fallow 2.90.0 → 2.92.1

package/types/output-contract.d.ts

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ kind: "dupes"
 kind: "dead-code-grouped"
 }) | (ImpactReport & {
 kind: "impact"
-}) | (SecurityOutput & {
+}) | ((SecurityOutput | SecuritySummaryOutput) & {
 kind: "security"
 }) | (CheckOutput & {
 kind: "dead-code"
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ export type IssueAction = (FixAction | SuppressLineAction | SuppressFileAction |
  * Discriminant string for [`FixAction`]. Kebab-case per the JSON output
  * contract.
  */
-export type FixActionType = ("remove-export" | "delete-file" | "remove-dependency" | "move-dependency" | "remove-enum-member" | "remove-class-member" | "resolve-import" | "install-dependency" | "remove-duplicate" | "move-to-dev" | "refactor-cycle" | "refactor-re-export-cycle" | "refactor-boundary" | "export-type" | "remove-catalog-entry" | "remove-empty-catalog-group" | "update-catalog-reference" | "add-catalog-entry" | "remove-catalog-reference" | "remove-dependency-override" | "fix-dependency-override")
+export type FixActionType = ("remove-export" | "delete-file" | "remove-dependency" | "move-dependency" | "remove-enum-member" | "remove-class-member" | "resolve-import" | "install-dependency" | "remove-duplicate" | "move-to-dev" | "refactor-cycle" | "refactor-re-export-cycle" | "refactor-boundary" | "export-type" | "remove-catalog-entry" | "remove-empty-catalog-group" | "update-catalog-reference" | "add-catalog-entry" | "remove-catalog-reference" | "remove-dependency-override" | "fix-dependency-override" | "resolve-policy-violation")
 /**
  * Singleton discriminant for [`SuppressLineAction`].
  */
@@ -232,6 +232,17 @@ export type MemberKind = ("enum_member" | "class_method" | "class_property" | "n
  * Discriminator for [`ReExportCycle`]: which structural shape was detected.
  */
 export type ReExportCycleKind = ("multi-node" | "self-loop")
+/**
+ * Which rule-pack rule kind produced a [`PolicyViolation`].
+ */
+export type PolicyRuleKind = ("banned-call" | "banned-import")
+/**
+ * Effective severity of a single [`PolicyViolation`]. Per-rule `severity`
+ * overrides the `rules."policy-violation"` master; `off` rules emit nothing,
+ * so only `error` and `warn` appear on the wire. The exit-code gate inspects
+ * this per-finding value, not the master severity.
+ */
+export type PolicyViolationSeverity = ("error" | "warn")
 /**
  * The origin of a stale suppression: inline comment or JSDoc tag.
  */
@@ -322,6 +333,18 @@ error: string
 kind: "malformed-tsconfig"
 } | {
 kind: "tsconfig-reference-dir-missing"
+} | {
+/**
+ * On-disk size of the skipped file in bytes.
+ */
+size_bytes: number
+kind: "skipped-large-file"
+} | {
+/**
+ * On-disk size of the skipped file in bytes.
+ */
+size_bytes: number
+kind: "skipped-minified-file"
 })
 /**
  * Discriminant for [`CloneGroupAction::kind`]. Mirrors the action types
@@ -600,12 +623,18 @@ export type ImpactTrendDirection = ("improving" | "declining" | "stable")
  * The `fallow security --format json` schema version. Independently versioned
  * from the main contract, mirroring `ImpactReportSchemaVersion`.
  */
-export type SecuritySchemaVersion = "1"
+export type SecuritySchemaVersion = ("1" | "2" | "3" | "4" | "5" | "6")
+/**
+ * Severity level for rules.
+ *
+ * Controls whether an issue type causes CI failure (`error`), is reported
+ * without failing (`warn`), or is suppressed entirely (`off`).
+ */
+export type Severity = ("error" | "warn" | "off")
 /**
- * Gate mode for `fallow security --gate <mode>` (issue #886). Tier 2 reserves
- * the value `newly-reachable`.
+ * Gate mode for `fallow security --gate <mode>`.
  */
-export type SecurityGateMode = "new"
+export type SecurityGateMode = ("new" | "newly-reachable")
 /**
  * Gate verdict on the wire. `fail` is the CI-state token; human output renders
  * it as "REVIEW REQUIRED" because these stay unverified candidates, never
@@ -617,14 +646,32 @@ export type SecurityGateVerdict = ("pass" | "fail")
  * verification, NOT verified vulnerabilities.
  */
 export type SecurityFindingKind = ("client-server-leak" | "tainted-sink")
+/**
+ * Verification-priority tier for a security candidate. This is ranking, not an
+ * exploitability verdict.
+ */
+export type SecuritySeverity = ("high" | "medium" | "low")
 /**
  * The role a hop plays in a security finding's structural import trace.
  */
-export type TraceHopRole = ("client-boundary" | "untrusted-source" | "intermediate" | "secret-source" | "sink")
+export type TraceHopRole = ("client-boundary" | "untrusted-source" | "module-source" | "intermediate" | "secret-source" | "sink")
 /**
  * Dead-code issue kind linked to a security candidate.
  */
 export type SecurityDeadCodeKind = ("unused-file" | "unused-export")
+/**
+ * How strongly the untrusted-source signal is associated with the sink, a
+ * structured discriminator so a consumer can tier candidates without parsing
+ * the human `evidence` prose. Present only when
+ * [`SecurityReachability::reachable_from_untrusted_source`] is true. Neither
+ * value proves exploitability; both are ranking signals (issue #885 doctrine:
+ * rank, never gate).
+ */
+export type TaintConfidence = ("arg-level" | "module-level")
+/**
+ * Static URL construction shape captured for URL-shaped security sinks.
+ */
+export type SecurityUrlShape = ("fixed-origin-dynamic-path" | "dynamic-origin")
 /**
  * Runtime coverage state for the function enclosing a security sink.
  * This is production-observation evidence, not an exploitability verdict.
@@ -634,6 +681,15 @@ export type SecurityRuntimeState = ("runtime-hot" | "runtime-cold" | "never-exec
  * Defensive control family detected on a source to sink path.
  */
 export type SecurityControlKind = ("sanitization" | "validation" | "authentication" | "authorization")
+/**
+ * Why a sink-shaped callee could not be flattened into a static catalogue
+ * path.
+ */
+export type SkippedSecurityCalleeReason = ("computed-member" | "dynamic-dispatch" | "unsupported-assignment-object")
+/**
+ * Syntactic expression shape for a skipped security callee.
+ */
+export type SkippedSecurityCalleeExpressionKind = ("static-member-expression" | "computed-member-expression" | "identifier" | "other")
 /**
  * Discriminator value for [`CodeClimateIssue::kind`].
  */
@@ -659,11 +715,20 @@ command: AuditCommand
 verdict: AuditVerdict
 changed_files_count: number
 base_ref: string
+/**
+ * Human-readable provenance of `base_ref`, e.g. `merge-base with
+ * origin/main`, `local main`, or `FALLOW_AUDIT_BASE=upstream/main`.
+ * Present when the base was auto-detected or set via `FALLOW_AUDIT_BASE`;
+ * absent for an explicit `--base` (the ref the user typed is already
+ * self-describing).
+ */
+base_description?: (string | null)
 head_sha?: (string | null)
 elapsed_ms: ElapsedMs
 base_snapshot_skipped?: (boolean | null)
 summary: AuditSummary
 attribution: AuditAttribution
+_meta?: (Meta | null)
 dead_code?: (CheckOutput | null)
 duplication?: (DupesReportPayload | null)
 complexity?: (HealthReport | null)
@@ -690,6 +755,88 @@ complexity_inherited: number
 duplication_introduced: number
 duplication_inherited: number
 }
+/**
+ * Metric and rule definitions emitted under `_meta` when `--explain` is
+ * passed (always present in MCP responses). Helps AI agents and CI systems
+ * interpret metric values without re-reading the docs site.
+ */
+export interface Meta {
+/**
+ * URL to the documentation page for this command.
+ */
+docs?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * Local telemetry correlation metadata for agent follow-up runs.
+ */
+telemetry?: (TelemetryMeta | null)
+/**
+ * Per-field definitions for envelope fields and action payload fields.
+ */
+field_definitions?: {
+[k: string]: string
+}
+/**
+ * Per-metric definitions: name, description, range, interpretation.
+ */
+metrics?: {
+[k: string]: MetaMetric
+}
+/**
+ * Per-rule definitions for check command output.
+ */
+rules?: {
+[k: string]: MetaRule
+}
+}
+/**
+ * Privacy-safe local run metadata emitted for JSON consumers.
+ */
+export interface TelemetryMeta {
+/**
+ * Ephemeral local token that may be passed to the hidden `--parent-run`
+ * flag on a later command. It is not derived from repository, path, user,
+ * machine, project, or cloud data.
+ */
+analysis_run_id?: (string | null)
+}
+/**
+ * Single-metric definition inside [`Meta::metrics`].
+ */
+export interface MetaMetric {
+/**
+ * Human-readable metric name.
+ */
+name?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * What this metric measures and how it is computed.
+ */
+description?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * Valid value range (e.g., `"[0, 100]"`).
+ */
+range?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * How to read the value (e.g., `"lower is better"`).
+ */
+interpretation?: (string | null)
+}
+/**
+ * Single-rule definition inside [`Meta::rules`].
+ */
+export interface MetaRule {
+/**
+ * Human-readable rule name.
+ */
+name?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * What this rule detects.
+ */
+description?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * URL to the rule documentation.
+ */
+docs?: (string | null)
+}
 /**
  * Envelope emitted by `fallow dead-code --format json` (plus the `check`
  * block inside the combined and audit envelopes).
@@ -817,6 +964,25 @@ re_export_cycles?: ReExportCycleFinding[]
  * array natively.
  */
 boundary_violations?: BoundaryViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Files that matched no architecture boundary zone while
+ * `boundaries.coverage.requireAllFiles` was enabled.
+ */
+boundary_coverage_violations?: BoundaryCoverageViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Calls from zoned files to callees forbidden for that zone via
+ * `boundaries.calls.forbidden`. Wrapped in
+ * [`BoundaryCallViolationFinding`] so each entry carries a typed
+ * `actions` array natively.
+ */
+boundary_call_violations?: BoundaryCallViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Banned calls and banned imports matched by declarative rule packs
+ * (`rulePacks` config). Wrapped in [`PolicyViolationFinding`] so each
+ * entry carries a typed `actions` array natively. Each finding carries
+ * its effective per-rule severity.
+ */
+policy_violations?: PolicyViolationFinding[]
 /**
  * Suppression comments or JSDoc tags that no longer match any issue.
  */
@@ -959,6 +1125,18 @@ re_export_cycles?: number
  * Imports that cross architecture boundary rules.
  */
 boundary_violations: number
+/**
+ * Files that match no architecture boundary zone.
+ */
+boundary_coverage_violations?: number
+/**
+ * Calls from zoned files to callees forbidden for that zone.
+ */
+boundary_call_violations?: number
+/**
+ * Banned calls and banned imports matched by declarative rule packs.
+ */
+policy_violations?: number
 /**
  * Suppression comments that no longer match a finding.
  */
@@ -1646,7 +1824,7 @@ introduced?: (AuditIntroduced | null)
  */
 export interface TestOnlyDependencyFinding {
 /**
- * Production dependency that is only imported by test files — consider
+ * Production dependency that is only imported by test files , consider
  * moving to devDependencies.
  */
 package_name: string
@@ -1817,6 +1995,124 @@ actions: IssueAction[]
  */
 introduced?: (AuditIntroduced | null)
 }
+/**
+ * Wire-shape envelope for a [`BoundaryCoverageViolation`] finding. Carries
+ * actions for assigning the file to a zone or explicitly allowing it to stay
+ * unmatched.
+ */
+export interface BoundaryCoverageViolationFinding {
+/**
+ * The unmatched source file.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * 1-based line number used for diagnostics.
+ */
+line: number
+/**
+ * 0-based byte column offset used for diagnostics.
+ */
+col: number
+/**
+ * Suggested next steps.
+ */
+actions: IssueAction[]
+/**
+ * Set by the audit pass when this finding is introduced relative to
+ * the merge-base.
+ */
+introduced?: (AuditIntroduced | null)
+}
+/**
+ * Wire-shape envelope for a [`BoundaryCallViolation`] finding. Carries
+ * actions for refactoring the forbidden call out of the zone or suppressing
+ * it with the shared `boundary-violation` token.
+ */
+export interface BoundaryCallViolationFinding {
+/**
+ * The zoned source file making the forbidden call.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * 1-based line number of the call site.
+ */
+line: number
+/**
+ * 0-based byte column offset of the call site.
+ */
+col: number
+/**
+ * The zone the calling file is classified into.
+ */
+zone: string
+/**
+ * The callee path as written at the call site (e.g. `cp.exec`).
+ */
+callee: string
+/**
+ * The configured pattern that matched (e.g. `child_process.*`), so
+ * consumers can see both the written path and the rule that fired.
+ */
+pattern: string
+/**
+ * Suggested next steps.
+ */
+actions: IssueAction[]
+/**
+ * Set by the audit pass when this finding is introduced relative to
+ * the merge-base.
+ */
+introduced?: (AuditIntroduced | null)
+}
+/**
+ * Wire-shape envelope for a [`PolicyViolation`] finding. Carries actions for
+ * replacing the banned call or import, or suppressing it with the
+ * `policy-violation` token.
+ */
+export interface PolicyViolationFinding {
+/**
+ * The source file containing the banned call or import.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * 1-based line number of the call site or import declaration.
+ */
+line: number
+/**
+ * 0-based byte column offset of the call site or import declaration.
+ */
+col: number
+/**
+ * Name of the rule pack that declared the matching rule.
+ */
+pack: string
+/**
+ * Id of the matching rule inside the pack. `pack` plus `rule_id` is the
+ * finding's policy identity.
+ */
+rule_id: string
+kind: PolicyRuleKind
+/**
+ * What matched: the written callee path for `banned-call` (e.g.
+ * `cp.exec`), or the raw import specifier for `banned-import` (e.g.
+ * `moment/locale/nl`).
+ */
+matched: string
+severity: PolicyViolationSeverity
+/**
+ * The rule's author-provided message, when set.
+ */
+message?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * Suggested next steps.
+ */
+actions: IssueAction[]
+/**
+ * Set by the audit pass when this finding is introduced relative to
+ * the merge-base.
+ */
+introduced?: (AuditIntroduced | null)
+}
 /**
  * A suppression comment or JSDoc tag that no longer matches any issue.
  */
@@ -2150,73 +2446,6 @@ exceeded: boolean
  */
 reason?: (string | null)
 }
-/**
- * Metric and rule definitions emitted under `_meta` when `--explain` is
- * passed (always present in MCP responses). Helps AI agents and CI systems
- * interpret metric values without re-reading the docs site.
- */
-export interface Meta {
-/**
- * URL to the documentation page for this command.
- */
-docs?: (string | null)
-/**
- * Per-field definitions for envelope fields and action payload fields.
- */
-field_definitions?: {
-[k: string]: string
-}
-/**
- * Per-metric definitions: name, description, range, interpretation.
- */
-metrics?: {
-[k: string]: MetaMetric
-}
-/**
- * Per-rule definitions for check command output.
- */
-rules?: {
-[k: string]: MetaRule
-}
-}
-/**
- * Single-metric definition inside [`Meta::metrics`].
- */
-export interface MetaMetric {
-/**
- * Human-readable metric name.
- */
-name?: (string | null)
-/**
- * What this metric measures and how it is computed.
- */
-description?: (string | null)
-/**
- * Valid value range (e.g., `"[0, 100]"`).
- */
-range?: (string | null)
-/**
- * How to read the value (e.g., `"lower is better"`).
- */
-interpretation?: (string | null)
-}
-/**
- * Single-rule definition inside [`Meta::rules`].
- */
-export interface MetaRule {
-/**
- * Human-readable rule name.
- */
-name?: (string | null)
-/**
- * What this rule detects.
- */
-description?: (string | null)
-/**
- * URL to the rule documentation.
- */
-docs?: (string | null)
-}
 /**
  * Wire-shape payload for `fallow dupes --format json` (the body that
  * flattens into [`crate::output_envelope::DupesOutput`] and is also
@@ -2757,7 +2986,7 @@ severity_high_count: number
 severity_moderate_count: number
 }
 /**
- * Project-wide vital signs — a fixed set of metrics for trend tracking.
+ * Project-wide vital signs , a fixed set of metrics for trend tracking.
  *
  * Metrics are `Option` when the data source was not available in the current run
  * (e.g., `duplication_pct` is `None` unless the duplication pipeline was run,
@@ -3298,7 +3527,7 @@ coverage_percent: number
 trace_count: number
 /**
  * Days of observation covered by the supplied dump (Phase 2 local analysis
- * emits 0 — set by the beacon/cloud in Phase 3+).
+ * emits 0 , set by the beacon/cloud in Phase 3+).
  */
 period_days: number
 /**
@@ -3760,6 +3989,14 @@ complex_functions?: EvidenceFunction[]
  * Files forming the import cycle (populated for `BreakCircularDependency` targets).
  */
 cycle_path?: string[]
+/**
+ * Files that directly import this target, with imported and local symbols.
+ */
+direct_callers?: DirectCallerEvidence[]
+/**
+ * Other duplicate-code instances that share a clone group with this target.
+ */
+clone_siblings?: CloneSiblingEvidence[]
 }
 /**
  * A function referenced in target evidence.
@@ -3778,6 +4015,57 @@ line: number
  */
 cognitive: number
 }
+/**
+ * A direct importer referenced in target evidence.
+ */
+export interface DirectCallerEvidence {
+/**
+ * File that directly imports the target.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * Symbols imported from the target by this file.
+ */
+symbols?: DirectCallerSymbolEvidence[]
+}
+/**
+ * Symbol details for a direct importer.
+ */
+export interface DirectCallerSymbolEvidence {
+/**
+ * Imported binding name.
+ */
+imported: string
+/**
+ * Local binding name in the importing file.
+ */
+local: string
+/**
+ * Whether the import is type-only.
+ */
+type_only: boolean
+}
+/**
+ * A duplicate-code sibling referenced in target evidence.
+ */
+export interface CloneSiblingEvidence {
+/**
+ * File containing the sibling clone instance.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * 1-based start line of the sibling clone.
+ */
+start_line: number
+/**
+ * 1-based end line of the sibling clone.
+ */
+end_line: number
+/**
+ * Stable duplicate-group handle, matching `dupes --trace dup:<id>`.
+ */
+fingerprint: string
+}
 /**
  * Suggested action attached to a [`RefactoringTarget`].
  *
@@ -4711,6 +4999,25 @@ re_export_cycles?: ReExportCycleFinding[]
  * array natively.
  */
 boundary_violations?: BoundaryViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Files that matched no architecture boundary zone while
+ * `boundaries.coverage.requireAllFiles` was enabled.
+ */
+boundary_coverage_violations?: BoundaryCoverageViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Calls from zoned files to callees forbidden for that zone via
+ * `boundaries.calls.forbidden`. Wrapped in
+ * [`BoundaryCallViolationFinding`] so each entry carries a typed
+ * `actions` array natively.
+ */
+boundary_call_violations?: BoundaryCallViolationFinding[]
+/**
+ * Banned calls and banned imports matched by declarative rule packs
+ * (`rulePacks` config). Wrapped in [`PolicyViolationFinding`] so each
+ * entry carries a typed `actions` array natively. Each finding carries
+ * its effective per-rule severity.
+ */
+policy_violations?: PolicyViolationFinding[]
 /**
  * Suppression comments or JSDoc tags that no longer match any issue.
  */
@@ -4762,6 +5069,7 @@ export interface ImpactReport {
 schema_version: ImpactReportSchemaVersion
 enabled: boolean
 record_count: number
+_meta?: (Meta | null)
 first_recorded?: (string | null)
 /**
  * Git SHA of the most recent recorded run, so a consumer can tell which
@@ -4863,6 +5171,13 @@ timestamp: string
  */
 export interface SecurityOutput {
 schema_version: SecuritySchemaVersion
+version: ToolVersion
+elapsed_ms: ElapsedMs
+config: SecurityOutputConfig
+/**
+ * Security-specific rule and field metadata, emitted with `--explain`.
+ */
+_meta?: (Meta | null)
 /**
  * Gate verdict, present only when `--gate <mode>` was set (issue #886).
  * Emitted on pass too (`verdict: "pass"`, `new_count: 0`) so consumers
@@ -4892,6 +5207,34 @@ unresolved_edge_files: number
  * here is NOT a clean bill.
  */
 unresolved_callee_sites: number
+/**
+ * Bounded diagnostics for unresolved callee blind spots.
+ */
+unresolved_callee_diagnostics?: (SecurityUnresolvedCalleeDiagnostics | null)
+}
+/**
+ * Allowlisted config context for `fallow security --format json`.
+ */
+export interface SecurityOutputConfig {
+rules: SecurityOutputRulesConfig
+/**
+ * `security.categories.include` from config. `null` means unset, `[]`
+ * means explicitly empty.
+ */
+categories_include: (string[] | null)
+/**
+ * `security.categories.exclude` from config. `null` means unset, `[]`
+ * means explicitly empty.
+ */
+categories_exclude: (string[] | null)
+}
+export interface SecurityOutputRulesConfig {
+security_client_server_leak: SecurityRuleSeverityConfig
+security_sink: SecurityRuleSeverityConfig
+}
+export interface SecurityRuleSeverityConfig {
+configured: Severity
+effective: Severity
 }
 /**
  * The `gate` block on `SecurityOutput`, present only when `--gate <mode>` ran.
@@ -4901,7 +5244,7 @@ export interface SecurityGate {
 mode: SecurityGateMode
 verdict: SecurityGateVerdict
 /**
- * Number of candidates introduced in the changed lines.
+ * Number of candidates matching the selected gate mode.
  */
 new_count: number
 }
@@ -4960,6 +5303,7 @@ evidence: string
  * `ClientServerLeak`. Skipped from JSON when `false` for output stability.
  */
 source_backed?: boolean
+severity: SecuritySeverity
 /**
  * Structural import-hop trace from the client boundary to the secret source.
  * The hop count is the uncalibrated signal; fallow does not prove the path
@@ -5071,6 +5415,15 @@ reachable_from_entry: boolean
  * not prove a specific source value reaches the sink argument.
  */
 reachable_from_untrusted_source?: boolean
+/**
+ * Structured tier of the untrusted-source association: `arg-level` when the
+ * sink argument traces to a same-module source read (strong), `module-level`
+ * when only the module is import-reachable from a source (weak). Present
+ * exactly when `reachable_from_untrusted_source` is true, so a consumer can
+ * separate strong from weak candidates from this field alone without parsing
+ * the `evidence` string. Not an exploitability proof.
+ */
+taint_confidence?: (TaintConfidence | null)
 /**
  * Number of value-import hops from the untrusted-source module to the sink
  * module when `reachable_from_untrusted_source` is true.
@@ -5099,10 +5452,11 @@ crosses_boundary: boolean
 /**
  * An agent-actionable candidate record on a [`SecurityFinding`]. fallow fills
  * `source_kind`, `sink`, and `boundary`. The exploitability IMPACT is
- * deliberately NOT a field: deciding severity / exploitability is the consuming
- * agent's job, not fallow's, and a perpetually-null `impact` key would only
- * train consumers to ignore it. The agent reads this record, then writes its
- * own impact verdict downstream.
+ * deliberately NOT a field: `severity` on the parent finding is only a
+ * review-priority tier, while deciding exploitability remains the consuming
+ * agent's job. A perpetually-null `impact` key would only train consumers to
+ * ignore it. The agent reads this record, then writes its own impact verdict
+ * downstream.
  */
 export interface SecurityCandidate {
 /**
@@ -5161,6 +5515,12 @@ cwe?: (number | null)
  * `None` for `client-server-leak` and matches that name no callee.
  */
 callee?: (string | null)
+/**
+ * URL construction shape for SSRF and open-redirect style candidates when
+ * fallow can classify whether the origin is fixed or dynamic. Absent for
+ * non-URL sinks and unclassified URL expressions.
+ */
+url_shape?: (SecurityUrlShape | null)
 }
 /**
  * The boundary slot of a [`SecurityCandidate`]: which structural boundaries the
@@ -5346,6 +5706,155 @@ col: number
  */
 callee: string
 }
+/**
+ * Bounded unresolved-callee diagnostics for `fallow security --format json`.
+ */
+export interface SecurityUnresolvedCalleeDiagnostics {
+/**
+ * Deterministic sample rows, capped by `sample_limit`.
+ */
+sampled: SecurityUnresolvedCalleeSample[]
+/**
+ * Files with the most unresolved callees, capped by `top_files_limit`.
+ */
+top_files: SecurityUnresolvedCalleeTopFile[]
+/**
+ * Full count by unresolved-callee reason, sorted by count then reason.
+ */
+by_reason: SecurityUnresolvedCalleeReasonCount[]
+/**
+ * Maximum number of sample rows emitted.
+ */
+sample_limit: number
+/**
+ * Maximum number of top-file rows emitted.
+ */
+top_files_limit: number
+}
+/**
+ * One sampled unresolved-callee row.
+ */
+export interface SecurityUnresolvedCalleeSample {
+/**
+ * Project-relative source path.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * 1-based source line.
+ */
+line: number
+/**
+ * 0-based byte column.
+ */
+col: number
+reason: SkippedSecurityCalleeReason
+expression_kind: SkippedSecurityCalleeExpressionKind
+}
+/**
+ * Count of unresolved callees in one file.
+ */
+export interface SecurityUnresolvedCalleeTopFile {
+/**
+ * Project-relative source path.
+ */
+path: string
+/**
+ * Number of unresolved callees in this file.
+ */
+count: number
+}
+/**
+ * Count of unresolved callees for one reason.
+ */
+export interface SecurityUnresolvedCalleeReasonCount {
+reason: SkippedSecurityCalleeReason
+/**
+ * Number of unresolved callees with this reason.
+ */
+count: number
+}
+/**
+ * Compact `fallow security --summary --format json` payload. Uses the same
+ * `kind: "security"` discriminator as the full payload, but omits candidate
+ * arrays and exposes only aggregate counts.
+ */
+export interface SecuritySummaryOutput {
+schema_version: SecuritySchemaVersion
+version: ToolVersion
+elapsed_ms: ElapsedMs
+config: SecurityOutputConfig
+/**
+ * Security-specific rule and field metadata, emitted with `--explain`.
+ */
+_meta?: (Meta | null)
+/**
+ * Gate verdict, present only when `--gate <mode>` was set.
+ */
+gate?: (SecurityGate | null)
+summary: SecuritySummary
+}
+/**
+ * Aggregate counts for `fallow security --summary --format json`.
+ */
+export interface SecuritySummary {
+/**
+ * Number of security candidates after all filters, gates, and scopes.
+ */
+security_findings: number
+by_severity: SecuritySeverityCounts
+/**
+ * Finding counts by catalogue category, or by kind for findings without a
+ * catalogue category.
+ */
+by_category: {
+[k: string]: number
+}
+by_reachability: SecurityReachabilityCounts
+by_runtime_state: SecurityRuntimeStateCounts
+/**
+ * Number of client files whose dynamic imports could not be followed.
+ */
+unresolved_edge_files: number
+/**
+ * Number of sink-shaped callees that could not be statically flattened.
+ */
+unresolved_callee_sites: number
+/**
+ * Number of attack-surface entries included in the prepared full output.
+ */
+attack_surface_entries: number
+}
+/**
+ * Fixed severity counters for summary JSON.
+ */
+export interface SecuritySeverityCounts {
+high: number
+medium: number
+low: number
+}
+/**
+ * Fixed reachability counters for summary JSON.
+ */
+export interface SecurityReachabilityCounts {
+entry_reachable: number
+untrusted_source_reachable: number
+arg_level: number
+module_level: number
+crosses_boundary: number
+source_backed: number
+}
+/**
+ * Fixed runtime coverage counters for summary JSON.
+ */
+export interface SecurityRuntimeStateCounts {
+runtime_hot: number
+runtime_cold: number
+never_executed: number
+low_traffic: number
+coverage_unavailable: number
+runtime_unknown: number
+not_collected: number
+}
 /**
  * Bare `fallow --format json` envelope.
  */
@@ -5362,6 +5871,7 @@ export interface CombinedMeta {
 check?: (Meta | null)
 dupes?: (Meta | null)
 health?: (Meta | null)
+telemetry?: (TelemetryMeta | null)
 }
 /**
  * Single CodeClimate-compatible issue inside [`CodeClimateOutput`].