geneseed 4.7.0 → 4.9.0

package/adapters/opencode/plugins/geneseed-guard.js

@@ -6,14 +6,15 @@
 //     added content carries a credential-shaped string (`.env`-shaped targets exempt).
 //   - External Gate:  block writes to a check listed in `.geneseed/protected-checks.txt`,
 //     and to the done gate's own list `.geneseed/done-checks.txt`.
-//   - Deletion Is Deliberate:  block catastrophic shell commands.
+//   - Deletion Is Deliberate:  block catastrophic shell commands, and every command that would
+//     really lose data, judged against the repository's state (`lossReason`, below).
 //   - Commands Must Return:  block a recursive scan rooted at a whole filesystem (find /).
 //   - Persist Insight (rule vs memory):  speed-bump the first write to user-rules.md
 //     memory file — that choice belongs to the user, via the rule skill.
 //   - Wiki (AGENT.md §8):  block mutations under a declared wiki's `protected`
 //     folders — the user's knowledge base sets its own no-go zones in geneseed-wiki.jsonc.
 // High-confidence patterns only, so legitimate work is never caught. Borderline cases
-// (.env edits, force-push) are WARNED, not blocked. Every block is recorded in the gate
+// (.env edits) are WARNED, not blocked. Every block is recorded in the gate
 // ledger (`<cfg>/notebook/gates.jsonl`) under the hook's rule key (`law-1`, `rigor-5`,
 // `law-4`, `ops-2`, `process-1`, `wiki`); every skill or subagent call, blocked or not, is
 // counted in `<cfg>/notebook/usage.jsonl` when that `notebook/` exists and `.usage-off` does not.
@@ -47,7 +48,8 @@
 // upgrade path there is still a session-level `permission` ruleset set by the loop launcher
 // when it creates the loop session (`session.create` accepts one).
 
-import { promises as fs, realpathSync, existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"
+import { promises as fs, realpathSync, existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync, lstatSync } from "node:fs"
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"
 import * as path from "node:path"
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"
 import { homedir } from "node:os"
@@ -122,6 +124,29 @@ const MODE = (process.env.GENESEED_GUARD || "on").toLowerCase()
 const OFF = ["off", "0", "false", "no"].includes(MODE)
 const WARN_ONLY = MODE === "warn"
 
+// The gate switches (`--no-deletion-gate` 2026-10-17, `--no-secrets-gate` 2026-10-18, user
+// decisions). The build writes `Deletion gate: off` / `Secrets gate: off` into the install's
+// AGENT.md only when that gate is off; this reads the carrier ONCE at load, from the same
+// harness dir the context plugin resolves ($GENESEED_HARNESS, else <plugin dir>/.. for a global
+// install, else <plugin dir>/../.. for a project one), so flipping a switch takes an OpenCode
+// restart. Anything unreadable or unexpected reads as ARMED. Each stands down only its own check
+// below (the real-loss check; the Sealed Secrets path block and content scan) — catastrophic
+// commands, root scans and protected checks still block.
+function carrierText() {
+  try {
+    const dirs = [path.resolve(PLUGIN_DIR, ".."), path.resolve(PLUGIN_DIR, "..", "..")]
+    if (process.env.GENESEED_HARNESS) dirs.unshift(process.env.GENESEED_HARNESS)
+    for (const d of dirs) {
+      try { return readFileSync(path.join(d, "AGENT.md"), "utf8") } catch { continue }
+    }
+  } catch { /* fall through: armed */ }
+  return ""
+}
+const CARRIER_TEXT = carrierText()
+const gateOff = (marker) => new RegExp(`^${marker}:[ \\t]*off[ \\t]*\\r?$`, "m").test(CARRIER_TEXT)
+const DELETION_GATE_OFF = gateOff("Deletion gate")
+const SECRETS_GATE_OFF = gateOff("Secrets gate")
+
 function log(msg) { console.error(`[geneseed-guard] ${msg}`) }
 
 // ---- the gate ledger ------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -179,8 +204,8 @@ const SECRET_WARN_RE = [/(^|\/)\.env(\.[\w.-]+)?$/i]
 // credential-shaped string, not the target path (SECRET_RE above is the path twin, file names
 // only). High-precision vendor prefixes only, same rationale as the Node side: a generic
 // "looks like entropy" scan fires on every hash and lockfile. Kept byte-identical by the parity
-// test in tests/plugins/guard.test.mjs — simple enough to literally diff, unlike SHELL_WARN_RE's
-// hand-mirrored git acts. `.env*` is exempt (SECRET_WARN_RE above already names it as where a
+// test in tests/plugins/guard.test.mjs — simple enough to literally diff, like the loss twin
+// block below. `.env*` is exempt (SECRET_WARN_RE above already names it as where a
 // secret may legitimately live) via the same path check used for the WARN tier.
 const SECRET_CONTENT_RE =
   /\b(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{30,}|sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|xox[abprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,})\b|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/
@@ -201,36 +226,537 @@ const SHELL_BLOCK_RE = [
   /\bremove-item\b[^\n]*-recurse\b[^\n]*-force\b/i,                  // PowerShell rm -rf
   /\bremove-item\b[^\n]*-force\b[^\n]*-recurse\b/i,                  // (either flag order)
 ]
-// History-rewriting / irreversible git ops (Deletion Is Deliberate) → WARN, never BLOCK:
-// `tool.execute.before` has no ask tier, so these are a speed bump rather than a wall. The
-// same acts js/hosts/hooks.mjs's `DESTRUCTIVE_GIT_RE` asks about — mirrored by hand rather
-// than shared, since this plugin is copied whole into an OpenCode install, outside this
-// repo's module graph. `clean`
-// and `--delete` need `--force` alongside them to count, EITHER order (`--force --delete` is
-// the same act as `--delete --force`) — an un-forced `clean`/`branch --delete` already refuses
-// or only removes what is reproducible. `-D --force`/`--delete -f`/`-d --force`/`-df` are the
-// same act again and are a known ceiling this does not chase. `git switch -h` lists `-f,
-// --force` and `--discard-changes` as two SEPARATE options, not one flag's long/short spelling,
-// so both are listed. `restore` and `stash drop`/`clear` are anchored to the VERB position
-// (`\bgit\s+restore\b`, not `\bgit\s+.*restore\b`) — every other row needs a flag that is
-// vanishingly unlikely in a commit message or filename, but `restore` needs none and
-// `drop`/`clear` are ordinary English, so a message like "restore working behavior" or "clear
-// old state" must never warn. `restore` matches UNLESS `--staged` appears on the line, EXCEPT
-// `--staged --worktree` together, which restores the working tree too and so discards exactly
-// like plain `restore` (see the twin rationale and tests in js/hosts/hooks.mjs).
-const SHELL_WARN_RE = [
-  /\bgit\s+push\b[^\n]*(--force\b|-f\b|\+\S|\s--delete\b|\s:\S)/,   // forced, mirror, or delete push
-  /\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/,
-  /\bgit\s+clean\b[^\n]*\s(-[a-zA-Z]*f|--force\b)/,
-  /\bgit\s+branch\b[^\n]*\s(-D\b|--delete\b[^\n]*--force\b|--force\b[^\n]*--delete\b)/,
-  /\bgit\s+checkout\s+--\s/,
-  /\bgit\s+checkout\b[^\n]*\s(-[a-zA-Z]*f\b|--force\b)/,
-  /\bgit\s+switch\b[^\n]*\s(-[a-zA-Z]*f\b|--force\b|--discard-changes\b)/,
-  /\bgit\s+restore\b(?:(?![^\n]*--staged\b)|(?=[^\n]*--staged\b)(?=[^\n]*--worktree\b))/,
-  /\bgit\s+stash\s+(drop|clear)\b/,
-  /\bgit\s+reflog\b[^\n]*\bexpire\b/,
-  /\bgit\s+gc\b[^\n]*--prune\b/,
-]
+// Deletion Is Deliberate, calibrated to REAL loss — the twin of js/hosts/loss.mjs (the plugin is
+// copied whole into an OpenCode install, so it cannot import it). The static `permission.bash`
+// globs (js/hosts/settings.mjs `LAW_IV_BASH`) keep only what loses data in EVERY state
+// (`reflog expire`, `gc --prune`); a glob cannot read a work tree, so everything that depends
+// on state is decided here. `tool.execute.before` has no ask tier, so a real loss is BLOCKED —
+// the Bob behaviour — and `GENESEED_GUARD=warn` downgrades it to a log line.
+//
+// The fs-only readers below are the twins of js/hosts/gitref.mjs (gitRootOf, gitDirOf,
+// gitCommonDirOf, currentBranch, protectedBranches, stashExists); the block between the twin
+// markers is js/hosts/loss.mjs verbatim, and tests/plugins/guard.test.mjs diffs it.
+function gitRootOf(cwd) {
+  try {
+    let dir = path.resolve(cwd)
+    for (;;) {
+      if (existsSync(path.join(dir, ".git"))) return dir
+      const up = path.dirname(dir)
+      if (up === dir) return null
+      dir = up
+    }
+  } catch { return null }
+}
+function gitDirOf(root) {
+  const dotgit = path.join(root, ".git")
+  if (statSync(dotgit).isFile()) {
+    const m = /^gitdir:\s*(.+?)\s*$/m.exec(readFileSync(dotgit, "utf8"))
+    if (!m) throw new Error(`${dotgit} does not name a gitdir`)
+    return path.resolve(root, m[1])
+  }
+  return dotgit
+}
+function gitCommonDirOf(root) {
+  const gitdir = gitDirOf(root)
+  try { return path.resolve(gitdir, readFileSync(path.join(gitdir, "commondir"), "utf8").trim()) } catch { return gitdir }
+}
+function currentBranch(cwd) {
+  try {
+    const root = gitRootOf(cwd)
+    if (!root) return null
+    const ref = /^ref:\s*refs\/heads\/(.+?)\s*$/m.exec(readFileSync(path.join(gitDirOf(root), "HEAD"), "utf8"))
+    return ref ? ref[1] : null
+  } catch { return null }
+}
+function protectedBranches(root) {
+  const names = new Set(["main", "master"])
+  const remotes = path.join(gitCommonDirOf(root), "refs", "remotes")
+  let dirs = []
+  try { dirs = readdirSync(remotes) } catch { /* no remotes */ }
+  for (const r of dirs) {
+    try {
+      const m = /^ref:\s*refs\/remotes\/[^/]+\/(.+?)\s*$/m.exec(readFileSync(path.join(remotes, r, "HEAD"), "utf8"))
+      if (m) names.add(m[1])
+    } catch { /* this remote has no HEAD symref */ }
+  }
+  return names
+}
+function stashExists(root) {
+  const common = gitCommonDirOf(root)
+  if (existsSync(path.join(common, "refs", "stash"))) return true
+  try { return /^[0-9a-f]+ refs\/stash$/m.test(readFileSync(path.join(common, "packed-refs"), "utf8")) } catch { return false }
+}
+
+// ---- loss twin: BEGIN — adapters/opencode/plugins/geneseed-guard.js carries everything down to
+// the END marker verbatim, with `export ` dropped (tests/plugins/guard.test.mjs diffs the two).
+
+/**
+ * The cheap prefilter: a command that matches neither alternative never reaches the parser or
+ * a spawn. A git destructive VERB anywhere after `git` on the same line, or a removal program
+ * as a word at a command boundary. Deliberately loose — the parse decides; this only has to be
+ * a superset of what the parse acts on.
+ */
+const LOSS_CANDIDATE_RE =
+  /\bgit\b[^\n]*\b(?:reset|clean|branch|checkout|switch|restore|stash|reflog|gc|push)\b|(?:^|[\s;&|("'])(?:rm|rmdir|del|erase|remove-item|ri|rd)(?:\.exe)?(?=[\s;&|)"']|$)/im;
+
+class Unverified extends Error {}
+const unverified = (why) => { throw new Unverified(why); };
+
+const RM_PROGS = new Set(['rm', 'rmdir', 'del', 'erase', 'remove-item', 'ri', 'rd']);
+// cmd.exe's own removal verbs take `/s` `/q` switches, which are not paths.
+const CMD_SWITCH_PROGS = new Set(['rmdir', 'del', 'erase', 'rd']);
+const CD_PROGS = new Set(['cd', 'pushd', 'chdir', 'set-location', 'sl']);
+const WRAPPERS = new Set(['sudo', 'doas', 'command', 'builtin', '\\builtin', 'time', 'nice', 'nohup', 'exec', 'env']);
+// Programs that run ANOTHER command from their arguments or stdin: what they would remove is
+// not on this command line in a form the parse can read, so a removal word inside one asks.
+const INDIRECT = new Set(['bash', 'sh', 'zsh', 'dash', 'ksh', 'fish', 'pwsh', 'powershell', 'cmd',
+  'eval', 'xargs', 'find', 'parallel', 'watch', 'invoke-expression', 'iex']);
+
+const OPAQUE = '\u0000';
+const GIT_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+
+/**
+ * `git -C <dir> …` — THE spawn. Returns `{ status, stdout, stderr }`; throws `Unverified` when
+ * git could not run to completion (missing, timed out, output too large), so the caller asks.
+ */
+function git(dir, args) {
+  /** @type {Record<string, string | undefined>} */
+  const env = { ...process.env, GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0', GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0' };
+  delete env.GIT_DIR; delete env.GIT_WORK_TREE; delete env.GIT_INDEX_FILE;
+  const r = spawnSync('git', ['-C', dir, '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=false', ...args], {
+    encoding: 'utf8', shell: false, windowsHide: true, timeout: GIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    maxBuffer: 8 * 1024 * 1024, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], env,
+  });
+  if (r.error || r.status === null) {
+    unverified(`git ${args[0]} did not finish (${r.error ? /** @type {any} */ (r.error).code || r.error.message : 'killed'})`);
+  }
+  return r;
+}
+
+const firstLine = (s) => String(s || '').trim().split(/\r?\n/)[0] || 'no output';
+
+/** A raw token with its quotes removed, or `OPAQUE`-marked when the shell would rewrite it. */
+function word(raw) {
+  const opaque = /[`$]|^~|[{}]/.test(raw);
+  const s = raw.replace(/"([^"]*)"?|'([^']*)'?/g, (_, a, b) => a ?? b ?? '');
+  return opaque ? `${OPAQUE}${s}` : s;
+}
+
+/** The segment's words, redirections dropped (`2>/dev/null`, `> out.log`) — they are not operands. */
+function words(rawTokens) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < rawTokens.length; i++) {
+    const t = rawTokens[i];
+    if (/^(?:\d*|&)(?:>>?|<)&?$/.test(t)) { i += 1; continue; }   // a bare operator: drop its target too
+    if (/^(?:\d*|&)(?:>>?|<)/.test(t)) continue;
+    out.push(word(t));
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** `p` resolved against `dir`. On Windows a Git Bash `/c/…` path maps to `C:/…`; any other POSIX root cannot. */
+function resolveIn(dir, p) {
+  if (p.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`\`${p.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+  let q = p;
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    const m = /^\/([a-zA-Z])(\/.*)?$/.exec(q);
+    if (m) q = `${m[1]}:${m[2] || '/'}`;
+    else if (/^\/(?!\/)/.test(q)) unverified(`${p} is a POSIX path this host cannot map`);
+  }
+  if (!dir && !path.isAbsolute(q)) unverified('the working directory is unknown after a `cd` the gate cannot follow');
+  return path.resolve(dir || '', q);
+}
+
+function repoRoot(dir) {
+  if (!dir) unverified('the working directory is unknown after a `cd` the gate cannot follow');
+  return gitRootOf(dir) || unverified(`${dir} is not inside a git repository`);
+}
+
+/** Ask if `git status` shows a tracked change (staged or not) under `paths` (all when empty). */
+function dirty(dir, paths, act) {
+  for (const p of paths) if (p.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`\`${p.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+  repoRoot(dir);
+  const r = git(dir, ['status', '--porcelain', '-z', '--untracked-files=no', '--', ...paths]);
+  if (r.status !== 0) unverified(`git status failed: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+  const first = r.stdout.split('\0').find(Boolean);
+  return first ? `${act} would discard uncommitted changes (${first.slice(3)})` : null;
+}
+
+const isCluster = (a) => /^-[a-zA-Z]+$/.test(a);
+const hasShort = (a, c) => isCluster(a) && a.includes(c);
+
+/** `git push` — asks only when a protected branch would be force-pushed or deleted. */
+function pushAct(rest, dir) {
+  let force = false; let del = false; let all = false; let mirror = false; let prune = false;
+  const pos = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < rest.length; i++) {
+    const a = rest[i];
+    if (a === '--') { pos.push(...rest.slice(i + 1)); break; }
+    if (['-o', '--push-option', '--repo', '--receive-pack', '--exec'].includes(a)) { i += 1; continue; }
+    if (a.startsWith('--')) {
+      if (/^--force(?:-with-lease)?(?:=|$)/.test(a)) force = true;
+      else if (a === '--delete') del = true;
+      else if (a === '--all' || a === '--branches') all = true;
+      else if (a === '--mirror') mirror = true;
+      else if (a === '--prune') prune = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (isCluster(a)) { if (a.includes('f')) force = true; if (a.includes('d')) del = true; continue; }
+    pos.push(a);
+  }
+  const specs = pos.slice(1);
+  const forcedSpec = (s) => force || del || s.startsWith('+') || s.startsWith(':');
+  if (!force && !del && !mirror && !prune && !specs.some(forcedSpec)) return null;
+  if (mirror) return '`git push --mirror` force-pushes and deletes every remote branch to match this repository';
+  if (prune) return '`git push --prune` deletes every remote branch with no local counterpart';
+  if (all && force) return 'a forced `git push --all` force-pushes every branch, protected ones included';
+  const root = repoRoot(dir);
+  const protectedSet = protectedBranches(root);
+  const verb = del ? 'delete' : 'force-push';
+  let targets;
+  if (specs.length) {
+    targets = [];
+    for (const spec of specs) {
+      if (spec.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`the refspec \`${spec.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+      if (!forcedSpec(spec)) continue;
+      const s = spec.replace(/^\+/, '');
+      const colon = s.indexOf(':');
+      if (!del && colon === 0) {
+        const dst = s.slice(1).replace(/^refs\/heads\//, '');
+        if (protectedSet.has(dst)) return `\`git push ${spec}\` would delete the protected branch ${dst}`;
+        continue;
+      }
+      targets.push(del || colon < 0 ? s : s.slice(colon + 1));
+    }
+  } else {
+    targets = defaultPushTargets(dir);
+  }
+  for (let t of targets) {
+    if (t === 'HEAD' || t === '@') t = currentBranch(dir) || unverified('HEAD is detached, so the pushed branch is unknown');
+    t = t.replace(/^refs\/heads\//, '');
+    if (t.startsWith('refs/')) continue;   // a tag or another namespace, not a branch
+    if (/[*?]/.test(t)) unverified(`the refspec target \`${t}\` is a pattern`);
+    if (protectedSet.has(t)) return `\`git push\` would ${verb} the protected branch ${t}`;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * What a refspec-less forced push targets: the current branch (`simple`/`current`) and its
+ * upstream (`upstream`). `matching` pushes every branch and a `remote.*.push` rewrites the
+ * target — neither is something this read can bound, so both ask.
+ */
+function defaultPushTargets(dir) {
+  const cur = currentBranch(dir) || unverified('HEAD is detached, so the pushed branch is unknown');
+  const esc = cur.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+  const r = git(dir, ['config', '--get-regexp', `^(push\\.default|remote\\..*\\.push|branch\\.${esc}\\.merge)$`]);
+  if (r.status !== 0 && r.status !== 1) unverified(`git config failed: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+  const targets = [cur];
+  for (const line of r.stdout.split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean)) {
+    const [key, value = ''] = line.split(/\s+/, 2);
+    if (/^remote\..*\.push$/i.test(key)) unverified(`${key} rewrites what a bare push targets`);
+    if (/^push\.default$/i.test(key) && value === 'matching') unverified('push.default=matching pushes every branch');
+    if (/\.merge$/i.test(key)) targets.push(value);
+  }
+  return targets;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The checked-out branch when it is protected, null when HEAD is detached or unreadable, and
+ * undefined when it is a known unprotected branch — read off disk, so a feature branch passes the
+ * protected-branch-only forms below without running git (user ruling, 2026-10-17).
+ */
+function protectedHead(dir) {
+  const cur = currentBranch(dir);
+  return cur && !protectedBranches(repoRoot(dir)).has(cur) ? undefined : cur;
+}
+
+/** `lost` on the protected branch `cur`; an unknown HEAD cannot be cleared as unprotected, so it asks. */
+function onProtected(cur, lost) {
+  if (!lost) return null;
+  if (!cur) unverified('HEAD is detached or unreadable, so the gate cannot tell whether a protected branch is checked out');
+  return `${lost} on the protected branch ${cur}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `branch -f`, `checkout -B`, `switch -C` moving `name` to `start` (HEAD when absent): stops when
+ * `name` is protected and its old tip holds a commit neither `start` nor any remote ref reaches.
+ * A branch that does not exist yet is created, which loses nothing.
+ */
+function forceMove(dir, name, start, act) {
+  if (name === undefined) return null;   // git refuses the command on its own
+  if (name.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`the branch name \`${name.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+  if (!protectedBranches(repoRoot(dir)).has(name)) return null;
+  const tip = git(dir, ['rev-parse', '-q', '--verify', `refs/heads/${name}`]);
+  if (tip.status === 1) return null;
+  if (tip.status !== 0) unverified(`cannot read the branch ${name}: ${firstLine(tip.stderr)}`);
+  const to = start ?? 'HEAD';
+  if (to.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`the start point \`${to.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+  const r = git(dir, ['rev-list', '-n1', `refs/heads/${name}`, '--not', to, '--remotes']);
+  if (r.status !== 0) unverified(`cannot compare ${name} with ${to}: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+  return r.stdout.trim() ? `${act} ${name} would strand commits no remote and not ${to} holds` : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `git checkout` with no `--` and no force: `-B <protected>` force-moves it; otherwise, on a
+ * protected branch, positionals naming files (the first one is not a commit, or follows one)
+ * discard their changes. A lone commit-ish is a branch switch, which refuses to overwrite work.
+ */
+function checkoutAct(rest, dir) {
+  const pos = [];
+  let reset;
+  for (let i = 0; i < rest.length; i++) {
+    const a = rest[i];
+    if (a === '-b' || a === '--orphan') return null;   // a new branch: additive
+    if (a === '-B') { reset = rest[i + 1]; i += 1; continue; }
+    if (a.startsWith('--pathspec-from-file')) unverified('checkout reads its paths from a file');
+    if (!a.startsWith('-')) pos.push(a);
+  }
+  if (reset !== undefined) return forceMove(dir, reset, pos[0], '`git checkout -B`');
+  if (!pos.length) return null;
+  const cur = protectedHead(dir);
+  if (cur === undefined) return null;
+  let paths = pos;
+  if (!pos[0].includes(OPAQUE) && git(dir, ['rev-parse', '-q', '--verify', `${pos[0]}^{commit}`]).status === 0) {
+    if (pos.length === 1) return null;
+    paths = pos.slice(1);
+  }
+  return onProtected(cur, dirty(dir, paths, '`git checkout <paths>`'));
+}
+
+/** `git branch` — a forced delete asks for a protected branch or one whose commits live nowhere else. */
+function branchAct(rest, dir) {
+  const opts = rest.filter((a) => a.startsWith('-'));
+  const del = opts.some((a) => a === '--delete' || a === '-D' || hasShort(a, 'd') || hasShort(a, 'D'));
+  const force = opts.some((a) => a === '--force' || a === '-D' || hasShort(a, 'f') || hasShort(a, 'D'));
+  if (!force) return null;   // an un-forced delete refuses an unmerged branch on its own
+  const names = rest.filter((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
+  if (!del) {
+    // `branch -f <name> [<start>]`; a forced rename or copy (-M, -C) is another form.
+    if (opts.some((a) => a === '--move' || a === '--copy' || [...'mMcC'].some((c) => hasShort(a, c)))) return null;
+    return forceMove(dir, names[0], names[1], '`git branch -f`');
+  }
+  if (opts.some((a) => a === '-r' || a === '--remotes')) return null;   // a remote-tracking ref; `fetch` restores it
+  const root = repoRoot(dir);
+  const protectedSet = protectedBranches(root);
+  for (const n of names) {
+    if (n.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`the branch name \`${n.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+    if (protectedSet.has(n)) return `\`git branch -D ${n}\` deletes the protected branch ${n}`;
+    // Empty output: every commit of `n` is reachable from a remote ref or from HEAD.
+    const r = git(dir, ['rev-list', '-n1', `refs/heads/${n}`, '--not', '--remotes', 'HEAD']);
+    if (r.status !== 0) unverified(`cannot read the branch ${n}: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+    if (r.stdout.trim()) return `\`git branch -D ${n}\` deletes commits no remote and no HEAD holds`;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** `git clean` — forced, it asks when `git clean -n` with the same selection lists anything. */
+function cleanAct(rest, dir) {
+  const forced = rest.some((a) => a === '--force' || hasShort(a, 'f'));
+  if (!forced) return null;
+  const dry = [];
+  for (const a of rest) {
+    if (a.includes(OPAQUE)) unverified(`\`${a.replace(OPAQUE, '')}\` expands in the shell`);
+    if (a === '--force' || a === '--interactive') continue;
+    if (isCluster(a)) {
+      const kept = a.replace(/[fin]/g, '');
+      if (kept !== '-') dry.push(kept);
+      continue;
+    }
+    dry.push(a);
+  }
+  repoRoot(dir);
+  const r = git(dir, ['clean', '-n', ...dry]);
+  if (r.status !== 0) unverified(`git clean -n failed: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+  const first = firstLine(r.stdout);
+  return r.stdout.trim() ? `\`git clean\` would delete untracked files (${first.replace(/^Would remove /, '')})` : null;
+}
+
+/** One `git …` segment: the verdict for its verb, or null. */
+function gitAct(args, dir, always) {
+  let d = dir;
+  let i = 0;
+  let redirected = false;
+  for (; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const a = args[i];
+    // A `-C` the gate cannot resolve leaves the directory unknown; only a destructive verb asks for it.
+    if (a === '-C') { try { d = resolveIn(d, args[i + 1] ?? OPAQUE); } catch { d = null; } i += 1; continue; }
+    if (a === '-c') { i += 1; continue; }
+    if (/^--(?:git-dir|work-tree)(?:=|$)/.test(a)) { redirected = true; if (!a.includes('=')) i += 1; continue; }
+    if (a.startsWith('-')) continue;
+    break;
+  }
+  const verb = args[i];
+  const rest = args.slice(i + 1);
+  const act = () => {
+    switch (verb) {
+      case 'reset':
+        return rest.includes('--hard') ? dirty(d, [], '`git reset --hard`') : null;
+      case 'checkout': {
+        const forced = rest.some((a) => a === '--force' || hasShort(a, 'f')) && dirty(d, [], '`git checkout --force`');
+        if (forced) return forced;
+        const dd = rest.indexOf('--');
+        if (dd < 0) return checkoutAct(rest, d);
+        const paths = rest.slice(dd + 1);
+        return paths.length ? dirty(d, paths, '`git checkout --`') : null;
+      }
+      case 'switch': {
+        const c = rest.findIndex((a) => a === '-C' || a === '--force-create');
+        const pos = c < 0 ? [] : rest.slice(c + 1).filter((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
+        return (c >= 0 && forceMove(d, pos[0], pos[1], '`git switch -C`'))
+          || (rest.some((a) => a === '--force' || a === '--discard-changes' || hasShort(a, 'f'))
+            ? dirty(d, [], '`git switch --discard-changes`') : null);
+      }
+      case 'rm': {
+        // Only a forced removal discards changes: git refuses a modified file without -f, and
+        // `--cached` or `-n` keep the file. Protected branch only (user ruling, 2026-10-17).
+        if (!rest.some((a) => a === '--force' || hasShort(a, 'f'))) return null;
+        if (rest.some((a) => a === '--cached' || a === '--dry-run' || hasShort(a, 'n'))) return null;
+        if (rest.some((a) => a.startsWith('--pathspec-from-file'))) unverified('git rm reads its paths from a file');
+        const paths = rest.filter((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
+        const cur = paths.length ? protectedHead(d) : undefined;
+        return cur === undefined ? null : onProtected(cur, dirty(d, paths, '`git rm -f`'));
+      }
+      case 'restore': {
+        const staged = rest.some((a) => a === '--staged' || hasShort(a, 'S'));
+        const worktree = rest.some((a) => a === '--worktree' || hasShort(a, 'W'));
+        if (staged && !worktree) return null;   // unstaging only: the change stays in the tree
+        if (rest.some((a) => a.startsWith('--pathspec-from-file'))) unverified('restore reads its paths from a file');
+        const paths = [];
+        for (let j = 0; j < rest.length; j++) {
+          const a = rest[j];
+          if (a === '-s' || a === '--source') { j += 1; continue; }
+          if (a === '--') continue;
+          if (!a.startsWith('-')) paths.push(a);
+        }
+        return paths.length ? dirty(d, paths, '`git restore`') : null;
+      }
+      case 'clean':
+        return cleanAct(rest, d);
+      case 'stash': {
+        const sub = rest.find((a) => !a.startsWith('-'));
+        if (sub !== 'drop' && sub !== 'clear') return null;
+        return stashExists(repoRoot(d)) ? `\`git stash ${sub}\` deletes stashed work` : null;
+      }
+      case 'reflog':
+        return always && rest.includes('expire') ? '`git reflog expire` deletes the reflog recovery depends on' : null;
+      case 'gc':
+        return always && rest.some((a) => a.startsWith('--prune'))
+          ? '`git gc --prune` deletes the unreachable commits recovery depends on' : null;
+      case 'branch':
+        return branchAct(rest, d);
+      case 'push':
+        return pushAct(rest, d);
+      default:
+        return null;
+    }
+  };
+  const verdict = act();
+  if (verdict && redirected) return `${verdict} (and --git-dir/--work-tree points it at a repository the gate did not read)`;
+  return verdict;
+}
+
+/** One removal segment: asks unless every operand is tracked AND unmodified in a git work tree. */
+function rmAct(prog, args, dir) {
+  const targets = [];
+  let opts = true;
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const a = args[i];
+    if (opts && a === '--') { opts = false; continue; }
+    if (opts && /^-(?:path|literalpath)$/i.test(a)) { targets.push(args[i + 1] ?? OPAQUE); i += 1; continue; }
+    const bound = opts && /^-(?:path|literalpath)[:=](.+)$/i.exec(a);
+    if (bound) { targets.push(bound[1]); continue; }
+    if (opts && /^-(?:filter|include|exclude)(?:[:=]|$)/i.test(a)) unverified(`\`${prog} ${a}\` selects files the gate cannot list`);
+    if (opts && a.length > 1 && a.startsWith('-')) continue;
+    if (opts && CMD_SWITCH_PROGS.has(prog) && /^\/[a-zA-Z?]$/.test(a)) continue;
+    targets.push(a);
+  }
+  const groups = new Map();
+  for (const t of targets) {
+    const shown = t.replace(OPAQUE, '');
+    if (t.includes(OPAQUE) || /[*?[\],]/.test(t)) unverified(`\`${shown}\` expands in the shell, so the gate cannot list what it names`);
+    const abs = resolveIn(dir, t);
+    if (abs.split(/[\\/]+/).includes('.git')) return `\`${prog} ${shown}\` deletes git's own data`;
+    // Nothing there, nothing lost: `rm -f build.log` on a clean tree is routine cleanup.
+    try { lstatSync(abs); } catch (e) {
+      if (e && e.code === 'ENOENT') continue;
+      unverified(`cannot read ${shown}: ${e && e.code}`);
+    }
+    const root = gitRootOf(abs);
+    if (!root) return `\`${prog} ${shown}\` deletes a path outside any git repository, which nothing could restore`;
+    if (path.resolve(root) === path.resolve(abs)) return `\`${prog} ${shown}\` deletes a whole repository or worktree`;
+    const rel = path.relative(root, abs).split(path.sep).join('/');
+    if (!groups.has(root)) groups.set(root, []);
+    groups.get(root).push({ shown, rel });
+  }
+  const fold = (s) => (process.platform === 'win32' ? s.toLowerCase() : s);
+  for (const [root, list] of groups) {
+    const r = git(root, ['ls-files', '-z', '-t', '--cached', '--others', '--modified', '--directory',
+      '--', ...list.map((x) => `:(literal)${x.rel}`)]);
+    if (r.status !== 0) unverified(`git ls-files failed: ${firstLine(r.stderr)}`);
+    const entries = r.stdout.split('\0').filter(Boolean).map((e) => ({ tag: e[0], p: fold(e.slice(2)) }));
+    for (const { shown, rel } of list) {
+      const key = fold(rel);
+      const mine = entries.filter((e) => e.p === key || e.p.startsWith(`${key}/`) || e.p === `${key}/`);
+      if (!mine.length) return `\`${prog} ${shown}\` deletes something git does not track, which nothing could restore`;
+      const bad = mine.find((e) => e.tag !== 'H');
+      if (bad) {
+        const what = bad.tag === '?' ? 'untracked or ignored' : 'modified or otherwise not restorable';
+        return `\`${prog} ${shown}\` deletes ${what} files (${bad.p}), which git cannot restore`;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** The program word, stripped of its path and `.exe`, lowercased (PowerShell and cmd are case-blind). */
+const progOf = (w) => w.split(/[\\/]/).pop().toLowerCase().replace(/\.exe$/, '');
+
+/**
+ * The verdict for a whole command, given its segments as RAW token arrays (quotes still on —
+ * `js/hosts/hooks.mjs` cuts and tokenises with the same lexer `rootScan` uses, so a quoted
+ * `;` or a heredoc body is never a segment). Returns the reason it would lose data, or null
+ * when it provably would not. What it cannot settle — a glob, a git that fails — is a "could not
+ * verify" reason, never a throw. A BUG still throws, on purpose: `guardGate` turns it into a
+ * `gate-error` (an ask on Claude, a warning on Bob) and the OpenCode guard logs and allows it —
+ * each host's ceiling for a crashed gate (docs/adr/0007-gates-fail-closed-per-host-ceiling.md).
+ * `always: false` skips the two acts that lose data in every state (`reflog expire`, `gc --prune`)
+ * — the OpenCode guard passes it, because a static `permission.bash` glob already asks for those.
+ */
+function lossReason(segments, cwd, { always = true } = {}) {
+  let dir = cwd;
+  try {
+    for (const raw of segments) {
+      let w = words(raw);
+      while (w.length && (/^\w+=/.test(w[0]) || WRAPPERS.has(progOf(w[0])))) {
+        const wrapper = progOf(w[0]);
+        w = w.slice(1);
+        // A wrapper's own flags (`sudo -u x`, `env -i`) are not the program.
+        if (wrapper !== 'command' && wrapper !== 'exec') while (w.length && w[0].startsWith('-')) w = w.slice(1);
+      }
+      if (!w.length) continue;
+      const prog = progOf(w[0]);
+      const args = w.slice(1);
+      if (CD_PROGS.has(prog)) {
+        const target = args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('-') && !/^\/d$/i.test(a));
+        try { dir = target && target !== '-' ? resolveIn(dir, target) : null; } catch { dir = null; }
+        continue;
+      }
+      let verdict = null;
+      if (prog === 'git') verdict = gitAct(args, dir, always);
+      else if (RM_PROGS.has(prog)) verdict = rmAct(prog, args, dir);
+      else if (INDIRECT.has(prog) && LOSS_CANDIDATE_RE.test(args.join(' '))) {
+        unverified(`\`${prog}\` runs a command the gate cannot read`);
+      }
+      if (verdict) return verdict;
+    }
+    return null;
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (!(e instanceof Unverified)) throw e;
+    return `the gate could not verify what this command would lose (${e.message})`;
+  }
+}
+// ---- loss twin: END
 
 // A recursive scan rooted at a whole filesystem (Commands Must Return) → BLOCK. Twin of
 // js/hosts/hooks.mjs's `rootScan` — keep in step; tests/plugins/guard.test.mjs diffs the
@@ -644,7 +1170,7 @@ export const GeneseedGuard = async (ctx) => {
           // blocks the whole call (see `pickPath` for why this is not a single path).
           const paths = pickPath(args, cwd)
           for (const p of paths) {
-            if (SECRET_RE.some((re) => re.test(p))) { await deny(`write to secret/key file ${p} (Sealed Secrets)`, "law-1"); return }
+            if (!SECRETS_GATE_OFF && SECRET_RE.some((re) => re.test(p))) { await deny(`write to secret/key file ${p} (Sealed Secrets)`, "law-1"); return }
             if (SECRET_WARN_RE.some((re) => re.test(p))) log(`WARN: writing ${p} — keep secrets out of tracked files (Sealed Secrets)`)
             const sensor = protectedCheck(p)
             if (sensor) { await deny(`${p} is a protected check (${sensor === DONE_LIST ? "the done gate list itself" : `${sensor}, listed in ${SENSOR_LIST}`}) — a check the agent can edit is not a check (External Gate)`, "rigor-5"); return }
@@ -661,7 +1187,7 @@ export const GeneseedGuard = async (ctx) => {
           // FILE, not pooled — a patch touching `.env` AND an ordinary file must still catch a
           // secret in the ordinary file; only the hunk whose OWN path is `.env`-shaped is
           // exempt, same as the path WARN tier above.
-          for (const { path: cp, content } of pickAddedContentByPath(args, cwd)) {
+          for (const { path: cp, content } of SECRETS_GATE_OFF ? [] : pickAddedContentByPath(args, cwd)) {
             if (SECRET_WARN_RE.some((re) => re.test(cp))) continue
             if (SECRET_CONTENT_RE.test(content)) {
               await deny(`${cp} would carry a credential-shaped string (Sealed Secrets) — secrets `
@@ -689,7 +1215,12 @@ export const GeneseedGuard = async (ctx) => {
               "search a specific directory instead: the project, node_modules, ~/.npm, %APPDATA%", "ops-2")
             return
           }
-          if (c && SHELL_WARN_RE.some((re) => re.test(c))) log(`WARN: irreversible op — confirm intent (Deletion Is Deliberate): ${c.slice(0, 80)}`)
+          if (c && !DELETION_GATE_OFF && LOSS_CANDIDATE_RE.test(c)) {
+            // OpenCode's bash tool may run in `workdir`, resolved against the session directory.
+            const wd = typeof args.workdir === "string" && args.workdir ? path.resolve(cwd, args.workdir) : cwd
+            const loss = lossReason(scanSegments(c).map((seg) => seg.match(SCAN_TOKEN_RE) || []), wd, { always: false })
+            if (loss) { await deny(`${loss} (Deletion Is Deliberate) — confirm with the user first`, "law-4"); return }
+          }
         }
       } catch (err) {
         // Our own deny must propagate; any inspection error must never break a tool call.