fullcourtdefense-cli 1.21.22 → 1.21.24
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/mcpGateway.js +13 -2
- package/dist/commands/onboard.js +15 -2
- package/dist/version.json +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
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@@ -876,8 +876,19 @@ class McpGatewayServer {
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876
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}
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877
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}
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else {
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879
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-
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-
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+
// Detailed, self-explanatory block message: WHICH policy fired, WHAT rule matched,
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880
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// and where to review it — so the developer (and the AI agent relaying the error)
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881
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// can tell exactly why the call was refused instead of guessing.
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882
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const policy = preflight.actionPolicy;
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883
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const parts = [];
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884
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parts.push(policy?.reason || preflight.intentEvaluation?.reasons?.[0] || `Tool call ${preflight.decision} by FullCourtDefense.`);
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885
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if (policy?.policyName)
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886
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parts.push(`Policy: "${policy.policyName}"`);
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887
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if (policy?.matchedRule)
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888
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parts.push(`Matched rule: ${policy.matchedRule}`);
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889
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parts.push(`Tool: ${toolName}${operation && operation !== toolName ? ` (operation: ${operation})` : ''}`);
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890
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parts.push(`Review or change this policy in the FullCourtDefense console → Agent Security → Policies.`);
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891
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throw new Error(parts.join(' | '));
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}
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}
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const rawResult = await this.downstream.callTool(toolName, toolArgs);
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package/dist/commands/onboard.js
CHANGED
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@@ -180,8 +180,13 @@ function checkMcpGateways() {
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function checkTerminalGuards() {
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const checks = [];
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if (process.platform === 'win32') {
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183
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-
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-
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// Warnings, not failures: managed/bank machines commonly block PowerShell
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184
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// profile and AutoRun registry writes (EDR persistence rules, redirected
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185
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// Documents folders). Hooks + MCP gateways + daemon still protect the
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// machine; failing onboarding here makes the MSI roll back a protected
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// install (seen on the first customer deployment).
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188
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checks.push({ label: 'PowerShell shell guard', ok: (0, shellGuard_1.isShellGuardInstalled)(), optional: true, detail: (0, shellGuard_1.isShellGuardInstalled)() ? undefined : 'run install-shell-guard' });
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189
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checks.push({ label: 'cmd.exe shell guard', ok: (0, cmdGuard_1.isCmdGuardInstalled)(), optional: true, detail: (0, cmdGuard_1.isCmdGuardInstalled)() ? undefined : 'run install-cmd-guard' });
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const audit = (0, windowsAudit_1.getWindowsAuditStatus)();
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const auditOk = audit.scriptBlockLogging && audit.transcription;
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checks.push({
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@@ -415,8 +420,16 @@ async function onboardCommand(args, config) {
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checkMcpGateways(),
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...checkTerminalGuards(),
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{
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// Warning, not a failure: on hardened/managed machines (bank laptops,
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// EDR blocking HKCU Run-key writes, standard users denied schtasks)
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// autostart registration can be denied even though hooks, enrollment,
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// and the in-session daemon are all healthy. Failing onboarding here
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// makes the MSI roll back a genuinely protected install — instead we
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// finish, and the fleet console nudges "run daemon --install" until
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// the daemon reports (real gap seen on the first customer install).
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label: 'Resident daemon autostart',
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ok: (0, daemon_1.isDaemonAutostartInstalled)(),
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optional: true,
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detail: (0, daemon_1.isDaemonAutostartInstalled)() ? undefined : 'run fullcourtdefense daemon --install true from an elevated terminal',
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},
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{
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package/dist/version.json
CHANGED