gemini-computer-use 0.4.3 → 0.4.4

package/gateway.py

@@ -1,2862 +0,0 @@
-import asyncio
-import base64
-from collections import deque
-from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
-import datetime
-import hmac
-import json
-import logging
-import os
-import re
-import secrets
-import shutil
-import socket
-import time
-import uuid
-from urllib.parse import urlparse
-from starlette.applications import Starlette
-from starlette.middleware import Middleware
-from starlette.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
-from starlette.requests import Request
-from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response, StreamingResponse
-from starlette.routing import Route, WebSocketRoute
-from starlette.websockets import WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
-import uvicorn
-
-logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s [%(levelname)s] %(message)s")
-logger = logging.getLogger("gateway")
-
-REGISTRY_PATH = "/etc/antigravity-mesh/registry.json"
-active_tunnels = {}  # user -> {"ws": WebSocket, "pending": {req_id: Future}}
-# user -> list of asyncio.Queue, OLDEST stream first. This was a set, which has
-# no order: the per-user cap below has to evict the OLDEST stream, and every
-# other reader (broadcast, /health, the watchdog) only iterates or measures the
-# container, so the type change stays invisible outside this module.
-active_sse_subscribers = {}
-active_sse_sessions = {}  # per-connection stream_key -> asyncio.Queue
-# client-visible session id -> queues opened under it. active_sse_sessions is
-# keyed per CONNECTION on purpose (one DELETE must not close a stream another
-# connection is still reading), so this second index is what lets a
-# re-initialize close exactly the streams of the session it replaces.
-active_sse_session_queues = {}
-active_sessions = {}  # session_id -> user, issued once per initialize
-latest_session_by_user = {}  # user -> most recently issued session id
-
-# A client that lost its session id opens a new stream every turn and never
-# closes the old one (observed: 9 abandoned streams for one user while no tunnel
-# was connected). Nothing above this many streams for one user is kept: the
-# oldest is closed, because the newest is the one the client just opened.
-# MESH_MAX_SSE_PER_USER raises the cap for a deployment whose clients legitimately
-# keep several streams open; the default stays deliberately small.
-try:
-    MAX_SSE_PER_USER = max(1, int(os.environ.get("MESH_MAX_SSE_PER_USER") or "2"))
-except (TypeError, ValueError):
-    MAX_SSE_PER_USER = 2
-
-# Tunnel lifecycle history for /health. "node_online: false" alone does not say
-# WHEN the node was last seen, which is the first question after an unexpected
-# reboot; the ring buffer is bounded so a long-lived gateway cannot grow.
-last_tunnel_seen = None  # ISO-8601 timestamp of the last successful connection
-TUNNEL_EVENTS_MAX = 10
-tunnel_events = deque(maxlen=TUNNEL_EVENTS_MAX)  # newest last
-
-
-def record_tunnel_event(event: str, user: str, reason: str = "") -> None:
-    """Record one tunnel connect/disconnect and stamp the last connect time."""
-    global last_tunnel_seen
-    ts = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat()
-    if event == "connect":
-        last_tunnel_seen = ts
-    tunnel_events.append({"ts": ts, "event": event, "user": user, "reason": reason})
-
-
-def forget_sse_queue(user: str, queue) -> None:
-    """Unregister a queue from the per-user list and from the session index.
-
-    Shared by the stream's own cleanup and the DELETE teardown so both keep the
-    two containers in step; a stream that is still registered after it stopped
-    being readable is exactly the leak ``/health`` is meant to expose.
-    """
-    subscribers = active_sse_subscribers.get(user)
-    if subscribers is not None and queue in subscribers:
-        subscribers.remove(queue)
-    for session_id, queues in list(active_sse_session_queues.items()):
-        if queue in queues:
-            queues.remove(queue)
-            if not queues:
-                active_sse_session_queues.pop(session_id, None)
-
-
-def close_sse_streams_for_session(session_id: str) -> int:
-    """Close every SSE stream opened under a session id that is now superseded.
-
-    ``None`` is the sentinel the stream loop treats as "close this stream", the
-    same one the DELETE teardown and the per-user cap use; the stream's own
-    ``finally`` does the unregistering, so nothing is removed here. Returns how
-    many streams were asked to close.
-    """
-    queues = active_sse_session_queues.pop(session_id, [])
-    for queue in queues:
-        try:
-            queue.put_nowait(None)
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-    return len(queues)
-
-# Negotiated protocol version per user. The value must be identical in the
-# initialize result AND in the mcp-protocol-version header of every response: a
-# client that asked for 2025-11-25 and reads 2024-11-05 back in the header can
-# reject the answer as belonging to a different protocol revision.
-active_protocol_versions = {}
-DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2024-11-05"
-
-# Legacy SSE transport experiment. The classic MCP SSE transport answers a POST
-# with 202 Accepted and an EMPTY body, and delivers the result only on the stream.
-# Set MESH_LEGACY_SSE=1 to switch a client that holds an open stream onto that
-# contract; leave it unset for the current "answer in the body too" behaviour.
-LEGACY_SSE = os.environ.get("MESH_LEGACY_SSE", "").strip() in ("1", "true", "yes")
-
-# Answering a POST in the HTTP body AND on the caller's SSE stream hands a strict
-# streamable-HTTP client the SAME response id twice, and it rejects the session.
-# The body alone is what /sse and /mcp clients read - the `initialize` response,
-# which is answered before any stream exists, is proof that they do. Only the
-# legacy /messages transport needs the stream, and LEGACY_SSE (202, no body)
-# deliberately needs it too.
-# Set MESH_BROADCAST_HTTP_RESPONSES=1 to duplicate on purpose while debugging.
-BROADCAST_HTTP_RESPONSES = os.environ.get(
-    "MESH_BROADCAST_HTTP_RESPONSES", "0"
-).strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# ONE SHARED DOMAIN FOR EVERY NODE (canonical URL contract)
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Every node is reached through the same public domain and is selected by the
-# ?user= query parameter. Per-device subdomains are deliberately NOT issued:
-#   * each extra hostname needs its own DNS record and its own SAN in the TLS
-#     certificate, so a device whose name is missing from the certificate fails
-#     the handshake and the client reports an opaque "cannot connect to host";
-#   * the node name stops being a security-relevant routing key, which keeps the
-#     installer's "name already taken -> node-2" behaviour harmless.
-# Canonical endpoints (see README "Connecting to Google Gemini"):
-#   SSE      https://<shared-domain>/sse?user=<node>&token=<token>
-#   HTTP     https://<shared-domain>/mcp?user=<node>&token=<token>
-#   Tunnel   wss://<shared-domain>/ws/tunnel?user=<node>&token=<token>
-# Override the shared domain with MESH_PUBLIC_URL (or its AGY_PUBLIC_BASE_URL
-# alias), or with the domain file - core/domain.py owns that order and holds the
-# single default, so the domain is configured in exactly one place.
-try:
-    from core import domain as _domain
-except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - gateway.py installed without core/ beside it
-    _domain = None
-
-if _domain is not None:
-    PUBLIC_BASE_URL = _domain.public_base_url()
-else:
-    # gateway.py is sometimes installed on its own (for example
-    # /opt/antigravity-mesh/gateway.py with no core/ next to it). Shipping
-    # core/domain.py alongside it is part of the deployment; this branch only keeps
-    # the service starting when that was forgotten, and it refuses to invent a
-    # domain of its own - the project default lives in core/domain.py alone.
-    PUBLIC_BASE_URL = (
-        os.environ.get("MESH_PUBLIC_URL") or os.environ.get("AGY_PUBLIC_BASE_URL") or ""
-    ).strip().rstrip("/")
-    if not PUBLIC_BASE_URL:
-        logger.error(
-            "core/domain.py is not importable and neither MESH_PUBLIC_URL nor "
-            "AGY_PUBLIC_BASE_URL is set: the public domain is unknown, so URLs handed "
-            "to clients will be relative. Install core/domain.py next to gateway.py, or "
-            "set the domain in the domain file / environment."
-        )
-PUBLIC_HOST = urlparse(PUBLIC_BASE_URL).netloc or PUBLIC_BASE_URL
-
-# Legacy per-device subdomain resolution. Kept only so URLs handed out before the
-# shared-domain contract keep working; never advertised, and it logs a warning.
-LEGACY_SUBDOMAIN_ACCESS = os.environ.get("MESH_LEGACY_SUBDOMAIN", "1").strip().lower() in (
-    "1", "true", "yes", "on"
-)
-
-
-def public_url(path: str, user: str, token: str) -> str:
-    """Canonical public URL for one node on the shared domain."""
-    return f"{PUBLIC_BASE_URL}{path}?user={user}&token={token}"
-
-
-def issue_session_id(user: str) -> str:
-    """Issue a unique ``Mcp-Session-Id`` for one initialize.
-
-    The spec requires a session id to be unique per session, and Google's
-    frontends open several parallel connections per turn (a POST for the call,
-    a GET for the stream, a DELETE to tear the session down, often from
-    different egress IPs). Returning the user name as the session id -- as this
-    gateway used to -- gave every one of those connections the same identity, so
-    a DELETE sent by one of them looked like it had terminated the session that
-    another connection's in-flight tool call belonged to, and the client dropped
-    the answer it had already received. Clients that never echo the header keep
-    working: they still fall back to the user name.
-    """
-    session_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
-    active_sessions[session_id] = user
-    latest_session_by_user[user] = session_id
-    return session_id
-
-
-def announce_endpoint_for_path(path: str) -> bool:
-    """Whether a GET stream on this path may emit the classic ``event: endpoint``.
-
-    The classic SSE transport announces the POST target (/messages). Streamable
-    HTTP (GET /mcp) must carry JSON-RPC frames only, so the frame is suppressed
-    there - a strict client otherwise drops the stream it reads results from.
-    """
-    return path != "/mcp"
-
-
-def should_broadcast_response(path: str) -> bool:
-    """Whether a POST response is also queued on the caller's SSE stream.
-
-    Duplicating the answer (body + stream) hands a strict streamable-HTTP client
-    the same response id twice; it rejects the session and the model never sees
-    the result. Only the legacy transports need the stream.
-    """
-    return path == "/messages" or LEGACY_SSE or BROADCAST_HTTP_RESPONSES
-
-
-def resolve_session_id(request: Request, user: str) -> str:
-    """The session id this connection must see.
-
-    Prefer the id the client sends back. Otherwise use the session this user most
-    recently opened: a client that holds a session but omits the header must not
-    be told a different id, or it believes it holds two sessions and aborts one
-    (that mismatch was the cause of the original initialize/DELETE churn). The
-    bare user name stays as the last resort for header-less legacy clients.
-    """
-    return (
-        request.headers.get("mcp-session-id")
-        or latest_session_by_user.get(user)
-        or user
-    )
-
-
-def protocol_version_for(user: str) -> str:
-    return active_protocol_versions.get(user, DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
-
-def broadcast_sse(user: str, message: dict) -> int:
-    """Queue a JSON-RPC frame on every open stream of this user.
-
-    Returns how many streams received it. The count is logged because it is the
-    only way to tell a client that reads results from the stream (Gemini Spark)
-    whether the answer actually had a live stream to land on: a response
-    broadcast to 0 streams reaches nobody on that channel.
-    """
-    data = json.dumps(message, ensure_ascii=False)
-    queues = list(active_sse_subscribers.get(user, ()))
-    for q in queues:
-        try:
-            q.put_nowait(data)
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-    label = message.get("method") or f"id={message.get('id')}"
-    logger.info(f"broadcast [{label}] for '{user}' to {len(queues)} open stream(s)")
-    return len(queues)
-
-RESERVED_NAMES = {
-    "admin", "administrator", "root", "api", "api-ag", "api-agy",
-    "drive", "derp", "mcp-tg", "chamber", "proxy-api", "tg-bot-api",
-    "anonymous", "gateway", "mesh", "mail", "vpn", "test", "null",
-    "undefined", "localhost", "local", "internal", "public", "ws",
-    "sse", "mcp", "messages", "health", "health-mesh", "core", "skills",
-    "install", "static", "assets"
-}
-
-def load_registry() -> dict:
-    if os.path.exists(REGISTRY_PATH):
-        try:
-            with open(REGISTRY_PATH, "r") as f:
-                return json.load(f)
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(f"Failed to read registry: {e}")
-    return {}
-
-def save_registry(data: dict):
-    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(REGISTRY_PATH), exist_ok=True)
-    with open(REGISTRY_PATH, "w") as f:
-        json.dump(data, f, indent=2)
-
-def tokens_equal(a: str, b: str) -> bool:
-    """Constant-time token comparison that never raises on non-ASCII input.
-
-    ``hmac.compare_digest`` rejects str arguments containing non-ASCII
-    characters (TypeError -> HTTP 500). Comparing UTF-8 bytes with
-    ``surrogateescape`` keeps the comparison constant-time and total.
-    """
-    try:
-        return hmac.compare_digest(
-            str(a).encode("utf-8", "surrogateescape"),
-            str(b).encode("utf-8", "surrogateescape"),
-        )
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def get_target_user(request: Request) -> str:
-    """Resolve which node a request addresses.
-
-    Canonical form: ``<shared-domain>/...?user=<node>&token=<token>``. The shared
-    domain only selects the gateway, so ``?user=`` is authoritative. A per-device
-    subdomain is accepted as a legacy fallback (MESH_LEGACY_SUBDOMAIN=0 disables
-    it) and logs a warning telling the caller to switch to the canonical URL.
-    """
-    user = (request.query_params.get("user") or "").strip()
-    if user:
-        return user.lower()
-
-    if LEGACY_SUBDOMAIN_ACCESS:
-        host_part = request.headers.get("host", "").split(":")[0].lower()
-        base = PUBLIC_HOST.lower()
-        if host_part.endswith(f".{base}") and host_part != base:
-            sub = host_part[:-len(base)-1]
-            parts = sub.split(".")
-            legacy_user = parts[-1].lower()
-            logger.warning(
-                "Legacy per-device subdomain '%s' used instead of the shared domain; "
-                "switch to %s/sse?user=%s&token=...", host_part, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, legacy_user,
-            )
-            return legacy_user
-
-    return "anonymous"
-
-def get_request_token(request: Request) -> str:
-    token = request.query_params.get("token") or request.headers.get("x-mesh-token")
-    if not token:
-        auth = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
-        if auth.startswith("Bearer "):
-            token = auth[7:].strip()
-    return token or ""
-
-def verify_token(request: Request) -> tuple[bool, str, str]:
-    user = get_target_user(request)
-    if user == "anonymous":
-        return False, (
-            "Node identity is missing. Use the shared-domain URL form "
-            f"{PUBLIC_BASE_URL}/sse?user=<node-name>&token=<your_token>."
-        ), ""
-    registry = load_registry()
-    if user not in registry:
-        return False, f"User '{user}' is not registered.", user
-    expected = registry[user].get("token", "")
-    token = get_request_token(request)
-    if not token or not tokens_equal(token, expected):
-        return False, "Invalid or missing token. Specify ?token=<your_token> in the URL.", user
-    return True, "ok", user
-
-def get_skill(user: str, host: str) -> str:
-    return f"""# 🌐 Antigravity Mesh — Node Orchestrator ({user})
-
-Target Node: {user} (shared gateway {PUBLIC_HOST})
-Endpoint: {PUBLIC_BASE_URL}/sse?user={user}&token=<your_token>
-Mode: Secure Cloud Gateway + Reverse Tunnel (one shared domain for every node)
-
-MANDATORY GROUNDING & EXECUTION DIRECTIVES:
-1. You are connected directly to the user's execution node '{user}' via Antigravity Mesh MCP tools.
-2. STRICT ZERO-HALLUCINATION POLICY:
-   - You DO NOT know local directory structure, file names, or environment state in advance.
-   - NEVER invent file paths, guess folder contents, or claim a directory is empty without checking.
-   - You MUST call `list_dir` or `bash_exec` (e.g. `pwd`, `ls -la`) to inspect the real filesystem first.
-3. DIRECT EXECUTION:
-   - Always execute operations directly via MCP tools (`list_dir`, `read_file`, `bash_exec`, `system_vitals`).
-   - Never ask the user to run shell commands manually.
-4. Always verify return codes and stdout/stderr before reporting results.
-"""
-
-async def call_remote_tool(user: str, name: str, args: dict) -> dict:
-    tunnel = active_tunnels.get(user)
-    if not tunnel or not tunnel.get("ws"):
-        # The agent reconnects within ~2s of a dropped link (VPN flap, network
-        # change, service restart), so give it a moment instead of reporting the
-        # node as offline immediately. A missing agent is then a rare answer.
-        #
-        # A host reboot is NOT a flap, though: the agent stays away for minutes,
-        # while the client's own frontend gives a tool call roughly 30 s. Waiting
-        # 8 s only made the eventual failure arrive later. 4 x 0.5 s covers a real
-        # reconnect and keeps the whole tools/call path within ~5 s.
-        for _ in range(4):                       # up to ~2 seconds
-            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
-            tunnel = active_tunnels.get(user)
-            if tunnel and tunnel.get("ws"):
-                break
-    if not tunnel or not tunnel.get("ws"):
-        return {
-            "exit_code": 1,
-            "stdout": "",
-            "stderr": (f"[Mesh Gateway] Node '{user}' has no active tunnel: the mesh agent on the "
-                       f"host is not connected to the gateway. Start/restart the mesh agent there, "
-                       f"then retry; this is a transport problem, not a missing file or permission.")
-        }
-    req_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
-    fut = asyncio.get_running_loop().create_future()
-    tunnel["pending"][req_id] = fut
-    payload = {
-        "id": req_id,
-        "method": "tools/call",
-        "params": {"name": name, "arguments": args}
-    }
-    try:
-        await tunnel["ws"].send_text(json.dumps(payload))
-        # 28s timeout: Agent runs commands with 25s timeout, so 28s gives 3s margin and returns cleanly
-        # BEFORE Google's 30s frontend timeout, completely preventing Gemini Error 1076
-        res_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(fut, timeout=28.0)
-        return res_msg.get("result", res_msg)
-    except asyncio.TimeoutError:
-        tunnel["pending"].pop(req_id, None)
-        return {"exit_code": 124, "error": f"Command timed out after 25s on node '{user}'"}
-    except Exception as e:
-        tunnel["pending"].pop(req_id, None)
-        # Self-heal: a dropped tunnel (network flap, agent restart) is transient.
-        # Wait for the agent to come back and replay the call once instead of
-        # failing the client's request.
-        logger.warning(f"Tunnel call to '{user}' failed ({e}); waiting for reconnect and retrying once")
-        for _ in range(4):                       # up to ~2 seconds
-            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
-            fresh = active_tunnels.get(user)
-            if fresh and fresh.get("ws") and fresh.get("ws") is not tunnel.get("ws"):
-                try:
-                    retry_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
-                    retry_fut = asyncio.get_running_loop().create_future()
-                    fresh["pending"][retry_id] = retry_fut
-                    await fresh["ws"].send_text(json.dumps({"id": retry_id, "method": "tools/call",
-                                                            "params": {"name": name, "arguments": args}}))
-                    res_msg = await asyncio.wait_for(retry_fut, timeout=20.0)
-                    logger.info(f"Retry after reconnect succeeded for '{user}'")
-                    return res_msg.get("result", res_msg)
-                except Exception as retry_exc:
-                    fresh["pending"].pop(retry_id, None)
-                    logger.warning(f"Retry after reconnect failed for '{user}': {retry_exc}")
-                    break
-        return {"exit_code": 1, "error": str(e)}
-
-def remote_tool_error(res):
-    """Return a human-readable error string if a remote tool response is a failure, else None.
-
-    Covers three cases:
-      * the node returned {"error": "..."} (tool-level failure);
-      * the node returned {"ok": false, ...};
-      * the gateway itself could not reach the node / the tunnel broke, which yields
-        a bare {"exit_code": !=0, "stdout", "stderr"} with no tool payload.
-    A legitimate job_output payload always carries a "status" key, so it is never
-    mistaken for a transport failure even when the job's exit_code != 0.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(res, dict):
-        return "invalid response from node"
-    if res.get("error"):
-        return str(res.get("error"))
-    if res.get("ok") is False:
-        return str(res.get("message") or res.get("stderr") or "operation failed (ok=false)")
-    if res.get("exit_code") not in (None, 0) and set(res.keys()) <= {"exit_code", "stdout", "stderr"}:
-        return str(res.get("stderr") or res.get("stdout") or f"remote call failed with exit code {res.get('exit_code')}")
-    return None
-
-
-async def health(request: Request):
-    if request.method == "OPTIONS":
-        return Response(status_code=204, headers={"Allow": "GET, HEAD, OPTIONS", "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*"})
-    user = get_target_user(request)
-    is_online = (user in active_tunnels) if user != "anonymous" else False
-    return JSONResponse({
-        "status": "healthy",
-        "service": "antigravity_mesh_gateway",
-        "host": PUBLIC_HOST,
-        "target_user": user,
-        "node_online": is_online,
-        "active_tunnels_count": len(active_tunnels),
-        # Diagnostics: an abandoned SSE stream keeps a queue alive, and a client
-        # with a connection cap would then be unable to open a new one.
-        # `open_sse_streams` is the total, `streams_per_user` the same count
-        # broken down per node - both unchanged in meaning, now fed by the
-        # insertion-ordered per-user container.
-        "open_sse_streams": sum(len(q) for q in active_sse_subscribers.values()),
-        "streams_per_user": {u: len(q) for u, q in active_sse_subscribers.items()},
-        # Tunnel lifecycle. `node_online: false` does not say when the node was
-        # last seen, which is what tells a reboot apart from a network flap;
-        # `tunnel_events` keeps the last 10 connect/disconnect events and why.
-        "last_tunnel_seen": last_tunnel_seen,
-        "tunnel_events": list(tunnel_events),
-    }, headers={"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*"})
-
-async def api_register(request: Request):
-    if request.method == "OPTIONS":
-        return Response(status_code=204, headers={"Allow": "POST, OPTIONS", "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "*"})
-    try:
-        data = await request.json()
-    except Exception:
-        return JSONResponse({"error": "Invalid JSON body"}, status_code=400)
-
-    raw_user = data.get("username", "").strip()
-    clean_user = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9_-]", "", raw_user.lower())
-    if not clean_user or len(clean_user) < 2:
-        return JSONResponse({"error": "Invalid username (min 2 alphanumeric chars)"}, status_code=400)
-
-    if clean_user in RESERVED_NAMES:
-        return JSONResponse({
-            "error": "reserved_username",
-            "message": f"Username '{clean_user}' is reserved for system services."
-        }, status_code=400)
-
-    raw_mac = data.get("mac_address", "").strip()
-    clean_mac = ""
-    if raw_mac:
-        mac_hex = re.sub(r"[^0-9a-fA-F]", "", raw_mac).lower()
-        if len(mac_hex) == 12:
-            clean_mac = ":".join(mac_hex[i:i+2] for i in range(0, 12, 2))
-        else:
-            clean_mac = raw_mac.lower()
-
-    clean_os = str(data.get("os", "")).strip()[:100]
-    registry = load_registry()
-    now_iso = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat()
-
-    # --- DEVICE FINGERPRINTING (MAC & OS) ---
-    # 1. Check if a device with this MAC address was already registered
-    if clean_mac and clean_mac != "00:00:00:00:00:00":
-        for u, entry in registry.items():
-            entry_mac = entry.get("mac_address", "").lower()
-            if entry_mac == clean_mac:
-                logger.info(f"Reusing existing node registration '{u}' for MAC {clean_mac}")
-                entry["last_seen"] = now_iso
-                if clean_os and not entry.get("os"):
-                    entry["os"] = clean_os
-                save_registry(registry)
-                token = entry["token"]
-                return JSONResponse({
-                    "status": "success",
-                    "username": u,
-                    "token": token,
-                    "gateway": PUBLIC_HOST,
-                    "sse_url": public_url("/sse", u, token),
-                    "tunnel_url": f"wss://{PUBLIC_HOST}/ws/tunnel?user={u}&token={token}",
-                    "reused": True,
-                    # `u` is the loop variable above; `user` does not exist in this
-                    # branch, so every re-registration of an already-known MAC
-                    # raised NameError and the gateway answered HTTP 500.
-                    "instructions": f"Antigravity Mesh node '{u}'. Direct access to the real remote host over a reverse tunnel. "
-                f"Do not guess paths or outputs: use list_dir/glob_find/grep_search/read_file/bash_exec/"
-                f"system_vitals. Use run_job for slow commands; page output with max_chars+cursor."
-                })
-
-    # 2. If not found by MAC, check if username already exists in registry
-    auto_suffix = data.get("auto_suffix", False)
-    if clean_user in registry:
-        req_token = request.headers.get("authorization", "").replace("Bearer ", "").strip() or data.get("token")
-        # If valid token provided, update device info for existing user
-        if req_token and tokens_equal(req_token, registry[clean_user]["token"]):
-            token = registry[clean_user]["token"]
-            if clean_mac:
-                registry[clean_user]["mac_address"] = clean_mac
-            if clean_os:
-                registry[clean_user]["os"] = clean_os
-            registry[clean_user]["last_seen"] = now_iso
-            save_registry(registry)
-            return JSONResponse({
-                "status": "success",
-                "username": clean_user,
-                "token": token,
-                "gateway": PUBLIC_HOST,
-                "sse_url": public_url("/sse", clean_user, token),
-                "tunnel_url": f"wss://{PUBLIC_HOST}/ws/tunnel?user={clean_user}&token={token}",
-                "reused": True,
-                "instructions": "Authenticated and updated existing user registration."
-            })
-        elif auto_suffix:
-            # Different device claiming same name -> generate unique suffix
-            suffix = 2
-            cand = f"{clean_user}-{suffix}"
-            while cand in registry or cand in RESERVED_NAMES:
-                suffix += 1
-                cand = f"{clean_user}-{suffix}"
-            clean_user = cand
-            token = secrets.token_hex(16)
-            registry[clean_user] = {
-                "token": token,
-                "created_at": now_iso,
-                "mode": "tunnel",
-                "status": "active",
-                "mac_address": clean_mac,
-                "os": clean_os
-            }
-            save_registry(registry)
-        else:
-            suffix = 2
-            cand = f"{clean_user}-{suffix}"
-            while cand in registry or cand in RESERVED_NAMES:
-                suffix += 1
-                cand = f"{clean_user}-{suffix}"
-            return JSONResponse({
-                "error": "conflict",
-                "message": f"User '{clean_user}' already exists. Provide token to retrieve config.",
-                "suggested_username": cand
-            }, status_code=409)
-    else:
-        # Brand new registration
-        token = secrets.token_hex(16)
-        registry[clean_user] = {
-            "token": token,
-            "created_at": now_iso,
-            "mode": "tunnel",
-            "status": "active",
-            "mac_address": clean_mac,
-            "os": clean_os
-        }
-        save_registry(registry)
-
-    return JSONResponse({
-        "status": "success",
-        "username": clean_user,
-        "token": token,
-        "gateway": PUBLIC_HOST,
-        "sse_url": public_url("/sse", clean_user, token),
-        "tunnel_url": f"wss://{PUBLIC_HOST}/ws/tunnel?user={clean_user}&token={token}",
-        "reused": False,
-        "instructions": "Add the sse_url to Google Gemini Web (Settings -> MCP)."
-    })
-
-async def oauth_discovery(request: Request):
-    """RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata.
-
-    Returning 404 here made every MCP client log a connection error while
-    connecting (Gemini Spark probes this path twice). The mesh authenticates with
-    a bearer token in the URL, so the honest answer is metadata that advertises
-    no authorization server and no bearer requirement for discovery.
-    """
-    host = request.headers.get("host", PUBLIC_HOST)
-    base = f"https://{host}"
-    return JSONResponse(
-        {
-            "resource": base,
-            "authorization_servers": [],
-            "bearer_methods_supported": ["query", "header"],
-            "scopes_supported": [],
-            "resource_documentation": "https://github.com/LevRa7/Computer-use-for-Gemini-App-Web",
-            "resource_name": "Antigravity Mesh",
-        },
-        headers={
-            "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-            "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, OPTIONS, HEAD",
-            "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "*",
-            "Cache-Control": "public, max-age=300",
-        },
-    )
-
-async def sse_endpoint(request: Request):
-    ok, msg, user = verify_token(request)
-    if not ok:
-        return JSONResponse(
-            {"error": "unauthorized", "message": msg},
-            status_code=401,
-            headers={"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*"}
-        )
-
-    if request.method == "HEAD":
-        return Response(
-            status_code=200,
-            media_type="text/event-stream",
-            headers={
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-            }
-        )
-
-    token = get_request_token(request)
-    # Two different things are needed here, and conflating them broke delivery:
-    #   * the id the CLIENT sees must match the one POST responses return, or the
-    #     client believes it holds two sessions and aborts one;
-    #   * the key this queue is stored under must be UNIQUE per connection,
-    #     because Google's frontends load-balance requests across many IPs and
-    #     any one of them may send DELETE. With a shared key that DELETE destroyed
-    #     the stream another in-flight request was still reading, so its result
-    #     never reached the model.
-    session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-    stream_key = str(uuid.uuid4())
-    # The classic SSE transport announces where to POST. A Streamable HTTP client
-    # (GET /mcp) must receive JSON-RPC frames only: an `endpoint` frame pointing
-    # at a different path is not part of that protocol, and a strict client drops
-    # the stream over it - the stream it was reading tool results from.
-    announce_endpoint = announce_endpoint_for_path(request.url.path)
-    queue = asyncio.Queue()
-    queues = active_sse_subscribers.setdefault(user, [])
-    queues.append(queue)
-    # Cap the streams one user may hold. Nothing in the protocol closes a stream
-    # a client forgot, so a client whose session id was lost (or that reconnects
-    # on every turn) accumulates queues until its own connection limit is reached
-    # and it can no longer open one at all. Evicting the OLDEST is safe: the
-    # newest is the stream the client just opened and is actually reading.
-    evicted = 0
-    while len(queues) > MAX_SSE_PER_USER:
-        oldest = queues.pop(0)
-        evicted += 1
-        try:
-            oldest.put_nowait(None)      # sentinel: the stream loop closes on None
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-        # Also drop it from the session index now, so /health and a later
-        # re-initialize never see a stream that was already closed.
-        forget_sse_queue(user, oldest)
-    # stored under the per-connection key, not the shared client-visible id
-    active_sse_sessions[stream_key] = queue
-    # ...and indexed by the client-visible session id, so a re-initialize can
-    # close exactly the streams of the session it replaces.
-    active_sse_session_queues.setdefault(session_id, []).append(queue)
-    logger.info(
-        f"SSE stream opened for '{user}' (stream_key={stream_key}, "
-        f"session={session_id[:12]}…, path={request.url.path}, "
-        f"open_now={len(queues)}"
-        + (f", evicted={evicted} over the cap of {MAX_SSE_PER_USER}" if evicted else "")
-        + ")"
-    )
-
-    async def event_generator():
-        # Keepalive deadline: intermediaries (nginx, Google's frontend) close an
-        # idle stream, and a closed stream is what makes a client believe the
-        # server went away. One frame - a comment counts - goes out at least every
-        # 15 s. Framing is untouched: `event: endpoint` once, then one
-        # `event: message` per queued frame.
-        keepalive_interval = 15.0
-        last_write = time.monotonic()
-        try:
-            if announce_endpoint:
-                yield f"event: endpoint\ndata: /messages?user={user}&token={token}\n\n"
-            while True:
-                try:
-                    remaining = keepalive_interval - (time.monotonic() - last_write)
-                    msg = await asyncio.wait_for(queue.get(), timeout=max(0.25, remaining))
-                except asyncio.TimeoutError:
-                    try:
-                        yield ": keepalive\n\n"
-                    except Exception as exc:
-                        # The write raised: nobody is reading this stream any
-                        # more, so drop it instead of keeping the queue alive.
-                        logger.warning(f"SSE keepalive write failed for '{user}' "
-                                       f"(stream_key={stream_key}): {exc}")
-                        break
-                    last_write = time.monotonic()
-                    continue
-                except Exception as exc:
-                    logger.warning(f"SSE queue unreadable for '{user}' "
-                                   f"(stream_key={stream_key}): {exc}")
-                    break
-                if msg is None:
-                    break
-                try:
-                    yield f"event: message\ndata: {msg}\n\n"
-                except Exception as exc:
-                    logger.warning(f"SSE write failed for '{user}' "
-                                   f"(stream_key={stream_key}): {exc}")
-                    break
-                last_write = time.monotonic()
-        except asyncio.CancelledError:
-            logger.info(f"SSE stream cancelled for '{user}' (stream_key={stream_key})")
-            raise
-        finally:
-            active_sse_sessions.pop(stream_key, None)
-            forget_sse_queue(user, queue)
-            logger.info(f"SSE stream closed for '{user}' (stream_key={stream_key}, "
-                        f"open_now={len(active_sse_subscribers.get(user, ()))})")
-
-    return StreamingResponse(
-        event_generator(),
-        media_type="text/event-stream",
-        headers={
-            "Cache-Control": "no-cache",
-            "Connection": "keep-alive",
-            "X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
-            "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-            "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-            "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-            "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-        }
-    )
-
-async def messages_endpoint(request: Request):
-    ok, err_msg, user = verify_token(request)
-    if not ok:
-        return JSONResponse(
-            {"error": "unauthorized", "message": err_msg},
-            status_code=401,
-            headers={
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-            }
-        )
-
-    try:
-        body = await request.json()
-    except Exception:
-        body = {}
-
-    method = body.get("method")
-    params = body.get("params", {})
-    req_id = body.get("id")
-
-    if req_id is None and method:
-        session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-        return Response(
-            status_code=204,
-            headers={
-                "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-            }
-        )
-
-    client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
-    call_started = time.monotonic()
-    # What the client accepts decides how the answer must be framed: a strict
-    # streamable-HTTP client that asks only for text/event-stream rejects a plain
-    # application/json body even when the payload is correct.
-    accept_hdr = (request.headers.get("accept") or "").lower()
-    incoming_session = request.headers.get("mcp-session-id") or ""
-    proto_hdr = request.headers.get("mcp-protocol-version") or ""
-    tool_note = ""
-    if method == "tools/call":
-        # Log which tool the client asked for: without it a retry loop in the
-        # client is impossible to diagnose from the gateway side.
-        try:
-            tool_note = ", tool=%s, args=%s" % (
-                params.get("name"),
-                json.dumps(params.get("arguments", {}), ensure_ascii=False)[:120],
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            tool_note = ", tool=?"
-    logger.info(f"Incoming MCP RPC from {client_ip} [{user}]: method={method}, id={req_id}{tool_note}"
-                + (f", accept={accept_hdr[:60]!r}" if accept_hdr else "")
-                + (f", session={incoming_session[:40]!r}" if incoming_session else ", session=<none>")
-                + (f", proto-hdr={proto_hdr[:20]!r}" if proto_hdr else ""))
-
-    resp = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": req_id}
-    issued_session_id = ""  # set by initialize; echoed in the response header below
-
-    if method == "initialize":
-        # Protocol version negotiation. The spec says a client MUST disconnect
-        # when the server answers with a version it does not support, and we used
-        # to hard-code 2024-11-05 whatever the client asked for. Echo the client's
-        # version when we support it, otherwise fall back to our baseline.
-        client_version = str((params or {}).get("protocolVersion") or "")
-        supported = ("2025-11-25", "2025-06-18", "2025-03-26", "2024-11-05")
-        if client_version in supported:
-            negotiated = client_version
-        elif re.fullmatch(r"\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}", client_version):
-            # The tool surface (initialize / tools list+call / ping) is stable
-            # across revisions. Answering an older version than the client asked
-            # for makes a compliant client DISCONNECT immediately - that was the
-            # real cause of the session churn - so echo any dated version rather
-            # than lose the session.
-            negotiated = client_version
-        else:
-            negotiated = "2024-11-05"
-        active_protocol_versions[user] = negotiated
-        # Session hygiene: this initialize replaces whatever session this user
-        # held before, and the client will never use that id again. Leaving its
-        # streams open is how one user ended up with 9 live streams and no
-        # tunnel - the client lost the session id, re-initialized every turn, and
-        # every abandoned stream stayed registered (and counted in /health).
-        # The response-header contract is untouched: the NEW id is what this
-        # response returns.
-        previous_session_id = latest_session_by_user.get(user)
-        if previous_session_id:
-            closed = close_sse_streams_for_session(previous_session_id)
-            active_sessions.pop(previous_session_id, None)
-            if closed:
-                logger.info(f"initialize: closed {closed} superseded SSE stream(s) of session "
-                            f"{previous_session_id[:12]}… for user '{user}'")
-        session_id = issue_session_id(user)
-        issued_session_id = session_id
-        logger.info(f"initialize: client requested protocolVersion={client_version!r} "
-                    f"clientInfo={(params or {}).get('clientInfo')} -> answering {negotiated}; "
-                    f"issued session {session_id[:12]}… for user '{user}'")
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "protocolVersion": negotiated,
-            "capabilities": {
-                "tools": {"listChanged": False},
-                "prompts": {"listChanged": False},
-                "resources": {"subscribe": False, "listChanged": False}
-            },
-            "serverInfo": {
-                "name": "antigravity_mesh",
-                "version": "1.0.0"
-            },
-            "instructions": (
-                (
-                (
-                f"Antigravity Mesh node '{user}' - direct access to the real host over a reverse tunnel.\n"
-                f"GROUNDING (mandatory): NEVER state a path, file, directory or process you have not seen "
-                f"in a tool result in THIS conversation. Tool output marked [VERIFIED BY TOOL] is real; "
-                f"anything marked [TOOL ERROR] means the path does NOT exist - never repeat it as real. "
-                f"If you have not inspected something, say so and call list_dir / glob_find / grep_search first.\n"
-                f"USE: list_dir/glob_find/grep_search to locate, read_file to read, write_file/edit_file to "
-                f"modify, bash_exec for short commands, system_vitals for resources. Only touch paths you "
-                f"have confirmed. For slow work (builds, installs, tests, downloads) use run_job, then "
-                f"job_output / job_kill / job_list. Long output is paged: pass cursor=<next_cursor>.\n"
-                f"REACHABILITY: every tool result you receive in this conversation was produced ON the "
-                f"node, so the node IS online. After any successful tool result, never tell the user the "
-                f"host is unreachable or that the agent did not answer. If a call fails, report its exact "
-                f"error text instead of guessing that the host is down.\n"
-                f"DEVICE: if system_info reports a 'device' block whose class is phone or tablet, prefer "
-                f"device_info / device_control for device-level work instead of hand-writing termux-* "
-                f"commands through bash_exec, and ask the user before any device_capture or "
-                f"device_messages call."
-            )
-            )
-            )
-        }
-    elif method == "notifications/initialized":
-        session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-        return Response(
-            status_code=204,
-            headers={
-                "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-            }
-        )
-    elif method == "ping":
-        resp["result"] = {}
-    elif method == "tools/list":
-        # annotate_tools attaches the confirmation policy (read-only / local
-        # write / publish / destructive) declared at the bottom of this file.
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "tools": annotate_tools([
-                {
-                    "name": "list_dir",
-                    "description": (
-                        "List a directory on the remote host (default: workspace)."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "path": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "Optional directory path to inspect. If omitted or empty, lists the agent's current working directory."
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "required": []
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "read_file",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Read a file, line-numbered. Page with max_chars/cursor."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "File path to read"},
-                            "start_line": {"type": "integer", "description": "First line (1-based)"},
-                            "end_line": {"type": "integer", "description": "Last line (1-based)"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["path"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "bash_exec",
-                    "description": (
-                        f"Execute a shell command directly on {user}'s host machine. "
-                        "The shell follows the host: bash on Linux/macOS, PowerShell or cmd.exe "
-                        "on Windows - call system_info first and match command_shell. "
-                        "Use it to inspect git status, run builds, check processes or run tasks, "
-                        "and NEVER guess command outputs. Commands that install or remove "
-                        "software, or that delete data, are refused here: this tool runs without "
-                        "a confirmation dialog, so those must go through system_change, where the "
-                        "user is asked to confirm first."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "command": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "Shell command to execute on the node"
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "required": ["command"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "system_change",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Install or remove software, or delete data, on the host - the only tool "
-                        "allowed to run those commands, and the one the user is asked to confirm "
-                        "before it runs. Same shell as bash_exec (check command_shell from "
-                        "system_info first). Use it for package managers (apt/dnf/pacman/apk/brew/"
-                        "pip/npm/winget/msiexec/...), uninstallers, rm / Remove-Item / del, disk "
-                        "wipes and anything else that installs, removes or destroys. Set "
-                        "background=true for long installs and poll with job_output. Ordinary "
-                        "inspection, builds and tests belong in bash_exec / run_job instead."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "command": {"type": "string",
-                                        "description": "The install / remove / delete command"},
-                            "timeout_sec": {"type": "integer",
-                                            "description": "Foreground only: 1-120 seconds (default 25)"},
-                            "background": {"type": "boolean",
-                                           "description": "Run it as a background job and return a job_id"},
-                            "cwd": {"type": "string",
-                                    "description": "Working directory; background=true only"},
-                            "max_chars": {"type": "integer",
-                                          "description": "Maximum characters per response"},
-                            "cursor": {"type": "integer",
-                                       "description": "Character offset to continue from"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["command"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "mesh_status",
-                    "description": ("Confirm this node is reachable. Call this FIRST if you believe the "
-                                    "host is offline: it returns live evidence from the host."),
-                    "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "mesh_update",
-                    "description": ("Report, check for, or install a newer release of the node's own "
-                                    "code. action=status reads local state; action=check asks GitHub; "
-                                    "action=apply installs it and restarts the agent (the tunnel "
-                                    "drops for a few seconds). Default action is status."),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "action": {"type": "string", "enum": ["status", "check", "apply"],
-                                       "description": "What to do (default: status)"},
-                            "force": {"type": "boolean",
-                                      "description": "Ignore the check interval and the failed-apply backoff"},
-                            "offline": {"type": "boolean",
-                                        "description": "check: cached answer only, no network"},
-                            "restart": {"type": "boolean",
-                                        "description": "apply: restart the node afterwards (default true)"}
-                        },
-                        "required": []
-                    }
-                },
-                # The node's own device (a phone/tablet under Termux, or the local
-                # laptop/desktop). core/mcp_tools.TOOLS is the SOURCE OF TRUTH for
-                # these four entries: their descriptions and schemas below are copied
-                # from it value for value (only the layout is the gateway's own - it
-                # deploys as one file and may not import node code). The node is what
-                # actually executes, and the client reads this copy, so any wording
-                # difference here would be a lie the model acts on. Keep them in step;
-                # tests/test_gateway_share_route.py pins the copy for these four.
-                {
-                    "name": "device_info",
-                    "description": (
-                        "One-call report for the device this node runs on: battery and charging, "
-                        "network interfaces with Wi-Fi and cellular signal strength, language, time and "
-                        "timezone, CPU, RAM, storage, cameras, microphones, sensors and what the platform "
-                        "can actually reach. On an Android/Termux node it reads the phone through the "
-                        "termux-api commands; on a laptop or desktop it reads the local system. Every "
-                        "section carries available/source, so 'not exposed here' is never reported as a "
-                        "zero - and on a non-phone the phone-only sections explain themselves instead of "
-                        "failing. Use device_control, device_capture or device_messages to act."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "section": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["summary", "all", "device", "battery", "network", "locale",
-                                         "time", "hardware", "storage", "cameras", "microphones",
-                                         "sensors", "capabilities"],
-                                "description": "Which blocks to return (default: all)."
-                            },
-                            "sensor": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": ("Name one sensor to take a single live sample from "
-                                                "(Android only; needs a name from the sensors block).")
-                            },
-                            "fresh": {
-                                "type": "boolean",
-                                "description": "Bypass the short-lived cache (default false)."
-                            },
-                            "quick": {
-                                "type": "boolean",
-                                "description": ("Skip the slow sections: network, cameras, microphones, "
-                                                "sensors (default false).")
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "additionalProperties": False
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "device_control",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Reversible actions on the node's own device: torch, vibrate, volume, screen "
-                        "brightness, text-to-speech, toast, notifications, clipboard, media playback, "
-                        "media scan, wake lock, download, opening or sharing a file, a text dialog and "
-                        "the wallpaper. Each action is a fixed termux-api command on Android and an "
-                        "explained no-op elsewhere; the result names the command and its argv so nothing "
-                        "is guessed. Nothing here is destructive, and all of it is refused when the node "
-                        "runs with MESH_READ_ONLY=1."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "action": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["torch", "vibrate", "volume", "volume_get", "brightness",
-                                         "tts_speak", "toast", "notify", "notify_list",
-                                         "notify_remove", "clipboard_get", "clipboard_set", "media",
-                                         "media_scan", "wakelock", "download", "open", "share",
-                                         "dialog", "wallpaper"],
-                                "description": "Action to perform."
-                            },
-                            "on": {
-                                "type": "boolean",
-                                "description": "torch: true lights it, false puts it out."
-                            },
-                            "value": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": ("vibrate: milliseconds; volume: level 0-15; "
-                                                "brightness: 0-255.")
-                            },
-                            "stream": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["music", "call", "alarm", "notification", "ring", "system"],
-                                "description": "volume: which audio stream (default music)."
-                            },
-                            "text": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": ("tts_speak/toast/notify/clipboard_set/dialog body; media: "
-                                                "play|pause|stop|info.")
-                            },
-                            "title": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "notify/dialog: heading text."
-                            },
-                            "id": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "notify_remove: the id the notification was posted with."
-                            },
-                            "url": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "download/open/wallpaper: URL to use."
-                            },
-                            "path": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "open/share/media/download/media_scan/wallpaper: file on the node."
-                            },
-                            "state": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["acquire", "release", "status"],
-                                "description": "wakelock: what to do (default status)."
-                            },
-                            "timeout_sec": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "dialog: seconds to wait for the person (5-120, default 30)."
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "required": ["action"],
-                        "additionalProperties": False
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "device_capture",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Camera, microphone, location, fingerprint, USB and infrared actions. These "
-                        "observe the physical world or authenticate the person holding the phone, so the "
-                        "client always asks for confirmation first. A photo or a recording is written to "
-                        "the node's capture directory and is never uploaded anywhere by itself; "
-                        "fingerprint returns only the verdict, never biometric data; USB access requests "
-                        "permission and returns the descriptor but deliberately refuses to run a program "
-                        "for you; and on Android 11+ the Termux:API app has to be in the foreground for a "
-                        "recording. Refused when MESH_READ_ONLY=1."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "action": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["camera_list", "camera_photo", "mic_record_start",
-                                         "mic_record_stop", "mic_record_status", "location",
-                                         "fingerprint", "usb_list", "usb_access",
-                                         "infrared_frequencies", "infrared_transmit"],
-                                "description": "Capture action to perform."
-                            },
-                            "camera_id": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "camera_photo: id from camera_list (default 0)."
-                            },
-                            "path": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": ("camera_photo/mic_record_start: output file (default: the "
-                                                "node's capture directory); usb_access: device path from "
-                                                "usb_list.")
-                            },
-                            "seconds": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "mic_record_start: recording length limit in seconds."
-                            },
-                            "provider": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["gps", "network", "passive"],
-                                "description": "location: which Android provider to use (default gps)."
-                            },
-                            "frequency": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "infrared_transmit: carrier frequency in Hz."
-                            },
-                            "pattern": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": ("infrared_transmit: durations in microseconds, e.g. "
-                                                "1000,2000,1000.")
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "required": ["action"],
-                        "additionalProperties": False
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "device_messages",
-                    "description": (
-                        "SMS, call log, contacts and placing a call. This is private data about the person "
-                        "who owns the phone, so the client asks for confirmation AND the node refuses "
-                        "until its operator enables it with MESH_DEVICE_PIM=1. The refusal names the flag "
-                        "and the Android permissions to grant, so the answer is an instruction rather than "
-                        "a dead end. Sending an SMS and placing a call are also refused under "
-                        "MESH_READ_ONLY=1."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "action": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "enum": ["sms_list", "sms_send", "call_log", "contacts", "call"],
-                                "description": "Message or PIM action to perform."
-                            },
-                            "number": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "sms_send/call: recipient number."
-                            },
-                            "text": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "sms_send: message body."
-                            },
-                            "limit": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "How many records (1-50, default 10)."
-                            },
-                            "offset": {
-                                "type": "integer",
-                                "description": "Record offset, for paging."
-                            },
-                            "type": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": ("sms_list/call_log: filter, e.g. inbox/sent or "
-                                                "incoming/outgoing/missed.")
-                            },
-                            "query": {
-                                "type": "string",
-                                "description": "contacts: filter by name or number."
-                            }
-                        },
-                        "required": ["action"],
-                        "additionalProperties": False
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "system_info",
-                    "description": ("One-call host summary: OS, desktop, user, home, disks, memory, load, "
-                                    "top processes and the current wallpaper. Prefer this over several "
-                                    "exploratory commands - the client allows only a few calls per turn."),
-                    "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "system_vitals",
-                    "description": f"Retrieve real-time CPU, RAM, and Disk metrics on {user}'s host machine",
-                    "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "get_orchestration_skill",
-                    "description": "Load the node orchestration rules.",
-                    "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "write_file",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Write a file atomically (creates parent dirs). Runs without a "
-                        "confirmation dialog, so a path inside the system - /etc, /usr, "
-                        "/boot, /var/lib, C:\\Windows, C:\\Program Files, ProgramData, the "
-                        "registry - is refused and has to go through system_write, which "
-                        "the user is asked to confirm."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "Absolute path, or relative to the agent's workspace"},
-                            "content": {"type": "string", "description": "Exact file content to write"},
-                            "create_dirs": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Create parent directories"},
-                            "mode": {"type": "string", "description": "File mode, e.g. 0644"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["path", "content"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "edit_file",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Replace an exact string in a file; old_string must be unique. Runs "
-                        "without a confirmation dialog, so a system path is refused here - "
-                        "read the file and write the whole new content with system_write "
-                        "instead, which the user confirms."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "File to edit"},
-                            "old_string": {"type": "string", "description": "Exact text to replace (not a regex); must be unique unless replace_all is true"},
-                            "new_string": {"type": "string", "description": "Replacement text"},
-                            "expected_sha256": {"type": "string", "description": "Fail if file changed since read"},
-                            "replace_all": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Replace every occurrence"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["path", "old_string", "new_string"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "system_write",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Write a file inside a system path - /etc, /usr, /boot, /var/lib, "
-                        "C:\\Windows, C:\\Program Files, ProgramData, the registry - the only "
-                        "way to write there, and the one the user is asked to confirm before "
-                        "it runs. Takes the exact content, like write_file (no shell "
-                        "quoting). To change an existing system file, read_file it first and "
-                        "send the full new content here."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "System path to write"},
-                            "content": {"type": "string", "description": "Exact file content to write"},
-                            "create_dirs": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Create parent directories"},
-                            "mode": {"type": "string", "description": "File mode, e.g. 0644 (POSIX only)"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["path", "content"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "grep_search",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Recursively search file contents; returns path:line: text."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "pattern": {"type": "string", "description": "Text or regular expression to search for"},
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "Directory to search recursively (default \".\")"},
-                            "glob": {"type": "string", "description": "Filename filter"},
-                            "limit": {"type": "integer", "description": "Max results"},
-                            "ignore_case": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Case-insensitive"},
-                            "fixed": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Literal text, not regex"},
-                            "context": {"type": "integer", "description": "Context lines"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["pattern"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "glob_find",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Find files by glob pattern (* and **)."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "pattern": {"type": "string", "description": "Glob pattern, e.g. \"**/*.py\" or \"src/*.json\""},
-                            "path": {"type": "string", "description": "Base directory to search from (default \".\")"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["pattern"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "run_job",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Start a long command in the background; returns job_id. Installs, "
-                        "removals and deletions are refused here (this tool has no confirmation "
-                        "step) - run those with system_change(background=true)."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "command": {"type": "string", "description": "Shell command to run in the background"},
-                            "cwd": {"type": "string", "description": "Optional working directory"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["command"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "job_output",
-                    "description": (
-                        "Get a job status/output. wait_ms<=20000; page via next_cursor."
-                    ),
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "job_id": {"type": "string", "description": "Job id returned by run_job"},
-                            "wait_ms": {"type": "integer", "description": "Block up to this long (max 20000)"},
-                            "max_chars": {"type": "integer", "description": "Chunk size"},
-                            "cursor": {"type": "integer", "description": "Offset to continue from"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["job_id"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "job_kill",
-                    "description": "Stop a running job.",
-                    "inputSchema": {
-                        "type": "object",
-                        "properties": {
-                            "job_id": {"type": "string", "description": "Job id to stop"},
-                            "signal": {"type": "string", "description": "Signal to send, e.g. TERM or KILL (default TERM)"}
-                        },
-                        "required": ["job_id"]
-                    }
-                },
-                {
-                    "name": "job_list",
-                    "description": "List recent jobs, newest first (20 by default).",
-                    "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {
-                        "limit": {"type": "integer", "description": "How many jobs to return (1-50, default 20)"}
-                    }, "required": []}
-                }
-            ] + SHARE_TOOL_SPECS)
-        }
-    elif method == "tools/call":
-        name = params.get("name")
-        args = params.get("arguments", {})
-        is_error = False
-        if name == "get_orchestration_skill":
-            content_text = get_skill(user, request.headers.get("host", PUBLIC_HOST))
-        elif name == "mesh_status":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                parts = ["[NODE REACHABLE] This answer was produced on the host itself - the mesh "
-                         "agent and the tunnel are working. Do not claim the node is offline."]
-                for key in ("hostname", "agent_pid", "checked_at", "host_uptime_human",
-                            "workspace", "node_version"):
-                    if res.get(key) is not None:
-                        parts.append(f"{key}: {res.get(key)}")
-                content_text = "\n".join(parts)
-        elif name == "mesh_update":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                parts = []
-                if res.get("current"):
-                    parts.append(f"node version: {res['current']}")
-                if res.get("latest"):
-                    parts.append(f"newest release: {res['latest']}")
-                if res.get("update_available") is not None:
-                    parts.append("update available: %s"
-                                 % ("yes" if res.get("update_available") else "no"))
-                if res.get("applied"):
-                    parts.append("applied: %s -> %s"
-                                 % (res.get("current"), res.get("latest")))
-                    parts.append("node is restarting; the tunnel drops for a few seconds")
-                elif res.get("reason"):
-                    parts.append(f"detail: {res['reason']}")
-                content_text = "\n".join(parts) if parts else json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
-        elif name == "system_info":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                parts = []
-                # command_shell tells the model which shell bash_exec really uses
-                # (PowerShell or cmd.exe on Windows, bash on Linux), so it writes
-                # commands for the right one instead of assuming bash.
-                for key in ("hostname", "os", "kernel", "user", "home", "desktop",
-                            "session_type", "command_shell", "scenario", "device_class",
-                            "wallpaper", "wallpaper_exists"):
-                    value = res.get(key)
-                    if value not in (None, ""):
-                        parts.append("%s: %s" % (key, value))
-                for key in ("memory", "load", "disks", "top_processes"):
-                    if res.get(key):
-                        parts.append("\n[%s]\n%s" % (key, res.get(key)))
-                parts.extend(_device_report_lines(res))
-                content_text = "\n".join(parts) if parts else json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
-        elif name == "system_vitals":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            if "error" in res:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"Error: {res.get('error')}"
-            else:
-                content_text = json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
-        elif name in ("bash_exec", "list_dir", "read_file"):
-            refusal = ""
-            if name == "bash_exec":
-                kind = classify_command(args.get("command"))
-                if kind:
-                    # Installs and deletions only run through system_change, which the
-                    # client confirms; this tool is advertised as read-only.
-                    refusal = command_confirmation_message(args.get("command", ""), kind, "bash_exec")
-                else:
-                    # Gateway-level guard: call_remote_tool gives up after 28s, so never
-                    # forward a bash timeout longer than 25s (the node defaults to 25).
-                    timeout_sec = args.get("timeout_sec")
-                    if isinstance(timeout_sec, (int, float)) and timeout_sec > 25:
-                        args = dict(args)
-                        args["timeout_sec"] = 25
-            if refusal:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = refusal
-            else:
-                res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-                content_text, is_error = format_command_result(res, name)
-        elif name in ("write_file", "edit_file"):
-            if is_system_path(args.get("path")):
-                # The unconfirmed file tools never touch the system: that is what
-                # system_write exists for, and the client confirms it.
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = path_confirmation_message(args.get("path", ""), name)
-                res = None
-            else:
-                res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            if res is not None:
-                err = remote_tool_error(res)
-                if err:
-                    is_error = True
-                    content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-                else:
-                    path = res.get("path", args.get("path", ""))
-                    sha = res.get("sha256", "")
-                    if name == "write_file":
-                        content_text = f"OK: wrote {res.get('bytes', 0)} bytes to {path} (sha256={sha})"
-                    else:
-                        content_text = f"OK: edited {path} ({res.get('replacements', 0)} replacement(s), sha256={sha})"
-        elif name == "system_write":
-            # Confirmed twin of write_file for paths inside the system. The node only
-            # ever sees write_file, so this works with every deployed node version.
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, "write_file", args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                path = res.get("path", args.get("path", ""))
-                sha = res.get("sha256", "")
-                content_text = (
-                    f"OK: wrote {res.get('bytes', 0)} bytes to {path} (sha256={sha}) "
-                    f"(confirmed system write)"
-                )
-        elif name == "grep_search":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                matches = res.get("matches") or []
-                if not matches:
-                    content_text = "No matches."
-                else:
-                    lines = []
-                    for m in matches:
-                        if not isinstance(m, dict):
-                            continue
-                        lines.append(f"{m.get('path')}:{m.get('line')}: {m.get('text')}")
-                    content_text = "\n".join(lines) if lines else "No matches."
-                    if res.get("truncated"):
-                        content_text += f"\n\n(truncated: showing first {len(lines)} matches; narrow the pattern or raise limit)"
-        elif name == "glob_find":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                files = res.get("files") or []
-                content_text = "\n".join(str(f) for f in files) if files else "No files found."
-                if res.get("truncated"):
-                    content_text += f"\n\n(truncated: showing first {len(files)} paths)"
-        elif name == "run_job":
-            kind = classify_command(args.get("command"))
-            if kind:
-                # Same rule as bash_exec: the unconfirmed tools never install or
-                # delete anything, not even in the background.
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = command_confirmation_message(args.get("command", ""), kind, "run_job")
-            else:
-                res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-                err = remote_tool_error(res)
-                if err:
-                    is_error = True
-                    content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-                else:
-                    content_text = format_job_started(res, args)
-        elif name == "system_change":
-            # The confirmed twin of bash_exec/run_job. The client asks the user
-            # before this call because the tool is advertised destructiveHint=true;
-            # the node itself only ever sees bash_exec or run_job, so this works with
-            # every node version, including payloads older than this gateway.
-            background = _wants_background(args)
-            forwarded = dict(args)
-            forwarded.pop("background", None)
-            if background:
-                forwarded.pop("timeout_sec", None)
-                forwarded.pop("max_chars", None)
-                forwarded.pop("cursor", None)
-                remote_name = "run_job"
-            else:
-                # bash_exec has no cwd of its own; the command runs in the node's
-                # workspace unless the caller asked for a background job.
-                forwarded.pop("cwd", None)
-                timeout_sec = forwarded.get("timeout_sec")
-                if isinstance(timeout_sec, (int, float)) and timeout_sec > 25:
-                    forwarded["timeout_sec"] = 25
-                remote_name = "bash_exec"
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, remote_name, forwarded)
-            if remote_name == "run_job":
-                err = remote_tool_error(res)
-                if err:
-                    is_error = True
-                    content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-                else:
-                    content_text = format_job_started(res, forwarded)
-            else:
-                content_text, is_error = format_command_result(res, remote_name)
-        elif name == "job_output":
-            # Gateway-level guard: call_remote_tool gives up after 28s, keep wait below it.
-            wait_ms = args.get("wait_ms")
-            if isinstance(wait_ms, (int, float)) and wait_ms > 20000:
-                args = dict(args)
-                args["wait_ms"] = 20000
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                parts = [f"[status={res.get('status')} exit_code={res.get('exit_code')} duration={res.get('duration')}]"]
-                stdout = res.get("stdout") or ""
-                stderr = res.get("stderr") or ""
-                if stdout:
-                    parts.append(stdout)
-                if stderr:
-                    parts.append(f"[STDERR]\n{stderr}")
-                if res.get("next_cursor") is not None:
-                    parts.append(f"... output truncated; continue with cursor={res.get('next_cursor')}")
-                content_text = "\n\n".join(parts)
-        elif name == "job_kill":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                content_text = f"Job {args.get('job_id', '')}: status={res.get('status')} (ok={res.get('ok')})"
-        elif name == "job_list":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                jobs = res.get("jobs") or []
-                if not jobs:
-                    content_text = "No jobs."
-                else:
-                    lines = ["job_id | status | exit_code | duration | started_at | command"]
-                    for j in jobs:
-                        if not isinstance(j, dict):
-                            continue
-                        lines.append(
-                            "{job_id} | {status} | {exit_code} | {duration} | {started_at} | {command}".format(
-                                job_id=j.get("job_id", ""),
-                                status=j.get("status", ""),
-                                exit_code=j.get("exit_code"),
-                                duration=j.get("duration"),
-                                started_at=j.get("started_at", ""),
-                                command=j.get("command", ""),
-                            )
-                        )
-                    content_text = "\n".join(lines)
-        elif name in ("share_file", "serve_dir"):
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                content_text = (
-                    "Published. Public link: {url}\n"
-                    "Anyone with this link can read it - the random part of the path is the credential. "
-                    "Revoke it with unshare(name=\"{name}\") when it is no longer needed.\n"
-                    "Local URL on the node: {local}"
-                ).format(url=res.get("url", ""), name=res.get("name", ""),
-                         local=res.get("local_url", ""))
-        elif name == "share_list":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                shares = res.get("shares") or []
-                if not shares:
-                    content_text = "No active shares."
-                else:
-                    lines = ["kind | name | url | running"]
-                    for item in shares:
-                        if isinstance(item, dict):
-                            lines.append("{kind} | {name} | {url} | {running}".format(
-                                kind=item.get("kind", ""), name=item.get("name", ""),
-                                url=item.get("url", ""), running=item.get("running")))
-                    content_text = "\n".join(lines)
-        elif name == "unshare":
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                content_text = (
-                    "Revoked share '{name}' ({slug}). Server stopped={stopped}, files removed={removed}."
-                ).format(name=res.get("name", ""), slug=res.get("slug", ""),
-                         stopped=res.get("server_stopped"), removed=res.get("files_removed"))
-        elif name in DEVICE_TOOLS:
-            res = await call_remote_tool(user, name, args)
-            err = remote_tool_error(res)
-            if err:
-                is_error = True
-                content_text = f"[Error] {err}"
-            else:
-                content_text = _format_device_result(name, res)
-        else:
-            resp["error"] = {"code": -32601, "message": f"Unknown tool: {name}"}
-            broadcast_sse(user, resp)
-            session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-            return JSONResponse(
-                resp,
-                headers={
-                    "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-                    "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                    "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                    "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                }
-            )
-
-        # Size guard for the Gemini Web turn budget. The node already paginates
-        # via next_cursor, so the gateway must NOT cut the middle out: that would
-        # break byte-exact continuation. Keep the head and say how to get the
-        # rest, so the model can ask for the next page instead of losing data.
-        MAX_GATEWAY_TEXT = 45000
-        if len(content_text) > MAX_GATEWAY_TEXT:
-            kept = content_text[:MAX_GATEWAY_TEXT]
-            omitted = len(content_text) - MAX_GATEWAY_TEXT
-            content_text = (
-                f"{kept}\n\n... [Output truncated by the gateway: {omitted} more characters. "
-                f"Do not re-run the command; the node can page the rest: call the same tool again "
-                f"with cursor=<next_cursor> and a larger max_chars, or read the saved file if the "
-                f"result reported one.] ..."
-            )
-
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": content_text}],
-            "isError": is_error
-        }
-    elif method == "prompts/list":
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "prompts": [{"name": "antigravity-orchestrator", "description": f"Orchestrator role for {user}"}]
-        }
-    elif method == "prompts/get":
-        skill_text = get_skill(user, request.headers.get("host", PUBLIC_HOST))
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "description": "Antigravity Orchestrator Persona",
-            "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": {"type": "text", "text": skill_text}}]
-        }
-    elif method == "resources/list":
-        resp["result"] = {
-            "resources": [{
-                "uri": "resource://skills/orchestrator.md",
-                "name": "orchestrator.md",
-                "mimeType": "text/markdown"
-            }]
-        }
-    elif method == "resources/read":
-        uri = params.get("uri")
-        if uri == "resource://skills/orchestrator.md":
-            text = get_skill(user, request.headers.get("host", PUBLIC_HOST))
-            resp["result"] = {"contents": [{"uri": uri, "mimeType": "text/markdown", "text": text}]}
-        else:
-            resp["error"] = {"code": -32602, "message": f"Resource not found: {uri}"}
-            broadcast_sse(user, resp)
-            session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-            return JSONResponse(
-                resp,
-                headers={
-                    "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-                    "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                    "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                    "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                }
-            )
-    else:
-        resp["error"] = {"code": -32601, "message": f"Method not found: {method}"}
-
-    # Delivery channel. The answer always goes in the HTTP body; duplicating it on
-    # the caller's stream is what makes a strict client see one response id twice
-    # and drop the session. Only the legacy transports (POST /messages, or
-    # LEGACY_SSE which answers 202 with no body) are delivered on the stream.
-    path = request.url.path
-    if should_broadcast_response(path):
-        broadcast_sse(user, resp)
-    else:
-        logger.info(f"response [{method} id={req_id}] answered in the POST body only "
-                    f"(no stream duplicate)")
-
-    if method == "tools/call":
-        # Duration matters: Gemini's frontend gives a tool call roughly 30 s, so a
-        # slow command shows up here before it shows up as a client-side timeout.
-        logger.info(f"tools/call {params.get('name')} took {time.monotonic() - call_started:.2f}s")
-
-    # Return response in HTTP body (for Streamable HTTP clients) with Mcp-Session-Id header.
-    # A client that asks ONLY for text/event-stream must get an SSE-framed body:
-    # a strict streamable-HTTP client rejects application/json even when the
-    # payload itself is correct.
-    # The id we issued at initialize must be the one the client sees here, or the
-    # client believes it holds a different session than the one it opened.
-    session_id = issued_session_id or resolve_session_id(request, user)
-    headers = {
-        "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-        "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-        "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-        "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-    }
-    wants_sse_only = ("text/event-stream" in accept_hdr) and ("application/json" not in accept_hdr)
-    if wants_sse_only:
-        payload = "event: message\ndata: %s\n\n" % json.dumps(resp, ensure_ascii=False)
-        headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-cache"
-        return Response(payload, media_type="text/event-stream", headers=headers)
-
-    if (LEGACY_SSE and method != "initialize"
-            and "text/event-stream" in accept_hdr and active_sse_subscribers.get(user)):
-        # The client is holding a stream and reads the answer there, so a body
-        # would be a second copy of the same response. 202 Accepted with no body
-        # is what the legacy SSE transport prescribes; the broadcast above has
-        # already queued the message on the stream.
-        #
-        # `initialize` is deliberately excluded: with it answered 202 the client
-        # never learns the session id or the negotiated version, and the observed
-        # result was a pure initialise/DELETE loop with no tool call at all.
-        logger.info(f"legacy-SSE mode: answering {method} with 202, result goes to the stream")
-        return Response(status_code=202, headers=headers)
-
-    return JSONResponse(resp, headers=headers)
-
-async def mcp_unified_endpoint(request: Request):
-    if request.method == "OPTIONS":
-        return Response(
-            status_code=204,
-            headers={
-                "Allow": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS, HEAD",
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS, HEAD",
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-            }
-        )
-    if request.method == "DELETE":
-        ok, msg, user = verify_token(request)
-        if not ok:
-            return JSONResponse(
-                {"error": "unauthorized", "message": msg},
-                status_code=401,
-                headers={
-                    "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                    "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                    "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                }
-            )
-        client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
-        session_id = resolve_session_id(request, user)
-        logger.info(f"Session teardown (DELETE) from {client_ip} [{user}] session_id={session_id[:12]}…")
-
-        # Forget the session we issued for this connection. Streams live under
-        # their own per-connection key, so a teardown can never close a stream
-        # that another in-flight request is still reading.
-        active_sessions.pop(session_id, None)
-
-        # Clean up session queue if active. The lookup stays keyed per connection
-        # (see above): a DELETE closes the stream whose key it names, never
-        # another connection's. The queue is unregistered from the per-user list
-        # and the session index here as well, so /health stays truthful even if
-        # the stream generator never resumes to run its own cleanup.
-        if session_id in active_sse_sessions:
-            q = active_sse_sessions.pop(session_id, None)
-            if q is not None:
-                try:
-                    q.put_nowait(None)
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-                forget_sse_queue(user, q)
-
-        return Response(
-            status_code=204,
-            headers={
-                "mcp-session-id": session_id,
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS, HEAD",
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-            }
-        )
-    if request.method in ("GET", "HEAD"):
-        path = request.url.path
-        if path == "/messages":
-            ok, msg, user = verify_token(request)
-            if not ok:
-                return JSONResponse(
-                    {"error": "unauthorized", "message": msg},
-                    status_code=401,
-                    headers={
-                        "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                        "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                        "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-                    }
-                )
-            accept = (request.headers.get("accept") or "").lower()
-            client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
-            logger.info(
-                f"GET /messages from {client_ip} [{user}] accept={accept[:60]!r} "
-                f"-> {'sse-stream' if 'text/event-stream' in accept else 'json-ready'}"
-            )
-            # Some MCP clients (Gemini Spark among them) open the message endpoint
-            # itself as the server->client stream instead of /sse. Answering that
-            # with a small JSON body closes the stream immediately, which makes the
-            # client drop the session and re-initialise in a loop. Serve a real SSE
-            # stream when the caller asks for one, and keep the JSON readiness probe
-            # for plain health checks.
-            if "text/event-stream" in accept:
-                return await sse_endpoint(request)
-            return JSONResponse({
-                "status": "ready",
-                "endpoint": "messages",
-                "user": user
-            }, headers={
-                "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-                "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-                "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user)
-            })
-        return await sse_endpoint(request)
-    if request.method == "POST":
-        return await messages_endpoint(request)
-    return Response(
-        status_code=405,
-        headers={
-            "Allow": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS, HEAD",
-            "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
-            "Access-Control-Expose-Headers": "mcp-session-id, mcp-protocol-version",
-            "mcp-protocol-version": protocol_version_for(user),
-        }
-    )
-
-async def ws_tunnel_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
-    query = websocket.query_params
-    user = query.get("user", "").lower()
-    token = query.get("token", "")
-    registry = load_registry()
-
-    if not user or user not in registry or not tokens_equal(token, registry[user].get("token", "")):
-        await websocket.close(code=4001, reason="Unauthorized")
-        return
-
-    # Cleanly terminate any prior websocket and fail pending futures for this user
-    old_tunnel = active_tunnels.get(user)
-    if old_tunnel:
-        for r_id, fut in list(old_tunnel.get("pending", {}).items()):
-            if not fut.done():
-                fut.set_exception(ConnectionResetError("Tunnel reconnected"))
-        if old_tunnel.get("ws"):
-            try:
-                await old_tunnel["ws"].close(code=1000, reason="Superceded by new connection")
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-
-    await websocket.accept()
-    logger.info(f"Agent tunnel connected for user '{user}'")
-    tunnel_data = {"ws": websocket, "pending": {}}
-    active_tunnels[user] = tunnel_data
-    # The agent is connected: this is the timestamp /health reports as
-    # last_tunnel_seen, and the event that tells a reboot apart from a flap.
-    record_tunnel_event("connect", user, "agent connected")
-
-    disconnect_reason = "tunnel closed"
-    try:
-        while True:
-            raw = await websocket.receive_text()
-            try:
-                msg = json.loads(raw)
-            except Exception:
-                continue
-            req_id = msg.get("id")
-            if req_id and req_id in tunnel_data["pending"]:
-                fut = tunnel_data["pending"].pop(req_id)
-                if not fut.done():
-                    fut.set_result(msg)
-    except WebSocketDisconnect:
-        disconnect_reason = "websocket disconnected"
-        logger.info(f"Agent tunnel disconnected for user '{user}'")
-    except Exception as exc:
-        disconnect_reason = f"tunnel error: {type(exc).__name__}"
-        logger.warning(f"Agent tunnel error for user '{user}': {exc}")
-        raise
-    finally:
-        if active_tunnels.get(user, {}).get("ws") == websocket:
-            active_tunnels.pop(user, None)
-            # Only the tunnel that is still the active one is reported here: if
-            # the watchdog already removed it as stale, or a newer connection
-            # replaced it, that path has its own event and this one is noise.
-            record_tunnel_event("disconnect", user, disconnect_reason)
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Public file shares: GET/HEAD <shared-domain>/<node>/<name>-<secret>/...
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# The node runs a loopback-only static server (core/web_share.py) and this route
-# relays the request over the existing tunnel; no port is ever opened on the
-# node. Only read methods are proxied, the 16-hex suffix is the share secret and
-# a node that is not connected fails fast with 503 instead of blocking on the
-# tunnel retry loop. The slug shape is duplicated from core/web_share.py on
-# purpose: the gateway deploys as a single file and must not import node code.
-SHARE_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}-[0-9a-f]{16}$")
-SHARE_METHODS = ("GET", "HEAD")
-# The node is trusted, but a corrupted or buggy reply must not be able to inject
-# response headers. An allow-list (not a deny-list) also keeps a compromised node
-# from setting cookies on the shared domain or adding headers this route never
-# means to expose; control characters are stripped and values are forced through
-# latin-1, which is what Starlette encodes headers with.
-_RELAY_HEADERS = (
-    "content-type", "content-disposition", "last-modified", "etag",
-    "cache-control", "location", "accept-ranges", "content-length",
-)
-_HEADER_VALUE_RE = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]")
-_CONTENT_LENGTH_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,12}$")
-
-
-def _relay_headers(raw) -> dict:
-    headers = {}
-    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
-        return headers
-    for key, value in raw.items():
-        name = str(key).strip().lower()
-        if name not in _RELAY_HEADERS:
-            continue
-        text = _HEADER_VALUE_RE.sub("", str(value))[:4096]
-        text = text.encode("latin-1", "replace").decode("latin-1")
-        if name == "location" and not text.startswith("/"):
-            continue  # a redirect must stay inside this domain's share namespace
-        headers[name] = text
-    return headers
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Confirmation policy: what goes through a tool the client confirms
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# bash_exec, run_job, write_file and edit_file are advertised with
-# readOnlyHint=true (see the policy below), and Gemini Spark - like any client
-# that keys its approval dialog on that hint - runs them without asking. That
-# promise is kept for the classes the operator wants gated, each with a confirmed
-# twin the model is told to use instead:
-#
-#   install / delete   software is installed or removed, data is deleted
-#                      -> system_change
-#   sudo               the command escalates privileges (sudo/doas/pkexec/runas)
-#                      -> system_change
-#   system             a system path or the registry is modified
-#                      -> system_change (shell) or system_write (file content)
-#
-# The shell check is deliberately conservative: a verb has to sit at the start of a
-# command segment, after stripping sudo/env/timeout/`powershell -Command`
-# prefixes, so `echo "rm -rf /"`, `grep rm notes.txt` and `git log --grep install`
-# all still run. It is a UX gate, not a sandbox - MESH_READ_ONLY on the node is the
-# hard boundary.
-_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[;&|\n]+")
-_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
-    r"^\s*(?:(?:sudo|doas|command|nohup|env|time|nice|"
-    r"timeout\s+\d+(?:\.\d+)?|"
-    r"(?:powershell|pwsh)(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+-[\w:]+)*|"
-    r"cmd(?:\.exe)?\s+/[cCkK]|"
-    r"&\s+|start\s+)\s+|\w+=\S+\s+)*"
-)
-INSTALL_COMMAND_PATTERNS = (
-    r"apt(?:-get)?\s+(?:install|remove|purge|autoremove|dist-upgrade|full-upgrade)\b",
-    r"aptitude\s+(?:install|remove|purge)\b",
-    r"dnf\s+(?:install|remove|erase|update|upgrade|autoremove|groupinstall)\b",
-    r"yum\s+(?:install|remove|erase|update|upgrade|groupinstall)\b",
-    r"zypper\s+(?:install|remove|rm|update|up|dup|patch)\b",
-    r"pacman\s+-[A-Za-z]*[SR][A-Za-z]*\b",
-    r"apk\s+(?:add|del|delete)\b",
-    r"brew\s+(?:install|uninstall|remove|upgrade|reinstall)\b",
-    r"(?:pip|pip3|pipx)\s+(?:install|uninstall)\b",
-    r"(?:python|python3|py)\s+-m\s+pip\s+(?:install|uninstall)\b",
-    r"(?:npm|pnpm|yarn)\s+(?:install|i|ci|add|uninstall|remove|rm|up|upgrade)\b",
-    r"winget\s+(?:install|uninstall|upgrade)\b",
-    r"(?:choco|scoop)\s+(?:install|uninstall|upgrade|remove)\b",
-    r"(?:snap|flatpak)\s+(?:install|remove|uninstall|refresh|update)\b",
-    r"(?:gem|cargo|dotnet)\s+(?:install|uninstall|tool\s+(?:install|uninstall)|"
-    r"add\s+package|remove\s+package)\b",
-    r"go\s+install\b",
-    r"msiexec(?:\.exe)?\s+/[ix]\b",
-    r"dpkg\s+-[A-Za-z]*[irP][A-Za-z]*\b",
-    r"rpm\s+-[A-Za-z]*[ieU][A-Za-z]*\b",
-    r"(?:install|uninstall)-(?:module|package|script|psresource|windowsfeature)\b",
-    r"(?:add|remove)-(?:appxpackage|windowsoptionalfeature|windowsfeature|"
-    r"provisionedappxpackage)\b",
-    r"\b(?:iex|invoke-expression)\b",
-)
-DELETE_COMMAND_PATTERNS = (
-    r"rm\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*\S",
-    r"(?:rmdir|rd|unlink|shred|srm)\s+\S",
-    r"(?:del|erase)\s+\S",
-    r"deltree\b",
-    r"remove-item\b",
-    r"ri\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*\S",
-    r"clear-content\b",
-    r"remove-itemproperty\b",
-    r"(?:format-volume|clear-disk|remove-partition)\b",
-    r"(?:mkfs(?:\.\w+)?|wipefs|blkdiscard|fdisk|parted)\b",
-    r"dd\s+",
-    r"truncate\s+-s\s*0\b",
-    r"git\s+clean\s+-\S*[fdx]",
-    r"git\s+rm\b",
-    r"docker\s+(?:rm|rmi)\b",
-    r"docker\s+(?:system|volume|image|container|builder)\s+prune\b",
-    r"kubectl\s+delete\b",
-    r"vssadmin\s+delete\b",
-    r"bcdedit\s+/delete\b",
-    r"(?:userdel|groupdel|deluser|delgroup)\b",
-)
-_INSTALL_RE = re.compile("|".join(INSTALL_COMMAND_PATTERNS), re.IGNORECASE)
-_DELETE_RE = re.compile("|".join(DELETE_COMMAND_PATTERNS), re.IGNORECASE)
-# `curl … | sh` is the installer idiom and never looks like a package manager.
-_PIPE_TO_SHELL_RE = re.compile(
-    r"\b(?:curl|wget)\b[^|]*\|\s*(?:sudo\s+)?(?:ba|z|k)?sh\b", re.IGNORECASE
-)
-# Privilege escalation: the operator asked to be asked whenever the agent reaches
-# for root, whatever the command does with it.
-_PRIVILEGE_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?:^|[;&|\n])\s*(?:sudo|doas|gsudo|pkexec|runas)\b"
-    r"|\bsu\s+-\S"
-    r"|\bStart-Process\b[^\n]*?-Verb\s+RunAs",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
-)
-# Paths that belong to the system, not to the user's work: the operator asked to be
-# asked before these are modified. Reads (`cat /etc/os-release`, `ls /usr/bin`) are
-# not gated - only a mutation of them is.
-SYSTEM_PATH_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?:"
-    r"/(?:etc|usr|bin|sbin|lib|lib64|boot|dev|proc|sys|opt|root)(?:/|\b)"
-    r"|/var/(?:lib|log|spool|cache|www)(?:/|\b)"
-    r"|[A-Za-z]:\\+(?:Windows|ProgramData)(?:\\|\b)"
-    r"|[A-Za-z]:\\+Program Files(?:\s*\(x86\))?(?:\\|\b)"
-    r"|%(?:SystemRoot|ProgramFiles|ProgramData|windir)%"
-    r"|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM\\+"
-    r")",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
-)
-# What "modifies" means for the test above.
-SYSTEM_MUTATION_PATTERNS = (
-    r"rm|rmdir|unlink|shred|mv|cp|install|chmod|chown|chgrp|mkdir|rmdir|touch|ln|"
-    r"truncate|dd|mount|umount|tee|sed\s+-i|patch|dpkg|rpm|apt(?:-get)?|"
-    r"(?:systemctl|service)\s+(?:start|stop|restart|reload|enable|disable|mask|unmask|"
-    r"daemon-reload|set-property)|"
-    r"crontab|visudo|passwd|user(?:add|mod|del)|group(?:add|mod|del)|"
-    r"reg\s+(?:add|delete|import|copy|restore|save|load|unload)|"
-    r"sc\s+(?:config|create|delete|start|stop)|netsh|schtasks|icacls|takeown|attrib|"
-    r"new-item|set-content|add-content|out-file|remove-item|move-item|copy-item|"
-    r"rename-item|new-itemproperty|set-itemproperty|clear-content|set-acl|"
-    r"(?:start|stop|restart|new|set|remove)-service"
-)
-_SYSTEM_MUTATION_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?<![\w.-])(?:%s)(?![\w.-])" % SYSTEM_MUTATION_PATTERNS, re.IGNORECASE
-)
-# A redirection that writes straight into a system path.
-_REDIRECT_TO_SYSTEM_RE = re.compile(
-    r">>?\s*[\"']?(?:"
-    r"/(?:etc|usr|bin|sbin|lib|lib64|boot|dev|proc|sys|opt|root)(?:/|\b)"
-    r"|/var/(?:lib|log|spool|cache|www)(?:/|\b)"
-    r"|[A-Za-z]:\\+(?:Windows|ProgramData)(?:\\|\b)"
-    r"|[A-Za-z]:\\+Program Files(?:\s*\(x86\))?(?:\\|\b)"
-    r")",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
-)
-_TRUE_VALUES = ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
-
-
-def _wants_background(args) -> bool:
-    """True when the caller asked for system_change in the background."""
-    if not isinstance(args, dict):
-        return False
-    value = args.get("background")
-    if isinstance(value, bool):
-        return value
-    return str(value or "").strip().lower() in _TRUE_VALUES
-
-
-def classify_command(command) -> str:
-    """Return "install", "delete", "sudo", "system" or "" for a shell command.
-
-    "" means the command may run in the unconfirmed tools; anything else has to go
-    through system_change, where the client asks the user first. The most specific
-    reason wins, so `sudo apt install x` reports the install, not the sudo.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
-        return ""
-    if _PIPE_TO_SHELL_RE.search(command):
-        return "install"
-    for segment in _SEGMENT_RE.split(command):
-        stripped = _PREFIX_RE.sub("", segment).strip().lstrip("\"'`").lstrip()
-        if not stripped:
-            continue
-        if _INSTALL_RE.match(stripped):
-            return "install"
-        if _DELETE_RE.match(stripped):
-            return "delete"
-    if _PRIVILEGE_RE.search(command):
-        return "sudo"
-    if SYSTEM_PATH_RE.search(command) and (
-            _SYSTEM_MUTATION_RE.search(command) or _REDIRECT_TO_SYSTEM_RE.search(command)):
-        return "system"
-    return ""
-
-
-def is_system_path(path) -> bool:
-    """True when *path* points into the system rather than the user's own files."""
-    if not isinstance(path, str) or not path.strip():
-        return False
-    return bool(SYSTEM_PATH_RE.search(path.strip()))
-
-
-def command_confirmation_message(command: str, kind: str, tool: str) -> str:
-    """The refusal a model gets instead of running a gated command unconfirmed."""
-    what = {
-        "install": "installs or removes software",
-        "delete": "deletes data",
-        "sudo": "runs with elevated privileges",
-        "system": "changes a system path",
-    }.get(kind, "is a system change")
-    return (
-        f"[Confirmation required] This command {what}, so it was not run.\n"
-        f"{tool} is advertised as read-only and therefore runs without a confirmation "
-        f"dialog; the operator's rule is to be asked before anything is installed, "
-        f"deleted, run as root, or written into a system path. Call system_change with "
-        f"the same command - that tool is advertised as destructive, so the user is "
-        f"asked to confirm it first.\n"
-        f"command: {command.strip() if isinstance(command, str) else command}\n"
-        f"Do not rephrase, split, encode or otherwise obfuscate the command to get around "
-        f"this; route it through system_change."
-    )
-
-
-def path_confirmation_message(path: str, tool: str) -> str:
-    """The refusal for write_file/edit_file aimed at a system path."""
-    return (
-        f"[Confirmation required] {path} is a system path, so it was not written.\n"
-        f"{tool} is advertised as read-only and runs without a confirmation dialog; the "
-        f"operator's rule is to be asked before anything outside their own files is "
-        f"changed. Use system_write(path=..., content=...) instead - it is advertised as "
-        f"destructive, so the user is asked to confirm the write first.\n"
-        f"path: {path}"
-    )
-
-
-def format_command_result(res, name: str):
-    """(text, is_error) for a bash_exec / system_change / list_dir / read_file reply."""
-    if "error" in res:
-        return (f"[Execution Error]: {res.get('error')}", True)
-    is_error = False
-    exit_code = res.get("exit_code", 0)
-    # Never strip: a paginated chunk must survive byte-exact so the
-    # client can rebuild the output by following next_cursor.
-    stdout = res.get("stdout", "")
-    stderr = res.get("stderr", "")
-    if exit_code != 0:
-        is_error = True
-        # A non-zero exit code is the command's own result, not a
-        # transport failure: the command RAN on the host. Without this
-        # wording a model reads isError=true as "the node is
-        # unreachable" and stops looking for the real output.
-        parts = [
-            f"[Exit code: {exit_code}] The command ran on the host and the node "
-            f"is reachable; {exit_code} is the command's own exit status."
-        ]
-        if stderr.strip():
-            parts.append(stderr)
-        if stdout.strip():
-            parts.append(stdout)
-        content_text = "\n".join(parts) if parts else f"[Exit code: {exit_code}]"
-    else:
-        parts = []
-        if stdout:
-            parts.append(stdout)
-        if stderr:
-            parts.append(f"[STDERR]\n{stderr}")
-        content_text = "\n\n".join(parts) if parts else "(Command executed successfully with no output)"
-    # Surface node-side pagination/spooling so the model knows there is more.
-    if isinstance(res, dict):
-        if res.get("next_cursor") is not None:
-            content_text += (
-                f"\n\n[output continues on the node: call {name} again with "
-                f"cursor={res.get('next_cursor')} (optionally a larger max_chars)]"
-            )
-        if res.get("saved_to"):
-            content_text += f"\n\n[full output saved on the node at {res['saved_to']}]"
-    return (content_text, is_error)
-
-
-def format_job_started(res, args) -> str:
-    """The reply for run_job and for system_change(background=true)."""
-    job_id = res.get("job_id", "")
-    return (
-        f"Started job {job_id} (pid {res.get('pid')})\n"
-        f"command: {res.get('command', (args or {}).get('command', ''))}\n"
-        f"Use job_output(job_id=\"{job_id}\") to poll progress; "
-        f"use job_kill(job_id=\"{job_id}\") to stop it."
-    )
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# MCP tool annotations: when the client may run a tool without asking first
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Gemini Spark reads ``Tool.annotations`` from ``tools/list`` to decide whether it
-# must stop and ask the user "confirm this action?" before a call. The spec's
-# defaults are pessimistic (readOnlyHint false, destructiveHint true), so a tool
-# advertised with no annotations is treated as destructive and *every* call was
-# confirmed. Declaring the hints explicitly keeps the prompt for the calls the
-# operator wants confirmed - installing/deleting, sudo, system paths - and removes
-# it from everything else.
-#
-# This table is the gateway's own: the gateway deploys as one file and may not
-# import node code, so tests/test_gateway_share_route.py compares the advertised
-# hints with the node's TOOLS. The differences are deliberate and pinned there:
-# system_change and system_write exist only here (they are translated to
-# bash_exec/run_job/write_file before the node sees them), and every tool this
-# gateway silences is still advertised honestly by the node, whose own surface has
-# no classifier to keep the read-only claim true.
-_ANNOT_READ_ONLY = {
-    "readOnlyHint": True,
-    "destructiveHint": False,
-    "idempotentHint": True,
-    "openWorldHint": False,
-}
-#: Tools that change something but are deliberately left without a dialog: file
-#: writes the operator asked not to confirm, and the unconfirmed shell pair whose
-#: gated classes are refused by classify_command() above.
-_ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE = {
-    "readOnlyHint": True,
-    "destructiveHint": False,
-    "idempotentHint": False,
-    "openWorldHint": False,
-}
-_ANNOT_LOCAL_WRITE = {
-    "readOnlyHint": False,
-    "destructiveHint": False,
-    "idempotentHint": False,
-    "openWorldHint": False,
-}
-#: Publishing hands out a password-like public link, so the client is told the
-#: tool reaches outside the host (openWorldHint). It is still not destructive.
-_ANNOT_PUBLISH = {
-    "readOnlyHint": True,
-    "destructiveHint": False,
-    "idempotentHint": False,
-    "openWorldHint": True,
-}
-_ANNOT_DESTRUCTIVE = {
-    "readOnlyHint": False,
-    "destructiveHint": True,
-    "idempotentHint": False,
-    "openWorldHint": False,
-}
-#: Camera, microphone, location, SMS and contacts. They delete nothing, so
-#: "destructive" is not literally true - but ``destructiveHint`` is the only hint
-#: clients such as Gemini Spark reliably turn into a "confirm this action?" prompt,
-#: and these calls observe the physical world (or a person's private messages)
-#: without the operator being able to see it happen. Marking them destructive is
-#: therefore the honest safety choice, and it is documented in the README.
-_ANNOT_SENSITIVE = {
-    "readOnlyHint": False,
-    "destructiveHint": True,
-    "idempotentHint": False,
-    "openWorldHint": False,
-}
-
-#: Confirmation policy per advertised tool; names must match core/mcp_tools.TOOLS.
-#: A tool left out stays unannotated on purpose and therefore asks for
-#: confirmation - the safe default for something nobody has judged yet.
-TOOL_ANNOTATIONS = {
-    # read-only: looking around never needs a prompt
-    "mesh_status": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "system_info": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "system_vitals": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "get_orchestration_skill": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "list_dir": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "read_file": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "grep_search": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "glob_find": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "job_output": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "job_list": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "share_list": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    "device_info": _ANNOT_READ_ONLY,
-    # Commands run without a dialog; classify_command() refuses the gated classes
-    # (install/delete, sudo, system paths) and routes them to system_change.
-    "bash_exec": _ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE,
-    "run_job": _ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE,
-    # Files are written without a dialog too; a write into a system path is refused
-    # and routed to system_write, which the user confirms.
-    "write_file": _ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE,
-    "edit_file": _ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE,
-    # Stopping a job is neither an install nor a delete, and bash_exec can
-    # terminate the same process anyway, so no prompt is spent on it.
-    "job_kill": _ANNOT_UNCONFIRMED_WRITE,
-    # Reversible actions on the node's own device (torch, volume, TTS, ...): they
-    # change state, but nothing is deleted, nothing is gated and nothing leaves the
-    # host. The node advertises the same hints and a test compares the two, so this
-    # stays the plain local-write profile rather than the classifier-backed one.
-    "device_control": _ANNOT_LOCAL_WRITE,
-    # publishing something on the internet: no dialog either, but the client is told
-    # the tool reaches outside the host
-    "share_file": _ANNOT_PUBLISH,
-    "serve_dir": _ANNOT_PUBLISH,
-    # destructive: install/delete, sudo, system paths -> confirm first
-    "system_change": _ANNOT_DESTRUCTIVE,
-    "system_write": _ANNOT_DESTRUCTIVE,
-    "mesh_update": _ANNOT_DESTRUCTIVE,
-    "unshare": _ANNOT_DESTRUCTIVE,
-    # sensitive: observing the world or a person's private messages. Nothing is
-    # deleted, but the client must always ask - see _ANNOT_SENSITIVE above.
-    "device_capture": _ANNOT_SENSITIVE,
-    "device_messages": _ANNOT_SENSITIVE,
-}
-
-
-def annotate_tools(tools):
-    """Return *tools* with the confirmation policy attached to each entry."""
-    annotated = []
-    for tool in tools:
-        profile = TOOL_ANNOTATIONS.get(tool.get("name"))
-        if profile is None:
-            annotated.append(tool)
-            continue
-        tool = dict(tool)
-        tool["annotations"] = dict(profile)
-        annotated.append(tool)
-    return annotated
-
-
-# Tool surface advertised for public shares. The gateway keeps its own static
-# tools/list (it must not import node code), so this list has to stay in step
-# with the node's core/mcp_tools.TOOLS; tests/test_gateway_share_route.py
-# compares the two surfaces to catch drift.
-SHARE_TOOL_SPECS = [
-    {
-        "name": "share_file",
-        "description": (
-            "Publish ONE local file on the internet through the gateway and return a public "
-            "HTTPS link (https://<domain>/<node>/<name>-<random>/<file>). Anyone with the link "
-            "can read it; revoke it with unshare when it is no longer needed."
-        ),
-        "inputSchema": {
-            "type": "object",
-            "properties": {
-                "path": {"type": "string", "description": "Path of the local file to publish."},
-                "name": {"type": "string", "description": "Human name in the URL (default: file name)."},
-                "overwrite": {"type": "boolean", "description": "Replace an existing share with the same name."},
-            },
-            "required": ["path"],
-        },
-    },
-    {
-        "name": "serve_dir",
-        "description": (
-            "Start a static web server for a local directory and return its public HTTPS link "
-            "(https://<domain>/<node>/<name>-<random>/). Served in place, read-only (GET/HEAD); "
-            "unshare stops it and the directory itself is never deleted."
-        ),
-        "inputSchema": {
-            "type": "object",
-            "properties": {
-                "path": {"type": "string", "description": "Local directory to serve."},
-                "name": {"type": "string", "description": "Human name in the URL (default: directory name)."},
-            },
-            "required": ["path"],
-        },
-    },
-    {
-        "name": "share_list",
-        "description": "List active public shares with their URLs and whether the local server is running.",
-        "inputSchema": {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []},
-    },
-    {
-        "name": "unshare",
-        "description": "Stop a public share and revoke its link (accepts the name, slug or full URL).",
-        "inputSchema": {
-            "type": "object",
-            "properties": {
-                "name": {"type": "string", "description": "Share name, slug or public URL from share_list."},
-            },
-            "required": ["name"],
-        },
-    },
-]
-
-
-# The node's own device: one relay branch in tools/call, one formatter. The four
-# names must match core/mcp_tools.TOOLS exactly (the same parity test as the
-# share tools above), and DEVICE_TOOLS is deliberately a tuple so the branch is a
-# single membership test instead of four elifs.
-#
-# core/mcp_tools.TOOLS is the source of truth for the device_* specs in tools/list
-# as well. Their descriptions and schemas above are copied from it verbatim; an
-# earlier draft of this file carried different prose, which the node's landed
-# version superseded. The node executes these calls and the client reads this
-# copy, so a wording difference here would be a lie the model acts on.
-DEVICE_TOOLS = ("device_info", "device_control", "device_capture", "device_messages")
-
-#: A device report is JSON by contract and ``device_info(section="all")`` can run
-#: to megabytes, so the gateway shows the head and names the way to ask for one
-#: block by itself - rather than cutting a table in the middle with no way back.
-DEVICE_REPORT_LIMIT = 8000
-
-
-def _device_report_lines(res):
-    """Render the device blocks of a ``system_info`` answer as readable lines.
-
-    The gateway used to print a fixed list of the original fields, which silently
-    dropped everything the device branch added - the client asked for the battery
-    and got a summary without it. Every block is rendered as either its facts or,
-    when the platform has no source for it, ``available: false`` with the reason and
-    the fix, because "not exposed here" and "0 %" must not look the same to a model.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(res, dict):
-        return []
-    lines = []
-    hint = res.get("device_hint")
-    if hint:
-        lines.append("\n[device] %s" % hint)
-
-    def block(name):
-        value = res.get(name)
-        return value if isinstance(value, dict) else None
-
-    def facts(name, fields, prefix=""):
-        value = block(name)
-        if value is None:
-            return
-        if value.get("available") is False:
-            line = "%s%s: not available - %s" % (prefix, name, value.get("reason") or "no reason given")
-            if value.get("fix"):
-                line += " (fix: %s)" % value["fix"]
-            lines.append(line)
-            return
-        shown = ["%s=%s" % (key, value[key]) for key in fields if value.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-        if shown:
-            lines.append("%s%s: %s" % (prefix, name, ", ".join(shown)))
-
-    device = block("device")
-    if device and device.get("available") is not False:
-        shown = [device.get(key) for key in ("class", "manufacturer", "model", "android_release")]
-        shown = [str(item) for item in shown if item]
-        if shown:
-            lines.append("\n[device] " + " ".join(shown))
-    facts("battery", ("percent", "status", "plugged", "temperature_c", "health",
-                      "time_remaining_s", "ac_online"))
-    network = block("network")
-    if network:
-        if network.get("available") is False:
-            facts("network", ())
-        else:
-            if network.get("signal"):
-                lines.append("signal: %s" % network["signal"])
-            shown = [network.get(key) for key in ("connected_kind", "interface_count",
-                                                  "default_route")]
-            shown = [str(item) for item in shown if item not in (None, "")]
-            if shown:
-                lines.append("network: " + ", ".join(shown))
-            wifi = network.get("wifi") or {}
-            if wifi:
-                detail = ["%s=%s" % (key, wifi[key]) for key in ("ssid", "rssi_dbm",
-                                                                 "link_speed_mbps", "frequency_mhz")
-                          if wifi.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-                if detail:
-                    lines.append("wifi: " + ", ".join(detail))
-            cellular = network.get("cellular") or {}
-            if cellular:
-                detail = ["%s=%s" % (key, cellular[key])
-                          for key in ("operator", "network_type", "signal_dbm", "level",
-                                      "roaming", "data_state")
-                          if cellular.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-                if detail:
-                    lines.append("cellular: " + ", ".join(detail))
-                if cellular.get("cellinfo_reason"):
-                    lines.append("cellular: %s" % cellular["cellinfo_reason"])
-    facts("locale", ("language", "region", "encoding"))
-    facts("time", ("iso_local", "utc_offset", "timezone", "abbreviation"))
-    hardware = block("hardware")
-    if hardware and hardware.get("available") is not False:
-        cpu = hardware.get("cpu") or {}
-        if cpu:
-            shown = ["%s=%s" % (key, cpu[key])
-                     for key in ("model", "cores", "freq_mhz_max", "temp_c", "load")
-                     if cpu.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-            if shown:
-                lines.append("cpu: " + ", ".join(shown))
-        memory = hardware.get("memory") or {}
-        if memory:
-            shown = ["%s=%s" % (key, memory[key])
-                     for key in ("total_mb", "used_mb", "free_mb", "used_pct", "swap_total_mb")
-                     if memory.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-            if shown:
-                lines.append("memory: " + ", ".join(shown))
-        thermal = hardware.get("thermal") or []
-        if thermal:
-            lines.append("thermal: " + ", ".join(
-                "%s=%s%s" % (item.get("name"), item.get("value"),
-                             item.get("unit") or "") for item in thermal[:6]
-                if isinstance(item, dict)))
-    storage = block("storage")
-    if storage:
-        if storage.get("available") is False:
-            facts("storage", ())
-        else:
-            shown = ["%s=%s" % (key, storage[key])
-                     for key in ("root", "total_gb", "free_gb", "used_pct", "shared",
-                                 "capture_dir")
-                     if storage.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-            if shown:
-                lines.append("storage: " + ", ".join(shown))
-            if storage.get("shared_fix"):
-                lines.append("storage: %s" % storage["shared_fix"])
-    for name, fields in (("cameras", ("count",)), ("microphones", ("count",)),
-                         ("sensors", ("count", "sampling"))):
-        value = block(name)
-        if value is None:
-            continue
-        if value.get("available") is False:
-            facts(name, ())
-            continue
-        shown = ["%s=%s" % (key, value[key]) for key in fields if value.get(key) not in (None, "")]
-        items = value.get(name) or value.get("sensors") or []
-        names = []
-        for item in items[:4] if isinstance(items, list) else []:
-            if isinstance(item, dict):
-                label = item.get("name") or item.get("facing") or item.get("id")
-                if label not in (None, ""):
-                    names.append(str(label))
-            elif isinstance(item, str):
-                names.append(item)
-        text = ", ".join(shown)
-        if names:
-            text = (text + " (" + ", ".join(names) + ")") if text else ", ".join(names)
-        if text:
-            lines.append("%s: %s" % (name, text))
-    capabilities = block("capabilities")
-    if capabilities:
-        api = capabilities.get("termux_api") or capabilities.get("api") or {}
-        if api:
-            lines.append("termux-api: installed=%s" % api.get("installed"))
-            if api.get("missing"):
-                lines.append("termux-api missing: %s" % ", ".join(api["missing"][:8]))
-        if capabilities.get("app_reachable") is False:
-            lines.append("termux-api app: not answering - %s"
-                         % (capabilities.get("app_fix") or "open the Termux:API app once"))
-        permissions = capabilities.get("permissions") or {}
-        denied = sorted(name for name, state in permissions.items() if state == "denied")
-        if denied:
-            lines.append("permissions denied: %s" % ", ".join(denied))
-    return lines
-
-
-def _format_device_result(name, res):
-    """Render one ``device_*`` answer for the model.
-
-    "Not available on this node" is deliberately NOT an error: on a Windows or
-    Linux laptop a phone-only action is the normal answer, the node reports it as
-    ``available: false`` with a reason (and often a fix), and reading that as a
-    crash would tell the model the host is broken when it is merely not a phone.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(res, dict):
-        return json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2, default=str)
-    if "error" in res:
-        # The relay already turns a real failure into isError; this keeps the text
-        # consistent with the other "[Error] ..." answers if this path is reached.
-        return "[Error] " + str(res.get("error"))
-    if res.get("available") is False:
-        lines = ["%s: not available on this node - %s"
-                 % (name, res.get("reason") or "this device does not expose it")]
-        if res.get("fix"):
-            lines.append("Fix: %s" % res.get("fix"))
-        return "\n".join(lines)
-    text = json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2, default=str)
-    if len(text) > DEVICE_REPORT_LIMIT:
-        text = text[:DEVICE_REPORT_LIMIT] + (
-            "\n... [device report truncated; call the tool again with section=<name> for one block]")
-    return text
-
-
-def _share_response(status: int, message: str, extra=None) -> Response:
-    headers = {"content-type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8", "cache-control": "no-store"}
-    if extra:
-        headers.update(extra)
-    return Response(message + "\n", status_code=status, headers=headers)
-
-async def public_share_endpoint(request: Request) -> Response:
-    """Relay one public share request to the node that owns it."""
-    user = (request.path_params.get("user") or "").strip().lower()
-    rest = (request.path_params.get("rest") or "").strip("/")
-    if not user or not rest:
-        return _share_response(404, "not found")
-    if user not in load_registry():
-        return _share_response(404, "not found")
-
-    slug, _, sub_path = rest.partition("/")
-    if not SHARE_SLUG_RE.match(slug):
-        return _share_response(404, "not found")
-
-    method = request.method.upper()
-    if method not in SHARE_METHODS:
-        return _share_response(405, "method not allowed", {"allow": "GET, HEAD"})
-    if user not in active_tunnels:
-        return _share_response(503, "node offline: the mesh agent on '%s' is not connected" % user)
-
-    result = await call_remote_tool(user, "_http_share", {
-        "slug": slug,
-        "path": "/" + sub_path,
-        "method": method,
-        "query": request.url.query or "",
-    })
-    if not isinstance(result, dict) or "status" not in result:
-        logger.warning("share relay for '%s' returned an invalid response: %r", user, result)
-        return _share_response(502, "bad gateway")
-    try:
-        status = int(result["status"])
-        body = base64.b64decode(result.get("body_b64") or "")
-    except Exception:
-        return _share_response(502, "bad gateway")
-    if not 200 <= status <= 599:
-        # 1xx is not a final response: h11 rejects it and the client gets no
-        # response at all, so a buggy node reply becomes a clean 502 instead.
-        return _share_response(502, "bad gateway")
-    headers = _relay_headers(result.get("headers"))
-    if status in (204, 304):
-        # These statuses must not carry a body or a Content-Length.
-        body = b""
-        headers.pop("content-length", None)
-    elif method == "HEAD":
-        # Keep the node's Content-Length - it describes the resource while the
-        # body is empty - but only a sane numeric value.
-        if not _CONTENT_LENGTH_RE.match(headers.get("content-length", "")):
-            headers.pop("content-length", None)
-    else:
-        # Never trust a declared length: a body that disagrees with
-        # Content-Length is a protocol error (h11 aborts the response).
-        headers["content-length"] = str(len(body))
-    return Response(content=body, status_code=status, headers=headers, media_type=None)
-
-
-routes = [
-    Route("/", health, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/health", health, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/health-mesh", health, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/api/register", api_register, methods=["POST", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", oauth_discovery, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/{path:path}", oauth_discovery, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-    Route("/sse", mcp_unified_endpoint, methods=["GET", "POST", "DELETE", "OPTIONS", "HEAD"]),
-    Route("/mcp", mcp_unified_endpoint, methods=["GET", "POST", "DELETE", "OPTIONS", "HEAD"]),
-    Route("/messages", mcp_unified_endpoint, methods=["GET", "POST", "DELETE", "OPTIONS", "HEAD"]),
-    WebSocketRoute("/ws/tunnel", ws_tunnel_endpoint),
-    # Public file shares. MUST stay last: it is a catch-all for two-segment
-    # paths and must never shadow /sse, /mcp, /health, /api/register or the
-    # WebSocket tunnel above.
-    Route("/{user}/{rest:path}", public_share_endpoint, methods=["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]),
-]
-
-middleware = [
-    Middleware(
-        CORSMiddleware,
-        allow_origins=["*"],
-        allow_methods=["*"],
-        allow_headers=["*"],
-        expose_headers=["mcp-session-id", "mcp-protocol-version"],
-    )
-]
-
-async def tunnel_watchdog():
-    """Background self-healing loop.
-
-    A websocket can die without a clean close (NAT timeout, host sleep). The entry
-    then stays in active_tunnels, so /health reports the node online while every
-    call hangs until the 28 s timeout. This loop removes such entries, prunes SSE
-    queues nobody consumes and keeps the state truthful.
-    """
-    logger.info("Self-heal watchdog started (30s interval)")
-    while True:
-        try:
-            await asyncio.sleep(30)
-            for user, tunnel in list(active_tunnels.items()):
-                ws = tunnel.get("ws")
-                state = getattr(getattr(ws, "client_state", None), "name", "UNKNOWN")
-                if ws is None or state not in ("CONNECTED",):
-                    logger.warning(f"Watchdog: removing stale tunnel for '{user}' (state={state})")
-                    for fut in list(tunnel.get("pending", {}).values()):
-                        if not fut.done():
-                            fut.set_exception(ConnectionResetError("Tunnel was stale"))
-                    active_tunnels.pop(user, None)
-                    # The stale path is a real disconnect: without this event the
-                    # history would show a connect with no matching disconnect
-                    # after a host reboot or a NAT timeout.
-                    record_tunnel_event("disconnect", user, f"stale tunnel (state={state})")
-            # drop subscriber queues that no stream is reading any more. The
-            # per-user container is an ordered list, so the surviving queues keep
-            # their order (oldest first) for the next cap eviction.
-            for user, queues in list(active_sse_subscribers.items()):
-                alive = [q for q in queues if not q.empty() or q in active_sse_sessions.values()]
-                if alive != queues:
-                    active_sse_subscribers[user] = alive
-                if not alive:
-                    active_sse_subscribers.pop(user, None)
-        except asyncio.CancelledError:
-            raise
-        except Exception as exc:                 # never let the watchdog die
-            logger.warning(f"Watchdog error: {exc}")
-
-
-@asynccontextmanager
-async def lifespan(_app):
-    """Start the self-healing watchdog with the app (modern Starlette API)."""
-    task = asyncio.create_task(tunnel_watchdog())
-    try:
-        yield
-    finally:
-        task.cancel()
-
-app = Starlette(debug=False, routes=routes, middleware=middleware, lifespan=lifespan)
-
-
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    # ws_max_size matters for public file shares: the node sends the base64
-    # payload through the tunnel as ONE websocket message, so uvicorn's 16 MiB
-    # default silently drops anything above ~12 MiB. 128 MiB carries the node's
-    # maximum share size (64 MiB -> ~85 MiB on the wire) with headroom.
-    uvicorn.run(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=8096, log_level="info",
-                timeout_graceful_shutdown=2, ws_max_size=128 * 1024 * 1024)