fullcourtdefense-cli 1.36.0 → 1.36.2

package/dist/commands/uninstallAll.js

@@ -33,11 +33,10 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
     };
 })();
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput = exports.findMsiProductCode = void 0;
 exports.listFcdConfigBackups = listFcdConfigBackups;
 exports.removeFcdConfigBackups = removeFcdConfigBackups;
 exports.purgeLocalState = purgeLocalState;
-exports.parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput = parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput;
-exports.findMsiProductCode = findMsiProductCode;
 exports.detachCommand = detachCommand;
 exports.reportUninstallToFleet = reportUninstallToFleet;
 exports.uninstallAllCommand = uninstallAllCommand;
@@ -62,6 +61,7 @@ const credentialStore_1 = require("../credentialStore");
 const machineKeyFile_1 = require("../machineKeyFile");
 const selfUpdate_1 = require("../selfUpdate");
 const backupManifest_1 = require("../backupManifest");
+const msiProductCode_1 = require("../msiProductCode");
 const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
 const GREEN = '\x1b[32m';
 const YELLOW = '\x1b[33m';
@@ -193,48 +193,9 @@ function purgeLocalState(config) {
     }
     return { failures };
 }
-/**
- * Product code of the installed FullCourtDefense MSI, from the registry
- * uninstall hive (both 64-bit and WOW6432Node views). Undefined on npm
- * installs or when the MSI entry is missing.
- */
-function parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput(output) {
-    // `reg query … /s /f FullCourtDefense /d` prints the matching key path line
-    // followed by its matching values. We want the {GUID} keyed entry whose
-    // DisplayName is FullCourtDefense.
-    const lines = output.split(/\r?\n/);
-    let currentGuid;
-    for (const line of lines) {
-        const keyMatch = line.match(/\\Uninstall\\(\{[0-9A-Fa-f-]{36}\})\s*$/);
-        if (keyMatch) {
-            currentGuid = keyMatch[1];
-            continue;
-        }
-        if (currentGuid && /DisplayName\s+REG_SZ\s+FullCourtDefense\s*$/i.test(line.trim())) {
-            return currentGuid;
-        }
-    }
-    return undefined;
-}
-function findMsiProductCode() {
-    if (process.platform !== 'win32')
-        return undefined;
-    const hives = [
-        'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall',
-        'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall',
-    ];
-    for (const hive of hives) {
-        const query = (0, child_process_1.spawnSync)('reg', ['query', hive, '/s', '/f', 'FullCourtDefense', '/d'], {
-            encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true, timeout: 30_000,
-        });
-        if (query.status !== 0 || !query.stdout)
-            continue;
-        const code = parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput(query.stdout);
-        if (code)
-            return code;
-    }
-    return undefined;
-}
+var msiProductCode_2 = require("../msiProductCode");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "findMsiProductCode", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return msiProductCode_2.findMsiProductCode; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return msiProductCode_2.parseMsiProductCodeFromRegOutput; } });
 /**
  * The shared local teardown: daemon autostart, self-heal schedule, MCP gateway
  * wraps, IDE hooks, terminal guards, and the daily discovery schedule. Each
@@ -405,7 +366,7 @@ async function uninstallAllCommand(args, config) {
         }
     }
     if (msiHandoff) {
-        const productCode = findMsiProductCode();
+        const productCode = (0, msiProductCode_1.findMsiProductCode)();
         if (productCode && launchMsiUninstall(productCode)) {
             console.log(`${GREEN}${BOLD}Local teardown done — Windows uninstaller launched.${RESET}`);
             console.log(`${DIM}Approve the Windows elevation prompt (UAC) to finish. That step removes the "FullCourtDefense Updater" SYSTEM task, the HKLM PowerShell audit policies FCD enabled, and the application files under Program Files.${RESET}`);

package/dist/config.d.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export interface PowershellHealth {
 export declare function getPowershellHealth(): PowershellHealth | undefined;
 /**
  * PowerShell language mode — the "is this a hardened WDAC/AppLocker fleet
- * machine?" bit that explained the lptx1110 incident. Spawned only on the
+ * machine?" bit that explained the devbox-01 incident. Spawned only on the
  * DPAPI failure path (and from the deep self-test), never on healthy runs.
  */
 export declare function capturePowershellLanguageMode(): string | undefined;

package/dist/config.js

@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ function getPowershellHealth() {
 }
 /**
  * PowerShell language mode — the "is this a hardened WDAC/AppLocker fleet
- * machine?" bit that explained the lptx1110 incident. Spawned only on the
+ * machine?" bit that explained the devbox-01 incident. Spawned only on the
  * DPAPI failure path (and from the deep self-test), never on healthy runs.
  */
 function capturePowershellLanguageMode() {
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ function unprotectShieldKeyForCurrentWindowsUser(value) {
     const result = powershellDpapi(exports.DPAPI_DECRYPT_SNIPPET, value);
     if (!result && value) {
         // The machine HAS a DPAPI-protected key it cannot read — the exact
-        // credential-broken state that 401-bricked lptx1110. Emit a coded
+        // credential-broken state that 401-bricked devbox-01. Emit a coded
         // distress signal so the fleet console sees it without asking the user.
         const health = powershellHealth;
         if (health && !health.spawnOk) {
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ function resolveCliCredentials(config, overrides = {}, options = {}) {
     lastCredentialTrace = { shieldKeySource, dpapiAttempted, at: new Date().toISOString() };
     // Self-healing migration: whenever the key still resolves through a legacy
     // source (DPAPI blob or plaintext config), copy it into the Credential
-    // Manager once. On fleets like lptx1110 the daemon's context CAN decrypt
+    // Manager once. On fleets like devbox-01 the daemon's context CAN decrypt
     // while IDE-spawned hooks CANNOT — after the daemon's first resolution the
     // native entry exists and every process reads it without PowerShell.
     if (shieldKey && resolvedShieldId

package/dist/credentialGrant.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * "Always allow" for a credential command, bound to where the credential goes (#1535).
+ *
+ * A grant under `gcloud_access_token_cmd` used to remember only programs
+ * (`curl`, `gcloud`), so for 30 days any line that minted a Google token and
+ * ran `curl` rode it — whatever host received the token. A credential grant
+ * now also binds:
+ *
+ *   - ISSUER rules (the command prints a token its own provider accepts:
+ *     gcloud / az access tokens, `gh auth token`, AWS keys): every host the line
+ *     sends to must sit under the issuer's domain (`*.googleapis.com`). The
+ *     2026-09-14 fix survives — `logging.` and `monitoring.googleapis.com`
+ *     share one grant — and a token sent anywhere else asks again.
+ *   - EXACT rules (the command reads a stored secret — Secret Manager, AWS
+ *     secrets, Vault, git / keychain / kubeconfig dumps): the store is not the
+ *     issuer of what it holds (a GitHub token read from Secret Manager goes to
+ *     `api.github.com`), so the grant binds the exact hosts and the named
+ *     secrets seen when the developer pressed the button.
+ *
+ * A destination or secret this module cannot read (a host in a variable it
+ * cannot resolve, a program it does not model such as `node` or `Set-Content`,
+ * a proxy / `--resolve` override) refuses the grant: no "Always allow" on the
+ * dialog, and no standing grant matches — the developer is asked.
+ *
+ * Grants recorded before this binding carry no `credential` field; for a
+ * credential rule they match nothing (asked again, never wider).
+ *
+ * Deterministic structure only (words, flags, literal URLs, same-line
+ * assignments). Pure: no I/O.
+ */
+import { type ShellDialect } from './shellQuoteMask';
 export type CredentialBindingMode = 'issuer' | 'exact';
 export interface CredentialGrantBinding {
     mode: CredentialBindingMode;
@@ -24,6 +55,23 @@ export interface CredentialRuleFacts {
 }
 /** Binding mode for the credential rules in one ask. Mixed or unknown rules bind exact hosts. */
 export declare function credentialRuleFacts(itemIds: string[]): CredentialRuleFacts;
+export declare const unquote: (word: string) => string;
+export interface LineVars {
+    /** Variable -> every literal value assigned to it on the line; null = assigned from something unreadable. */
+    values: Map<string, string[] | null>;
+    /** The line can set variables in ways not read here (`Set-Variable`, `-OutVariable`, `read`, `source`): nothing resolves. */
+    poisoned: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Every assignment on the line, wherever it sits (statement start, a script
+ * block, an `else` branch, a condition). Read on the masked line, so quoted
+ * text never counts as an assignment.
+ */
+export declare function lineVars(command: string, dialect: ShellDialect): LineVars;
+/** `--name value` / `--name=value` as a literal; undefined when absent, null when dynamic. */
+export declare function flagValue(words: string[], names: string[], vars: LineVars): string | null | undefined;
+/** A literal word or a variable holding exactly one literal; null when dynamic. */
+export declare function literalWord(word: string | undefined, vars: LineVars): string | null;
 /**
  * The binding for one credential-command line. `uses` are the program uses the
  * grant scanner found (`scanShellPrograms`), `localOnly` the programs that only

package/dist/credentialGrant.js

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.CREDENTIAL_GRANT_TTL_MS = exports.CREDENTIAL_ISSUERS = void 0;
+exports.unquote = exports.CREDENTIAL_GRANT_TTL_MS = exports.CREDENTIAL_ISSUERS = void 0;
 exports.credentialRuleFacts = credentialRuleFacts;
+exports.lineVars = lineVars;
+exports.flagValue = flagValue;
+exports.literalWord = literalWord;
 exports.credentialBindingFor = credentialBindingFor;
 exports.withinIssuer = withinIssuer;
 exports.credentialBindingCovers = credentialBindingCovers;
@@ -60,6 +63,7 @@ function credentialRuleFacts(itemIds) {
 // Destinations
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 const unquote = (word) => word.replace(/^(["'])([\s\S]*)\1$/, '$2');
+exports.unquote = unquote;
 function assign(vars, name, value) {
     const key = name.toLowerCase();
     const prior = vars.values.get(key);
@@ -71,13 +75,19 @@ function assign(vars, name, value) {
     }
     vars.values.set(key, [...(prior || []), value]);
 }
-/** A right-hand side this module can use as data: literal text, no command or sub-expression. */
-function literalValue(rhs) {
+/**
+ * A right-hand side this module can use as data: literal text, no command or sub-expression.
+ * In PowerShell a bare word on the right (`$p = Read-Host`) RUNS that command; only quoted
+ * text, a hashtable or a number is data there.
+ */
+function literalValue(rhs, ps = false) {
     const text = rhs.trim();
     if (!text || /\$\(|@\(|`/.test(text))
         return null;
     if (/^'[^']*'$/.test(text) || /^"[^"]*"$/.test(text) || /^@\{[^{}]*\}$/.test(text))
         return text;
+    if (ps)
+        return /^-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?$/.test(text) ? text : null;
     if (/^[\w.:/@%+?=#~-]+$/.test(text))
         return text;
     return null;
@@ -118,7 +128,7 @@ function lineVars(command, dialect) {
     for (const m of code.matchAll(assignment)) {
         const from = m.index + m[0].length;
         const rhs = command.slice(from, expressionEnd(code, from, !ps));
-        assign(vars, m[1], m[2] ? null : literalValue(rhs));
+        assign(vars, m[1], m[2] ? null : literalValue(rhs, ps));
     }
     const loops = ps ? /\bforeach\s*\(\s*\$([A-Za-z_]\w*)\s+in\s+/gi : /\bfor\s+([A-Za-z_]\w*)\s+in\s+/g;
     for (const m of code.matchAll(loops)) {
@@ -128,14 +138,14 @@ function lineVars(command, dialect) {
         if (!items.length)
             assign(vars, m[1], null);
         for (const item of items)
-            assign(vars, m[1], literalValue(item));
+            assign(vars, m[1], literalValue(item, ps));
     }
     return vars;
 }
 const HOST_OK = /^(?:[a-z0-9-]+\.)*[a-z0-9-]+$|^\[[0-9a-f:.]+\]$/;
 /** Host of one URL-ish value; `unknown` when the host itself is dynamic or malformed. */
 function hostOfUrl(value) {
-    const text = unquote(value).trim();
+    const text = (0, exports.unquote)(value).trim();
     const match = text.match(/^(?:([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):\/\/)?([^/?#\s]*)/i);
     const authority = (match?.[2] || '').replace(/^[^@]*@/, '');
     if (!authority || /[$`({%]/.test(authority))
@@ -156,7 +166,7 @@ function urlHostsIn(text) {
 }
 /** A destination word: a literal URL / host, or `$var` / `"$var/path"` resolved through the line's literal assignments. */
 function resolveDestination(word, vars) {
-    const text = unquote(word).trim();
+    const text = (0, exports.unquote)(word).trim();
     const ref = text.match(/^[$@]\{?(?:(?:script|global|local|private):)?([A-Za-z_]\w*)\}?/);
     if (ref) {
         if (vars.poisoned)
@@ -221,7 +231,7 @@ function senderDestinations(grammar, words, vars) {
     let positionalSeen = false;
     for (let k = 1; k < words.length; k++) {
         const word = words[k];
-        const bare = unquote(word);
+        const bare = (0, exports.unquote)(word);
         if (grammar.powershell) {
             const param = bare.match(/^-([A-Za-z]+)(?::(.*))?$/);
             if (param) {
@@ -317,7 +327,7 @@ function registryDestination(words, vars) {
     const valued = new Set(['-u', '--username', '-p', '--password', '--authfile', '--cert-dir']);
     const start = verb === 'registry' ? verbAt + 2 : verbAt + 1;
     for (let k = start; k < words.length; k++) {
-        const bare = unquote(words[k]);
+        const bare = (0, exports.unquote)(words[k]);
         if (bare.startsWith('-')) {
             if (valued.has(bare.split('=')[0].toLowerCase()) && !bare.includes('='))
                 k++;
@@ -330,9 +340,10 @@ function registryDestination(words, vars) {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Secret resources
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** `--name value` / `--name=value` as a literal; undefined when absent, null when dynamic. */
 function flagValue(words, names, vars) {
     for (let k = 0; k < words.length; k++) {
-        const bare = unquote(words[k]);
+        const bare = (0, exports.unquote)(words[k]);
         for (const name of names) {
             if (bare === name)
                 return literalWord(words[k + 1], vars);
@@ -346,13 +357,13 @@ function flagValue(words, names, vars) {
 function literalWord(word, vars) {
     if (word === undefined)
         return null;
-    const text = unquote(word).trim();
+    const text = (0, exports.unquote)(word).trim();
     const ref = text.match(/^\$\{?(?:(?:script|global|local|private):)?([A-Za-z_]\w*)\}?$/);
     if (ref) {
         if (vars.poisoned)
             return null;
         const values = vars.values.get(ref[1].toLowerCase());
-        return values && values.length && new Set(values).size === 1 ? unquote(values[0]) : null;
+        return values && values.length && new Set(values).size === 1 ? (0, exports.unquote)(values[0]) : null;
     }
     return text && !/[$`(){}]/.test(text) ? text : null;
 }
@@ -360,15 +371,15 @@ function secretResources(ruleId, uses, dialect, vars) {
     const out = [];
     for (const use of uses) {
         const words = (0, shellQuoteMask_1.shellWords)(use.text.trim(), dialect);
-        const at = words.findIndex(w => unquote(w).toLowerCase().replace(/\.(exe|cmd)$/, '').endsWith(use.name));
+        const at = words.findIndex(w => (0, exports.unquote)(w).toLowerCase().replace(/\.(exe|cmd)$/, '').endsWith(use.name));
         const args = words.slice(at + 1);
-        const lower = args.map(w => unquote(w).toLowerCase());
+        const lower = args.map(w => (0, exports.unquote)(w).toLowerCase());
         if (ruleId === 'gcloud_secret_access_cmd' && use.name === 'gcloud') {
             const idx = lower.findIndex((w, k) => w === 'secrets' && lower[k + 1] === 'versions' && lower[k + 2] === 'access');
             if (idx < 0)
                 continue;
-            const positional = args.slice(idx + 3).find(w => !unquote(w).startsWith('-'));
-            const full = positional && unquote(positional).match(/^projects\/([^/]+)\/secrets\/([^/]+)/);
+            const positional = args.slice(idx + 3).find(w => !(0, exports.unquote)(w).startsWith('-'));
+            const full = positional && (0, exports.unquote)(positional).match(/^projects\/([^/]+)\/secrets\/([^/]+)/);
             if (full) {
                 out.push(`projects/${full[1]}/secrets/${full[2]}`);
                 continue;
@@ -401,7 +412,7 @@ function secretResources(ruleId, uses, dialect, vars) {
             if (!/^(?:get|read)$/.test(lower[verbAt] || ''))
                 continue;
             const mount = flagValue(args, ['-mount'], vars);
-            const paths = args.slice(verbAt + 1).filter(w => !unquote(w).startsWith('-'));
+            const paths = args.slice(verbAt + 1).filter(w => !(0, exports.unquote)(w).startsWith('-'));
             if (mount === null || paths.length !== 1)
                 return null;
             const path = literalWord(paths[0], vars);
@@ -429,7 +440,7 @@ function credentialBindingFor(command, uses, localOnly, ruleCommands, facts) {
         if (ruleCommands.includes(use.name) || localOnly(use.name))
             continue;
         const words = (0, shellQuoteMask_1.shellWords)(use.text.trim(), dialect);
-        const at = words.findIndex(w => unquote(w).toLowerCase().replace(/^.*[\\/]/, '').replace(/\.(exe|cmd|bat)$/, '') === use.name);
+        const at = words.findIndex(w => (0, exports.unquote)(w).toLowerCase().replace(/^.*[\\/]/, '').replace(/\.(exe|cmd|bat)$/, '') === use.name);
         const argv = at >= 0 ? words.slice(at) : words;
         const grammar = SENDERS[use.name];
         const read = grammar ? senderDestinations(grammar, argv, vars)

package/dist/credentialStore.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const distress_1 = require("./distress");
  * Native credential store — Windows Credential Manager via `@napi-rs/keyring`
  * (a prebuilt N-API binding; in-process win32 API calls, no PowerShell).
  *
- * WHY: the lptx1110 incident class. The shield key at rest was DPAPI-protected
+ * WHY: the devbox-01 incident class. The shield key at rest was DPAPI-protected
  * and decrypted by spawning powershell.exe — exactly the pattern EDRs flag
  * ("IDE process spawns PowerShell that touches credentials"). On hardened
  * fleets PowerShell is additionally locked to Constrained Language Mode or

package/dist/devConfirm.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { type AlwaysCovers, type AskSubject, type NativeDialogView } from './approvalPrompt';
 import { type CredentialGrantBinding, type CredentialRuleFacts } from './credentialGrant';
 export { isCiEnvironment, isHumanPresent } from './callerEnv';
 export type ConfirmRemember = 'none' | 'session' | '1h';
@@ -44,9 +45,30 @@ export interface NativeDialogOptions {
     alwaysScopeLabel?: string;
     /** How long / how many times it would hold, e.g. "30 days" or "7 days or 20 uses". */
     alwaysLimitsLabel?: string;
+    /** What / How / Where the grant covers (`grantCoverage`), shown as one compact row. */
+    alwaysCovers?: AlwaysCovers;
+    /** Two buttons: why "Always allow" is not offered (`grantNotOfferedReason`), one short line. */
+    alwaysNotOffered?: string;
+    /** Envelope facts for the "Why you're asked" header (grant scope, rule id). */
+    subject?: AskSubject;
     /** Icon and copy. Buttons stay Deny / Allow once / Always allow for `ask`. */
     tone?: 'ask' | 'approval' | 'block';
 }
+/** Card HTML for macOS WKWebView. Button labels stay the existing Deny / Allow once / Always allow. */
+export declare function dialogCardHtml(view: NativeDialogView, options: NativeDialogOptions): string;
+/**
+ * The layout facts for the Windows card, base64 JSON, written to the dialog's STDIN.
+ * `-EncodedCommand` carries the script as UTF-16 base64 and Windows caps a command line
+ * at 32,767 characters: with the view inside it, a long script (a 9-step token query)
+ * failed to spawn and the ask silently fell back to the IDE card.
+ */
+export declare function windowsDialogPayload(view: NativeDialogView): string;
+/**
+ * Windows branded card. Compact prompt text stays the first payload so tests still
+ * read the dialog copy; layout facts arrive on stdin (`windowsDialogPayload`).
+ * Exit codes: 0 = Allow once, 3 = Always allow, 2 = timed out, anything else = Deny.
+ */
+export declare function windowsDialogScript(message: string, timeoutSeconds: number, options: NativeDialogOptions, title: string, view: NativeDialogView): string;
 export declare function confirmNativeActionDetailed(reason: string, timeoutMs?: number, options?: NativeDialogOptions): Promise<{
     outcome: NativeDialogOutcome;
     latencyMs: number;
@@ -138,6 +160,18 @@ export interface GrantScope {
      * binding existed) never covers a credential-rule ask — asked again.
      */
     credential?: CredentialGrantBinding;
+    /**
+     * Shell only, when the line runs a cloud CLI: `gcloud|<how>|<where>` per use,
+     * sorted and unique (`cloudGrant.ts`). A grant without it (recorded before
+     * the binding existed) never covers a cloud line — asked again.
+     */
+    cloud?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Set when the rule that asked is about a removal that can never be granted
+     * (home folder, a drive, the filesystem root): no Always allow is offered,
+     * none is stored, and no standing grant covers it. Not part of the grant key.
+     */
+    refusal?: 'destructive_scope';
 }
 /**
  * A developer's standing "Always allow" for one scope under one rule. Bound to the
@@ -344,10 +378,13 @@ export declare function shellProgramsForRule(command: string, ruleCommands?: rea
 export declare function splitLocalSafetyRuleIds(matchedRule?: string): string[] | undefined;
 /**
  * Can "Always allow" exist for this scope at all? Not for a shell line whose
- * programs could not be read (empty set) and not for a credential line whose
- * destination or secret could not be read, or that sends the credential
- * outside its issuer. The dialog offers two buttons; no grant matches.
+ * programs could not be read (empty set), not for a credential line whose
+ * destination or secret could not be read or that sends the credential
+ * outside its issuer, and not for a cloud line that deletes, changes
+ * permissions or whose target cannot be read. The dialog offers two
+ * buttons and says why in one line; no grant matches.
  */
+export declare function grantNotOfferedReason(scope: GrantScope): string | undefined;
 export declare function grantOffered(scope: GrantScope): boolean;
 /** The caps a grant for this scope is created under: credential grants live 7 days at most. */
 export declare function capGrantLimitsForScope(limits: GrantLimits | null, scope: GrantScope): GrantLimits | null;
@@ -391,6 +428,8 @@ export declare function describeGrantScope(scope: GrantScope, rule?: {
     policyId?: string;
     policyName?: string;
 }): string;
+/** What / How / Where an "Always allow" covers, as the dialog's compact rows. */
+export declare function grantCoverage(scope: GrantScope): AlwaysCovers;
 /**
  * Which line-level facts the RULE that asked actually depends on. A grant binds
  * the facts the rule fired on and nothing else: `gcloud_access_token_cmd` fired
@@ -414,6 +453,8 @@ export interface GrantRuleFacts {
      * credential goes (issuer domain or exact hosts) and the secret read.
      */
     credential?: CredentialRuleFacts;
+    /** The rule is a home / drive / root delete (`NEVER_GRANTED_ITEMS`): the scope carries a refusal. */
+    neverGrant?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Derive `GrantRuleFacts` from the source of the ask. Unknown = bound (the