failproofai 1.0.12-beta.1 → 1.0.12

package/src/hooks/cloud-login.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/**
+ * The CLI half of "Log in to FailproofAI Cloud" — `failproofai config`'s
+ * browser login.
+ *
+ * The CLI asks the dashboard for a link, a person approves it in a browser
+ * (signing up, signing in, picking or creating an org on the way), and the CLI
+ * — polling with a secret only it holds — sees the approval and, once setup has
+ * finished, claims a freshly minted machine key. The server side is
+ * `server/src/routes/cli_login.rs` in AgentEye; the relay is the dashboard's
+ * `/api/auth/cli/*`.
+ *
+ * Three calls, each with an injectable `fetch` so tests never reach the network:
+ *   start → { verificationUrl, pollSecret, expiresIn, interval }
+ *   poll  → pending / slow_down / approved (org + who) / denied / expired / …
+ *   claim → the key, exactly once. Called at APPLY, after the daemon installs:
+ *           an approval that is never claimed leaves no key behind.
+ *
+ * Every call refuses to follow a redirect, for the reason `introspectKey` gives:
+ * a dashboard that does not know a path can answer with a login page, and a 200
+ * from that must never read as success.
+ */
+
+export const LOGIN_START_PATH = "/api/auth/cli/start";
+export const LOGIN_POLL_PATH = "/api/auth/cli/poll";
+export const LOGIN_CLAIM_PATH = "/api/auth/cli/claim";
+
+const TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+export interface LoginOrg {
+  id?: string;
+  slug?: string;
+  name?: string;
+}
+
+export type StartResult =
+  | { kind: "ok"; verificationUrl: string; pollSecret: string; expiresIn: number; interval: number }
+  /** This cloud predates browser login. Pasting a key still works. */
+  | { kind: "unsupported" }
+  | { kind: "refused"; reason: string }
+  | { kind: "unreachable"; reason: string };
+
+export type PollResult =
+  | { kind: "pending"; interval?: number }
+  | { kind: "slow_down" }
+  | { kind: "approved"; org: LoginOrg; approvedBy?: string; keyName?: string; permissions: string[] }
+  | { kind: "denied" }
+  | { kind: "expired" }
+  | { kind: "claimed" }
+  /** The server no longer knows this request (swept, or never existed). */
+  | { kind: "unknown" }
+  | { kind: "unreachable"; reason: string };
+
+export type ClaimResult =
+  | {
+      kind: "ok";
+      key: string;
+      keyId?: string;
+      keyName?: string;
+      org: LoginOrg;
+      permissions: string[];
+      approvedBy?: string;
+    }
+  | { kind: "expired" }
+  /** The person who approved can no longer grant this key. */
+  | { kind: "revoked" }
+  | { kind: "refused"; reason: string }
+  | { kind: "unreachable"; reason: string };
+
+type Fetch = typeof fetch;
+
+async function postJson(
+  origin: string,
+  path: string,
+  body: unknown,
+  fetchImpl: Fetch,
+): Promise<{ status: number; json: Record<string, unknown> | null } | { error: string }> {
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), TIMEOUT_MS);
+  try {
+    const res = await fetchImpl(`${origin.replace(/\/+$/, "")}${path}`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      redirect: "manual",
+      signal: controller.signal,
+    });
+    let json: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
+    try {
+      const parsed: unknown = await res.json();
+      json = parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>) : null;
+    } catch {
+      json = null;
+    }
+    return { status: res.status, json };
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Deliberately not the URL: setup is often run while screen-sharing.
+    return { error: err instanceof Error ? (err.name === "AbortError" ? "timed out" : err.message) : String(err) };
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+const str = (v: unknown): string | undefined => (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : undefined);
+
+// Controls (a terminal executes them: clear the screen, retitle the window,
+// write the clipboard), bidi overrides and isolates, and zero-width formatting.
+const INVISIBLE = /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u061c\u180e\u200b-\u200f\u202a-\u202e\u2060-\u2069\ufeff]/g;
+
+/**
+ * A server-supplied string made safe to print. Org names are chosen by whoever
+ * created the org and the CLI prints the one it was approved into — the line
+ * that is meant to show who approved what — so none of it may reach the
+ * terminal as anything but text.
+ */
+export function displayText(v: unknown, max = 200): string | undefined {
+  if (typeof v !== "string") return undefined;
+  const t = v.replace(INVISIBLE, "").trim().slice(0, max);
+  return t.length > 0 ? t : undefined;
+}
+
+function org(v: unknown): LoginOrg {
+  const o = v && typeof v === "object" ? (v as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
+  return { id: str(o.id), slug: displayText(o.slug), name: displayText(o.name) };
+}
+
+function permissions(v: unknown): string[] {
+  return Array.isArray(v) ? v.map((p) => displayText(p, 64)).filter((p): p is string => p !== undefined) : [];
+}
+
+/** A server's number, kept to a range this client can live with: a huge poll
+ *  interval overflows `setTimeout` into a 1 ms storm, a tiny one polls flat out. */
+const within = (v: unknown, lo: number, hi: number, fallback: number): number =>
+  typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v) && v > 0 ? Math.min(hi, Math.max(lo, v)) : fallback;
+
+/**
+ * Only an http(s) link is ever handed to the browser opener. The URL comes from
+ * the server, and `xdg-open` / `open` will happily act on any scheme they know.
+ */
+export function isOpenableUrl(raw: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const u = new URL(raw);
+    return u.protocol === "https:" || u.protocol === "http:";
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/** What the browser page should call this machine and its OS. */
+export function machineOs(platform: NodeJS.Platform = process.platform): string {
+  return platform === "darwin" ? "macOS" : platform === "win32" ? "windows" : platform;
+}
+
+export async function startLogin(
+  origin: string,
+  machine: { label: string; os: string; cliVersion: string },
+  fetchImpl: Fetch = fetch,
+): Promise<StartResult> {
+  const r = await postJson(
+    origin,
+    LOGIN_START_PATH,
+    { machine_label: machine.label, machine_os: machine.os, cli_version: machine.cliVersion },
+    fetchImpl,
+  );
+  if ("error" in r) return { kind: "unreachable", reason: r.error };
+  // No such route, the web app redirecting an unknown path, or serving a page
+  // (200, not JSON) in its place: a cloud from before this feature. Not an
+  // error — the key prompt still connects it.
+  if (r.status === 404 || (r.status >= 300 && r.status < 400) || (r.status === 200 && !r.json)) {
+    return { kind: "unsupported" };
+  }
+  if (r.status === 429) return { kind: "refused", reason: "too many login attempts from here — wait a minute" };
+  if (r.status !== 201 || !r.json) {
+    return r.status >= 500
+      ? { kind: "unreachable", reason: `the server answered ${r.status}` }
+      : { kind: "refused", reason: displayText(r.json?.error, 120) ?? `the server answered ${r.status}` };
+  }
+  const verificationUrl = str(r.json.verification_url);
+  const pollSecret = str(r.json.poll_secret);
+  if (!verificationUrl || !pollSecret || !isOpenableUrl(verificationUrl)) {
+    // A 201 without the fields is something other than this API.
+    return { kind: "unsupported" };
+  }
+  return {
+    kind: "ok",
+    // Re-serialised, never the raw string: it is printed, and the parser
+    // percent-encodes every control and non-ASCII character in it.
+    verificationUrl: new URL(verificationUrl).href,
+    pollSecret,
+    expiresIn: within(r.json.expires_in, 30, 3600, 600),
+    interval: within(r.json.interval, 1, 30, 2),
+  };
+}
+
+export async function pollLogin(origin: string, pollSecret: string, fetchImpl: Fetch = fetch): Promise<PollResult> {
+  const r = await postJson(origin, LOGIN_POLL_PATH, { poll_secret: pollSecret }, fetchImpl);
+  if ("error" in r) return { kind: "unreachable", reason: r.error };
+  if (r.status === 404) return { kind: "unknown" };
+  if (r.status !== 200 || !r.json) return { kind: "unreachable", reason: `the server answered ${r.status}` };
+  const j = r.json;
+  switch (j.status) {
+    case "pending":
+      return { kind: "pending", interval: typeof j.interval === "number" ? within(j.interval, 1, 30, 2) : undefined };
+    case "slow_down":
+      return { kind: "slow_down" };
+    case "approved":
+      return {
+        kind: "approved",
+        org: org(j.org),
+        approvedBy: displayText(j.approved_by),
+        keyName: displayText(j.key_name),
+        permissions: permissions(j.permissions),
+      };
+    case "denied":
+      return { kind: "denied" };
+    case "expired":
+      return { kind: "expired" };
+    case "claimed":
+      return { kind: "claimed" };
+    default:
+      return { kind: "unknown" };
+  }
+}
+
+export async function claimLogin(origin: string, pollSecret: string, fetchImpl: Fetch = fetch): Promise<ClaimResult> {
+  const r = await postJson(origin, LOGIN_CLAIM_PATH, { poll_secret: pollSecret }, fetchImpl);
+  if ("error" in r) return { kind: "unreachable", reason: r.error };
+  const j = r.json ?? {};
+  if (r.status === 201) {
+    const key = str(j.api_key);
+    if (!key) return { kind: "refused", reason: "the server answered without a key" };
+    return {
+      kind: "ok",
+      key,
+      keyId: str(j.key_id),
+      keyName: displayText(j.key_name),
+      org: org(j.org),
+      permissions: permissions(j.permissions),
+      approvedBy: displayText(j.approved_by),
+    };
+  }
+  if (r.status === 410) return { kind: "expired" };
+  if (r.status === 403 && j.error === "approval_revoked") return { kind: "revoked" };
+  if (r.status >= 500) return { kind: "unreachable", reason: `the server answered ${r.status}` };
+  return {
+    kind: "refused",
+    reason: displayText(j.status, 40) ? `the login request is ${displayText(j.status, 40)}` : `the server answered ${r.status}`,
+  };
+}

package/src/hooks/cloud-managed-policies.ts

@@ -170,10 +170,11 @@ export function resolveManagedPath(root: string, candidate: string): string {
  * Stop enforcing cloud-managed policies on this machine.
  *
  * Removes `desired-state.json` FIRST, then `active.json` — the manifest that
- * says which deployment is live — both error reports and the Jev budget record.
- * The content-addressed artifacts are left alone: they are large, hash-verified
- * on use, and inert once nothing points at them, so keeping them makes a
- * reconnect cheap.
+ * says which deployment is live — both error reports, the Jev budget record,
+ * the load-check record and the content-addressed `artifacts/` directory.
+ * The departed organisation's policy source is removed too; a reconnect
+ * downloads the artifacts its deployment names. Cleanup runs only in the
+ * CLI-owned default directory, never a `FAILPROOFAI_CLOUD_POLICY_DIR` override.
  *
  * The snapshot has to go, and before the pointer. It is what the daemon's
  * maintenance lane rebuilds a lost `active.json` from, and it used to be left
@@ -400,6 +401,55 @@ export function readCloudJevState(): CloudJevState {
   return { jevMode, deployment, errors };
 }
 
+// ── Which Cloud Jev checks this agent has (jevPolicies) ─────────────────────
+
+/** One `jev` / `both` assignment whose Jev checks FailproofAI Cloud asks here. */
+export interface CloudJevAssignment {
+  id: string;
+  version: number;
+  effect: PolicyEffect;
+  agentTargets?: AgentTarget[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * `active.json`'s `jevPolicies`: the Cloud Jev assignments of this deployment
+ * (ids, effects and scopes, never a question). `null` when the manifest does
+ * not carry the list (a server that predates it) or carries one this build
+ * cannot read: then nothing is known, and every gated call is still sent to
+ * Cloud, as before. Never throws.
+ */
+export function readCloudJevAssignments(): CloudJevAssignment[] | null {
+  try {
+    const active = readActiveRaw();
+    if (!active || !Array.isArray(active.jevPolicies)) return null;
+    const schema = active.schemaVersion as number;
+    const out: CloudJevAssignment[] = [];
+    for (const raw of active.jevPolicies as unknown[]) {
+      if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) return null;
+      const entry = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
+      if (typeof entry.id !== "string" || !POLICY_ID_RE.test(entry.id)) return null;
+      if (!Number.isSafeInteger(entry.version) || (entry.version as number) < 0) return null;
+      if (entry.effect !== undefined && entry.effect !== "enforce" && entry.effect !== "observe") return null;
+      const targets = parseAgentTargets(entry.agentTargets, schema);
+      out.push({
+        id: entry.id,
+        version: entry.version as number,
+        effect: entry.effect === "observe" ? "observe" : "enforce",
+        ...(targets ? { agentTargets: targets } : {}),
+      });
+    }
+    return out;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** The Cloud Jev assignments that apply to `agent`, or null when unknown (see {@link readCloudJevAssignments}). */
+export function cloudJevAssignmentsFor(agent: AgentIdentity | null): CloudJevAssignment[] | null {
+  const all = readCloudJevAssignments();
+  return all === null ? null : all.filter((a) => agentTargetsMatch(a.agentTargets, agent));
+}
+
 // ── `both` policies: reviewed by their OWN Cloud checks ─────────────────────
 
 /**

package/src/hooks/codex-system-hooks.ts

@@ -432,10 +432,16 @@ export type CodexHookTrust =
   /** In hooks.json and not all trusted: Codex skips the untrusted ones. */
   | { kind: "untrusted"; path: string; untrusted: number; total: number };
 
+/** The Codex profile's home: `CODEX_HOME` when set, else `~/.codex`. */
+export function codexHome(): string {
+  const dir = process.env.CODEX_HOME?.trim();
+  return dir ? resolve(dir) : resolve(homedir(), ".codex");
+}
+
 export interface CodexTrustDeps extends CodexSystemDeps {
-  /** `~/.codex/hooks.json`. */
+  /** `$CODEX_HOME/hooks.json` (`~/.codex/hooks.json`). */
   hooksJsonPath?: string;
-  /** `~/.codex/config.toml`, where Codex keeps `[hooks.state]`. */
+  /** `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml`, where Codex keeps `[hooks.state]`. */
   userConfigPath?: string;
 }
 
@@ -452,7 +458,7 @@ export function codexHookTrust(deps: CodexTrustDeps = {}): CodexHookTrust {
   const systemPath = resolvedPath(deps);
   if (systemPath && codexSystemHooksPresent({ path: systemPath })) return { kind: "system", path: systemPath };
 
-  const hooksJsonPath = deps.hooksJsonPath ?? resolve(homedir(), ".codex", "hooks.json");
+  const hooksJsonPath = deps.hooksJsonPath ?? resolve(codexHome(), "hooks.json");
   const ours = failproofaiCodexHookIdentities(hooksJsonPath);
   if (ours.length === 0) return { kind: "none" };
 
@@ -462,7 +468,7 @@ export function codexHookTrust(deps: CodexTrustDeps = {}): CodexHookTrust {
   let trustedHashes = new Map<string, string>();
   try {
     trustedHashes = parseCodexTrustedHashes(
-      readFileSync(deps.userConfigPath ?? resolve(homedir(), ".codex", "config.toml"), "utf8"),
+      readFileSync(deps.userConfigPath ?? resolve(codexHome(), "config.toml"), "utf8"),
     );
   } catch {
     // No user config: nothing is trusted.

package/src/hooks/config-status.ts

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import { readCloudCredentials } from "./cloud-enrollment";
 import { CODEX_UNTRUSTED_NOTICE, codexHookTrust, type CodexHookTrust } from "./codex-system-hooks";
 import { describeMachine } from "./cloud-enrollment-cli";
 import { cloudBaseFor } from "./cloud-connection";
-import { readActiveCloudManagedPolicies } from "./cloud-managed-policies";
+import { listActiveCloudManagedPolicies } from "./cloud-managed-policies";
 import { readIngestCredential } from "./collector-config";
 import { discoverPolicyFiles } from "./custom-hooks-loader";
 import { daemonSocketPresent, isDaemonConfigured } from "./daemon-client";
@@ -259,7 +259,10 @@ export function summarizePolicySources(cwd?: string): StatusPolicies {
   }
 
   try {
-    for (const artifact of readActiveCloudManagedPolicies()) {
+    // Every assignment, whatever agent it targets: a hook's agent scope applied
+    // with no agent hid each targeted policy ("None installed" beside a
+    // deployment that enforces), the status twin of B4.
+    for (const artifact of listActiveCloudManagedPolicies()) {
       if (artifact.effect === "observe") summary.observing++;
       else summary.cloudOn++;
     }
@@ -525,7 +528,10 @@ export function renderStatusScreen(facts: StatusFacts, opts: ScreenKitOpts & { c
       return kit.caution(`No report from failproofaid for ${formatDuration(now - health.writtenAt)}`);
     }
     if (!health.delivering) return `${kit.off} Not delivering, failproofaid has no key`;
-    const backlog = queued === 0 ? "nothing queued" : `${many(queued, "batch", "batches")} queued`;
+    // Batches an earlier key had refused wait for the daemon to re-send them
+    // with the key that works now: queued, not refused.
+    const pending = queued + (refused.resending ?? 0);
+    const backlog = pending === 0 ? "nothing queued" : `${many(pending, "batch", "batches")} queued`;
     const stuck =
       queued > 0 &&
       (oldestQueuedMs ?? 0) > STATUS_QUEUE_STUCK_MS &&