eyeling 1.34.5 → 2.34.7

package/examples/eyelang/access-control-policy.pl

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-% Access control policy example adapted from Eyelet input/access-control-policy.pl.
-%
-% This version avoids findall/3 by expressing allOf/anyOf/noneOf checks as
-% finite logical conditions.  The universal allOf/noneOf checks use negation
-% as failure over bound policy facts.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(policy, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(reason, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-policy_request(test1, policy_x).
-has(test1, claim_a).
-has(test1, claim_b).
-has(test1, claim_c).
-
-policy(policy_x).
-allOf(policy_x, claim_a).
-allOf(policy_x, claim_b).
-anyOf(policy_x, claim_c).
-noneOf(policy_x, claim_d).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-passes_all_of(Request, Policy) :-
-  policy_request(Request, Policy),
-  policy(Policy),
-  not((allOf(Policy, Claim), not(has(Request, Claim)))).
-
-passes_any_of(Request, Policy) :-
-  policy_request(Request, Policy),
-  policy(Policy),
-  anyOf(Policy, Claim),
-  has(Request, Claim).
-
-passes_none_of(Request, Policy) :-
-  policy_request(Request, Policy),
-  policy(Policy),
-  not((noneOf(Policy, Claim), has(Request, Claim))).
-
-passes_policy(Request, Policy) :-
-  passes_all_of(Request, Policy),
-  passes_any_of(Request, Policy),
-  passes_none_of(Request, Policy).
-
-policy(test1, policy_x).
-
-status(test1, policy_passed) :-
-  passes_policy(test1, policy_x).
-
-reason(test1, "all required claims are present, one allowed claim is present, and no forbidden claim is present") :-
-  passes_policy(test1, policy_x).

package/examples/eyelang/ackermann.pl

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-% Ackermann-style hyperoperation benchmark adapted from Eyeling ackermann.n3.
-% The two-argument entry point follows the Eyeling encoding:
-%   ackermann(X, Y) = hyper(X, Y + 3, 2) - 3.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(ackermann, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-ackermann(X, Y, A) :-
-  add(Y, 3, B),
-  hyper(X, B, 2, C),
-  sub(C, 3, A).
-
-% Successor, addition, multiplication, and exponentiation levels.
-hyper(0, Y, _Z, A) :- add(Y, 1, A).
-hyper(1, Y, Z, A) :- add(Y, Z, A).
-hyper(2, Y, Z, A) :- mul(Y, Z, A).
-hyper(3, Y, Z, A) :- pow(Z, Y, A).
-
-% Higher levels recurse over the previous hyperoperation.
-hyper(X, 0, _Z, 1) :- gt(X, 3).
-hyper(X, Y, Z, A) :-
-  gt(X, 3),
-  neq(Y, 0),
-  sub(Y, 1, B),
-  hyper(X, B, Z, C),
-  sub(X, 1, D),
-  hyper(D, C, Z, A).
-
-ack_case(0, 0).
-ack_case(0, 6).
-ack_case(1, 2).
-ack_case(1, 7).
-ack_case(2, 2).
-ack_case(2, 9).
-ack_case(3, 4).
-ack_case(3, 1000).
-ack_case(4, 0).
-ack_case(4, 1).
-ack_case(4, 2).
-ack_case(5, 0).
-
-ackermann([X, Y], A) :-
-  ack_case(X, Y),
-  ackermann(X, Y, A).

package/examples/eyelang/age.pl

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-% Age checker adapted from Eyeling.
-%
-% Is the age of a person above some duration?
-
-% Person data.
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(birthDay, 2).
-materialize(duration, 2).
-materialize(ageAbove, 2).
-materialize(is, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-birthDay(patH, "1944-08-21").
-duration(check, "P80Y").
-
-% A person is above a duration if the local date minus the birthday is greater
-% than that duration.
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-ageAbove(S, A) :-
-  birthDay(S, B),
-  duration(check, A),
-  local_time(D),
-  difference(D, B, F),
-  gt(F, A).
-
-% Test mirroring the Eyeling example.
-is(test, true) :-
-  ageAbove(S, "P80Y").

package/examples/eyelang/aliases-and-namespaces.pl

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-% Built-ins use one native spelling each.
-% Vocabulary predicate names remain ordinary user predicates.
-
-% The materialized relations below show that built-ins can coexist with
-% ordinary vocabulary predicates that happen to look namespace-like.
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(value, 2).
-materialize(ok, 2).
-materialize(tail, 2).
-materialize(label, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-% Native operations are called through their canonical predicate names.
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-value(nativeMath, X) :- add(0.125, 0.875, X).
-ok(nativeCompare, true) :- lt(2, 3).
-ok(nativeString, true) :- matches("scoped retail insight", "retail|medical").
-tail(nativeList, Tail) :- rest([a, b, c], Tail).
-
-% These names are just user data; eyelang does not give them special meaning.
-example_label(vocabularyExample, "vocabulary names are ordinary predicate names").
-label(vocabularyExample, Text) :- example_label(vocabularyExample, Text).

package/examples/eyelang/alignment-demo.pl

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-% Alignment demo, adapted from Eyeling's examples/alignment-demo.n3.
-%
-% The output is the Prolog-style counterpart of the Eyeling golden output:
-% broader/narrower alignments, their transitive closure, the reflexive
-% narrower-or-equal relation, and the concepts that roll up to ref_car.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(broader, 2).
-materialize(narrower, 2).
-materialize(broaderTransitive, 2).
-materialize(narrowerTransitive, 2).
-materialize(narrowerOrEqualOf, 2).
-materialize(rollsUpTo, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-concept(ref_car).
-concept(tel_car).
-concept(tel_heavy_vehicle).
-concept(anpr_vehicle_with_plate).
-concept(anpr_passenger_car).
-
-assertedBroader(tel_car, ref_car).
-assertedBroader(tel_heavy_vehicle, ref_car).
-assertedBroader(anpr_vehicle_with_plate, ref_car).
-assertedNarrower(anpr_vehicle_with_plate, anpr_passenger_car).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-broader(X, Y) :- assertedBroader(X, Y).
-broader(X, Y) :- assertedNarrower(Y, X).
-
-narrower(X, Y) :- broader(Y, X).
-
-broaderTransitive(X, Y) :- broader(X, Y).
-broaderTransitive(X, Z) :- broader(X, Y), broaderTransitive(Y, Z).
-
-narrowerTransitive(X, Y) :- narrower(X, Y).
-narrowerTransitive(X, Z) :- narrower(X, Y), narrowerTransitive(Y, Z).
-
-narrowerOrEqualOf(X, X) :- concept(X).
-narrowerOrEqualOf(X, Y) :- broaderTransitive(X, Y).
-
-rollsUpTo(X, ref_car) :-
-  narrowerOrEqualOf(X, ref_car),
-  neq(X, ref_car).

package/examples/eyelang/allen-interval-calculus.pl

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-% Allen interval calculus adapted from Eyeling allen-interval-calculus.n3.
-% Eyeling demonstrates dateTime and duration built-ins; this eyelang version
-% uses integer hour offsets so the interval rules remain pure Horn clauses.
-% The input interval table is a list of records, showing how tabular data can
-% stay scoped as one term instead of many unrelated global start/end facts.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(start, 2).
-materialize(end, 2).
-materialize(duration, 2).
-materialize(statement, 3).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-interval_table([
-  interval(a, 10, 12),
-  interval(b, 13, 15),
-  interval(c, 12, 14),
-  interval(d, 11, 13),
-  interval(e, 10, 12),
-  interval(f, 10, 11),
-  interval(g, 11, 12),
-  interval(h, 9, 16),
-  interval(i, 16, 18),
-  interval(j, 15, 16),
-  interval(k, 13, 14)
-]).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-interval(I) :- interval_table(Table), member(interval(I, _Start, _End), Table).
-start(I, Start) :- interval_table(Table), member(interval(I, Start, _End), Table).
-end(I, End) :- interval_table(Table), member(interval(I, _Start, End), Table).
-
-relation(I, before, J) :- end(I, EI), start(J, SJ), lt(EI, SJ).
-relation(I, meets, J) :- end(I, E), start(J, E).
-relation(I, overlaps, J) :-
-  start(I, SI), end(I, EI),
-  start(J, SJ), end(J, EJ),
-  lt(SI, SJ), lt(SJ, EI), lt(EI, EJ).
-relation(I, starts, J) :-
-  start(I, S), start(J, S),
-  end(I, EI), end(J, EJ),
-  lt(EI, EJ).
-relation(I, during, J) :-
-  start(I, SI), end(I, EI),
-  start(J, SJ), end(J, EJ),
-  lt(SJ, SI), lt(EI, EJ).
-relation(I, finishes, J) :-
-  end(I, E), end(J, E),
-  start(I, SI), start(J, SJ),
-  lt(SJ, SI).
-relation(I, equals, J) :-
-  start(I, S), start(J, S),
-  end(I, E), end(J, E).
-
-relation(J, after, I) :- relation(I, before, J).
-relation(J, metBy, I) :- relation(I, meets, J).
-relation(J, overlappedBy, I) :- relation(I, overlaps, J).
-relation(J, startedBy, I) :- relation(I, starts, J).
-relation(J, contains, I) :- relation(I, during, J).
-relation(J, finishedBy, I) :- relation(I, finishes, J).
-
-duration(I, D) :- end(I, E), start(I, S), sub(E, S, D).
-
-statement(I, Rel, J) :- relation(I, Rel, J).

package/examples/eyelang/ancestor.pl

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-% Basic recursive relation example.
-% Both input facts and derived recursive answers are printed.
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(parent, 2).
-materialize(ancestor, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-% Direct parent facts form a simple chain.
-parent(pat, jan).
-parent(jan, lies).
-parent(lies, emma).
-
-% Base case: every parent is also an ancestor.
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-ancestor(X, Y) :-
-  parent(X, Y).
-
-% Recursive case: walk one parent edge and continue through the chain.
-ancestor(X, Z) :-
-  parent(X, Y),
-  ancestor(Y, Z).

package/examples/eyelang/animal.pl

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-% Animal classification, adapted from Eyelet's input/animal.pl.
-%
-% The Eyelet source uses Unicode predicate names; this eyelang version keeps the
-% same tiny inheritance idea with plain vocabulary names.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(type, 2).
-materialize(subclassOf, 2).
-materialize(succeeds, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-human(joe).
-animal(human).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-animal(X) :- human(X).
-
-type(joe, human) :- human(joe).
-type(joe, animal) :- animal(joe).
-subclassOf(human, animal) :- animal(human).
-succeeds(animalExample, true) :- animal(_).

package/examples/eyelang/annotation.pl

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-% Annotation with quoted formula data.
-%
-% The program keeps the annotation as data and derives visible relations from it.
-% Context members become default output only when explicit rules project them.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(name, 2).
-materialize(log_nameOf, 2).
-materialize(statedBy, 2).
-materialize(recorded, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-annotation(t, (
-  name(a, "Alice"),
-  statedBy(t, bob),
-  recorded(t, "2021-07-07")
-)).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-name(S, O) :-
-  annotation(_T, Context),
-  holds(Context, name(S, O)).
-
-log_nameOf(T, name(S, O)) :-
-  annotation(T, Context),
-  holds(Context, name(S, O)).
-
-statedBy(S, O) :-
-  annotation(_T, Context),
-  holds(Context, statedBy(S, O)).
-
-recorded(S, O) :-
-  annotation(_T, Context),
-  holds(Context, recorded(S, O)).

package/examples/eyelang/auroracare.pl

@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
-% AuroraCare purpose-based medical-data exchange case adapted from Eyeling auroracare.n3.
-% The original N3 emits one Markdown block per scenario.  This eyelang
-% translation materializes the policy decisions, reasons, traces, and ARC-style
-% check values as ordinary relation output.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(label, 2).
-materialize(description, 2).
-materialize(careTeamLinked, 2).
-materialize(subjectOptIn, 2).
-materialize(subjectOptOut, 2).
-materialize(decision, 2).
-materialize(reason, 2).
-materialize(matchedPolicyUid, 2).
-materialize(matchedProhibition, 2).
-materialize(trace, 2).
-materialize(checkC1, 2).
-materialize(checkC2, 2).
-materialize(checkC3, 2).
-materialize(checkC4, 2).
-materialize(checkC5, 2).
-materialize(checkC6, 2).
-materialize(checkC7, 2).
-materialize(checkC8, 2).
-materialize(checkC9, 2).
-materialize(checkC10Text, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-caseName(case, "auroracare").
-question(case, "For each AuroraCare scenario, should the PDP permit or deny the requested use of health data, and why?").
-
-% Policies: primary care, quality improvement, research, and an explicit denial.
-policyUid(policyPrimary, "urn:policy:primary-care-001").
-purposeAllowed(policyPrimary, primaryCareManagement).
-purposeAllowed(policyPrimary, patientRemoteMonitoring).
-roleAllowed(policyPrimary, "clinician").
-allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, patientSummary).
-allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, labResults).
-
-policyUid(policyQi, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora").
-purposeAllowed(policyQi, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-requireEnvironment(policyQi, "secure_env").
-requireAllCategory(policyQi, labResults).
-requireAllCategory(policyQi, patientSummary).
-duty(policyQi, requireConsent).
-duty(policyQi, noExfiltration).
-
-policyUid(policyResearch, "urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes").
-purposeAllowed(policyResearch, healthcareScientificResearch).
-requireEnvironment(policyResearch, "secure_env").
-requireTom(policyResearch, anonymisation).
-allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, labResults).
-allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, patientSummary).
-allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, imagingReport).
-duty(policyResearch, annualOutcomeReport).
-duty(policyResearch, noReidentification).
-duty(policyResearch, noExfiltration).
-
-policyUid(policyDenyInsurance, "urn:policy:deny-insurance").
-prohibitPurpose(policyDenyInsurance, insuranceManagement).
-
-linkedTo(clinicianAlba, ruben).
-linkedTo(gpRuben, ruben).
-consentAllow(ruben, healthcareScientificResearch).
-consentDeny(ruben, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms).
-primaryPurpose(auroracare, primaryCareManagement).
-primaryPurpose(auroracare, patientRemoteMonitoring).
-prohibitedPurpose(auroracare, insuranceManagement).
-
-% Scenarios A-G mirror the upstream Markdown report cases.
-scenario(scenarioA).
-outputKey(scenarioA, out010A).
-scenario_label(scenarioA, "A – Primary care visit").
-scenario_description(scenarioA, "Clinician in the patient's care team accessing the patient summary for primary care management.").
-requester(scenarioA, clinicianAlba).
-requesterRole(scenarioA, "clinician").
-subject(scenarioA, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioA, primaryCareManagement).
-environment(scenarioA, "api_gateway").
-category(scenarioA, patientSummary).
-
-scenario(scenarioB).
-outputKey(scenarioB, out020B).
-scenario_label(scenarioB, "B – Quality improvement (in scope)").
-scenario_description(scenarioB, "QI analyst using lab results + summary in a secure environment.").
-requester(scenarioB, qiAnalyst).
-requesterRole(scenarioB, "data_user").
-subject(scenarioB, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioB, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-environment(scenarioB, "secure_env").
-category(scenarioB, labResults).
-category(scenarioB, patientSummary).
-
-scenario(scenarioC).
-outputKey(scenarioC, out030C).
-scenario_label(scenarioC, "C – Quality improvement (out of scope)").
-scenario_description(scenarioC, "QI analyst with only lab results; policy expects labs + summary.").
-requester(scenarioC, qiAnalyst).
-requesterRole(scenarioC, "data_user").
-subject(scenarioC, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-environment(scenarioC, "secure_env").
-category(scenarioC, labResults).
-
-scenario(scenarioD).
-outputKey(scenarioD, out040D).
-scenario_label(scenarioD, "D – Insurance management").
-scenario_description(scenarioD, "Insurance bot attempting to use health data for insurance management (prohibited purpose).").
-requester(scenarioD, insurerBot).
-requesterRole(scenarioD, "data_user").
-subject(scenarioD, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioD, insuranceManagement).
-environment(scenarioD, "secure_env").
-category(scenarioD, patientSummary).
-
-scenario(scenarioE).
-outputKey(scenarioE, out050E).
-scenario_label(scenarioE, "E – GP checks labs").
-scenario_description(scenarioE, "GP for the same patient checking lab results via the API gateway.").
-requester(scenarioE, gpRuben).
-requesterRole(scenarioE, "clinician").
-subject(scenarioE, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioE, primaryCareManagement).
-environment(scenarioE, "api_gateway").
-category(scenarioE, labResults).
-
-scenario(scenarioF).
-outputKey(scenarioF, out060F).
-scenario_label(scenarioF, "F – Research on anonymised dataset").
-scenario_description(scenarioF, "Researcher using anonymised labs + summary in a secure environment, with opt-in.").
-requester(scenarioF, researcherAurora).
-requesterRole(scenarioF, "data_user").
-subject(scenarioF, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioF, healthcareScientificResearch).
-environment(scenarioF, "secure_env").
-tom(scenarioF, anonymisation).
-category(scenarioF, patientSummary).
-category(scenarioF, labResults).
-
-scenario(scenarioG).
-outputKey(scenarioG, out070G).
-scenario_label(scenarioG, "G – AI training (opt-out)").
-scenario_description(scenarioG, "Data user wants to train AI, but the subject opted out of AI training.").
-requester(scenarioG, mlOps).
-requesterRole(scenarioG, "data_user").
-subject(scenarioG, ruben).
-purpose(scenarioG, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms).
-environment(scenarioG, "secure_env").
-category(scenarioG, patientSummary).
-category(scenarioG, labResults).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-label(S, Label) :- scenario_label(S, Label).
-description(S, Description) :- scenario_description(S, Description).
-
-care_team_linked(S) :-
-  requester(S, Requester),
-  subject(S, Subject),
-  linkedTo(Requester, Subject).
-
-subject_opt_in(S) :-
-  subject(S, Subject),
-  purpose(S, Purpose),
-  consentAllow(Subject, Purpose).
-
-subject_opt_out(S) :-
-  subject(S, Subject),
-  purpose(S, Purpose),
-  consentDeny(Subject, Purpose).
-
-primary_policy_match(S) :-
-  purpose(S, primaryCareManagement),
-  requesterRole(S, "clinician"),
-  care_team_linked(S),
-  category(S, Category),
-  allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, Category).
-
-qi_policy_match(S) :-
-  purpose(S, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare),
-  environment(S, "secure_env"),
-  category(S, labResults),
-  category(S, patientSummary).
-
-research_policy_match(S) :-
-  purpose(S, healthcareScientificResearch),
-  environment(S, "secure_env"),
-  tom(S, anonymisation),
-  subject_opt_in(S),
-  category(S, labResults).
-
-insurance_prohibition_match(S) :-
-  purpose(S, insuranceManagement),
-  prohibitPurpose(policyDenyInsurance, insuranceManagement).
-
-ai_training_opt_out_match(S) :-
-  purpose(S, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms),
-  subject_opt_out(S).
-
-careTeamLinked(S, true) :- care_team_linked(S).
-subjectOptIn(S, true) :- subject_opt_in(S).
-subjectOptOut(S, true) :- subject_opt_out(S).
-
-% Permit when a scenario satisfies one of the allowed policy branches.
-decision(S, "PERMIT") :- primary_policy_match(S).
-decision(S, "PERMIT") :- qi_policy_match(S).
-decision(S, "PERMIT") :- research_policy_match(S).
-% Deny branches preserve the reason that will be materialized for the report.
-decision(S, "DENY") :- insurance_prohibition_match(S).
-decision(S, "DENY") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(S).
-decision(scenarioC, "DENY") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-
-matchedPolicyUid(S, Uid) :- primary_policy_match(S), policyUid(policyPrimary, Uid).
-matchedPolicyUid(S, Uid) :- qi_policy_match(S), policyUid(policyQi, Uid).
-matchedPolicyUid(S, Uid) :- research_policy_match(S), policyUid(policyResearch, Uid).
-matchedProhibition(S, policyDenyInsurance) :- insurance_prohibition_match(S).
-
-reason(S, "Permitted: clinician in the patient's care team, and the primary-care policy matched.") :- primary_policy_match(S).
-reason(S, "Permitted: ODRL/DPV policy matched for secondary use.") :- qi_policy_match(S).
-reason(S, "Permitted: subject opted in and an ODRL/DPV policy matched (anonymised dataset in secure environment).") :- research_policy_match(S).
-reason(S, "Denied: the requested purpose (insurance management) is prohibited by policy.") :- insurance_prohibition_match(S).
-reason(S, "Denied: you opted out of your data being used to train AI systems.") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(S).
-reason(scenarioC, "Denied: no policy matched (purpose, environment, TOMs, or categories out of scope).") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-
-trace(S, "permit:primary_care_allowed") :- primary_policy_match(S).
-trace(S, "urn:policy:primary-care-001:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- primary_policy_match(S).
-trace(S, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- qi_policy_match(S).
-trace(S, "urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- research_policy_match(S).
-trace(S, "deny:prohibited_purpose") :- insurance_prohibition_match(S).
-trace(S, "urn:policy:deny-insurance:deny:odrl:prohibition_matched") :- insurance_prohibition_match(S).
-trace(S, "deny:subject_opted_out_ai_training") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(S).
-trace(scenarioC, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora:deny:odrl:no_permission_matched") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
-
-% C1-C10 below are the ARC-style checklist lines from the upstream output.
-checkC1(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC2(scenarioA, "OK - clinician") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC3(scenarioA, "OK - care-team linked") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC4(scenarioA, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC5(scenarioA, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"]") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC6(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC7(scenarioA, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC8(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC9(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - policy has no environment constraint") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-checkC10Text(scenarioA, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:primary-care-001") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
-
-checkC1(scenarioB, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC2(scenarioB, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC3(scenarioB, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC4(scenarioB, "OK - opt-in present and policy matched") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC5(scenarioB, "OK - operator=isAllOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"]") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC6(scenarioB, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC7(scenarioB, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC8(scenarioB, "INFO - duties attached: duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#requireConsent, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noExfiltration") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC9(scenarioB, "OK - operator=eq, allowed=\"secure_env\", requested=\"secure_env\"") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-checkC10Text(scenarioB, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
-
-checkC1(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC2(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC3(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC4(scenarioC, "OK - denied because opt-in missing or no policy match") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC5(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC6(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC7(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC8(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC9(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-checkC10Text(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
-
-checkC1(scenarioD, "OK - denied prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC2(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC3(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC4(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC5(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC6(scenarioD, "OK - denied due to prohibition") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC7(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC8(scenarioD, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC9(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-checkC10Text(scenarioD, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
-
-checkC1(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC2(scenarioE, "OK - clinician") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC3(scenarioE, "OK - care-team linked") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC4(scenarioE, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC5(scenarioE, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"]") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC6(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC7(scenarioE, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC8(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC9(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - policy has no environment constraint") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-checkC10Text(scenarioE, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:primary-care-001") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
-
-checkC1(scenarioF, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC2(scenarioF, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC3(scenarioF, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC4(scenarioF, "OK - opt-in present and policy matched") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC5(scenarioF, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#IMAGING_REPORT\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"]") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC6(scenarioF, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC7(scenarioF, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC8(scenarioF, "INFO - duties attached: duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#annualOutcomeReport, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noReidentification, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noExfiltration") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC9(scenarioF, "OK - operator=eq, allowed=\"secure_env\", requested=\"secure_env\"") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-checkC10Text(scenarioF, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
-
-checkC1(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC2(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC3(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC4(scenarioG, "OK - denied because opt-in missing or no policy match") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC5(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC6(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC7(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC8(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC9(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
-checkC10Text(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").

package/examples/eyelang/backward.pl

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(isIndeedMoreInterestingThan, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-% Backward rule example adapted from Eyeling backward.n3.
-% Eyeling writes the interestingness rule backward; eyelang records the same
-% relation as an ordinary rule whose body is the numeric comparison.
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-moreInterestingThan(X, Y) :- gt(X, Y).
-
-isIndeedMoreInterestingThan(5, 3) :- moreInterestingThan(5, 3).