git-watchtower 1.14.16 → 1.14.18

package/bin/git-watchtower.js

@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ const { parseDiffStats, stash: gitStash, stashPop: gitStashPop } = require('../s
 
 // Server process command parsing and static server utilities
 const { parseCommand } = require('../src/server/process');
-const { getMimeType, injectLiveReload } = require('../src/server/static');
+const { getMimeType, injectLiveReload, resolveStaticPath } = require('../src/server/static');
 
 // State (non-store globals)
 let previousBranchStates = new Map(); // branch name -> commit hash
@@ -2225,52 +2225,67 @@ function createStaticServer() {
   }
 
   pathname = path.normalize(pathname).replace(/^(\.\.[\/\\])+/, '');
-  let filePath = path.join(STATIC_DIR, pathname);
+  const candidate = path.join(STATIC_DIR, pathname);
 
-  // Security: ensure resolved path stays within STATIC_DIR to prevent path traversal.
-  // Use realpath to follow symlinks — without this, a symlink inside STATIC_DIR
-  // pointing outside would bypass the startsWith check.
-  const resolvedStaticDir = path.resolve(STATIC_DIR);
-  let resolvedPath = path.resolve(filePath);
-  try {
-    resolvedPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
-  } catch {
-    // File doesn't exist — path.resolve is sufficient since there's no symlink to follow.
-  }
+  // Realpath the static root once per request. A failure here means the
+  // install is broken (missing dir, bad permissions) — fall back to the
+  // resolved-but-not-realpath'd form so the request still gets a 403
+  // from resolveStaticPath rather than crashing.
   let realStaticDir;
   try {
-    realStaticDir = fs.realpathSync(resolvedStaticDir);
+    realStaticDir = fs.realpathSync(path.resolve(STATIC_DIR));
   } catch (e) {
-    // STATIC_DIR comes from our own package layout, so a realpath failure
-    // means the install is broken (missing dir, permissions, etc.) — worth
-    // diagnosing. Fall back to the unresolved path so the request still
-    // gets its 403 rather than crashing.
     telemetry.captureError(e);
-    realStaticDir = resolvedStaticDir;
+    realStaticDir = path.resolve(STATIC_DIR);
   }
-  if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(realStaticDir + path.sep) && resolvedPath !== realStaticDir) {
+
+  const send403 = () => {
     res.writeHead(403, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
     res.end('<h1>403 Forbidden</h1>');
     addServerLog(`GET ${logPath} → 403 (path traversal blocked)`, true);
-    return;
-  }
+  };
 
-  if (fs.existsSync(filePath) && fs.statSync(filePath).isDirectory()) {
-    filePath = path.join(filePath, 'index.html');
-  }
+  const send404 = () => {
+    res.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
+    res.end('<h1>404 Not Found</h1>');
+    addServerLog(`GET ${logPath} → 404`, true);
+  };
 
-  if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
-    if (fs.existsSync(filePath + '.html')) {
-      filePath = filePath + '.html';
+  // All downstream reads go through `finalPath` — the realpath-resolved
+  // target from resolveStaticPath(). Using the pre-realpath candidate
+  // opens a TOCTOU window where a symlink inside STATIC_DIR could be
+  // swapped between the containment check and the fs.readFile to point
+  // outside the root.
+  let finalPath = null;
+
+  const initial = resolveStaticPath(candidate, realStaticDir);
+  if (initial.status === 'forbidden') { send403(); return; }
+  if (initial.status === 'ok') {
+    // Directory requests resolve the index.html *inside the realpath'd*
+    // directory. Without this second realpath+check, a symlinked dir
+    // whose target pointed outside would serve its attacker-controlled
+    // index.html through our root check.
+    if (fs.statSync(initial.path).isDirectory()) {
+      const indexResult = resolveStaticPath(
+        path.join(initial.path, 'index.html'),
+        realStaticDir,
+      );
+      if (indexResult.status === 'forbidden') { send403(); return; }
+      if (indexResult.status === 'ok') finalPath = indexResult.path;
+      // 'missing' → fall through to 404 (no .html fallback for dirs)
     } else {
-      res.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
-      res.end('<h1>404 Not Found</h1>');
-      addServerLog(`GET ${logPath} → 404`, true);
-      return;
+      finalPath = initial.path;
     }
+  } else {
+    // 'missing' — try the `foo` → `foo.html` convenience fallback.
+    const htmlFallback = resolveStaticPath(candidate + '.html', realStaticDir);
+    if (htmlFallback.status === 'forbidden') { send403(); return; }
+    if (htmlFallback.status === 'ok') finalPath = htmlFallback.path;
   }
 
-  serveFile(res, filePath, logPath);
+  if (!finalPath) { send404(); return; }
+
+  serveFile(res, finalPath, logPath);
   });
 }
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "git-watchtower",
-  "version": "1.14.16",
+  "version": "1.14.18",
   "description": "Terminal-based Git branch monitor with activity sparklines and optional dev server with live reload",
   "main": "bin/git-watchtower.js",
   "bin": {

package/src/git/commands.js

@@ -15,6 +15,43 @@ const FETCH_TIMEOUT = 60000;
 // Short timeout for quick local operations (5 seconds)
 const SHORT_TIMEOUT = 5000;
 
+/**
+ * Environment overrides applied to every git child process.
+ *
+ * LANG=C / LC_ALL=C force git into the C locale so parseable summary
+ * lines — e.g. "X files changed, Y insertions(+), Z deletions(-)" —
+ * don't get localized into the user's language. Without this,
+ * parseDiffStats() returns (0, 0) on systems with a non-English LANG
+ * and certain git builds, silently zeroing sparklines and hiding
+ * activity from the user.
+ *
+ * GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 prevents git from blocking on a credential
+ * prompt when auth is needed — we never run interactively, so a prompt
+ * would just hang until the timeout fires.
+ *
+ * Spread `...process.env` first so callers can still override these
+ * per-call if needed, and so the child inherits everything else
+ * (critically PATH so `git` resolves on Windows).
+ */
+const GIT_ENV_OVERRIDES = {
+  LANG: 'C',
+  LC_ALL: 'C',
+  GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0',
+};
+
+/**
+ * Build the child-process env for a git call.
+ *
+ * Exported for tests. Accepts a base env (defaults to process.env) so
+ * tests can pin behaviour without relying on the runner's shell.
+ *
+ * @param {NodeJS.ProcessEnv} [base] - Base env; defaults to process.env.
+ * @returns {NodeJS.ProcessEnv}
+ */
+function buildGitEnv(base) {
+  return { ...(base || process.env), ...GIT_ENV_OVERRIDES };
+}
+
 /**
  * Execute a git command safely using execFile (no shell).
  * @param {string[]} args - Git arguments as an array (e.g. ['log', '--oneline'])
@@ -37,6 +74,7 @@ async function execGit(args, options = {}) {
     const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
       execFile('git', args, {
         cwd,
+        env: buildGitEnv(),
         maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB buffer for large outputs
         timeout,          // kill child process after timeout ms
         killSignal: 'SIGTERM',
@@ -482,6 +520,8 @@ module.exports = {
   deleteLocalBranch,
   getAheadBehind,
   getDiffShortstat,
+  buildGitEnv,
+  GIT_ENV_OVERRIDES,
   DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
   FETCH_TIMEOUT,
 };

package/src/server/static.js

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
  * @module server/static
  */
 
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
 /**
  * MIME type mapping by file extension.
  */
@@ -63,9 +66,61 @@ function injectLiveReload(html) {
   return html;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Resolve a static-server request candidate to a safe, realpath'd path
+ * inside the static root.
+ *
+ * The critical property: the returned `path` is the realpath-resolved
+ * target, so all downstream file reads operate on the same bytes the
+ * containment check approved. Previously the server would realpath the
+ * candidate for the 403 check but then read the pre-realpath path — a
+ * TOCTOU window where a symlink inside the static dir could be swapped
+ * between check and read to point outside the root.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ * - 'ok'        → the candidate exists inside `realStaticDir`; serve `path`.
+ * - 'missing'   → the candidate resolves (or would resolve) inside the
+ *                 root but doesn't exist. Callers can try an extension
+ *                 fallback (e.g. `.html`) or return 404.
+ * - 'forbidden' → the candidate resolves outside the root, via symlink
+ *                 or via path traversal like `../../etc/passwd`. Return
+ *                 403; do not attempt fallbacks, since the attacker
+ *                 controls the request.
+ *
+ * @param {string} candidate - Unresolved absolute path (e.g.
+ *   `path.join(STATIC_DIR, pathname)`).
+ * @param {string} realStaticDir - The realpath'd absolute path of the
+ *   static root. Callers should cache this per-request.
+ * @returns {{ status: 'ok', path: string } | { status: 'missing' } | { status: 'forbidden' }}
+ */
+function resolveStaticPath(candidate, realStaticDir) {
+  const resolvedCandidate = path.resolve(candidate);
+  let realPath;
+  let exists;
+  try {
+    realPath = fs.realpathSync(resolvedCandidate);
+    exists = true;
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Doesn't exist. Fall back to the normalized form so path-traversal
+    // attempts against non-existent files (`../../etc/passwd`) still get
+    // rejected with 403 instead of silently 404'ing.
+    realPath = resolvedCandidate;
+    exists = false;
+  }
+
+  if (realPath !== realStaticDir && !realPath.startsWith(realStaticDir + path.sep)) {
+    return { status: 'forbidden' };
+  }
+  if (!exists) {
+    return { status: 'missing' };
+  }
+  return { status: 'ok', path: realPath };
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   MIME_TYPES,
   getMimeType,
   LIVE_RELOAD_SCRIPT,
   injectLiveReload,
+  resolveStaticPath,
 };