fedipod-server 0.29.0 → 0.31.0

package/lib/core/intake/notes.mjs

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-// notes.mjs — a note on its way in: whether it concerns us, fetching it at
-// its origin, filing it, the replies collection on our own posts, and the
-// two ways a held post leaves again (forget, retract). Also the §7.1.2
-// forward of a reply into one of our threads to our followers.
-
-import * as podNotes from '../../pod/notes.mjs';
-import { PUBLIC } from '../wire.mjs';
-import * as polls from '../polls.mjs';
-import { httpOnly, emojisOf, pollOf, isContentType, authorOf, quoteOf, quotePolicyOf, MAX_MENTIONS, MAX_URL_CHARS, MAX_REPLIES_RECORDED, MAX_FORWARDED, FORWARDABLE, FORWARD_TYPES } from './activity.mjs';
-
-// Does this activity/note concern us at all? Either it comes from someone
-// we follow, or it names us (to/cc, mention tag) or replies to one of our
-// notes. Anything else is a stranger blasting inboxes — refuse it before
-// spending a dereference on it.
-export function concernsUs(intake, doc, actor) {
-  if (intake.store.getContacts().following.some(f => f.actor === actor && f.accepted)) return true;
-  const audience = []
-    .concat(doc?.to || [], doc?.cc || [], doc?.bto || [], doc?.bcc || [], doc?.audience || [])
-    .map(v => (typeof v === 'string' ? v : v?.id)).filter(Boolean);
-  if (audience.includes(intake.urls.actor) || audience.includes(intake.urls.followers)) return true;
-  const tagged = [].concat(doc?.tag || [])
-    .some(t => t?.type === 'Mention' && (t.href === intake.urls.actor || t.name?.includes(intake.urls.actor)));
-  if (tagged) return true;
-  // A post that quotes one of ours is about us as much as a reply is.
-  const quoted = quoteOf(doc);
-  if (quoted && quoted.startsWith(intake.urls.notes)) return true;
-  const inReplyTo = typeof doc?.inReplyTo === 'string' ? doc.inReplyTo : doc?.inReplyTo?.id;
-  if (!inReplyTo) return false;
-  if (String(inReplyTo).startsWith(intake.urls.notes)) return true;
-  // A group also owns the conversation under anything it carried. Without
-  // this, a reply that lost the group's mention on its way round the
-  // fediverse is refused, and the thread breaks for everyone who was only
-  // ever following the group.
-  return intake.config.kind === 'group'
-    && intake.store.getStatuses().some(s => s.noteId === String(inReplyTo));
-}
-
-// §7.1.2 Forwarding from the inbox. A reply into one of our threads reaches
-// only the servers the replier's server chose to deliver to — never our
-// followers on servers it has never heard of. As the actor those followers
-// follow, WE close that gap: an activity addressed to our followers collection
-// that names one of our objects is re-delivered to our followers' inboxes.
-//
-// Only what was addressed to the followers COLLECTION is carried — bto/bcc are
-// never read here, so a direct message (addressed to a person) never qualifies
-// and is never rebroadcast. And this runs only after handle() accepted the
-// activity, so anything blocked or muted was already refused upstream and is
-// never forwarded.
-export async function maybeForward(intake, activity) {
-  if (!activity || typeof activity !== 'object') return;
-  if (!FORWARDABLE.has(activity.type)) return;              // see FORWARDABLE
-  // Forwarding signs somebody else's activity with OUR key and pushes it to
-  // every follower we have. That is a lot to do on the word of an unsigned
-  // POST, so it is narrowed three ways:
-  //
-  //   1. Only the types whose object this drain actually DEREFERENCED at the
-  //      author's own origin. A Create/Update/Delete went through onCreate /
-  //      onUpdate / onDelete, which fetch and check the author; a Like, an
-  //      Announce or an Undo is believed on the envelope alone, so relaying
-  //      one made us a signed relay for anything a stranger cared to write.
-  //   2. The actor has to be someone we already know of. A complete stranger
-  //      addressing our followers collection is not a conversation we are
-  //      party to.
-  //   3. A budget per drain, so a flood cannot turn one sweep into thousands
-  //      of outbound deliveries under our signature.
-  if (!FORWARD_TYPES.has(activity.type)) return;
-  try {
-    const audience = []
-      .concat(activity.to || [], activity.cc || [], activity.audience || [])
-      .map(v => (typeof v === 'string' ? v : v?.id)).filter(Boolean);
-    if (!audience.includes(intake.urls.followers)) return;      // not for our followers
-    if (!intake._referencesOurObject(activity)) return;         // not into a thread of ours
-    const actor = typeof activity.actor === 'string' ? activity.actor : activity.actor?.id;
-    if (actor === intake.urls.actor) return;                    // our own; nothing to forward
-    if (!intake.known(actor)) {
-      intake.log(`not forwarding ${activity.type} from ${actor}: nobody we know of`);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (intake._forwardBudget <= 0) {
-      intake.log(`not forwarding ${activity.type}: this drain's forwarding budget is spent`);
-      return;
-    }
-    const id = typeof activity.id === 'string' ? activity.id : null;
-    if (!id) return;
-    const forwarded = intake.store.read('forwarded.json', []);
-    if (forwarded.includes(id)) return;                       // already done
-
-    const inboxes = [...new Set(intake.store.getContacts().followers
-      .filter(f => !f.bsky)                                   // Bluesky members are not AP inboxes
-      .map(f => f.sharedInbox || f.inbox)
-      .filter(Boolean))];
-    if (!inboxes.length) return;
-    intake._forwardBudget -= 1;
-    // Blind copies are for their sender's delivery alone and never travel on
-    // (§6, §7.1), from the activity or its object.
-    const strip = (o) => { if (!o || typeof o !== 'object') return o; const { bto, bcc, ...rest } = o; return rest; };   // eslint-disable-line no-unused-vars
-    const onward = { ...strip(activity), ...(activity.object && typeof activity.object === 'object' ? { object: strip(activity.object) } : {}) };
-    await intake.deliverer.deliverToAll(inboxes, onward);
-    intake.store.write('forwarded.json', [...forwarded, id].slice(-MAX_FORWARDED));
-    intake.log(`forwarded ${activity.type} ${id} to ${inboxes.length} follower inbox(es)`);
-  } catch (e) {
-    intake.log(`inbox forwarding: ${e.message}`);               // never stalls the drain
-  }
-}
-
-// The "objects owned by the server" half of §7.1.2: does the activity reply
-// to, like, boost or otherwise name one of our own objects?
-export function referencesOurObject(intake, activity) {
-  const refs = [];
-  const add = (v) => { const id = typeof v === 'string' ? v : v?.id; if (id) refs.push(String(id)); };
-  const obj = activity.object;
-  if (obj && typeof obj === 'object') add(obj.inReplyTo);     // a reply's parent
-  add(activity.inReplyTo);
-  add(activity.object);                                       // a Like/Announce of our note
-  add(activity.target);
-  if (refs.some(r => r.startsWith(intake.urls.notes))) return true;
-  return intake.config.kind === 'group'
-    && refs.some(r => intake.store.getStatuses().some(s => s.noteId === r));
-}
-
-// Shared tail of Create/Announce: deref the note at its origin (never trust
-// the delivered copy), mirror it into pod RDF + statuses, notify on replies
-// to our own notes. Returns a rejection reason string, or undefined.
-export async function ingestNote(intake, objectId, actor, { via, inline = null } = {}) {
-  // `inline` is the note as delivered, offered only for a delivery whose
-  // signature the door verified (onCreate); otherwise the origin's copy.
-  const note = inline || await intake.fetchAP(objectId);
-  if (!note) return `object fetch failed (${objectId})`;
-  if (note.id !== objectId || !isContentType(note.type)) return `object not verifiable content (${objectId}, ${note.type})`;
-  const { attachmentsOf, titledContent } = await import('../wire.mjs');
-  const attachments = attachmentsOf(note);
-  const content = titledContent(note);          // hostile markup never reaches pod or client
-  // The delivering actor was checked on arrival; the author is only known once
-  // the note is dereferenced. authorOf refuses an author the note's own origin
-  // does not vouch for — see its comment; this is where a forged attribution
-  // would otherwise become a timeline entry, a pod document, and for a group a
-  // signed Announce to every member.
-  const author = authorOf(note, actor);
-  if (!author) return `object names an author its origin does not vouch for (${objectId})`;
-  // The verified document, kept for whoever acts on this note after the
-  // carry: a forum caches it for its readers. Only when someone asked.
-  intake.recentNotes?.set(note.id, note);
-  // This is the check that catches a blocked actor reaching us through
-  // somebody else's boost, or through a hashtag feed.
-  if (intake.store.isBlocked(author)) return `blocked author (${author})`;
-
-  // The ENVELOPE said this concerns us. The envelope is a document a stranger
-  // wrote: onCreate reads addressing off the delivered copy to decide whether
-  // fetching is worth it, and nothing re-asked the question of the copy that
-  // came back from the author's own server. So anyone could take any public
-  // post, address the delivery to us, and have it filed as "X mentioned you"
-  // — or, to a group, have a member's post carried to every follower when the
-  // member never sent it there.
-  //
-  // A boost is exempt (`via`): someone we follow deliberately putting a post
-  // in front of us is the whole point, and the note will not address us.
-  if (!via && !intake.concernsUs(note, author)) {
-    return `the note its own server serves does not address us (${objectId})`;
-  }
-
-  // An answer to one of our polls is a number on a document, not a post. It
-  // arrives as an ordinary reply naming an option and carrying nothing else,
-  // so filing it as one would put a blank entry in the thread and ring the
-  // owner once per voter. Counted or refused — a second answer, an option we
-  // do not offer, a poll already shut — it stops here either way.
-  const asked = note.inReplyTo && intake.store.getStatuses()
-    .find(x => x.noteId === String(note.inReplyTo) && x.kind === 'post' && x.poll);
-  if (asked && polls.isVoteShape(note)) {
-    const counted = await intake.publisher.recordVote(asked.noteId, author, note.name)
-      .catch(e => { intake.log(`vote on ${asked.noteId}: ${e.message}`); return false; });
-    intake.log(counted
-      ? `vote counted (${note.name}): ${asked.noteId}`
-      : `vote not counted (${note.name}) from ${author}: ${asked.noteId}`);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Anyone can Append to a public inbox, so arriving is not the same as
-  // belonging in the home timeline. Follow Mastodon's split: people you
-  // follow (and their boosts) are HOME; anyone else is a MENTION — kept,
-  // notified, readable in the Mentions view, but out of the timeline, and
-  // mirror-only so unsolicited content never accumulates in the pod.
-  // A group's people are its FOLLOWERS — it follows nobody. Reading the
-  // following list for one filed every member's post as a stranger's mention,
-  // so nothing reached the pod RDF and each post raised a notification.
-  const contacts = intake.store.getContacts();
-  const known = intake.config.kind === 'group'
-    ? contacts.followers.some(f => f.actor === author)
-    : contacts.following.some(f => f.actor === author && f.accepted);
-  // Someone in a group you are in is not a stranger: their reply belongs in
-  // the room, not in the drawer of unsolicited mail. Whose word this is on
-  // is the group's — its published membership — so the group's own door
-  // decides who gets in.
-  const followed = via || known || (!known && await intake.isCoMember(author));
-  const kind = followed ? 'timeline' : 'mention';
-
-  // Mastodon carries a thread's mentions into every reply, which is the only
-  // reason a reply ever reaches a group. Keep them so our composer can too.
-  const mentions = [].concat(note.tag || [])
-    .filter(t => t?.type === 'Mention' && t.href && t.name)
-    .slice(0, MAX_MENTIONS)
-    .map(t => ({ href: httpOnly(String(t.href).slice(0, MAX_URL_CHARS)), name: String(t.name).slice(0, 256) }))
-    .filter(m => m.href);
-  const hashtags = [].concat(note.tag || [])
-    .filter(t => t?.type === 'Hashtag' && t.name)
-    .slice(0, MAX_MENTIONS)
-    .map(t => ({ name: String(t.name).replace(/^#/, '').slice(0, 128), url: httpOnly(String(t.href || '').slice(0, MAX_URL_CHARS)) }))
-    .filter(t => t.name);
-  const emojis = emojisOf(note);
-  const poll = pollOf(note);
-  // What the note quotes, and what its author lets others quote. The quoted
-  // post is fetched and kept so the quote can be shown whole; whether the
-  // quote was allowed is checked, never assumed.
-  const quote = quoteOf(note);
-  const quotePolicy = quotePolicyOf(note, author);
-  const quoteState = quote ? await intake.quoteStateOf(note, quote) : null;
-  if (quote) await holdQuoted(intake, quote);
-  // Explicitly addressed, but to nobody public and to no followers
-  // collection: a direct message, which belongs to the conversations view
-  // rather than a timeline. A note with no addressing at all is NOT direct —
-  // some servers omit to/cc, and vanishing from home is the wrong reading.
-  const audience = [].concat(note.to || [], note.cc || []).map(String);
-  const direct = audience.length > 0
-    && !audience.includes(PUBLIC) && !audience.some(a => a.endsWith('/followers'));
-  // Addressed to less than the world: whatever else happens to it, a group
-  // must never widen its audience by carrying it.
-  const nonPublic = audience.length > 0 && !audience.includes(PUBLIC);
-  intake.store.addStatus({
-    noteId: note.id, actor: author, content,
-    published: note.published, inReplyTo: note.inReplyTo, kind,
-    ...(direct ? { direct: true } : {}),
-    ...(nonPublic ? { nonPublic: true } : {}),
-    // The author's content warning, shown as one: plain text only.
-    ...(note.summary ? { spoiler: String(note.summary).replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '') } : {}),
-    ...(note.sensitive === true ? { sensitive: true } : {}),
-    ...(hashtags.length ? { tags: hashtags } : {}),
-    ...(poll ? { poll } : {}),
-    ...(emojis.length ? { emojis } : {}),
-    ...(mentions.length ? { mentions } : {}),
-    ...(attachments.length ? { attachments } : {}),
-    ...(quote ? { quote, quoteState } : {}),
-    ...(quotePolicy ? { quotePolicy } : {}),
-    ...(via ? { via } : {}),
-  });
-  // A notification for anything addressed to this person: a stranger's
-  // post, a reply to one of ours, a direct message, or a post that names
-  // us — whoever sent it. A direct message from someone followed used to
-  // raise nothing and sat unseen in the private mentions. A post quoting
-  // one of ours is its own kind of notification.
-  const namesUs = mentions.some((m) => m.href === intake.urls.actor);
-  const replyToOurs = !!note.inReplyTo && String(note.inReplyTo).startsWith(intake.urls.notes);
-  const quotesUs = !!quote && quote.startsWith(intake.urls.notes);
-  if (quotesUs) {
-    intake.store.addNotification({ type: 'quote', actor: author, noteId: note.id });
-  } else if (!followed || replyToOurs || direct || namesUs) {
-    intake.store.addNotification({ type: 'mention', actor: author, noteId: note.id });
-  }
-  if (note.inReplyTo && String(note.inReplyTo).startsWith(intake.urls.notes)) {
-    await intake.addReply(String(note.inReplyTo), note.id)
-      .catch(e => intake.log(`replies collection: ${e.message}`));
-  }
-  intake.log(`${kind}: ${note.id}${via ? ` (boosted by ${via})` : ''}`);
-}
-
-// The post a quote shows: fetched at its origin and kept out of every
-// timeline (`remote`), the way a thread's ancestors are — it is there to be
-// shown inside the quoting post, not on its own. Nothing is fetched twice,
-// and nothing is followed further: a quote of a quote shows one level.
-export async function holdQuoted(intake, quoteId) {
-  if (intake.store.getStatuses().some(s => s.noteId === quoteId)) return;
-  if (intake.store.isBlocked(quoteId)) return;
-  const q = await intake.fetchAP(quoteId).catch(() => null);
-  if (!q || q.id !== quoteId || !isContentType(q.type)) {
-    intake.log(`quoted post ${quoteId} could not be read — the quote shows without it`);
-    return;
-  }
-  const by = authorOf(q, null);
-  if (!by || intake.store.isBlocked(by)) return;
-  const { attachmentsOf, titledContent } = await import('../wire.mjs');
-  const attachments = attachmentsOf(q);
-  const emojis = emojisOf(q);
-  const poll = pollOf(q);
-  const quotePolicy = quotePolicyOf(q, by);
-  const mentions = [].concat(q.tag || [])
-    .filter(t => t?.type === 'Mention' && t.href && t.name)
-    .slice(0, MAX_MENTIONS)
-    .map(t => ({ href: httpOnly(String(t.href).slice(0, MAX_URL_CHARS)), name: String(t.name).slice(0, 256) }))
-    .filter(m => m.href);
-  intake.store.addStatus({
-    noteId: q.id, actor: by, content: titledContent(q),
-    published: q.published, inReplyTo: q.inReplyTo, kind: 'remote',
-    ...(q.summary ? { spoiler: String(q.summary).replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '') } : {}),
-    ...(q.sensitive === true ? { sensitive: true } : {}),
-    ...(poll ? { poll } : {}),
-    ...(emojis.length ? { emojis } : {}),
-    ...(mentions.length ? { mentions } : {}),
-    ...(attachments.length ? { attachments } : {}),
-    ...(quotePolicy ? { quotePolicy } : {}),
-  });
-  intake.log(`quoted post kept: ${q.id}`);
-}
-
-// Drop a post we were holding. A group that carried it also unsays its own
-// Announce — forwarding the author's Delete would be signed by us and not by
-// them, which receivers are right to refuse.
-// `collect` batches the outbox side: retract pushes the Announce id onto it
-// instead of republishing, and the caller writes once for all of them.
-export async function forget(intake, s, { collect = null } = {}) {
-  if (s.announceActivity) {
-    await intake.retract(s.noteId, { collect }).catch(e => intake.log(`retract: ${e.message}`));
-  }
-  intake.store.removeStatus(s.noteId);
-}
-
-// Undo an Announce this group made. Shared with the operator's `retract`.
-export async function retract(intake, noteId, { collect = null } = {}) {
-  const s = intake.store.getStatuses().find(x => x.noteId === noteId);
-  if (!s) throw new Error('no such post');
-  // A Bluesky carry is a repost, and unsaying it is deleting the repost.
-  if (s.repostUri) {
-    if (!intake.bskyGroup) throw new Error('no bluesky account connected');
-    return intake.bskyGroup.retract(s);
-  }
-  if (!s.announceActivity) throw new Error('that post was never carried');
-  const { undoActivity } = await import('../wire.mjs');
-  const inboxes = intake.announceTargets(s.actor);
-  const undo = undoActivity({ urls: intake.urls, activity: s.announceActivity, serial: intake.serial++ });
-  await intake.deliverer.deliverToAll(inboxes, undo);
-  // The Undo takes the carry's place in the outbox, so a reader catching up
-  // from it learns the carry was withdrawn.
-  if (collect) collect.push(undo);
-  else await intake.publisher.unrecordOutbox(i => i?.id === s.announceActivity.id,
-    { record: () => (intake.config.private ? null : undo) });
-  intake.store.updateStatus(noteId, {
-    announcedAt: undefined, announceActivity: undefined, retractedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-  });
-  return { ok: true, noteId, inboxes: inboxes.length };
-}
-
-// Read-modify-write, and the drain is serialized, so two replies in one sweep
-// do not race. Nothing else writes this document.
-// MAX_REPLIES_RECORDED caps the collection. It is a discovery aid — a client
-// reading a thread — and the statuses index is what actually holds the
-// replies, so dropping the oldest costs a hop, not a record.
-export async function addReply(intake, parentId, replyId) {
-  // The parent has to be a post we actually made. The only check used to be
-  // that the id started with our notes prefix, and `inReplyTo` is read off a
-  // document at the sender's own origin — so a stranger could name a note we
-  // never wrote, and we would CREATE a document on the pod at a URL of their
-  // choosing and then grow it, one whole re-PUT per reply, with no cap. Four
-  // pod requests each and bytes quadratic in the number of replies.
-  if (!intake.store.getStatuses().some(s => s.noteId === parentId && s.kind === 'post')) {
-    intake.log(`reply names ${parentId}, which is not a post of ours — not recorded`);
-    return;
-  }
-  const { repliesId, collection } = await import('../wire.mjs');
-  const url = repliesId(parentId);
-  // Deliberately NOT caught: a read we could not make is not an empty
-  // collection, and rewriting on top of one erases every reply already
-  // recorded. getJson returns null only for a genuine 404 — the document does
-  // not exist yet — and throws otherwise, which the caller logs and retries.
-  const cur = await podNotes.readReplies(intake.remote, url);
-  const items = Array.isArray(cur?.items) ? cur.items : [];
-  if (items.includes(replyId)) return;
-  items.push(replyId);
-  await podNotes.writeReplies(intake.remote, url, collection(url, items.slice(-MAX_REPLIES_RECORDED)));
-  intake.log(`reply recorded on ${parentId}`);
-}

package/lib/core/intake/verify.mjs

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-// verify.mjs — how the drain decides what to believe: a signed fetch of the
-// claimed document at its own origin, what local state already knows of, and
-// the receipt a gateway left beside a delivery.
-
-import * as podInbox from '../../pod/inbox.mjs';
-import { readCapped } from '../../shared/safefetch.mjs';
-import { isActorType, sameOrigin, ACCEPT_AP } from './activity.mjs';
-import { readLenient } from '../as2.mjs';
-
-export async function fetchAP(intake, url) {
-  const res = await intake.deliverer.signedFetch(url, { headers: { accept: ACCEPT_AP } });
-  if (res.status >= 400) return null;
-  // Remote servers are untrusted: read with a byte budget rather than
-  // letting res.json() buffer whatever they choose to send.
-  const { readCapped } = await import('../../shared/safefetch.mjs');
-  // Plenty of servers answer 200 text/html however politely we ask for AS2 —
-  // people reply to ordinary web pages, and their id is that page. Say so,
-  // rather than handing the HTML to JSON.parse and logging the parser's
-  // complaint about an unexpected `<`.
-  // Not logged: people reply to ordinary web pages, so the reply's object id
-  // is that page and this is the expected answer, not a fault. Only a server
-  // that CLAIMS to be sending JSON and then does not is worth a line.
-  const ct = (res.headers.get('content-type') || '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
-  if (ct && !ct.endsWith('json')) return null;
-  let doc = null;
-  try {
-    const read = await readLenient(await readCapped(res));
-    if (read.degraded) intake.log(`fetch ${url} grounded to read: ${read.degraded}`);
-    doc = read.view ?? read.doc;
-  } catch (e) { intake.log(`fetch ${url}: unreadable — ${e.message}`); return null; }
-  if (!doc) { intake.log(`fetch ${url}: unreadable as JSON`); return null; }
-  // A document is only evidence about its OWN origin.
-  //
-  // signedFetch follows redirects and hands back only the final response, and
-  // every caller checks `doc.id` against the URL it ASKED for — so an open
-  // redirector on a victim's origin let an attacker's server answer for a
-  // victim's URL and be believed by that check.
-  //
-  // Only a redirect that CROSSED AN ORIGIN is refused here. A same-origin
-  // redirect is ordinary (canonicalisation, trailing slashes), and a document
-  // fetched with no redirect at all is still returned whatever it claims —
-  // the callers reject it on id, and they say something more useful about it
-  // than this could ("actor id mismatch", "object not verifiable content").
-  const landed = res.finalUrl || url;
-  if (!sameOrigin(landed, url) && doc && doc.id && !sameOrigin(doc.id, landed)) {
-    intake.log(`fetch ${url}: redirected to ${landed}, which is not where ${doc.id} lives — refused`);
-    return null;
-  }
-  // Every actor type, not just Person. A Group was fetched, used and thrown
-  // away, so nothing knew its preferredUsername — and a client rendering it
-  // fell back to the last path segment of the actor URL, which is the literal
-  // word `actor`. That is where @actor@host came from.
-  // Under the id the document CLAIMS, but only when its own origin vouches
-  // for that id. A stranger's actor document naming someone else's id used to
-  // overwrite that actor's cached name, bio, avatar and Person/Group flag —
-  // one appended Follow was enough, and the id-mismatch checks in onFollow
-  // and ingestNote both run after this line and never undid it.
-  //
-  // Same origin rather than exact equality: signedFetch follows redirects
-  // without reporting where it landed, so a server that redirects its own
-  // canonical actor URL would otherwise stop being cached at all.
-  if (isActorType(doc?.type) && doc.id && sameOrigin(doc.id, url)) {
-    intake.store.cacheActor(doc.id, doc);
-  }
-  return doc;
-}
-
-// Have we ever heard of this actor or object? Answered entirely from local
-// state, so asking costs nothing. It is what stops a stranger's Delete or
-// Update — of which Mastodon broadcasts a great many, and of which anyone at
-// all can Append one — turning into a signed request to a host they chose.
-export function known(intake, id) {
-  const c = intake.store.getContacts();
-  return c.followers.some(f => f.actor === id)
-    || c.following.some(f => f.actor === id)
-    || intake.store.getStatuses().some(s => s.noteId === id || s.actor === id)
-    || !!intake.store.getActors()[id];
-}
-
-// Returns a rejection reason string, or undefined when handled.
-// The gateway's shared HMAC secret, or null when no gateway is configured.
-// Its absence is what makes the whole receipt path dormant by default.
-export function gatewaySecret(intake) {
-  return intake.store.getConfig()?.gateway?.hmacSecret || null;
-}
-
-// Shadow-mode measurement: how much real traffic actually verified. The one
-// number an operator needs before trusting receipts. Only touched while a
-// gateway is configured, so it costs a non-gateway install nothing.
-export function bumpGatewayStat(intake, verified) {
-  const s = intake.store.read('gateway-stats.json', { verified: 0, unverified: 0 });
-  if (verified) s.verified++; else s.unverified++;
-  s.lastAt = new Date().toISOString();
-  intake.store.write('gateway-stats.json', s);
-}
-
-// Read and authenticate the receipt a gateway wrote beside an inbox item.
-// Returns the receipt object only when its HMAC verifies against our secret;
-// null otherwise (no gateway, no receipt, a stranger's forged one, or a read
-// failure) — and null means "unverified", the pre-gateway behavior.
-export async function readReceipt(intake, itemUrl) {
-  const secret = intake.gatewaySecret();
-  if (!secret) return null;
-  try {
-    const { readCapped: cap } = await import('../../shared/safefetch.mjs');
-    const receipt = await podInbox.readDeliveryReceipt(intake.remote, itemUrl, { maxBytes: 64 * 1024, readCapped: cap });
-    if (!receipt) return null;
-    const { verifyReceipt } = await import('../../gateway/httpsig.mjs');
-    return verifyReceipt(receipt, secret) ? receipt : null;
-  } catch { return null; }
-}
-
-// Whether a receipt says anything about THIS actor. Verified-and-about-someone
-// -else is worth exactly as much as unverified, and is treated the same way:
-// the drain's verify-by-dereference still stands behind it.
-export function receiptVouchesFor(intake, receipt, actor) {
-  if (!receipt?.verified) return false;
-  if (!receipt.actor || receipt.actor !== actor) return false;
-  // A missing keyId with verified:true cannot come from our own door
-  // (makeReceipt fills both from the same key), so refuse rather than waive.
-  if (!receipt.keyId || !sameOrigin(receipt.keyId, actor)) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-// Is this really gone at its origin? true / false / null when the origin
-// could not be asked. Delivered bodies carry no signature, so this is how a
-// Delete is verified — the same verify-by-dereference the rest of intake uses.
-export async function isGone(intake, url) {
-  let res;
-  try { res = await intake.deliverer.signedFetch(url, { headers: { accept: ACCEPT_AP } }); }
-  catch { return null; }
-  if (res.status === 404 || res.status === 410) return true;
-  if (res.status < 400) {
-    // A Tombstone answers 200 and still means deleted.
-    try {
-      const { readCapped } = await import('../../shared/safefetch.mjs');
-      const read = await readLenient(await readCapped(res));
-      return (read.view ?? read.doc)?.type === 'Tombstone';
-    } catch { return false; }
-  }
-  return null;                       // 401/403/5xx — no answer, not a denial
-}

package/lib/core/keys.mjs

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-// keys.mjs — actor signing keys. RSA (Mastodon's draft-cavage HTTP Signatures
-// require RSA-SHA256) signs deliveries; Ed25519 signs the FEP-8b32 proof that
-// travels with an activity. PEM at rest (0600), CryptoKey in memory for
-// Fedify's signRequest and for the proof.
-//
-// The key lives on THIS MACHINE by default (AP_HOME/keys.json): the pod host
-// then never holds it. `setup --keys pod` puts it in pod state instead,
-// which is what lets several devices sign as the same actor without copying
-// anything — see resolveKeys() for the guard that keeps the two modes from
-// silently breaking each other.
-
-import crypto from 'node:crypto';
-import fs from 'node:fs';
-import path from 'node:path';
-import { writeJsonAtomic } from '../device/home.mjs';
-
-const RSA_ALG = { name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' };
-
-const localPath = (dir) => path.join(dir, 'keys.json');
-const readLocal = (dir) => {
-  try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(localPath(dir), 'utf8')); } catch { return null; }
-};
-// Atomic: this is the private key remote servers have cached, and a truncated
-// one cannot be recovered from anywhere — the pod does not hold it.
-const writeLocal = (dir, rec) => {
-  fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  writeJsonAtomic(localPath(dir), rec);
-};
-
-function generate() {
-  const rsa = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
-  const ed = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
-  return {
-    rsa: {
-      publicPem: rsa.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }),
-      privatePem: rsa.privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }),
-    },
-    ed25519: {
-      publicPem: ed.publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }),
-      privatePem: ed.privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Find or create the key record.
- *
- * The dangerous case is minting a NEW key when the actor already advertises
- * one: remote servers cache the public key, so a fresh keypair silently
- * invalidates every signature until the actor document is republished — and
- * then breaks whichever other device holds the old key. So when key material
- * is missing but the actor doc already has a key, we refuse and explain,
- * unless the caller passes rotate:true deliberately.
- *
- * @param {object} store            pod-backed state store
- * @param {object} o
- * @param {string|null} o.localDir  AP_HOME when keys are local (the default)
- * @param {boolean} o.rotate        mint a replacement on purpose
- * @param {function} [o.actorHasKey] async () => boolean, consulted only when
- *                                  no key material exists anywhere
- * @param {function} [o.log]
- */
-export async function resolveKeys(store, { localDir = null, rotate = false, actorHasKey = null, actorId = null, log = () => {} } = {}) {
-  let rec = localDir ? readLocal(localDir) : null;
-
-  // A key belongs to ONE actor. Adopting whatever keys.json happens to be in
-  // the directory is right within an identity and wrong across two: it is how
-  // a second setup in the same AP_HOME ended up signing as a different actor
-  // with the first one's key, which links the two publicly for anyone who
-  // compares the actor documents. A stamped key that names another actor is
-  // treated as absent, so the mint path (and its actorHasKey guard) applies.
-  if (rec && actorId && rec.mintedFor && rec.mintedFor !== actorId) {
-    log(`local keys.json belongs to ${rec.mintedFor} — not reusing it for ${actorId}`);
-    rec = null;
-  } else if (rec && actorId && !rec.mintedFor) {
-    // Written before keys were stamped: keep working, but say so, because it
-    // may be another actor's key.
-    log('keys.json predates per-identity stamping — if this actor was set up in a '
-      + 'home that already held a key, `setup --rotate-key` mints one of its own');
-  }
-
-  if (!rec) {
-    const podRec = store.read('keys.json', null);
-    if (podRec && localDir) {
-      // Migrating an existing actor to local keys: adopt the pod's key so
-      // the identity is preserved, then remove the pod's copy — leaving it
-      // would defeat the point of going local.
-      writeLocal(localDir, podRec);
-      rec = podRec;
-      const gone = await store.remove('keys.json');
-      log(gone
-        ? `signing key moved to ${localPath(localDir)} and deleted from pod state`
-        : `signing key copied to ${localPath(localDir)} — could NOT delete the pod copy, remove it by hand`);
-    } else {
-      rec = podRec;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!rec && !rotate && actorHasKey && await actorHasKey()) {
-    throw new Error(
-      'this actor already publishes a signing key, but no key material is present here.\n'
-      + `  Copy keys.json from your other device into ${localDir || 'pod state'}, or\n`
-      + '  re-run setup with --keys pod to share the key through the pod, or\n'
-      // --force, because rotate-key connects before it rotates and would meet
-      // this same refusal: advice has to name a command that can actually run.
-      + '  run `fedipod rotate-key --force` to replace the published key (breaks other devices).');
-  }
-
-  if (!rec || rotate) {
-    rec = { ...generate(), ...(actorId ? { mintedFor: actorId } : {}) };
-    if (localDir) writeLocal(localDir, rec); else store.write('keys.json', rec);
-    log(rotate ? 'minted a REPLACEMENT signing key — republish the profile' : 'minted a signing key');
-  }
-
-  // A record written before proofs existed has no Ed25519 half. Minting one is
-  // safe in a way minting an RSA key is not: nothing has ever published or
-  // cached it, so no remote signature is invalidated.
-  if (!rec.ed25519) {
-    rec = { ...rec, ed25519: generate().ed25519 };
-    if (localDir) writeLocal(localDir, rec); else store.write('keys.json', rec);
-    log('minted the Ed25519 half of the signing key');
-  }
-
-  const der = crypto.createPrivateKey(rec.rsa.privatePem).export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'der' });
-  const rsaPrivate = await crypto.subtle.importKey('pkcs8', der, RSA_ALG, true, ['sign']);
-  const { edPrivateKey, multibaseEd25519 } = await import('./proof.mjs');
-  return {
-    rsaPrivate, rsaPublicPem: rec.rsa.publicPem,
-    edPrivate: await edPrivateKey(rec.ed25519.privatePem),
-    edPublicMultibase: multibaseEd25519(rec.ed25519.publicPem),
-  };
-}
-
-// Move a local key into pod state — the arrangement that lets several
-// devices sign as one actor once the state store is a pod they all reach.
-// The pod write is forced and checked BEFORE the local file goes: a key
-// remote servers have cached cannot be recovered from anywhere else.
-export async function moveKeysToPod(store, { localDir, actorId = null, log = () => {} }) {
-  const rec = readLocal(localDir);
-  if (!rec) throw new Error(`no local key at ${localPath(localDir)} — nothing to move`);
-  if (actorId && rec.mintedFor && rec.mintedFor !== actorId) {
-    throw new Error(`local keys.json belongs to ${rec.mintedFor}, not ${actorId} — refusing to move it`);
-  }
-  store.write('keys.json', rec);
-  const landed = store.commit ? await store.commit() : await store.flush?.();
-  if (landed === false) throw new Error('the pod write did not land — the local key is untouched');
-  fs.rmSync(localPath(localDir), { force: true });
-  log('signing key moved to pod state and removed from this machine');
-  return true;
-}
-
-// Back-compat alias for callers that just want "the keys, wherever they are".
-export const ensureKeys = (store, opts) => resolveKeys(store, opts);