forgedock 1.2.0 → 1.3.0

package/commands/review-pr-agents/spec-cli.md

@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+---
+install: internal
+---
+<!-- SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) RapierCraft Studios -->
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later -->
+
+# Agent: Spec/CLI Auditor
+
+> Read `review-pr-agents/protocols.md` for the Evidence-Based Review Protocol, Structured Findings Protocol, Per-Agent Input Scoping rules, and Tool-Result Truncation Discipline that all agents must follow.
+
+
+
+**Trigger**: SPEC_CLI domain detected (PR touches `commands/**` or `bin/**`)
+**Type**: `security-exploit-auditor` | **Model**: `sonnet`
+
+**Prompt template:**
+```
+You are auditing PR #[PR_NUMBER] for spec-as-code and CLI correctness in [PROJECT_NAME].
+
+## Context
+- PR title: [TITLE]
+- Files changed: [FILE_LIST]
+[PROJECT_CONTEXT]
+
+## Spec/CLI Conventions
+
+[DOMAIN_CONTEXT]
+
+If no spec/CLI context is configured above, derive conventions from the changed files: read sibling `.mjs` files for the established exec pattern and sibling `commands/*.md` files for the established side-effect gating pattern.
+
+## Why This Agent Exists
+`commands/**` (the pipeline's spec-as-code prompts) and `bin/**` (the Node CLI) ARE the product — every `commands/*.md` file is executed as instructions by an AI agent on every customer repo, and every `bin/*.mjs` file runs with the user's local `gh` credentials. The General Security agent's checklist is Python/FastAPI/Docker-shaped and does not cover exec/spawn injection in `.mjs`, `gh` write/egress side effects, or command-spec side-effect changes — this agent exists to close exactly that gap (ref: forge#1586, forge#1587, both of which reached staging via PR #1575 uncaught by any automated persona).
+
+## Step 1: Read the Diff
+
+The diff is pre-supplied as `[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]` and is capped at ~100K chars. Do NOT re-fetch the full diff — use what was provided.
+
+```bash
+gh pr diff [PR_NUMBER] --name-only
+# Use the pre-supplied diff: [DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]
+```
+
+Build the two file subsets this agent scans (note: `gh pr diff` does NOT accept path arguments — always filter the name-only list with grep):
+
+```bash
+CLI_FILES=$(gh pr diff [PR_NUMBER] --name-only | grep -E '^bin/.*\.(mjs|js|ts)$')
+SPEC_FILES=$(gh pr diff [PR_NUMBER] --name-only | grep -E '^commands/.*\.md$')
+```
+
+## Step 2: Shell-String Exec/Spawn Interpolation (CLI files)
+
+Node's `child_process.exec()`/`execSync()` run their argument through `/bin/sh -c` (or `cmd.exe` on Windows) — any interpolated string becomes shell-interpretable. `execFile()`/`execFileSync()`/`spawn()` with an args array never invoke a shell and are safe by construction.
+
+Scan the added lines of the pre-supplied diff for exec calls with template-string or concatenated arguments (attribute each hit to its file via the nearest preceding `diff --git` header):
+
+```bash
+# Added lines with exec/execSync taking a template string or concatenation
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -E '\bexecSync?\(`|\bexecSync?\([^)]*\+' | grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+```
+
+For each hit, read the surrounding file (from `$CLI_FILES`) with the Read tool to trace the interpolated variable to its source. Classify:
+- `execSync(\`gh ... ${variable} ...\`)` or `execSync("cmd " + variable)`: **CONFIRMED HIGH** if `variable` derives from ANY external/config-controlled source — a repo-local `forge.yaml` field, CLI argv, an environment variable, or a `gh api` response body. This is the exact shape of forge#1586 (`ghJson()` in `bin/report.mjs` interpolated `forge.yaml`-derived `owner`/`repo` into an `execSync` string parsed by a hand-rolled YAML reader that did not reject `$(...)`, backticks, `;`, or `&`).
+- `execFileSync("gh", [...args])` or `spawn(cmd, [args], {shell: false})`: **OK** — this is the safe pattern already used elsewhere in this codebase (e.g. `watch()` in `bin/forgedock.mjs`).
+- `execSync`/`exec` called with a **fully static string literal** (no interpolation, no concatenation): **OK** — no injectable surface.
+
+**Do not stop at the first call site** — scan every `exec(`/`execSync(` occurrence in the diff, not just the one nearest an obviously-tainted variable. A file can fix one call site and leave a sibling one unconverted.
+
+## Step 3: `gh` Write/Egress Side Effects (all files)
+
+Any new or modified `gh` invocation that **writes** (mutates GitHub state) or **publishes** (makes something world-readable) is a side-effect change and must be justified by the PR's stated purpose.
+
+```bash
+# gh write/publish operations in added lines
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -E \
+  'gh (gist create|pr merge|pr close|issue create|issue close|issue comment|repo edit|label create|release create|workflow run)' | \
+  grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+
+# Newly-added --public / visibility flags
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -E '\-\-public\b|visibility.*public|make.*public' | grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+```
+
+For each hit:
+- A new `gh gist create ... --public` (or any new default-to-public visibility change) that writes issue/PR content, root-cause analysis, or file paths: **CONFIRMED HIGH** — this is the exact shape of forge#1587 (`commands/work-on/close.md` published the pipeline's per-issue memory index — titles, root causes, affected file paths — to a world-readable Gist; a secret gist is sufficient since the read side already authenticates via `gh`).
+- A new `gh pr merge`, `gh issue close`, or `gh label` mutation added to a command spec (`commands/*.md`) that was not previously present: **LIKELY MEDIUM** — verify the new destructive/mutating step is gated behind the same preconditions (auto-merge flag, terminal-state check, etc.) as sibling mutations in the same file. An ungated new mutation can fire on a code path the spec author didn't intend.
+- Read-only `gh` calls (`gh pr view`, `gh issue list`, `gh api ... GET`) or a write call gated behind an explicit `--auto-merge`/confirmation flag already present in the spec: **OK**.
+
+## Step 4: Command-Spec Side-Effect Changes (spec files)
+
+`commands/*.md` files are prompts, but they are executable specifications — they instruct an autonomous agent to run shell/`gh` commands with real side effects on every repo that installs ForgeDock. Review diffs to these files the same way you would review a code diff to a function that performs the same operations.
+
+```bash
+# Added lines in the pre-supplied diff that introduce/alter gh, git-destructive, delete, or network commands
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -E '\bgh \w|\bgit (push|reset|clean|rm)|\brm -rf|\bcurl\b|\bwget\b' | grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+```
+
+Attribute each hit to its `commands/*.md` file via the nearest preceding `diff --git` header, then ask: "Does this new/changed line cause a write, delete, publish, or network egress that the PREVIOUS version of this spec did not perform, or performed with a narrower scope (e.g. `gist create` without `--public` → with `--public`; `git push` → `git push --force`)?" If yes: **CONFIRMED** finding — severity HIGH if the new side effect is destructive or publishes data, MEDIUM if it is a scope-widening of an existing side effect (e.g. a new label added to an existing bulk-edit loop). <!-- allowlist:check-command-side-effects — the `git push` above is a cited example of a scope-widening diff this auditor looks for, not a command this spec runs -->
+
+
+**Do NOT treat `commands/*.md` diffs as "just docs".** A one-line change to a `gh` command embedded in a code fence has the exact same blast radius as the equivalent change in a `.py`/`.mjs` file — it runs autonomously, unattended, across every customer repo using the pipeline.
+
+## Step 5: Secret Handling (CLI files)
+
+```bash
+# Added lines touching secret-like identifiers
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -iE 'token|secret|api[_-]?key|password|credential' | grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+```
+
+For each hit attributed to a file in `$CLI_FILES`:
+- A token/secret/key passed as a CLI argument to a child process (visible to any other process via `ps`/Task Manager) rather than via an env var or stdin: **CONFIRMED HIGH**.
+- A token/secret logged via `console.log`/`console.error`, written to a non-gitignored file, or included in an error message that could be posted back to a public GitHub comment: **CONFIRMED HIGH**.
+- A token/secret read from `process.env` and passed through `env:` to a child process without being logged or echoed: **OK**.
+
+## Step 6: Network/Publish Calls (CLI files)
+
+```bash
+# Added lines with network or publish calls
+echo "[DOMAIN_DIFF_SLICE]" | grep -E '^\+' | grep -iE '\bfetch\(|\bhttps?\.request\(|\baxios\.|npm publish|npm.*publish' | grep -v '^\+\+\+'
+```
+
+For each hit: identify the destination host. A call to `api.github.com`/`github.com` via the already-authenticated `gh` CLI wrapper is expected. A call to any OTHER host (telemetry endpoint, analytics service, third-party API) introduced without being named in the PR title/description: **LIKELY MEDIUM** — undisclosed egress from a CLI tool that runs with the user's local credentials is a trust-surface concern even when not directly exploitable.
+
+## Step 7: Post Findings
+```bash
+gh pr comment [PR_NUMBER] --body "$(cat <<'EOF'
+## Spec/CLI Audit
+
+### Risk Level: [LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL]
+
+### Shell/Exec Injection Findings
+| File:Line | Pattern | Tainted Source | Confidence | Evidence |
+|-----------|---------|-----------------|------------|----------|
+| ... | execSync template string | forge.yaml field / argv / env | CONFIRMED | [code path] |
+
+### gh Write/Egress Side Effects
+| File:Line | Operation | New or Widened? | Confidence | Evidence |
+|-----------|-----------|------------------|------------|----------|
+| ... | gh gist create --public | New | CONFIRMED | [explanation] |
+
+### Command-Spec Side-Effect Changes
+| File:Line | Old Behavior | New Behavior | Confidence |
+|-----------|--------------|--------------|------------|
+| ... | ... | ... | ... |
+
+### Secret Handling
+[Any secrets passed as argv, logged, or written to disk — or "None found"]
+
+### Network/Publish Calls
+[Any new external network destinations — or "None found — all egress via gh CLI to github.com"]
+
+### Files Reviewed
+[List all files checked]
+
+---
+*Spec/CLI audit*
+
+<!-- REVIEW-FINDINGS-START -->
+<!-- FINDING:SPEC-1|CONFIDENCE|SEVERITY|file.mjs:line|Summary -->
+<!-- (add one FINDING line per issue found — include ALL confidence levels) -->
+<!-- REVIEW-FINDINGS-END -->
+EOF
+)"
+```
+
+**Structured Findings**: Include the structured findings block above at the end of your comment. Your prefix: `SPEC`. See the Structured Findings Protocol in `protocols.md` for format rules.
+```
+
+### Coverage Matrix — SPEC Agent
+
+| Defect Category | Check Item(s) | Status | Ref |
+|----------------|---------------|--------|-----|
+| Shell-string exec/spawn interpolation in `.mjs` | Step 2 | COVERED | forge#1586 |
+| `gh` write/egress side effects (gist --public, pr merge, issue create) | Step 3 | COVERED | forge#1587 |
+| Command-spec side-effect changes in `commands/*.md` | Step 4 | COVERED | |
+| Secret handling in `.mjs` (argv exposure, logging) | Step 5 | COVERED | |
+| Undisclosed network/publish calls | Step 6 | COVERED | |
+| Prototype pollution / unsafe `eval`/`new Function` in `.mjs` | — | GAP | |
+| Path traversal via CLI-supplied file paths | — | GAP | |
+
+---

package/commands/review-pr.md

@@ -252,6 +252,14 @@ done
 
 # Resolve repo name early — used in Phases 5, 6, 8B, 9A (clean-review skip path bypasses Phase 6A) <!-- Added: forge#820 -->
 REPO=$(gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq '.nameWithOwner')
+
+# First-time contributor detection <!-- Added: forge#960 -->
+# Requires REPO to be set (line above). Checks whether the PR author has any prior merged PRs in this repo.
+# IS_FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR is consumed in Phase 9 to conditionally post an onboarding welcome comment.
+PR_AUTHOR=$(gh pr view "$ARGUMENTS" -R "$REPO" --json author --jq '.author.login')
+PRIOR_MERGED_COUNT=$(gh pr list -R "$REPO" --author "$PR_AUTHOR" --state merged --limit 1 --json number --jq 'length' 2>/dev/null || echo "1")
+IS_FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR="false"
+[ "$PRIOR_MERGED_COUNT" -eq 0 ] && IS_FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR="true"
 ```
 
 ### 1B: Classify
@@ -2210,6 +2218,47 @@ REVIEW_IS_STALE="false"
 if [ "$CURRENT_SHA" != "$REVIEW_SHA" ]; then REVIEW_IS_STALE="true"; fi
 ```
 
+### Phase 9 — New Contributor Welcome (Conditional) <!-- Added: forge#960 -->
+
+Post a welcome comment when all three conditions are true:
+1. `IS_FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR="true"` (set in Phase 1A — no prior merged PRs from this author in this repo)
+2. `community.welcome_new_contributors` is not `false` in `forge.yaml` (default: enabled)
+3. This is a single-PR review (MODE 3) — not a staging→main or multi-PR review
+
+```bash
+# Read config — default enabled when key is absent
+WELCOME_ENABLED=$(yq '.community.welcome_new_contributors // true' forge.yaml 2>/dev/null || echo 'true')
+
+if [ "$IS_FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR" = "true" ] && [ "$WELCOME_ENABLED" != "false" ]; then
+    # Read optional custom values from forge.yaml community section
+    CONTRIBUTING_URL=$(yq '.community.contributing_url // "CONTRIBUTING.md"' forge.yaml 2>/dev/null || echo 'CONTRIBUTING.md')
+    CUSTOM_CONVENTIONS=$(yq '.community.conventions // ""' forge.yaml 2>/dev/null || echo '')
+    PROJECT_NAME_WELCOME=$(yq '.project.name // "this project"' forge.yaml 2>/dev/null || echo 'this project')
+
+    gh pr comment "$ARGUMENTS" --body "## Welcome to ${PROJECT_NAME_WELCOME}! 🎉
+
+Hi @${PR_AUTHOR} — this looks like your first merged contribution here. Thanks for opening a PR!
+
+### What just happened
+
+The automated review pipeline (/review-pr) ran against your PR. It spawned domain-specific agents to review security, integration assumptions, and code quality. Any findings were created as separate GitHub issues — not merge blockers unless they are CONFIRMED at HIGH/CRITICAL severity.
+
+### Key conventions
+
+$([ -n "\$CUSTOM_CONVENTIONS" ] && echo "\$CUSTOM_CONVENTIONS" || echo "- **Conventional commits**: prefix your commit messages with \`fix(scope):\`, \`feat(scope):\`, \`refactor(scope):\`, etc.
+- **DCO sign-off**: all commits must be signed off with \`git commit -s\` (Developer Certificate of Origin — required for the dual-license model).
+  Fix unsigned commits: \`git commit --amend -s --no-edit && git push --force-with-lease\`
+- **Issues, not inline fixes**: when you spot a bug or improvement opportunity, open a GitHub issue rather than fixing it inline — so it flows through the pipeline with full traceability.")
+
+### Getting started
+
+- Contributing guide: [\`${CONTRIBUTING_URL}\`](${CONTRIBUTING_URL})
+- Run \`npx forgedock\` to install the pipeline commands locally if you want to run /review-pr or /work-on yourself.
+
+Welcome aboard!"
+fi
+```
+
 **Verifiable agent count (MANDATORY — do not report a self-asserted `Agents: [N]` figure)** <!-- Added: forge#1849 -->
 
 A degraded run that skipped Task-based agent dispatch must be visible from this summary alone, without interrogating the agent afterward. Compute the actual launched-agent count from the `<!-- FORGE:REVIEW-AGENT:{domain} -->` comments each agent is required to post (Phase 3C), rather than trusting a free-text tally: