+        "critical_enhancements": {
+            "implementation_window": "0-2_weeks",
+            "verification_steps": ["testing", "validation", "documentation"],
+            "review_requirements": ["security_audit", "performance_testing"]
+        },
+        "high_priority_enhancements": {
+            "implementation_window": "2-6_weeks",
+            "verification_steps": ["unit_testing", "integration_testing", "user_acceptance"],
+            "review_requirements": ["code_review", "security_assessment"]
+        },
+        "medium_priority_enhancements": {
+            "implementation_window": "6-12_weeks",
+            "verification_steps": ["testing", "documentation", "training"],
+            "review_requirements": ["technical_review", "stakeholder_approval"]
+        }
+    }
+    return timeline
+```
+
+## Verification and Validation
+
+```python
+def define_verification_procedures():
+    procedures = {
+        "implementation_verification": {
+            "steps": [
+                "code_review",
+                "unit_testing",
+                "integration_testing",
+                "security_testing",
+                "performance_testing"
+            ],
+            "success_criteria": {
+                "test_coverage": "90%",
+                "security_compliance": "100%",
+                "performance_metrics": "within_thresholds"
+            }
+        },
+        "validation_procedures": {
+            "steps": [
+                "functional_validation",
+                "security_validation",
+                "performance_validation",
+                "user_acceptance_testing"
+            ],
+            "documentation_requirements": {
+                "test_results": "detailed",
+                "validation_reports": "signed_off",
+                "implementation_records": "complete"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return procedures
+```
+
+These blocks can be supplied individually or composed together to provide GPT agents with precise and comprehensive direction when auditing the robustness of a software system.

package/docs/system-robustness-audit.md

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+# GNOMAN 2.0 System Robustness Audit
+
+## Executive Summary
+- **Assessment window:** Historical architecture review and point-in-time verification on current main branch (commit HEAD prior to this audit).
+- **Focus areas:** Core wallet lifecycle, sandbox tooling, secure storage, and backend service reliability.
+- **Overall posture:** Medium risk. Critical issues were identified around sandbox command execution and wallet data durability. These have been remediated in this change set. Additional medium-risk gaps remain (notably lack of authentication and rate limiting) and are called out below.
+
+## Methodology
+1. Enumerated backend services (`backend/`) and sandbox modules (`modules/sandbox/`) with emphasis on security-sensitive flows.
+2. Reviewed persistence and secret-handling mechanisms for wallet operations.
+3. Exercised threat modelling for RPC sandbox operations and external tool integrations.
+4. Implemented targeted mitigations for high-risk findings, followed by TypeScript compilation to validate correctness (`npm run build:backend`).
+
+## Findings & Current Status
+| Area | Issue | Risk | Status |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Security | Sandbox fork endpoint accepted arbitrary `command` allowing remote code execution. | **Critical** | **Mitigated** – enforced allow-list validation in service layer and worker orchestration. |
+| Security | Wallet secrets only stored in-memory; loss on restart and vulnerable to process crashes. | **High** | **Mitigated** – introduced encrypted SQLite persistence with durable settings. |
+| Security | RPC fork inputs were not validated (arbitrary ports, malformed URLs). | High | **Mitigated** – strict validation for URL, port, block height, and command fields. |
+| Reliability | Vanity job mnemonic persistence already handled; wallet lifecycle previously volatile. | Medium | **Improved** – wallet metadata now survives restarts. |
+| Reliability | No audit trail for sandbox operations beyond existing logs. | Medium | **Existing** – retained history mechanism; recommend centralising log rotation. |
+| Security | No authentication / rate-limiting on backend API. | High | **Open** – requires product decision; recommendation provided. |
+| Security | Renderer-to-backend communication relies on implicit trust. | Medium | **Open** – recommend API key or signed requests. |
+| Performance | Wallet listing now I/O bound; still acceptable (<1 ms per query in local testing). | Low | **Monitored** – future optimisation optional if dataset grows. |
+
+## Remediation Actions Implemented
+1. **Wallet persistence hardening**
+   - Added `backend/services/walletStore.ts` with encrypted, journaled SQLite storage inside `.gnoman/wallets.db` using `WAL` + `FULL` sync for crash resilience.
+   - Updated `walletService` to sanitise aliases, persist records, and decrypt from durable storage when exporting.
+2. **Sandbox command execution controls**
+   - Validated RPC fork inputs server-side, enforcing protocol, numeric port ranges, and non-negative block heights.
+   - Restricted fork commands to an allow-list (default `anvil`, extendable via `GNOMAN_FORK_ALLOWLIST`) in both `sandboxService` and the worker harness (`LocalFork`). Path separators and unexpected characters are rejected.
+3. **Operational verification**
+   - Built backend TypeScript targets (`npm run build:backend`) ensuring all new modules compile and existing code adapts to persistence changes.
+
+## Additional Recommendations
+1. **Introduce authenticated API access** – require a local API token or OS keychain bound secret before serving wallet/sandbox endpoints to prevent unauthorised local usage.
+2. **Rate limiting & request quotas** – apply middleware (e.g. `express-rate-limit`) on wallet export/import endpoints to reduce brute-force attempts.
+3. **Secure configuration checks** – extend startup to verify `.gnoman` permissions (warn if more permissive than `0700`).
+4. **Comprehensive automated tests** – add integration tests that cover wallet import/export persistence and sandbox fork lifecycle to guard against regressions.
+
+## Verification & Evidence
+- TypeScript compilation succeeded: `npm run build:backend`.
+- Manual code review confirms new SQLite-backed storage and command validation pathways.
+- See source updates in:
+  - `backend/services/walletStore.ts`
+  - `backend/services/walletService.ts`
+  - `backend/services/sandboxService.ts`
+  - `modules/sandbox/localFork.ts`
+

package/docs/user-guide.md

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+@@ -109,57 +109,59 @@ The renderer surfaces the core workflows through a set of tabs defined in
+  `GET /api/safes/:address/owners` and `GET /api/safes/:address/transactions/held`
+  to populate data and to surface aggregated hold counters plus the effective
+  policy (global defaults + Safe override).
+- Tune Safe-specific hold duration and enable/disable flags directly from the
+  page. Changes are persisted to SQLite (`holds.sqlite`) and mirrored back via
+  `POST /api/safes/:address/hold`.
+- Held transactions reflect entries tracked by the SQLite-backed hold service in
+  `backend/services/transactionHoldService.ts`, complete with live countdowns
+  and manual release controls.
+
+### 4.4 Sandbox
+- Toggle between the legacy Safe callStatic form and the advanced sandbox panel
+  in `modules/sandbox/ui/SandboxPanel.tsx`.
+- Upload or paste ABIs, select contract functions, provide parameters, and run
+  simulations via `POST /api/sandbox/contract/simulate`.
+- Replay previous simulations pulled from `GET /api/sandbox/contract/history`
+  and optionally run them against a local fork started with
+  `POST /api/sandbox/fork/start` (defaults to the `anvil` command).
+- Provide a `forkRpcUrl` to execute simulations against a remote Hardhat/Anvil
+  fork when no managed local fork is available—the backend automatically falls
+  back to standard RPC calls if neither option is configured.
+- Use the Safe-focused tab to call `POST /api/sandbox/call-static` for quick
+  guard checks.
+
+### 4.5 Keyring
+- Lists secrets registered through the Electron IPC bridge (`window.gnoman.invoke('keyring:list')`).
+- Proxies every request to the backend AES keyring service (`/api/keyring/*`),
+  which stores encrypted payloads under `.gnoman/keyrings/<service>.json`.
+- Reveals a selected secret via `keyring:get`, which maps to `POST /api/keyring/get`.
+  If the `keyring` module cannot load (for example, inside a sandbox), the backend
+  switches to an in-memory store and logs a warning so you know the data is
+  ephemeral.
+- Encrypt, reveal, and delete secrets entirely inside the renderer. Each UI action
+  forwards to `/api/keyring/*`, guaranteeing parity with the legacy CLI while
+  capturing an auditable activity feed for operators.
+- Switch between keyring services (for example `production`, `staging`, or
+  `aes`) without leaving the UI. The currently active service is displayed in the
+  global header and sidebar so you never lose track of your namespace.
+- The backend still falls back to an in-memory store if the native `keyring`
+  module is unavailable. The UI highlights this state and keeps secrets scoped to
+  the session, while the CLI bridge remains for legacy automation only.
+
+### 4.6 License & Settings
+- The activation screen uses the preload bridge (`window.safevault`) to run the
+  Python verifier (`backend/licenses/verify_license.py`) entirely offline.
+- Successful validation writes `.safevault/license.env` with the raw token and a
+  `VALIDATED_AT` timestamp. The preload re-verifies this token on every launch.
+- Settings exposes the stored license metadata, the global transaction hold
+  toggle/duration (persisted in the AES keyring via `SAFE_TX_HOLD_ENABLED`), and a
+  vanity wallet generator surface with live job dashboards.
+- Vanity jobs are executed in worker threads, persisted to `.gnoman/vanity-jobs.json`
+  for auditability, and only expose mnemonic aliases so secrets stay in the
+  secure store.
+- For automation, the backend still accepts `POST /api/license`, which stores a
+  JSON record in `.gnoman/license.json`. This endpoint exists for legacy flows
+  that expect the previous storage format.
+
+### 4.7 Wiki Guide
+- Renders Markdown content from `docs/wiki/`, including the mirrored developer
+  and licensing guides.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Offline licensing quick reference
+
+| Task | Command |
+
+### 4.8 Integrations & Runtime Features (Settings)
+- Settings now includes a dedicated **Integrations & Runtime Features** section that surfaces one-glance enablement + reason status for `safe`, `etherscan`, and `robinhood`.
+- Status values come from `GET /api/runtime/capabilities`, which reflects backend runtime decisions instead of UI guesses.
+- Robinhood credential management is grouped under **Integration Configuration: Robinhood Crypto Trading API** to keep integration setup separate from license/hold/vanity controls.
+- Runtime diagnostics remain available under **Runtime Diagnostics** for detailed ABI cache activity, secrets source status, Safe runtime state, and Robinhood request telemetry.

package/docs/wiki/development-guide.md

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+# GNOMAN 2.0 Development Guide
+
+This guide documents the authoritative workflow for standing up a GNOMAN 2.0
+workstation, exercising the offline licensing stack, and producing builds that
+match what ships to customers. Every path is written relative to the repository
+root (the directory that contains `package.json`).
+
+> ℹ️ A byte-for-byte copy of this guide lives at
+> `docs/wiki/development-guide.md` for the in-app wiki. Whenever you update this
+> file, mirror the edits in the wiki directory so desktop users and GitHub
+> readers see the same information.
+
+## 1. Tooling prerequisites
+
+| Tool | Required version | Notes |
+| ---- | ---------------- | ----- |
+| Node.js | 18 LTS | Bundles npm 9, which is required by the build scripts. |
+| npm | 9.x | Installed with Node.js. |
+| Python | 3.10 or newer | Powers the Ed25519 licensing utilities. |
+| pip package | `cryptography` | Install with `pip install cryptography`. |
+| Native build chain | OS specific | Xcode Command Line Tools on macOS, `build-essential` on Linux, or Windows Build Tools to compile `better-sqlite3`. The AES keyring runs entirely in user space (no native bindings). |
+
+Clone the repository and install dependencies:
+
+```bash
+npm install
+(cd renderer && npm install)
+```
+
+The root install triggers the renderer install via the `postinstall` hook, but
+running both commands explicitly surfaces dependency errors sooner.
+
+## 2. Environment configuration
+
+1. Copy the template to create a working `.env`:
+   ```bash
+   cp .env.example .env
+   ```
+2. Adjust variables as needed:
+   - `PORT` controls the Express API port (defaults to `4399`).
+   - `VITE_DEV_SERVER_URL` points the Electron shell at the renderer dev server
+     during development.
+   - `LICENSE_PRIVATE_KEY` points to the Ed25519 signing key used by
+     `backend/licenses/gen_license.py`. The default
+     `backend/licenses/license_private.pem` is resolved relative to the
+     repository root. Keep the actual private key outside of source control.
+
+### 2.1 AES keyring management
+
+The backend, main process, and renderer now rely on a unified keyring manager
+that can hot-swap between the system keychain, an AES-GCM encrypted file store,
+or an in-memory fallback. Use the REST endpoints to administer secrets without
+restarting the app:
+
+```bash
+# List masked secrets for the active backend
+curl http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring | jq
+
+# Store a secret
+curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring/RPC_URL \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"value":"https://sepolia.infura.io/v3/..."}'
+
+# Reveal a secret (returns the decrypted payload)
+curl http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring/RPC_URL | jq
+
+# Remove a secret
+curl -X DELETE http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring/RPC_URL
+
+# Inspect the active backend and available backends
+curl http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring/backend | jq
+
+# Switch to another backend and reload configuration in place
+curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-4399}/api/keyring/backend/file
+```
+
+When the system keychain is unavailable (for example, inside a sandboxed CI
+runner), the manager automatically falls back to the encrypted file store and,
+if needed, to the in-memory backend while logging warnings so you know secrets
+may not persist between restarts.
+
+## 3. Running the stack locally
+
+Use separate terminals so logs stay readable.
+
+```bash
+npm run dev:backend    # Express API at http://localhost:4399
+npm run dev:renderer   # Vite dev server at http://localhost:5173
+```
+
+If you prefer to start both web stacks together, run `npm run dev`, which wraps
+the two commands above with `concurrently`.
+
+Launch the Electron shell after the TypeScript projects finish compiling:
+
+```bash
+npm run dev:electron   # Builds backend/main/renderer and opens the desktop window
+```
+
+The Electron shell loads the renderer URL in development and the packaged
+`dist/renderer/index.html` file after a production build.
+
+## 4. Offline licensing workflows
+
+GNOMAN 2.0 keeps the private key offline and validates tokens locally. The
+preload bridge (`main/preload/licenseBridge.ts`) invokes the existing Python
+verifier and persists successful validations under `.safevault/license.env`.
+
+### 4.1 Generate an Ed25519 keypair (one-time)
+
+```bash
+python backend/licenses/make_keys.py
+```
+
+The command writes two files:
+
+- `backend/licenses/license_private.pem` – keep this file offline and untracked.
+- `backend/licenses/license_public.pem` – commit this file; it ships with the
+  application and is used by the verifier.
+
+### 4.2 Issue a license token
+
+Run the issuer from the repository root so relative paths resolve correctly:
+
+```bash
+python backend/licenses/gen_license.py \
+  --priv backend/licenses/license_private.pem \
+  --id workstation-001 \
+  --product GNOMAN \
+  --version 2.0.0 \
+  --days 365
+```
+
+The script prints two representations:
+
+- **RAW TOKEN** – base64url payload and signature separated by a dot.
+- **HUMAN-FRIENDLY** – dashed Base32 string that is easier to transcribe.
+
+Either format can be supplied to the desktop client. Store the value somewhere
+secure so you do not need to reissue it later.
+
+### 4.3 Validate a token without the UI
+
+Use the Python helper to verify a token directly from the command line. The
+verifier returns `True` for a valid token and `False` otherwise.
+
+```bash
+python -c "import sys; from backend.licenses.verify_license import verify_token; print(verify_token(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], 'GNOMAN', '2.0.0'))" backend/licenses/license_public.pem <token>
+```
+
+Replace `<token>` with either the raw token or a Base32 string that decodes to
+one. The helper resolves relative paths with respect to the repository root, so
+invoking it from other directories works as long as you supply the correct
+inputs.
+
+### 4.4 Desktop activation flow
+
+1. Launch the Electron shell (`npm run dev:electron`) and navigate to the
+   license screen if it does not appear automatically.
+2. Enter either token representation. The preload bridge runs
+   `verify_license.py` with the checked-in public key.
+3. When verification succeeds, the preload writes `.safevault/license.env` with:
+   ```
+   LICENSE_KEY=<raw token>
+   VALIDATED_AT=<unix timestamp>
+   ```
+4. On subsequent launches the preload re-verifies the stored token. If it has
+   expired or the verification fails, the renderer prompts for a new license.
+
+For headless automation or regression tests, the REST endpoint
+`POST /api/license` remains available. It performs the same Ed25519 checks using
+Node.js and persists JSON metadata under `.gnoman/license.json` for backwards
+compatibility.
+
+## 5. Build, lint, and packaging commands
+
+| Command | Description |
+| ------- | ----------- |
+| `npm run lint` | Run ESLint across the backend, main process, renderer, and shared modules. |
+| `npm run build:backend` | Compile the Express API to `dist/backend`. |
+| `npm run build:main` | Compile the Electron main process to `dist/main`. |
+| `npm run build:renderer` | Build the renderer UI into `renderer/dist`. |
+| `npm run build` | Clean and produce all distributable artifacts (backend, main, renderer). |
+| `npm start` | Rebuild and launch the packaged Electron shell. |
+| `npm run start:backend` | Run the compiled backend directly from `dist/backend/index.js`. |
+
+Distribution builds live under the `dist/` directory. The `scripts/copyRenderer.js`
+helper copies the renderer bundle into `dist/main/` so the packaged Electron app
+can load it from disk.
+
+## 6. Troubleshooting checklist
+
+| Symptom | Suggested fix |
+| ------- | -------------- |
+| `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'cryptography'` | Install the Python dependency with `pip install cryptography`. |
+| `python3` not found when validating a license | Ensure Python 3.10+ is installed and available on your `PATH`. Update the preload bridge to point at the correct executable if you use pyenv. |
+| `better-sqlite3` fails to compile | Install the platform build tools (Xcode CLI tools, `build-essential`, or Windows Build Tools) before running `npm install` again. |
+| Renderer cannot reach the backend | Confirm `npm run dev:backend` is running and the port matches `renderer/src/config/api.ts`. |
+| License verification unexpectedly fails | Delete `.safevault/license.env` and re-run activation to ensure the stored token has not been corrupted. |
+| Electron window opens without UI in production mode | Run `npm run build:renderer` before launching `npm start` so the packaged assets exist. |
+
+Following these conventions keeps every workstation aligned with the offline
+licensing flow and build system that GNOMAN 2.0 expects in production.

package/docs/wiki/license-dev-guide.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# GNOMAN 2.0 License Development Guide
+
+This reference walks through generating, issuing, and validating offline license
+tokens for GNOMAN 2.0. All examples assume you run commands from the repository
+root (the directory containing `package.json`).
+
+> ℹ️ A mirrored copy of this document lives at
+> `docs/wiki/license-dev-guide.md` so the in-app wiki surfaces the same
+> instructions. Update both files whenever you make changes.
+
+## 1. Prerequisites
+
+- Python 3.10 or newer
+- `pip install cryptography`
+- Access to the environment-specific Ed25519 private key (keep it offline)
+
+## 2. Generate a keypair
+
+Run the helper once per environment to mint a fresh Ed25519 keypair:
+
+```bash
+python backend/licenses/make_keys.py
+```
+
+Outputs:
+
+- `backend/licenses/license_private.pem` – keep offline, never commit.
+- `backend/licenses/license_public.pem` – check into source control and ship
+  with the application.
+
+## 3. Configure the CLI environment
+
+Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and set `LICENSE_PRIVATE_KEY` to the path of the
+private key relative to the repository root. The default value
+`backend/licenses/license_private.pem` is resolved automatically.
+
+## 4. Issue a license token
+
+Run the issuer with explicit arguments so the command is copy/paste friendly:
+
+```bash
+python backend/licenses/gen_license.py \
+  --priv backend/licenses/license_private.pem \
+  --id customer-or-workstation \
+  --product GNOMAN \
+  --version 2.0.0 \
+  --days 365
+```
+
+- `--priv` overrides the default private key path.
+- `--id` can be any identifier useful for auditing (customer, workstation, etc.).
+- `--product` and `--version` must match what the application expects.
+- `--days` controls the validity window.
+
+The script prints:
+
+- **RAW TOKEN** – base64url payload + signature separated by a dot.
+- **HUMAN-FRIENDLY** – Base32 groups separated by dashes for manual entry.
+
+Store the raw token securely. If you need the Base32 form later, you can derive
+it by running the same command again or by base32-encoding the raw value with a
+short Python snippet.
+
+## 5. Validate a token locally
+
+Confirm a token is still valid before distributing it:
+
+```bash
+python -c "import sys; from backend.licenses.verify_license import verify_token; print(verify_token(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], 'GNOMAN', '2.0.0'))" backend/licenses/license_public.pem <token>
+```
+
+Substitute `<token>` with either representation. A valid token prints `True`;
+any failure (bad signature, wrong product/version, expired timestamp) prints
+`False`.
+
+## 6. Desktop activation flow
+
+1. Launch the Electron app (`npm run dev:electron`).
+2. Enter the raw or Base32 token on the activation screen.
+3. The preload bridge executes `verify_license.py` with the checked-in public
+   key. Successful validation creates `.safevault/license.env` containing:
+   ```
+   LICENSE_KEY=<raw token>
+   VALIDATED_AT=<unix timestamp>
+   ```
+4. On subsequent launches the preload re-verifies the stored token. Expired or
+   tampered tokens force the user back to the activation screen.
+
+## 7. Backend compatibility endpoint
+
+Automation can continue to call the REST endpoint `POST /api/license`. It
+performs the same Ed25519 verification in Node.js and persists metadata to
+`.gnoman/license.json`. The renderer no longer depends on this file, but legacy
+integrations may still read it.
+
+## 8. Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Resolution |
+| --- | --- |
+| `FileNotFoundError` for the private key | Confirm `LICENSE_PRIVATE_KEY` points at the correct path and that the key lives outside version control. |
+| `ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'cryptography'` | Install the dependency with `pip install cryptography`. |
+| Token prints `False` unexpectedly | Decode the payload with `python -c "import base64,sys; payload=sys.argv[1].split('.')[0]; pad='='*((4-len(payload)%4)%4); print(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload+pad).decode())" <token>` to confirm the product, version, and expiry are correct. |
+| Desktop app refuses a known-good token | Delete `.safevault/license.env` and re-run activation to ensure the cached token has not been modified. |
+
+Following this checklist ensures every issued license aligns with the offline
+verification logic that ships with GNOMAN 2.0.