failproofai 1.0.0-beta.2 → 1.0.0-beta.21

package/.next/standalone/openclaw-plugin/index.js

@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * failproofai policy bridge for OpenClaw (openclaw gateway).
- *
- * Loaded in-process by the gateway (registered via `plugins.load.paths` +
- * `plugins.entries.failproofai` in ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json). It subscribes to
- * OpenClaw's typed PLUGIN hooks — the only surface that can block; OpenClaw's
- * file-based "internal hooks" are observation-only — and forwards each to the
- * failproofai binary as `failproofai --hook <event> --cli openclaw`. failproofai
- * prints a flat `{permission, reason}` verdict on stdout; this shim maps it to
- * each hook's native return shape.
- *
- * Marker comment for failproofai's installer detection (do not remove):
- *   __failproofai_hook__: true
- *
- * Design notes (verified live against openclaw v2026.7.1):
- *  • ASYNC spawn, never spawnSync — the gateway is a long-running multi-channel
- *    process; a synchronous spawn on every hook would stall every channel.
- *    30s guard timer; fail-open on any error (never block on infra failure).
- *  • Raw forwarding — we send the raw tool name / params and a Claude-shaped
- *    stdin (params→tool_input, toolName→tool_name, transcriptPath→
- *    transcript_path, stopHookActive→stop_hook_active, sessionKey→session_id).
- *    The binary canonicalizes via OPENCLAW_* maps (single source of truth); the
- *    shim ships NO inline maps (unlike the OpenCode/Pi shims).
- *  • No top-level `await` — OpenClaw's plugin loader rejects it; all async work
- *    happens inside register()'s handlers.
- *
- * Binary resolution mirrors pi-extension/index.ts: prefer the bundled
- * dist/cli.mjs (node-compatible), fall back to bin/failproofai.mjs with bun for
- * dev; honor FAILPROOFAI_BINARY_OVERRIDE. Paths resolve relative to this file
- * via import.meta.url (the gateway spawns plugins with an undefined cwd).
- */
-import { definePluginEntry } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/plugin-entry";
-import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
-import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
-import { resolve, dirname } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-
-const HERE = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
-const DIST_BIN = resolve(HERE, "..", "dist", "cli.mjs");
-const SRC_BIN = resolve(HERE, "..", "bin", "failproofai.mjs");
-
-function resolveSpawn() {
-  if (process.env.FAILPROOFAI_BINARY_OVERRIDE) {
-    return { cmd: "node", args: [process.env.FAILPROOFAI_BINARY_OVERRIDE] };
-  }
-  if (existsSync(DIST_BIN)) {
-    return { cmd: "node", args: [DIST_BIN] };
-  }
-  return { cmd: "bun", args: [SRC_BIN] };
-}
-
-function debug(msg) {
-  if (process.env.FAILPROOFAI_OPENCLAW_DEBUG === "1") {
-    process.stderr.write(`[failproofai-openclaw-shim] ${msg}\n`);
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Spawn `failproofai --hook <rawEvent> --cli openclaw`, write the JSON payload
- * to stdin, and resolve the parsed flat `{permission, reason}` verdict. Async +
- * fail-open: any spawn/parse error or timeout resolves to `{permission:"allow"}`
- * so a failproofai fault never blocks the gateway.
- */
-function callPolicy(rawEvent, payload) {
-  return new Promise((done) => {
-    const { cmd, args } = resolveSpawn();
-    let child;
-    try {
-      child = spawn(cmd, [...args, "--hook", rawEvent, "--cli", "openclaw"], {
-        stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
-      });
-    } catch (err) {
-      debug(`spawn threw: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`);
-      done({ permission: "allow" });
-      return;
-    }
-    let out = "";
-    let settled = false;
-    const finish = (verdict) => {
-      if (settled) return;
-      settled = true;
-      clearTimeout(timer);
-      done(verdict);
-    };
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-      debug(`timeout on ${rawEvent}; killing child`);
-      try { child.kill(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
-      finish({ permission: "allow" });
-    }, 30_000);
-    child.stdout.on("data", (d) => { out += d; });
-    child.on("error", (err) => {
-      debug(`child error: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`);
-      finish({ permission: "allow" });
-    });
-    child.on("close", () => {
-      const stdout = out.trim();
-      if (!stdout) { finish({ permission: "allow" }); return; }
-      try {
-        finish(JSON.parse(stdout));
-      } catch (err) {
-        debug(`parse error: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`);
-        finish({ permission: "allow" });
-      }
-    });
-    try {
-      child.stdin.end(JSON.stringify(payload));
-    } catch (err) {
-      debug(`stdin write failed: ${err && err.message ? err.message : String(err)}`);
-      finish({ permission: "allow" });
-    }
-  });
-}
-
-/** Claude-shaped stdin base. Extra keys are ignored by the binary's payload
- *  parser; they're forwarded for future use / activity attribution. */
-function baseMeta(payload, ctx) {
-  const p = payload || {};
-  const c = ctx || {};
-  return {
-    session_id: c.sessionId ?? p.sessionId ?? c.sessionKey ?? p.sessionKey,
-    cwd: p.cwd ?? c.workspaceDir ?? process.cwd(),
-    transcript_path: p.transcriptPath,
-    stop_hook_active: p.stopHookActive === true,
-    openclaw: {
-      agentId: c.agentId,
-      sessionKey: c.sessionKey ?? p.sessionKey,
-      runId: c.runId ?? p.runId,
-      provider: p.provider,
-      model: p.model,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-export default definePluginEntry({
-  id: "failproofai",
-  name: "failproofai",
-  description: "Real-time policy enforcement for OpenClaw by failproofai",
-  register(api) {
-    // before_tool_call → PreToolUse. Full deny: return {block:true, blockReason}.
-    api.on(
-      "before_tool_call",
-      async (payload, ctx) => {
-        const p = payload || {};
-        const verdict = await callPolicy("before_tool_call", {
-          ...baseMeta(payload, ctx),
-          tool_name: p.toolName,
-          tool_input: p.params,
-          hook_event_name: "before_tool_call",
-        });
-        if (verdict.permission === "deny") {
-          return { block: true, blockReason: verdict.reason || "Blocked by failproofai" };
-        }
-        return undefined;
-      },
-      { priority: 100, timeoutMs: 60_000 },
-    );
-
-    // before_agent_run → UserPromptSubmit. Deny: return {outcome:"block", reason}.
-    api.on(
-      "before_agent_run",
-      async (payload, ctx) => {
-        const p = payload || {};
-        const verdict = await callPolicy("before_agent_run", {
-          ...baseMeta(payload, ctx),
-          prompt: p.prompt,
-          hook_event_name: "before_agent_run",
-        });
-        if (verdict.permission === "deny") {
-          return { outcome: "block", reason: verdict.reason || "Blocked by failproofai" };
-        }
-        return undefined;
-      },
-      { priority: 100, timeoutMs: 60_000 },
-    );
-
-    // before_agent_finalize → Stop. The real turn-end gate: a deny becomes a
-    // revise so the agent runs another pass. The evaluator supplies the
-    // MANDATORY ACTION wording; the payload's stop_hook_active guards the
-    // require-*-before-stop builtins against infinite loops.
-    api.on(
-      "before_agent_finalize",
-      async (payload, ctx) => {
-        const verdict = await callPolicy("before_agent_finalize", {
-          ...baseMeta(payload, ctx),
-          hook_event_name: "before_agent_finalize",
-        });
-        if (verdict.permission === "deny") {
-          return { action: "revise", reason: verdict.reason || "Action required by failproofai" };
-        }
-        return undefined;
-      },
-      { priority: 100, timeoutMs: 60_000 },
-    );
-
-    // Observation hooks — await so activity ordering is stable, ignore verdict.
-    // after_tool_call → PostToolUse; session_start/end → SessionStart/End;
-    // subagent_ended → SubagentStop (obs only); before_compaction → PreCompact.
-    for (const ev of [
-      "after_tool_call",
-      "session_start",
-      "session_end",
-      "subagent_ended",
-      "before_compaction",
-    ]) {
-      api.on(
-        ev,
-        async (payload, ctx) => {
-          const p = payload || {};
-          await callPolicy(ev, {
-            ...baseMeta(payload, ctx),
-            tool_name: p.toolName,
-            tool_input: p.params,
-            tool_response: p.result,
-            reason: p.reason,
-            hook_event_name: ev,
-          });
-          return undefined;
-        },
-        { priority: 100, timeoutMs: 60_000 },
-      );
-    }
-  },
-});

package/.next/standalone/openclaw-plugin/openclaw.plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "failproofai",
-  "name": "failproofai",
-  "description": "Real-time policy enforcement for OpenClaw by failproofai",
-  "configSchema": {}
-}

package/.next/standalone/openclaw-plugin/package.json

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "@failproofai/openclaw-plugin",
-  "version": "0.0.1",
-  "description": "failproofai policy bridge for OpenClaw (openclaw gateway)",
-  "type": "module",
-  "main": "./index.js",
-  "private": true,
-  "keywords": [
-    "openclaw-plugin",
-    "failproofai"
-  ]
-}

package/.next/standalone/osv-scanner.toml

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-# OSV-Scanner allow-list — auto-loaded by the Supply Chain CI gate
-# (.github/workflows/osv-scanner.yml) when it scans bun.lock.
-#
-# The gate blocks on ANY known-vulnerable or malicious dependency. When a finding
-# has no available fix (e.g. an unpatched transitive advisory), add a justified,
-# time-boxed entry here so unrelated PRs aren't blocked. Always prefer FIXING
-# (bump the dependency, or pin it via `overrides` in package.json) over ignoring.
-# Keep this list short and re-review entries when their ignoreUntil date passes.
-#
-# Every entry MUST include a reason and an ignoreUntil date. Example:
-#
-# [[IgnoredVulns]]
-# id = "GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx"
-# ignoreUntil = 2026-07-01
-# reason = "No upstream fix yet; transitive via <pkg>; not reachable in our usage. Re-review by 2026-07-01."
-#
-# There are currently no ignored vulnerabilities — the dependency tree is clean.