foldrun 14.3.0 → 14.3.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/docs/api.md +1 -1
- package/docs/cli.md +1 -1
- package/docs/secrets.md +1 -1
- package/docs/security.md +3 -3
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/docs/api.md
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@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ its header and requires a URL it can GET for itself.
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| Route | Methods | |
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| `/api/secrets?workspace=` | GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE | the vault: list which secrets exist (never a value), each with the `sites` it is bound to; set one (`name` plus one shape, below, and optionally `sites`); bind one to sites with PATCH `{ name, sites }` — `sites` a list like `["api.example.com", "*.example.com"]`, `[]` unbinds, the value untouched, 404 for a secret that is not there, 400 for a site with a scheme, path or port and for a file, ssh or api secret ([bound to sites](secrets#bound-to-sites)); delete one (`name`). `workspace` names a workspace's own store; unsaid is the account's, which a key scoped to some workspaces may not touch. `name` is a string (400 otherwise). The account's `RESEND_API_KEY` and `EMAIL_FROM` — the sender of everyone's sign-in mail — are set, rebound and deleted by the owner alone (403 to anyone else), here and through an OAuth connect — the owner in
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| `/api/secrets?workspace=` | GET, PUT, PATCH, DELETE | the vault: list which secrets exist (never a value), each with the `sites` it is bound to; set one (`name` plus one shape, below, and optionally `sites`); bind one to sites with PATCH `{ name, sites }` — `sites` a list like `["api.example.com", "*.example.com"]`, `[]` unbinds, the value untouched, 404 for a secret that is not there, 400 for a site with a scheme, path or port and for a file, ssh or api secret ([bound to sites](secrets#bound-to-sites)); delete one (`name`). `workspace` names a workspace's own store; unsaid is the account's, which a key scoped to some workspaces may not touch. `name` is a string (400 otherwise). The account's `RESEND_API_KEY` and `EMAIL_FROM` — the sender of everyone's sign-in mail — are set, rebound and deleted by the owner alone (403 to anyone else), here and through an OAuth connect — the owner signed in, in the browser: no key, not even their own `foldrun login` one. An oauth2 recipe from a caller scoped to some workspaces links to the account's saved OAuth app with the same token URL and client id but never saves or changes one (as `POST /api/oauth/clients` refuses them). PATCH also takes `workspaces` (with or instead of `sites`): `{ name, workspaces: ["sales", "ops"] }` limits an **account** secret to those workspaces — every other one finds it not set, in runs, tool tests, `notify:` (its email too), the egress proxy and MCP, for runs that start after it ([limited to some workspaces](secrets#limited-to-some-workspaces)); `null` opens it to every workspace, `[]` to none; the answer carries `workspaces` (sorted, or `null`). `ifWorkspaces` — the list you loaded, `null` for every workspace — makes it conditional: 409 when the list changed since, nothing written. PUT takes the same `workspaces` and saves it with the value in one write (the answer carries it too); it is never ignored. Account store only (400 with `workspace`), an admin over every workspace (403 for a scoped caller), names of workspaces that exist, checked under the vault's lock (400 otherwise), 404 for a secret that is not there; audited as `secret.workspaces` (PATCH) and in `secret.set` (PUT). GET of the account store lists each limited secret's `workspaces`, and `?workspace=` leaves out an account secret that workspace may not use. PUT is idempotent; PATCH and a PUT with `sites` are audited as `secret.sites` / `secret.set`. PUT also takes `token_exchange: { token_url, client_id, client_secret?, token_auth?, subject_secret, subject_token_type?, requested_token_type?, audience?, resource?, scope? }`: a secret whose value is another secret's token traded at a token endpoint (RFC 8693); its `kind` is `token-exchange`. Deleting an `oauth2` secret, or replacing one with a PUT, revokes the old grant at the provider (RFC 7009) when its recipe has a `revocation_url`. The secret is written or deleted first, then the old grant is revoked, and the answer carries `revoked: { skipped?, revoked: [refresh_token, access_token], error? }`. `skipped` is `no-revocation-url`, `shared-grant` (another secret holds the same refresh token, or a grant from the same app; providers such as Google revoke per app, so it is kept), `same-app` (the replacement is from the same app, so revoking would end it too) or `unreadable`. A refusal is reported in `error` and never undoes the write. The recipe's `token_auth` (`client_secret_post`, `client_secret_basic`, `none`, `private_key_jwt` with `client_assertion_key`) and `revocation_url` are kept with it. `oauth2.generate_key: true` with `private_key_jwt` makes the key, and the answer carries `public_jwk` |
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`PUT` takes `name` plus exactly one shape: `value` (a string), `file` (a PEM,
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a cert), `oauth2`, `service_account`, `ssh`, `api`, `client_cert` (`{ cert, key, passphrase?, export? }` — mutual TLS, presented by the egress proxy to the exact sites the secret is bound to), or `identity` (`{ audience }` — keyless cloud access). They go to the vault;
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package/docs/cli.md
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@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ claude.ai or Claude Code there, nor any MCP configuration on disk.
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| `foldrun stop <run-id>` | kill a run in flight: the queued job is dropped and the sandbox the current step is spending in is destroyed. It prints which step is running and what has been spent, then asks you to type the run id back unless `--yes`. Finished steps keep their results, and costs already incurred stay on the bill. A run that has already finished is said so, not stopped. With no run id and a filter — `--status running,queued`, `--since 2h`, `--until 1h` (started before then: a span ago, or a date), `--flow <name>` — it stops every run that matches (`POST …/runs/bulk`), in `--to <workspace>` or across the account: it lists what matches first, asks, and then stops exactly the runs it listed, so one that starts in between is not swept up. `--dry-run` lists and touches nothing. The route refuses more than 100 at once |
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| `foldrun answer <run-id> "…"` | answer the question an agent is asking mid-step (`tools: [ask]`). `--option <n>` picks one of the choices it offered; `--question <id>` one of several. The agent is waiting in its sandbox and carries on at once. `foldrun approvals` lists what is being asked |
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| `foldrun message <run-id> "…"` | say something to a running agent. It reaches the model after its next tool call, as context — it changes none of the step's tools. `--step <n>` picks one when a parallel group has several running. Platform only |
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| `foldrun secrets set NAME` | store a secret — also `ls`, `rm`, and `status` (OAuth grant health). `rm` of an oauth2 secret also revokes its grant at the provider when it has a revocation URL, and says if that failed. `--site <domain>` (repeatable, or `a,b`) binds it as it is stored |
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| `foldrun secrets set NAME` | store a secret — also `ls`, `rm`, and `status` (OAuth grant health). `rm` of an oauth2 secret also revokes its grant at the provider when it has a revocation URL, and says if that failed. `--site <domain>` (repeatable, or `a,b`) binds it as it is stored. The account's `RESEND_API_KEY` and `EMAIL_FROM` (the sender of everyone's reset mail) are refused from the CLI: the owner sets them signed in, in Settings → Secrets |
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| `foldrun secrets sites NAME [site…]` | bind a secret to the sites it is for: the egress proxy fills it in requests to those sites alone, and it never enters a sandbox ([bound to sites](secrets#bound-to-sites)). No sites prints what it is bound to; `--clear` unbinds. On the platform, or this machine's vault with `--local` |
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| `foldrun secrets set NAME --kind <k>` | the other shapes the Connections form stores: `file` (`--file <path>`), `ssh` (`--host`, `--user`, `--port`, `--key-file <path>` or a prompted password), `api` (`--base-url`, `--header "Name: value"` repeatable, or `--basic-user <u>` with the password prompted or `--basic-password`), `service-account` (`--file <key.json>`, `--scopes`, `--subject <user>` to act as a user where the provider allows it), `client-cert` (`--cert-file`, `--key-file`, `--passphrase`, `--export` to put it in the sandbox as files too; bind it with `--site <host>` as it is stored, or later with `secrets sites`). `--site` binds any kind as it is stored, `identity` (`--audience`: keyless cloud access — nothing secret is stored), `m2m` (a client-credentials app: `--token-url`, `--client-id`, `--scopes`, the secret prompted, `--token-auth basic` for a provider that takes the secret only as HTTP Basic), `token-exchange` (RFC 8693: `--token-url`, `--client-id`, `--subject-secret <NAME>` whose token is traded, and `--audience`, `--scopes`, `--requested-token-type` to narrow it). On the platform, or this machine's vault with `--local` |
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| `foldrun secrets clients` | the OAuth clients saved on the platform — what a consent runs from without typing the client again; the client secret is never shown. `clients add <name> --authorize-url … --token-url … --client-id … --scopes …` saves one (secret prompted), with `--authorize-param name=value` for anything else the provider's authorize URL takes and `--token-auth basic` for a provider that takes the secret only as HTTP Basic, `clients rm <name>` removes it |
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package/docs/secrets.md
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@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ given the old name inherits nothing. If a secret limited to it cannot be read
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with the platform's keys, the rename or delete is refused and names it — set
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it again or delete it, then try again. Only an admin with access to every
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workspace sets the limit, and the account's `RESEND_API_KEY` and `EMAIL_FROM`
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stay the owner's. The account's own uses of a secret — its model key in
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stay the owner's, signed in (no key, not even `foldrun login`). The account's own uses of a secret — its model key in
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Settings → Model, and the mail the platform sends for the account (password
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resets, invites, billing) — are not a workspace's and are not limited. A new
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value or a new site binding keeps the limit. Limiting a secret seals the list
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package/docs/security.md
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- only the account's owner can set, rebind or remove the account's
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`RESEND_API_KEY` and `EMAIL_FROM`, because that sender carries everyone's
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reset links — whether through the secrets API or an OAuth connect. The
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owner means the owner in
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their own `foldrun login` made
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owner means the owner signed in, in the browser: no API key can, not even
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the one their own `foldrun login` made (since 5 November 2026), so a
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leaked laptop key cannot repoint the reset mail and take the account;
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- a key rotated by a caller that is no person (a key known only by its
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label) acts as nobody, never as the rotated key's owner;
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- a member or key limited to some workspaces cannot change what every
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