failproofai 1.0.1-beta.1 → 1.0.2-beta.0

package/src/hooks/policy-catalog.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+/**
+ * The builtin policy CATALOG: what each policy is, never what it does.
+ *
+ * Split out of `builtin-policies.ts` so the metadata every consumer actually
+ * reads — the setup picker, `failproofai policies`, the presets, the audit
+ * report, the dashboard's server action — can be listed, searched and rendered
+ * without loading a single policy implementation. That is what lets a machine
+ * browse the catalog offline while the executable half moves to a fetched pack.
+ *
+ * ## Rules this file lives by
+ *
+ * - **Pure data.** No functions, no RegExp, no computed values. Every entry is
+ *   a literal, so this module can be read, serialized, and eventually shipped
+ *   as a manifest rather than as code.
+ * - **No value import from `builtin-policies.ts`.** Type-only imports are fine.
+ *   `policy-evaluator.ts` builds `POLICY_PARAMS_MAP` from `BUILTIN_POLICIES` at
+ *   MODULE SCOPE, so an import cycle here is a ReferenceError under ESM and a
+ *   `.filter of undefined` under the CJS bundle — thrown at import time, on the
+ *   hook critical path.
+ * - **Order is load-bearing and must not be sorted or regrouped.** Policy
+ *   evaluation short-circuits on the first deny, so this array's order decides
+ *   which policy name reaches the agent, the activity log, PostHog and the audit
+ *   report. First appearance of each `category` is also what orders the sections
+ *   in the TUI picker and the dashboard.
+ * - **Absent optionals stay absent.** `beta`, `alwaysOn` and `params` are read
+ *   with `in` and `undefined` checks; default-filling them changes behaviour and
+ *   fails existing tests.
+ *
+ * `params.default` values are handed to policies BY REFERENCE, so this must stay
+ * one module-level const — never a factory minting fresh defaults per call.
+ */
+import type { PolicyCatalogEntry, PolicyParamsSchema } from "./policy-types";
+
+export const POLICY_CATALOG: PolicyCatalogEntry[] = [
+  {
+    name: "sanitize-jwt",
+    description: "Stop Claude from reading JWTs in tool responses",
+    displayTitle: "Redacted JWT tokens from tool output",
+    impact: "Stops the agent from echoing auth tokens it saw in command output.",
+    match: { events: ["PostToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Sanitize",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "sanitize-api-keys",
+    description: "Stop Claude from reading API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub, AWS, Stripe, Google) in tool responses",
+    displayTitle: "Redacted API keys from tool output",
+    impact: "Catches OpenAI / Anthropic / GitHub / AWS / Stripe / Google keys before the model sees them.",
+    match: { events: ["PostToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Sanitize",
+    params: {
+      additionalPatterns: {
+        type: "pattern[]",
+        description: "Additional API key patterns to scrub, each with { regex, label }",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "sanitize-connection-strings",
+    description: "Stop Claude from reading database connection strings with embedded credentials in tool responses",
+    displayTitle: "Redacted database connection strings from tool output",
+    impact: "Strips embedded DB credentials before they reach the model context.",
+    match: { events: ["PostToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Sanitize",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "sanitize-private-key-content",
+    description: "Stop Claude from reading PEM private key content in tool responses",
+    displayTitle: "Redacted PEM private keys from tool output",
+    impact: "Prevents private key bodies from being echoed into chat context.",
+    match: { events: ["PostToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Sanitize",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "sanitize-bearer-tokens",
+    displayTitle: "Redacted bearer tokens from tool output",
+    impact: "Strips Authorization: Bearer values before they hit the model.",
+    description: "Stop Claude from reading Authorization Bearer tokens in tool responses",
+    match: { events: ["PostToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Sanitize",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "protect-env-vars",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to dump environment variables to chat",
+    impact: "Env vars often contain secrets; blocking `env` / `printenv` keeps them out of the model context.",
+    description: "Prevent commands that read environment variables",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Environment",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-env-files",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to read or write a .env file",
+    impact: "`.env` files routinely contain API keys and DB credentials.",
+    description: "Block reading/writing .env files",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Environment",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-read-outside-cwd",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to read files outside your project directory",
+    impact: "Stops the agent from peeking at neighboring repos or your home directory.",
+    description: "Block file reads outside the session working directory",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Read", "Glob", "Grep", "Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Environment",
+    params: {
+      allowPaths: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Absolute paths outside cwd that are allowed to be read",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-sudo",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a command with sudo",
+    impact: "Sudo gives the agent root — blocked unless explicitly allow-listed.",
+    description: "Block sudo commands",
+    // PermissionRequest is Codex's escalation-approval event; fire the same
+    // sudo guard there so Codex sandbox bypasses are blocked too.
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse", "PermissionRequest"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Dangerous Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Sudo command patterns to allow, matched token-by-token (e.g. 'sudo systemctl status')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-curl-pipe-sh",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to pipe a downloaded script straight to a shell",
+    impact: "`curl ... | sh` runs unverified remote code on your machine.",
+    description: "Block piping downloads to shell",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Dangerous Commands",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-rm-rf",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to recursively delete a system path",
+    impact: "Catches catastrophic `rm -rf /` and Windows equivalents.",
+    description: "Prevent catastrophic deletions",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Dangerous Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPaths: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Paths that are allowed to be recursively deleted",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-failproofai-commands",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to disable, pause or modify failproofai itself",
+    impact: "An agent that can pause or remove enforcement can switch off every other policy.",
+    description: "Block failproofai CLI commands, self-pause and uninstallation",
+    // PermissionRequest is carried over from the merged-in `block-self-pause`.
+    // It is a real enforcement point on Copilot and Devin, and dropping it would
+    // have left this guard blind on both.
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse", "PermissionRequest"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    alwaysOn: true,
+    category: "Dangerous Commands",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-kubectl",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a Kubernetes command",
+    impact: "kubectl can change live cluster state — gated unless allow-listed.",
+    description: "Block kubectl commands (Kubernetes cluster mutations)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "kubectl command patterns to allow, matched token-by-token (e.g. 'kubectl get *', 'kubectl describe *')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-terraform",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a Terraform/OpenTofu command",
+    impact: "Terraform mutates real infrastructure — gated unless allow-listed.",
+    description: "Block terraform and tofu (OpenTofu) commands",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "terraform/tofu command patterns to allow (e.g. 'terraform plan', 'terraform validate')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-aws-cli",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run an AWS CLI command",
+    impact: "AWS CLI can spend money or break prod — gated.",
+    description: "Block aws CLI commands",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "aws CLI command patterns to allow (e.g. 'aws s3 ls *', 'aws sts get-caller-identity')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-gcloud",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a Google Cloud command",
+    impact: "gcloud can spend money or break prod — gated.",
+    description: "Block gcloud (Google Cloud) CLI commands",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "gcloud command patterns to allow (e.g. 'gcloud auth list', 'gcloud config list')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-az-cli",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run an Azure CLI command",
+    impact: "az can spend money or break prod — gated.",
+    description: "Block az (Azure) CLI commands",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "az CLI command patterns to allow (e.g. 'az account show', 'az group list')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-helm",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a Helm command",
+    impact: "Helm releases mutate cluster state — gated.",
+    description: "Block helm commands",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "helm command patterns to allow (e.g. 'helm list', 'helm status *')",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-gh-pipeline",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to run a privileged GitHub CLI pipeline command",
+    impact: "Catches `gh workflow run`, `gh pr merge`, `gh secret set`, etc.",
+    description: "Block gh CLI pipeline-trigger subcommands (workflow run, run rerun/cancel, pr merge, release create/delete, cache delete, secret set/delete)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Infra Commands",
+    params: {
+      allowPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "gh pipeline command patterns to allow (e.g. specific scripted invocations); read-only gh subcommands like 'gh pr view' and 'gh run list' are not matched by this policy",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-secrets-write",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to write a secret-key file",
+    impact: "Stops the agent from creating `.pem`, `id_rsa`, `credentials.json`, etc.",
+    description: "Block writing secret key files",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Write"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Dangerous Commands",
+    params: {
+      additionalPatterns: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Additional filename patterns (substrings) to block",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-push-master",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to push directly to main/master",
+    impact: "Direct pushes to a protected branch bypass review.",
+    description: "Block pushing to main/master",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: true,
+    category: "Git",
+    params: {
+      protectedBranches: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Branch names to protect from direct pushes",
+        default: ["main", "master"],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-force-push",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to force-push",
+    impact: "Force-pushes rewrite history and can clobber teammates' work.",
+    description: "Prevent force-pushing to any branch",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Git",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "block-work-on-main",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to commit or merge on main/master",
+    impact: "Work should land via PR — direct commits skip review.",
+    description: "Block git commits and merges on main/master branch",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Git",
+    params: {
+      protectedBranches: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Branch names where commits/merges are blocked",
+        default: ["main", "master"],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-git-amend",
+    displayTitle: "Used git commit --amend",
+    impact: "Amending after a push rewrites history that others may have pulled.",
+    description: "Warns before amending git commits, which rewrites history",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Git",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-git-stash-drop",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to drop or clear git stash",
+    impact: "Stash deletions are permanent and silent.",
+    description: "Warns before permanently deleting stashed changes",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Git",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-all-files-staged",
+    displayTitle: "Staged all files with git add -A / .",
+    impact: "Wide stages routinely catch generated files or secrets you didn't intend to commit.",
+    description: "Warns before staging all working tree files with git add -A / . / --all",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Git",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-destructive-sql",
+    displayTitle: "Ran destructive SQL (DROP / TRUNCATE / DELETE without WHERE)",
+    impact: "Easy way to wipe a table by accident.",
+    description: "Warn before executing destructive SQL (DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE without WHERE) via database clients",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Database",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-schema-alteration",
+    displayTitle: "Altered a database schema column",
+    impact: "ALTER TABLE operations can lock tables and break readers.",
+    description: "Warns before SQL schema changes (ALTER TABLE with column or rename operations)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Database",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-package-publish",
+    displayTitle: "Tried to publish a package",
+    impact: "Publishes are irreversible — `npm publish` / `cargo publish` shouldn't happen without intent.",
+    description: "Warn before publishing packages to public registries (npm, PyPI, crates.io, RubyGems, etc.)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Packages & System",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-global-package-install",
+    displayTitle: "Installed a package globally",
+    impact: "`npm i -g`, `cargo install`, `pip --user` pollute your machine outside the project.",
+    description: "Warns before installing packages globally (npm -g, cargo install, etc.)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Packages & System",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "prefer-package-manager",
+    displayTitle: "Used a non-preferred package manager",
+    impact: "Mixing package managers creates lockfile churn for your team.",
+    description: "Blocks non-preferred package managers and tells Claude to use an allowed one (e.g., uv instead of pip)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Packages & System",
+    params: {
+      allowed: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Allowed package manager names (e.g. ['uv', 'bun']). Any detected manager not in this list is blocked.",
+        default: [],
+      },
+      blocked: {
+        type: "string[]",
+        description: "Additional manager names to block beyond the built-in list (e.g. ['pdm', 'pipx']).",
+        default: [],
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-large-file-write",
+    displayTitle: "Wrote a file larger than the configured threshold",
+    impact: "Catches accidentally large file writes (logs, binaries, model dumps).",
+    description: "Warn before writing files larger than 1MB (configurable via thresholdKb param)",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Write"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Packages & System",
+    params: {
+      thresholdKb: {
+        type: "number",
+        description: "File size threshold in KB above which a warning is issued",
+        default: 1024,
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-background-process",
+    displayTitle: "Started a long-lived background process",
+    impact: "Catches `nohup` / `&` / `screen` / `tmux` / `disown` patterns that the agent often forgets to clean up.",
+    description: "Warns before starting detached or background processes",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"], toolNames: ["Bash"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Packages & System",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "warn-repeated-tool-calls",
+    displayTitle: "Called the same tool 3+ times with identical arguments",
+    impact: "Usually a sign of a stuck loop burning tokens.",
+    description: "Warn when the same tool is called 3+ times with identical parameters",
+    match: { events: ["PreToolUse"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "AI Behavior",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "require-commit-before-stop",
+    displayTitle: "Stopped with uncommitted changes",
+    impact: "Work not in a commit is invisible to teammates and easy to lose.",
+    description: "Require all changes to be committed before Claude stops",
+    match: { events: ["Stop"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Workflow",
+  },
+  {
+    name: "require-push-before-stop",
+    displayTitle: "Stopped with unpushed commits",
+    impact: "Local-only commits won't trigger CI or be reviewable.",
+    description: "Require all commits to be pushed to remote before Claude stops",
+    match: { events: ["Stop"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Workflow",
+    params: {
+      remote: {
+        type: "string",
+        description: "Remote name to push to (default: origin)",
+        default: "origin",
+      },
+      baseBranch: {
+        type: "string",
+        description: "Base branch to compare against (default: main)",
+        default: "main",
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "require-pr-before-stop",
+    displayTitle: "Stopped without a PR for the branch",
+    impact: "Branches without PRs don't get reviewed.",
+    description: "Require a pull request to exist for the current branch before Claude stops",
+    match: { events: ["Stop"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Workflow",
+    params: {
+      baseBranch: {
+        type: "string",
+        description: "Base branch to compare against (default: main)",
+        default: "main",
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "require-no-conflicts-before-stop",
+    displayTitle: "Stopped with a branch that conflicts with main",
+    impact: "Conflicting branches can't merge — surface them early.",
+    description: "Require the current branch to merge cleanly with the base branch before Claude stops",
+    match: { events: ["Stop"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Workflow",
+    params: {
+      baseBranch: {
+        type: "string",
+        description: "Base branch to check for conflicts against (default: main)",
+        default: "main",
+      },
+    } satisfies PolicyParamsSchema,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "require-ci-green-before-stop",
+    displayTitle: "Stopped with failing CI",
+    impact: "Failing CI blocks deploy.",
+    description: "Require CI checks to pass on the current HEAD commit before Claude stops (ignores stale runs on prior commits)",
+    match: { events: ["Stop"] },
+    defaultEnabled: false,
+    category: "Workflow",
+  },
+];

package/src/hooks/policy-evaluator.ts

@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@
  */
 import type { HookEventType, SessionMetadata } from "./types";
 import type { PolicyContext, HooksConfig } from "./policy-types";
-import { BUILTIN_POLICIES } from "./builtin-policies";
-import { DEFAULT_POLICY_NAMESPACE, getPoliciesForEvent, normalizePolicyName } from "./policy-registry";
+import { DEFAULT_POLICY_NAMESPACE, getPoliciesForEvent } from "./policy-registry";
 import { hookLogInfo, hookLogWarn } from "./hook-logger";
 import { trackHookEvent } from "./hook-telemetry";
 import { getInstanceId } from "../../lib/telemetry-id";
@@ -28,11 +27,6 @@ export interface EvaluationResult {
   decision: "allow" | "deny" | "instruct";
 }
 
-// Build a map from canonical policy name to its params schema (for injecting defaults).
-// Keyed by canonical name because registered policies always carry the canonical form.
-const POLICY_PARAMS_MAP = new Map(
-  BUILTIN_POLICIES.filter((p) => p.params).map((p) => [normalizePolicyName(p.name), p.params!]),
-);
 
 /**
  * Look up policy params for a canonical policy name in the user config,
@@ -91,18 +85,25 @@ export async function evaluatePolicies(
     // Inject params: merge policyParams[policy.name] over schema defaults.
     // policy.name is canonical (e.g. "failproofai/block-force-push"); user
     // config keys may be flat or canonical — getConfigParamsFor accepts both.
-    const schema = POLICY_PARAMS_MAP.get(policy.name);
+    // The schema comes off the REGISTERED policy, so a pack's or a cloud
+    // assignment's declared params work exactly like a builtin's. It used to be
+    // looked up in a map built from the builtin catalog, which could only ever
+    // describe policies compiled into this build.
+    const schema = policy.params;
+    const userParams = getConfigParamsFor(config, policy.name) ?? {};
     let ctx: PolicyContext;
     if (schema) {
-      const userParams = getConfigParamsFor(config, policy.name) ?? {};
       const resolvedParams: Record<string, unknown> = {};
       for (const [key, spec] of Object.entries(schema)) {
         resolvedParams[key] = key in userParams ? userParams[key] : spec.default;
       }
       ctx = { ...baseCtx, params: resolvedParams };
     } else {
-      // Custom hooks and policies without schema get empty params
-      ctx = { ...baseCtx, params: {} };
+      // No schema means no defaults to merge — but the user may still have
+      // configured params for it, and silently dropping what they wrote is how
+      // a policy ends up ignoring its own configuration. Absent config still
+      // yields `{}`, which is what every schema-less policy saw before.
+      ctx = { ...baseCtx, params: userParams };
     }
 
     let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof policy.fn>>;
@@ -111,11 +112,18 @@ export async function evaluatePolicies(
     } catch (err) {
       const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
       hookLogWarn(`policy "${policy.name}" threw: ${msg}`);
-      // Custom hooks are wrapped in handler.ts with their own try/catch that
-      // emits custom_hook_error. Anything reaching here is a builtin policy
-      // crash — track separately so we can surface regressions in builtins.
-      const isCustom = policy.name.startsWith("custom/") || policy.name.startsWith(".failproofai-");
-      if (!isCustom) {
+      // `policy_evaluation_error` exists to surface regressions in the policies
+      // WE compile in, so it must fire only for those.
+      //
+      // Tested positively — a builtin is exactly a policy in the `failproofai/`
+      // namespace — rather than by listing the prefixes that are not builtins.
+      // The list version enumerated `custom/` and `.failproofai-` only, so
+      // `cloud/…` and `pack/…` both failed it and reported a third party's
+      // crash as ours, under a publisher-controlled policy name. Reproduced
+      // exactly that way by an observe-mode pack on this branch. A positive test
+      // also means the NEXT source kind cannot re-open this by omission.
+      const isBuiltin = policy.name.startsWith(`${DEFAULT_POLICY_NAMESPACE}/`);
+      if (isBuiltin) {
         void trackHookEvent(getInstanceId(), "policy_evaluation_error", {
           policy_name: policy.name,
           event_type: eventType,

package/src/hooks/policy-presets.ts

@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ export const RECOMMENDED_POLICIES: readonly string[] = [
   "protect-env-vars",
   "block-env-files",
   "block-secrets-write",
-  // The agent cannot disable its own guardrails.
-  "block-self-pause",
+  // The agent cannot disable its own guardrails. `block-failproofai-commands`
+  // is `alwaysOn` and registers with or without this entry; it is listed anyway
+  // so Recommended reads as the complete set rather than quietly omitting the
+  // most important line in it.
   "block-failproofai-commands",
   // Commands that are unrecoverable when they are wrong.
   "block-sudo",

package/src/hooks/policy-registry.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * chunk splitting and remains a true singleton across dynamic imports.
  */
 import type { HookEventType } from "./types";
-import type { PolicyFunction, PolicyMatcher, RegisteredPolicy } from "./policy-types";
+import type { PolicyFunction, PolicyMatcher, PolicyParamsSchema, RegisteredPolicy } from "./policy-types";
 
 const REGISTRY_KEY = "__FAILPROOFAI_POLICY_REGISTRY__";
 const INDEX_CACHE_KEY = "__FAILPROOFAI_POLICY_INDEX_CACHE__";
@@ -57,11 +57,17 @@ export function registerPolicy(
   fn: PolicyFunction,
   match: PolicyMatcher,
   priority: number = 0,
+  params?: PolicyParamsSchema,
 ): void {
   const canonical = normalizePolicyName(name);
   const registry = getRegistry();
   const idx = registry.findIndex((p) => p.name === canonical);
-  const entry: RegisteredPolicy = { name: canonical, description, fn, match, priority };
+  const entry: RegisteredPolicy = {
+    name: canonical, description, fn, match, priority,
+    // Absent stays absent: `evaluatePolicies` distinguishes "declares a schema"
+    // from "declares none", and a spread `params: undefined` is neither.
+    ...(params ? { params } : {}),
+  };
   if (idx >= 0) {
     registry[idx] = entry;
   } else {