eyelang 1.2.2 → 1.3.1

package/examples/n-queens-8.pl

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-% N-queens search for the 8x8 board.
-%
-% A solution is represented as a list of row numbers, one per column.  Using a
-% permutation enforces one queen per row automatically; safe_rows/1 only has to
-% reject diagonal attacks.
-materialize(n_queens_answer, 2).
-
-% Cache diagonal checks; the same row/distance/suffix states recur across many
-% candidate permutations during the 8-queens search.  The example asks only for
-% the first solution with once/1, keeping it playground-friendly.
-memoize(no_diagonal_attack, 3).
-
-perm([], []).
-perm(Items, [X|Rest]) :-
-  select(X, Items, Remaining),
-  perm(Remaining, Rest).
-
-safe_rows([]).
-safe_rows([Row|Rest]) :-
-  no_diagonal_attack(Row, 1, Rest),
-  safe_rows(Rest).
-
-no_diagonal_attack(_Row, _Distance, []).
-no_diagonal_attack(Row, Distance, [Other|Rest]) :-
-  sub(Row, Other, Delta),
-  abs(Delta, AbsDelta),
-  neq(AbsDelta, Distance),
-  add(Distance, 1, NextDistance),
-  no_diagonal_attack(Row, NextDistance, Rest).
-
-queen_solution(Rows) :-
-  perm([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], Rows),
-  safe_rows(Rows).
-
-n_queens_answer(first_solution, Rows) :- once(queen_solution(Rows)).

package/examples/network-sla.pl

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-% Technology example: network path SLA check.
-%
-% The path latency is the sum of link delays plus jitter. The path is compliant
-% when the resulting end-to-end latency stays below the SLA limit.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(endToEndLatency_ms, 2).
-materialize(slaLimit_ms, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(reason, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-path(edge_path, [link_a, link_b, link_c]).
-link_latency(link_a, 12.0).
-link_latency(link_b, 18.0).
-link_latency(link_c, 9.0).
-jitter(edge_path, 8.0).
-sla(edge_path, maximum_latency_ms, 50.0).
-
-latency_sum([], 0.0).
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-latency_sum([Link|Links], Total) :-
-  link_latency(Link, LinkLatency),
-  latency_sum(Links, Rest),
-  add(LinkLatency, Rest, Total).
-
-end_to_end_latency(Path, Latency) :-
-  path(Path, Links),
-  latency_sum(Links, LinkLatency),
-  jitter(Path, Jitter),
-  add(LinkLatency, Jitter, Latency).
-
-sla_compliant(Path) :-
-  end_to_end_latency(Path, Latency),
-  sla(Path, maximum_latency_ms, Maximum),
-  lt(Latency, Maximum).
-
-endToEndLatency_ms(Path, Latency) :-
-  end_to_end_latency(Path, Latency).
-
-slaLimit_ms(Path, Maximum) :-
-  sla(Path, maximum_latency_ms, Maximum).
-
-status(Path, sla_compliant) :-
-  sla_compliant(Path).
-
-reason(Path, "path latency including jitter is below the SLA limit") :-
-  sla_compliant(Path).

package/examples/newton-raphson.pl

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-% Newton-Raphson root finding, adapted from Eyelet input/newton-raphson.pl.
-% Each want_root/1 case names a function, starting point, and tolerance.  The
-% recursive finder stops when |f(x)| is below tolerance; otherwise it applies
-% x := x - f(x)/f'(x) using the corresponding derivative rule.
-
-materialize(findRoot, 2).
-
-want_root([1, 1.0, 1.0e-15]).
-want_root([2, 2.0, 1.0e-15]).
-want_root([3, 3.0, 1.0e-15]).
-
-findRoot(Input, Root) :-
-  want_root(Input),
-  find_root(Input, Root).
-
-% f(1, X) = X^2 - 2
-f(1, X, Y) :-
-  mul(X, X, XX),
-  sub(XX, 2, Y).
-
-% f(2, X) = log(X) - 1
-f(2, X, Y) :-
-  log(X, LX),
-  sub(LX, 1, Y).
-
-% f(3, X) = sin(X)
-f(3, X, Y) :-
-  sin(X, Y).
-
-fd(1, X, Y) :-
-  mul(2, X, Y).
-fd(2, X, Y) :-
-  div(1, X, Y).
-fd(3, X, Y) :-
-  cos(X, Y).
-
-find_root([N, X, Tolerance], X) :-
-  f(N, X, FX),
-  abs(FX, AFX),
-  lt(AFX, Tolerance).
-find_root([N, X, Tolerance], Root) :-
-  f(N, X, FX),
-  abs(FX, AFX),
-  ge(AFX, Tolerance),
-  fd(N, X, FDX),
-  div(FX, FDX, Step),
-  sub(X, Step, NewX),
-  find_root([N, NewX, Tolerance], Root).

package/examples/nixon-diamond.pl

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-% Nixon diamond: two independent defaults support incompatible conclusions.
-% This mirrors the classic EYE reasoning theme while keeping the conclusion explicit:
-% a subject with both defaults is reported as conflicted rather than forced to
-% choose one extension.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(defaultSupports, 2).
-materialize(conflict, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-kind(nixon, quaker).
-kind(nixon, republican).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-supports_default(Person, pacifist) :-
-  kind(Person, quaker).
-
-supports_default(Person, hawk) :-
-  kind(Person, republican).
-
-contrary(pacifist, hawk).
-contrary(hawk, pacifist).
-
-conflicted(Person, A, B) :-
-  supports_default(Person, A),
-  supports_default(Person, B),
-  contrary(A, B).
-
-defaultSupports(Person, Conclusion) :-
-  supports_default(Person, Conclusion).
-
-conflict(Person, conflict(A, B)) :-
-  conflicted(Person, A, B).
-
-status(Person, conflicted_default_case) :-
-  conflicted(Person, _A, _B).

package/examples/observability-log-correlation.pl

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-% Observability example: parse unstructured service logs with named regex
-% captures, then reason over the extracted context to correlate events that
-% share a W3C trace id.
-%
-% The noisy health-check line is deliberately present to show that only logs
-% matching the pattern become parsed events.
-materialize(parsed_event, 5).
-materialize(captured_field, 3).
-materialize(trace_alert, 3).
-
-log_pattern("^ts=(?<ts>\\S+) level=(?<level>\\w+) event=(?<event>\\w+) user=(?<user>\\w+) ip=(?<ip>\\S+) traceparent=00-(?<trace_id>[0-9a-f]{32})-(?<span_id>[0-9a-f]{16})-(?<flags>[0-9a-f]{2})$").
-
-raw_log(l1, "ts=2026-06-18T10:00:00Z level=warn event=login_failed user=alice ip=203.0.113.9 traceparent=00-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736-00f067aa0ba902b7-01").
-raw_log(l2, "ts=2026-06-18T10:00:03Z level=error event=payment_denied user=alice ip=203.0.113.9 traceparent=00-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736-aaf067aa0ba90000-01").
-raw_log(l3, "ts=2026-06-18T10:01:12Z level=info event=login_success user=bob ip=198.51.100.4 traceparent=00-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa-bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb-01").
-raw_log(noise, "healthcheck ok").
-
-parsed(Log, Context) :-
-  raw_log(Log, Text),
-  log_pattern(Pattern),
-  matches(Text, Pattern, Context).
-
-% matches/3 returns a context term containing named captures.  holds/3 then
-% projects either Name, Value pairs or field(Value) shorthand facts from that
-% same context without writing one regex per field.
-captured_field(Log, Name, Value) :-
-  parsed(Log, Context),
-  holds(Context, Name, [Value]).
-
-parsed_event(Log, Event, User, Ip, TraceId) :-
-  parsed(Log, Context),
-  holds(Context, event(Event)),
-  holds(Context, user(User)),
-  holds(Context, ip(Ip)),
-  holds(Context, trace_id(TraceId)).
-
-trace_alert(User, TraceId, Ip) :-
-  parsed_event(LoginLog, "login_failed", User, Ip, TraceId),
-  parsed_event(PaymentLog, "payment_denied", User, Ip, TraceId),
-  neq(LoginLog, PaymentLog).

package/examples/odrl-dpv-fpv-trust-flow.pl

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-% ODRL + DPV + local FPV trust-flow decisioning in Eyelang.
-%
-% Each flow has a source, recipient, data item, action, and purpose.  Permissions
-% and prohibitions are checked together with source trust scores to produce
-% permit, review, or deny decisions.
-%
-% The example separates the policy vocabulary from the local FPV-style report
-% predicates, which keeps the final decision/confidence/status/risk facts easy to
-% consume.
-
-materialize(decision, 2).
-materialize(confidence, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(risk, 2).
-
-trust_score(hospital_a, 0.92).
-trust_score(small_clinic, 0.63).
-trust_score(ad_network, 0.28).
-
-flow(flow_care, hospital_a, research_partner, lab_result, dpv_use, dpv_healthcare).
-flow(flow_clinic, small_clinic, research_partner, lab_result, dpv_use, dpv_healthcare).
-flow(flow_ads, hospital_a, ad_network, lab_result, dpv_share, dpv_marketing).
-
-permission(permit_healthcare_research, research_partner, lab_result, dpv_use, dpv_healthcare, 0.80).
-prohibition(prohibit_marketing_disclosure, ad_network, lab_result, dpv_share, dpv_marketing).
-
-permitted_flow(Flow, Score) :-
-  flow(Flow, Source, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose),
-  permission(_Permission, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose, MinTrust),
-  trust_score(Source, Score),
-  ge(Score, MinTrust).
-
-review_flow(Flow, Score) :-
-  flow(Flow, Source, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose),
-  permission(_Permission, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose, MinTrust),
-  trust_score(Source, Score),
-  lt(Score, MinTrust).
-
-denied_flow(Flow) :-
-  flow(Flow, _Source, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose),
-  prohibition(_Prohibition, Recipient, Data, Action, Purpose).
-
-decision(Flow, fpv_permit) :- permitted_flow(Flow, _Score).
-decision(Flow, fpv_review) :- review_flow(Flow, _Score).
-decision(Flow, fpv_deny) :- denied_flow(Flow).
-confidence(Flow, Score) :- permitted_flow(Flow, Score).
-confidence(Flow, Score) :- review_flow(Flow, Score).
-status(Flow, fpv_executable_flow) :- permitted_flow(Flow, _Score).
-status(Flow, fpv_blocked_flow) :- denied_flow(Flow).
-risk(Flow, risk_trustworthiness_risk) :- review_flow(Flow, _Score).
-risk(Flow, risk_unwanted_disclosure_data) :- denied_flow(Flow).

package/examples/odrl-dpv-healthcare-risk-ranked.pl

@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-% ODRL + DPV healthcare risk ranking adapted from Eyeling.
-%
-% The scenario models a healthcare data-use agreement, patient needs, processing
-% clauses, risk scores, and mitigation suggestions.  Rules derive violations, raw
-% and normalized scores, risk levels, and small formula-valued suggestion graphs.
-%
-% This is one of the richer policy examples: it combines structured policy data,
-% ranked risk computation, and report-oriented materialization.
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(policyGraph, 2).
-materialize(contains, 2).
-materialize(dpv_hasRisk, 2).
-materialize(type, 2).
-materialize(scoreRaw, 2).
-materialize(score, 2).
-materialize(dpv_hasRiskLevel, 2).
-materialize(dpv_hasSeverity, 2).
-materialize(aboutClause, 2).
-materialize(violatesNeed, 2).
-materialize(dct_source, 2).
-materialize(dct_description, 2).
-materialize(reportKey, 2).
-materialize(dpv_isMitigatedByMeasure, 2).
-materialize(suggestAddGraph, 2).
-materialize(firstRisk, 2).
-materialize(retentionRiskScore, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-party(hospital).
-party(researchUnit).
-party(pharmaPartner).
-party(clinicalAIService).
-data_asset(healthRecordData).
-data_asset(genomicData).
-process(processContextHC1).
-
-title(agreementHC1, "Example Healthcare & Life-Sciences Data Use Agreement").
-title(patientExample, "Example patient profile").
-
-has_need(patientExample, need_ConsentForResearch).
-has_need(patientExample, need_DeIdentifyBeforeSharing).
-has_need(patientExample, need_HumanReviewForAutomatedTriage).
-has_need(patientExample, need_RetentionLimit3y).
-
-importance(need_ConsentForResearch, 35).
-importance(need_DeIdentifyBeforeSharing, 35).
-importance(need_HumanReviewForAutomatedTriage, 25).
-importance(need_RetentionLimit3y, 15).
-max_retention_days(need_RetentionLimit3y, 1095).
-
-clause_id(clauseH1, "H1").
-clause_text(clauseH1, "Hospital may use EHR and genomic data for internal clinical research and publication.").
-clause_id(clauseH2, "H2").
-clause_text(clauseH2, "Hospital may share genomic data with pharmaceutical partners for drug discovery and R&D.").
-clause_id(clauseH3, "H3").
-clause_text(clauseH3, "Hospital may use automated triage and prioritisation systems using EHR data.").
-clause_id(clauseH4, "H4").
-clause_text(clauseH4, "Hospital retains patient health records for 10 years.").
-
-agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, policyGraphHC1).
-
-policy_graph(policyGraphHC1, (
-  type(policyHC1, odrl_Policy),
-  odrl_permission(policyHC1, permResearchUse),
-  odrl_permission(policyHC1, permShareWithPharma),
-  odrl_permission(policyHC1, permAutomatedTriage),
-  odrl_permission(policyHC1, permRetention10y),
-
-  type(permResearchUse, odrl_Permission),
-  odrl_assigner(permResearchUse, hospital),
-  odrl_assignee(permResearchUse, researchUnit),
-  odrl_action(permResearchUse, hl7ca_use),
-  odrl_target(permResearchUse, healthRecordData),
-  odrl_target(permResearchUse, genomicData),
-  odrl_constraint(permResearchUse, cResearchPurpose),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cResearchPurpose, odrl_purpose),
-  odrl_rightOperandReference(cResearchPurpose, purposeHMB),
-  clause(permResearchUse, clauseH1),
-
-  type(permShareWithPharma, odrl_Permission),
-  odrl_assigner(permShareWithPharma, hospital),
-  odrl_assignee(permShareWithPharma, pharmaPartner),
-  odrl_action(permShareWithPharma, hl7ca_disclose),
-  odrl_target(permShareWithPharma, genomicData),
-  odrl_constraint(permShareWithPharma, cSharePurpose),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cSharePurpose, odrl_purpose),
-  odrl_rightOperandReference(cSharePurpose, purposeHMB),
-  clause(permShareWithPharma, clauseH2),
-
-  type(permAutomatedTriage, odrl_Permission),
-  odrl_assigner(permAutomatedTriage, hospital),
-  odrl_assignee(permAutomatedTriage, clinicalAIService),
-  odrl_action(permAutomatedTriage, hl7ca_use),
-  odrl_target(permAutomatedTriage, healthRecordData),
-  odrl_constraint(permAutomatedTriage, cTriagePurpose),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cTriagePurpose, odrl_purpose),
-  odrl_rightOperandReference(cTriagePurpose, purposeCC),
-  odrl_duty(permAutomatedTriage, dutyHumanReview),
-  odrl_action(dutyHumanReview, humanReview),
-  odrl_constraint(dutyHumanReview, cTriageEncryption),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cTriageEncryption, encryptionAtRest),
-  odrl_rightOperand(cTriageEncryption, true),
-  clause(permAutomatedTriage, clauseH3),
-
-  type(permRetention10y, odrl_Permission),
-  odrl_assigner(permRetention10y, hospital),
-  odrl_assignee(permRetention10y, hospital),
-  odrl_action(permRetention10y, hl7ca_collect),
-  odrl_target(permRetention10y, healthRecordData),
-  odrl_constraint(permRetention10y, cRetentionPurpose),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cRetentionPurpose, odrl_purpose),
-  odrl_rightOperandReference(cRetentionPurpose, purposeCC),
-  odrl_constraint(permRetention10y, cRetentionDays),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cRetentionDays, retentionDays),
-  odrl_rightOperand(cRetentionDays, 3650),
-  clause(permRetention10y, clauseH4)
-)).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-policy_statement(GraphName, Subject, Predicate, Object) :-
-  policy_graph(GraphName, Context),
-  holds(Context, Predicate, [Subject, Object]).
-
-permission(Graph, Permission) :- policy_statement(Graph, policyHC1, odrl_permission, Permission).
-clause(Graph, Permission, Clause) :- policy_statement(Graph, Permission, clause, Clause).
-action(Graph, Permission, Action) :- policy_statement(Graph, Permission, odrl_action, Action).
-target(Graph, Permission, Target) :- policy_statement(Graph, Permission, odrl_target, Target).
-duty(Graph, Permission, Duty) :- policy_statement(Graph, Permission, odrl_duty, Duty).
-duty_action(Graph, Duty, Action) :- policy_statement(Graph, Duty, odrl_action, Action).
-constraint(Graph, Permission, Constraint) :- policy_statement(Graph, Permission, odrl_constraint, Constraint).
-constraint_left(Graph, Constraint, Left) :- policy_statement(Graph, Constraint, odrl_leftOperand, Left).
-constraint_right(Graph, Constraint, Right) :- policy_statement(Graph, Constraint, odrl_rightOperand, Right).
-
-has_constraint(Graph, Permission, Left, Right) :-
-  constraint(Graph, Permission, Constraint),
-  constraint_left(Graph, Constraint, Left),
-  constraint_right(Graph, Constraint, Right).
-
-has_duty_action(Graph, Permission, Action) :-
-  duty(Graph, Permission, Duty),
-  duty_action(Graph, Duty, Action).
-
-missing_explicit_consent(Graph, Permission) :-
-  permission(Graph, Permission),
-  not(has_constraint(Graph, Permission, explicitConsent, true)).
-
-missing_deidentified(Graph, Permission) :-
-  permission(Graph, Permission),
-  not(has_constraint(Graph, Permission, deIdentified, true)).
-
-missing_human_review(Graph, Permission) :-
-  permission(Graph, Permission),
-  not(has_duty_action(Graph, Permission, humanReview)).
-
-retention_days(Graph, Permission, Days) :-
-  has_constraint(Graph, Permission, retentionDays, Days).
-
-risk(riskH1) :-
-  agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, Graph),
-  has_need(patientExample, need_ConsentForResearch),
-  permission(Graph, permResearchUse),
-  clause(Graph, permResearchUse, clauseH1),
-  missing_explicit_consent(Graph, permResearchUse).
-
-risk(riskH2) :-
-  agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, Graph),
-  has_need(patientExample, need_DeIdentifyBeforeSharing),
-  permission(Graph, permShareWithPharma),
-  target(Graph, permShareWithPharma, genomicData),
-  clause(Graph, permShareWithPharma, clauseH2),
-  missing_deidentified(Graph, permShareWithPharma).
-
-risk(riskH3) :-
-  agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, Graph),
-  has_need(patientExample, need_HumanReviewForAutomatedTriage),
-  permission(Graph, permAutomatedTriage),
-  clause(Graph, permAutomatedTriage, clauseH3),
-  missing_human_review(Graph, permAutomatedTriage).
-
-risk(riskH4) :-
-  agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, Graph),
-  has_need(patientExample, need_RetentionLimit3y),
-  max_retention_days(need_RetentionLimit3y, Max),
-  permission(Graph, permRetention10y),
-  clause(Graph, permRetention10y, clauseH4),
-  retention_days(Graph, permRetention10y, Days),
-  gt(Days, Max).
-
-base_score(riskH1, 85).
-base_score(riskH2, 90).
-base_score(riskH3, 80).
-base_score(riskH4, 55).
-violates_need(riskH1, need_ConsentForResearch).
-violates_need(riskH2, need_DeIdentifyBeforeSharing).
-violates_need(riskH3, need_HumanReviewForAutomatedTriage).
-violates_need(riskH4, need_RetentionLimit3y).
-about_clause(riskH1, clauseH1).
-about_clause(riskH2, clauseH2).
-about_clause(riskH3, clauseH3).
-about_clause(riskH4, clauseH4).
-risk_source_of(riskH1, permResearchUse).
-risk_source_of(riskH2, permShareWithPharma).
-risk_source_of(riskH3, permAutomatedTriage).
-risk_source_of(riskH4, permRetention10y).
-
-description(riskH1, "Risk: health/genomic data may be used for research without explicit opt-in consent.").
-description(riskH2, "Risk: genomic data may be shared with external pharma partners without a de-identification/pseudonymisation requirement.").
-description(riskH3, "Risk: automated triage may affect care pathways without a human review/override safeguard.").
-description(riskH4, "Risk: retention (3650 days) exceeds patient preference (1095 days).").
-
-mitigation_graph(riskH1, mitigateConsent, (
-  odrl_constraint(permResearchUse, cExplicitConsent),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cExplicitConsent, explicitConsent),
-  odrl_rightOperand(cExplicitConsent, true)
-)).
-mitigation_graph(riskH2, mitigateDeId, (
-  odrl_constraint(permShareWithPharma, cDeIdentified),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cDeIdentified, deIdentified),
-  odrl_rightOperand(cDeIdentified, true),
-  odrl_duty(permShareWithPharma, dutyDeIdentify),
-  odrl_action(dutyDeIdentify, deIdentify)
-)).
-mitigation_graph(riskH3, mitigateHumanReview, (
-  odrl_duty(permAutomatedTriage, dutyHumanReview),
-  odrl_action(dutyHumanReview, humanReview)
-)).
-mitigation_graph(riskH4, mitigateRetention, (
-  odrl_constraint(permRetention10y, cRetentionLimit),
-  odrl_leftOperand(cRetentionLimit, retentionDays),
-  odrl_rightOperand(cRetentionLimit, 1095)
-)).
-
-score_raw(Risk, Raw) :-
-  risk(Risk),
-  base_score(Risk, Base),
-  violates_need(Risk, Need),
-  importance(Need, Weight),
-  add(Base, Weight, Raw).
-
-score(Risk, 100) :- score_raw(Risk, Raw), gt(Raw, 100).
-score(Risk, Raw) :- score_raw(Risk, Raw), ge(100, Raw).
-
-severity(Risk, risk_HighSeverity) :- score(Risk, Score), gt(Score, 79).
-severity(Risk, risk_ModerateSeverity) :- score(Risk, Score), lt(Score, 80), gt(Score, 49).
-risk_level(Risk, risk_HighRisk) :- score(Risk, Score), gt(Score, 79).
-risk_level(Risk, risk_ModerateRisk) :- score(Risk, Score), lt(Score, 80), gt(Score, 49).
-
-report_key(Risk, Key) :- score(Risk, Score), sub(1000, Score, Key).
-
-policyGraph(agreementHC1, GraphTerm) :-
-  agreement_policy_graph(agreementHC1, Graph),
-  policy_graph(Graph, GraphTerm).
-
-contains(policyGraphHC1, statement(Subject, Predicate, Object)) :-
-  policy_statement(policyGraphHC1, Subject, Predicate, Object).
-
-dpv_hasRisk(processContextHC1, Risk) :- risk(Risk).
-type(Risk, dpv_Risk) :- risk(Risk).
-scoreRaw(Risk, Raw) :- score_raw(Risk, Raw).
-dpv_hasRiskLevel(Risk, Level) :- risk_level(Risk, Level).
-dpv_hasSeverity(Risk, Severity) :- severity(Risk, Severity).
-aboutClause(Risk, Clause) :- risk(Risk), about_clause(Risk, Clause).
-violatesNeed(Risk, Need) :- risk(Risk), violates_need(Risk, Need).
-dct_source(Risk, Source) :- risk(Risk), risk_source_of(Risk, Source).
-dct_description(Risk, Description) :- risk(Risk), description(Risk, Description).
-reportKey(Risk, Key) :- report_key(Risk, Key).
-dpv_isMitigatedByMeasure(Risk, Mitigation) :- risk(Risk), mitigation_graph(Risk, Mitigation, _Graph).
-suggestAddGraph(Mitigation, Graph) :- mitigation_graph(Risk, Mitigation, Graph), risk(Risk).
-firstRisk(report, riskH1) :- score(riskH1, 100), score(riskH2, 100).
-retentionRiskScore(report, Score) :- score(riskH4, Score).