eyelang 1.2.2 → 1.3.0

package/examples/access-control-policy.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+% Access control policy example adapted from Eyelet input/access-control-policy.eye.
+%
+% This version avoids findall/3 by expressing allOf/anyOf/noneOf checks as
+% finite logical conditions.  The universal allOf/noneOf checks use negation
+% as failure over bound policy facts.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(policy, 2).
+materialize(status, 2).
+materialize(reason, 2).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+policy_request(test1, policy_x).
+has(test1, claim_a).
+has(test1, claim_b).
+has(test1, claim_c).
+
+policy(policy_x).
+allOf(policy_x, claim_a).
+allOf(policy_x, claim_b).
+anyOf(policy_x, claim_c).
+noneOf(policy_x, claim_d).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+passes_all_of(?request, ?policy) :-
+  policy_request(?request, ?policy),
+  policy(?policy),
+  not((allOf(?policy, ?claim), not(has(?request, ?claim)))).
+
+passes_any_of(?request, ?policy) :-
+  policy_request(?request, ?policy),
+  policy(?policy),
+  anyOf(?policy, ?claim),
+  has(?request, ?claim).
+
+passes_none_of(?request, ?policy) :-
+  policy_request(?request, ?policy),
+  policy(?policy),
+  not((noneOf(?policy, ?claim), has(?request, ?claim))).
+
+passes_policy(?request, ?policy) :-
+  passes_all_of(?request, ?policy),
+  passes_any_of(?request, ?policy),
+  passes_none_of(?request, ?policy).
+
+policy(test1, policy_x).
+
+status(test1, policy_passed) :-
+  passes_policy(test1, policy_x).
+
+reason(test1, "all required claims are present, one allowed claim is present, and no forbidden claim is present") :-
+  passes_policy(test1, policy_x).

package/examples/ackermann.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+% Ackermann-style hyperoperation benchmark adapted from Eyeling ackermann.n3.
+% The public ackermann/2 answers are small, but the helper relation exercises
+% deeply nested arithmetic recursion: hyper/4 encodes successor, addition,
+% multiplication, exponentiation, and then the Ackermann-style offset
+% ackermann(X, Y) = hyper(X, Y + 3, 2) - 3.
+% Keeping the selected inputs explicit avoids unbounded generation while still
+% testing the solver's recursive numeric workload.
+
+materialize(ackermann, 2).
+
+ackermann(?x, ?y, ?a) :-
+  add(?y, 3, ?b),
+  hyper(?x, ?b, 2, ?c),
+  sub(?c, 3, ?a).
+
+% Successor, addition, multiplication, and exponentiation levels.
+hyper(0, ?y, ?_z, ?a) :- add(?y, 1, ?a).
+hyper(1, ?y, ?z, ?a) :- add(?y, ?z, ?a).
+hyper(2, ?y, ?z, ?a) :- mul(?y, ?z, ?a).
+hyper(3, ?y, ?z, ?a) :- pow(?z, ?y, ?a).
+
+% Higher levels recurse over the previous hyperoperation.
+hyper(?x, 0, ?_z, 1) :- gt(?x, 3).
+hyper(?x, ?y, ?z, ?a) :-
+  gt(?x, 3),
+  neq(?y, 0),
+  sub(?y, 1, ?b),
+  hyper(?x, ?b, ?z, ?c),
+  sub(?x, 1, ?d),
+  hyper(?d, ?c, ?z, ?a).
+
+ack_case(0, 0).
+ack_case(0, 6).
+ack_case(1, 2).
+ack_case(1, 7).
+ack_case(2, 2).
+ack_case(2, 9).
+ack_case(3, 4).
+ack_case(3, 1000).
+ack_case(4, 0).
+ack_case(4, 1).
+ack_case(4, 2).
+ack_case(5, 0).
+
+ackermann([?x, ?y], ?a) :-
+  ack_case(?x, ?y),
+  ackermann(?x, ?y, ?a).

package/examples/age.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+% Age checker adapted from Eyeling.
+% The example combines date literals, ISO-8601 duration values, local_time/1,
+% difference/3, and duration comparison.  It deliberately uses the current
+% local date so the derived ageAbove/2 fact remains an executable temporal
+% check rather than a precomputed constant.
+
+materialize(birthDay, 2).
+materialize(duration, 2).
+materialize(ageAbove, 2).
+materialize(is, 2).
+
+birthDay(patH, "1944-08-21").
+duration(check, "P80Y").
+
+% A person is above a duration if the local date minus the birthday is greater
+% than that duration.
+ageAbove(?s, ?a) :-
+  birthDay(?s, ?b),
+  duration(check, ?a),
+  local_time(?d),
+  difference(?d, ?b, ?f),
+  gt(?f, ?a).
+
+% Test mirroring the Eyeling example.
+is(test, true) :-
+  ageAbove(?s, "P80Y").

package/examples/aliases-and-namespaces.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+% Built-ins use one native spelling each, while vocabulary-style predicate names
+% remain ordinary user predicates.
+%
+% This keeps the language small: add/3, lt/2, matches/3, and rest/2 are native
+% operations, but labels such as nativeMath or vocabularyExample are just data.
+materialize(value, 2).
+materialize(ok, 2).
+materialize(tail, 2).
+materialize(label, 2).
+
+% The first four rules call native built-ins; the last two rules show that
+% application vocabulary is modeled with ordinary facts and rules.
+value(nativeMath, ?x) :- add(0.125, 0.875, ?x).
+ok(nativeCompare, true) :- lt(2, 3).
+ok(nativeString, true) :- matches("scoped retail insight", "retail|medical").
+tail(nativeList, ?tail) :- rest([a, b, c], ?tail).
+
+% These names are just user data; eyelang does not give them special meaning.
+example_label(vocabularyExample, "vocabulary names are ordinary predicate names").
+label(vocabularyExample, ?text) :- example_label(vocabularyExample, ?text).

package/examples/alignment-demo.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+% Alignment demo, adapted from Eyeling's examples/alignment-demo.n3.
+%
+% The output is the Prolog-style counterpart of the Eyeling golden output:
+% broader/narrower alignments, their transitive closure, the reflexive
+% narrower-or-equal relation, and the concepts that roll up to ref_car.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(broader, 2).
+materialize(narrower, 2).
+materialize(broaderTransitive, 2).
+materialize(narrowerTransitive, 2).
+materialize(narrowerOrEqualOf, 2).
+materialize(rollsUpTo, 2).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+concept(ref_car).
+concept(tel_car).
+concept(tel_heavy_vehicle).
+concept(anpr_vehicle_with_plate).
+concept(anpr_passenger_car).
+
+assertedBroader(tel_car, ref_car).
+assertedBroader(tel_heavy_vehicle, ref_car).
+assertedBroader(anpr_vehicle_with_plate, ref_car).
+assertedNarrower(anpr_vehicle_with_plate, anpr_passenger_car).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+broader(?x, ?y) :- assertedBroader(?x, ?y).
+broader(?x, ?y) :- assertedNarrower(?y, ?x).
+
+narrower(?x, ?y) :- broader(?y, ?x).
+
+broaderTransitive(?x, ?y) :- broader(?x, ?y).
+broaderTransitive(?x, ?z) :- broader(?x, ?y), broaderTransitive(?y, ?z).
+
+narrowerTransitive(?x, ?y) :- narrower(?x, ?y).
+narrowerTransitive(?x, ?z) :- narrower(?x, ?y), narrowerTransitive(?y, ?z).
+
+narrowerOrEqualOf(?x, ?x) :- concept(?x).
+narrowerOrEqualOf(?x, ?y) :- broaderTransitive(?x, ?y).
+
+rollsUpTo(?x, ref_car) :-
+  narrowerOrEqualOf(?x, ref_car),
+  neq(?x, ref_car).

package/examples/allen-interval-calculus.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+% Allen interval calculus adapted from Eyeling allen-interval-calculus.n3.
+% Eyeling demonstrates dateTime and duration built-ins; this eyelang version
+% uses integer hour offsets so the interval rules remain pure Horn clauses.
+% The input interval table is a list of records, showing how tabular data can
+% stay scoped as one term instead of many unrelated global start/end facts.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(start, 2).
+materialize(end, 2).
+materialize(duration, 2).
+materialize(statement, 3).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+interval_table([
+  interval(a, 10, 12),
+  interval(b, 13, 15),
+  interval(c, 12, 14),
+  interval(d, 11, 13),
+  interval(e, 10, 12),
+  interval(f, 10, 11),
+  interval(g, 11, 12),
+  interval(h, 9, 16),
+  interval(i, 16, 18),
+  interval(j, 15, 16),
+  interval(k, 13, 14)
+]).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+interval(?i) :- interval_table(?table), member(interval(?i, ?_start, ?_end), ?table).
+start(?i, ?start) :- interval_table(?table), member(interval(?i, ?start, ?_end), ?table).
+end(?i, ?end) :- interval_table(?table), member(interval(?i, ?_start, ?end), ?table).
+
+relation(?i, before, ?j) :- end(?i, ?ei), start(?j, ?sj), lt(?ei, ?sj).
+relation(?i, meets, ?j) :- end(?i, ?e), start(?j, ?e).
+relation(?i, overlaps, ?j) :-
+  start(?i, ?si), end(?i, ?ei),
+  start(?j, ?sj), end(?j, ?ej),
+  lt(?si, ?sj), lt(?sj, ?ei), lt(?ei, ?ej).
+relation(?i, starts, ?j) :-
+  start(?i, ?s), start(?j, ?s),
+  end(?i, ?ei), end(?j, ?ej),
+  lt(?ei, ?ej).
+relation(?i, during, ?j) :-
+  start(?i, ?si), end(?i, ?ei),
+  start(?j, ?sj), end(?j, ?ej),
+  lt(?sj, ?si), lt(?ei, ?ej).
+relation(?i, finishes, ?j) :-
+  end(?i, ?e), end(?j, ?e),
+  start(?i, ?si), start(?j, ?sj),
+  lt(?sj, ?si).
+relation(?i, equals, ?j) :-
+  start(?i, ?s), start(?j, ?s),
+  end(?i, ?e), end(?j, ?e).
+
+relation(?j, after, ?i) :- relation(?i, before, ?j).
+relation(?j, metBy, ?i) :- relation(?i, meets, ?j).
+relation(?j, overlappedBy, ?i) :- relation(?i, overlaps, ?j).
+relation(?j, startedBy, ?i) :- relation(?i, starts, ?j).
+relation(?j, contains, ?i) :- relation(?i, during, ?j).
+relation(?j, finishedBy, ?i) :- relation(?i, finishes, ?j).
+
+duration(?i, ?d) :- end(?i, ?e), start(?i, ?s), sub(?e, ?s, ?d).
+
+statement(?i, ?rel, ?j) :- relation(?i, ?rel, ?j).

package/examples/ancestor.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+% Basic recursive relation example.
+% parent/2 facts form a small family chain.  ancestor/2 has the classic two-rule
+% shape: one base rule copies direct parents, and one recursive rule walks one
+% parent edge before continuing through the chain.  Both source and derived
+% relations are materialized so the output shows the closure explicitly.
+
+materialize(parent, 2).
+materialize(ancestor, 2).
+
+% Direct parent facts form a simple chain.
+parent(pat, jan).
+parent(jan, lies).
+parent(lies, emma).
+
+% Base case: every parent is also an ancestor.
+ancestor(?x, ?y) :-
+  parent(?x, ?y).
+
+% Recursive case: walk one parent edge and continue through the chain.
+ancestor(?x, ?z) :-
+  parent(?x, ?y),
+  ancestor(?y, ?z).

package/examples/animal.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+% Animal classification, adapted from Eyelet's input/animal.eye.
+%
+% The Eyelet source uses Unicode predicate names; this eyelang version keeps the
+% same tiny inheritance idea with plain vocabulary names.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(type, 2).
+materialize(subclassOf, 2).
+materialize(succeeds, 2).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+human(joe).
+animal(human).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+animal(?x) :- human(?x).
+
+type(joe, human) :- human(joe).
+type(joe, animal) :- animal(joe).
+subclassOf(human, animal) :- animal(human).
+succeeds(animalExample, true) :- animal(?_).

package/examples/annotation.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+% Annotation with quoted formula data.
+%
+% The program keeps the annotation as data and derives visible relations from it.
+% Context members become default output only when explicit rules project them.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(name, 2).
+materialize(log_nameOf, 2).
+materialize(statedBy, 2).
+materialize(recorded, 2).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+annotation(t, (
+  name(a, "Alice"),
+  statedBy(t, bob),
+  recorded(t, "2021-07-07")
+)).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+name(?s, ?o) :-
+  annotation(?_t, ?context),
+  holds(?context, name(?s, ?o)).
+
+log_nameOf(?t, name(?s, ?o)) :-
+  annotation(?t, ?context),
+  holds(?context, name(?s, ?o)).
+
+statedBy(?s, ?o) :-
+  annotation(?_t, ?context),
+  holds(?context, statedBy(?s, ?o)).
+
+recorded(?s, ?o) :-
+  annotation(?_t, ?context),
+  holds(?context, recorded(?s, ?o)).

package/examples/auroracare.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+% AuroraCare purpose-based medical-data exchange case adapted from Eyeling auroracare.n3.
+% The original N3 emits one Markdown block per scenario.  This eyelang
+% translation materializes the policy decisions, reasons, traces, and ARC-style
+% check values as ordinary relation output.
+
+% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
+materialize(label, 2).
+materialize(description, 2).
+materialize(careTeamLinked, 2).
+materialize(subjectOptIn, 2).
+materialize(subjectOptOut, 2).
+materialize(decision, 2).
+materialize(reason, 2).
+materialize(matchedPolicyUid, 2).
+materialize(matchedProhibition, 2).
+materialize(trace, 2).
+materialize(checkC1, 2).
+materialize(checkC2, 2).
+materialize(checkC3, 2).
+materialize(checkC4, 2).
+materialize(checkC5, 2).
+materialize(checkC6, 2).
+materialize(checkC7, 2).
+materialize(checkC8, 2).
+materialize(checkC9, 2).
+materialize(checkC10Text, 2).
+
+% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
+caseName(case, "auroracare").
+question(case, "For each AuroraCare scenario, should the PDP permit or deny the requested use of health data, and why?").
+
+% Policies: primary care, quality improvement, research, and an explicit denial.
+policyUid(policyPrimary, "urn:policy:primary-care-001").
+purposeAllowed(policyPrimary, primaryCareManagement).
+purposeAllowed(policyPrimary, patientRemoteMonitoring).
+roleAllowed(policyPrimary, "clinician").
+allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, patientSummary).
+allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, labResults).
+
+policyUid(policyQi, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora").
+purposeAllowed(policyQi, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+requireEnvironment(policyQi, "secure_env").
+requireAllCategory(policyQi, labResults).
+requireAllCategory(policyQi, patientSummary).
+duty(policyQi, requireConsent).
+duty(policyQi, noExfiltration).
+
+policyUid(policyResearch, "urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes").
+purposeAllowed(policyResearch, healthcareScientificResearch).
+requireEnvironment(policyResearch, "secure_env").
+requireTom(policyResearch, anonymisation).
+allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, labResults).
+allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, patientSummary).
+allowAnyCategory(policyResearch, imagingReport).
+duty(policyResearch, annualOutcomeReport).
+duty(policyResearch, noReidentification).
+duty(policyResearch, noExfiltration).
+
+policyUid(policyDenyInsurance, "urn:policy:deny-insurance").
+prohibitPurpose(policyDenyInsurance, insuranceManagement).
+
+linkedTo(clinicianAlba, ruben).
+linkedTo(gpRuben, ruben).
+consentAllow(ruben, healthcareScientificResearch).
+consentDeny(ruben, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms).
+primaryPurpose(auroracare, primaryCareManagement).
+primaryPurpose(auroracare, patientRemoteMonitoring).
+prohibitedPurpose(auroracare, insuranceManagement).
+
+% Scenarios A-G mirror the upstream Markdown report cases.
+scenario(scenarioA).
+outputKey(scenarioA, out010A).
+scenario_label(scenarioA, "A – Primary care visit").
+scenario_description(scenarioA, "Clinician in the patient's care team accessing the patient summary for primary care management.").
+requester(scenarioA, clinicianAlba).
+requesterRole(scenarioA, "clinician").
+subject(scenarioA, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioA, primaryCareManagement).
+environment(scenarioA, "api_gateway").
+category(scenarioA, patientSummary).
+
+scenario(scenarioB).
+outputKey(scenarioB, out020B).
+scenario_label(scenarioB, "B – Quality improvement (in scope)").
+scenario_description(scenarioB, "QI analyst using lab results + summary in a secure environment.").
+requester(scenarioB, qiAnalyst).
+requesterRole(scenarioB, "data_user").
+subject(scenarioB, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioB, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+environment(scenarioB, "secure_env").
+category(scenarioB, labResults).
+category(scenarioB, patientSummary).
+
+scenario(scenarioC).
+outputKey(scenarioC, out030C).
+scenario_label(scenarioC, "C – Quality improvement (out of scope)").
+scenario_description(scenarioC, "QI analyst with only lab results; policy expects labs + summary.").
+requester(scenarioC, qiAnalyst).
+requesterRole(scenarioC, "data_user").
+subject(scenarioC, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+environment(scenarioC, "secure_env").
+category(scenarioC, labResults).
+
+scenario(scenarioD).
+outputKey(scenarioD, out040D).
+scenario_label(scenarioD, "D – Insurance management").
+scenario_description(scenarioD, "Insurance bot attempting to use health data for insurance management (prohibited purpose).").
+requester(scenarioD, insurerBot).
+requesterRole(scenarioD, "data_user").
+subject(scenarioD, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioD, insuranceManagement).
+environment(scenarioD, "secure_env").
+category(scenarioD, patientSummary).
+
+scenario(scenarioE).
+outputKey(scenarioE, out050E).
+scenario_label(scenarioE, "E – GP checks labs").
+scenario_description(scenarioE, "GP for the same patient checking lab results via the API gateway.").
+requester(scenarioE, gpRuben).
+requesterRole(scenarioE, "clinician").
+subject(scenarioE, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioE, primaryCareManagement).
+environment(scenarioE, "api_gateway").
+category(scenarioE, labResults).
+
+scenario(scenarioF).
+outputKey(scenarioF, out060F).
+scenario_label(scenarioF, "F – Research on anonymised dataset").
+scenario_description(scenarioF, "Researcher using anonymised labs + summary in a secure environment, with opt-in.").
+requester(scenarioF, researcherAurora).
+requesterRole(scenarioF, "data_user").
+subject(scenarioF, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioF, healthcareScientificResearch).
+environment(scenarioF, "secure_env").
+tom(scenarioF, anonymisation).
+category(scenarioF, patientSummary).
+category(scenarioF, labResults).
+
+scenario(scenarioG).
+outputKey(scenarioG, out070G).
+scenario_label(scenarioG, "G – AI training (opt-out)").
+scenario_description(scenarioG, "Data user wants to train AI, but the subject opted out of AI training.").
+requester(scenarioG, mlOps).
+requesterRole(scenarioG, "data_user").
+subject(scenarioG, ruben).
+purpose(scenarioG, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms).
+environment(scenarioG, "secure_env").
+category(scenarioG, patientSummary).
+category(scenarioG, labResults).
+
+% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
+label(?s, ?label) :- scenario_label(?s, ?label).
+description(?s, ?description) :- scenario_description(?s, ?description).
+
+care_team_linked(?s) :-
+  requester(?s, ?requester),
+  subject(?s, ?subject),
+  linkedTo(?requester, ?subject).
+
+subject_opt_in(?s) :-
+  subject(?s, ?subject),
+  purpose(?s, ?purpose),
+  consentAllow(?subject, ?purpose).
+
+subject_opt_out(?s) :-
+  subject(?s, ?subject),
+  purpose(?s, ?purpose),
+  consentDeny(?subject, ?purpose).
+
+primary_policy_match(?s) :-
+  purpose(?s, primaryCareManagement),
+  requesterRole(?s, "clinician"),
+  care_team_linked(?s),
+  category(?s, ?category),
+  allowAnyCategory(policyPrimary, ?category).
+
+qi_policy_match(?s) :-
+  purpose(?s, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare),
+  environment(?s, "secure_env"),
+  category(?s, labResults),
+  category(?s, patientSummary).
+
+research_policy_match(?s) :-
+  purpose(?s, healthcareScientificResearch),
+  environment(?s, "secure_env"),
+  tom(?s, anonymisation),
+  subject_opt_in(?s),
+  category(?s, labResults).
+
+insurance_prohibition_match(?s) :-
+  purpose(?s, insuranceManagement),
+  prohibitPurpose(policyDenyInsurance, insuranceManagement).
+
+ai_training_opt_out_match(?s) :-
+  purpose(?s, trainTestAndEvaluateAiSystemsAlgorithms),
+  subject_opt_out(?s).
+
+careTeamLinked(?s, true) :- care_team_linked(?s).
+subjectOptIn(?s, true) :- subject_opt_in(?s).
+subjectOptOut(?s, true) :- subject_opt_out(?s).
+
+% Permit when a scenario satisfies one of the allowed policy branches.
+decision(?s, "PERMIT") :- primary_policy_match(?s).
+decision(?s, "PERMIT") :- qi_policy_match(?s).
+decision(?s, "PERMIT") :- research_policy_match(?s).
+% Deny branches preserve the reason that will be materialized for the report.
+decision(?s, "DENY") :- insurance_prohibition_match(?s).
+decision(?s, "DENY") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(?s).
+decision(scenarioC, "DENY") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+
+matchedPolicyUid(?s, ?uid) :- primary_policy_match(?s), policyUid(policyPrimary, ?uid).
+matchedPolicyUid(?s, ?uid) :- qi_policy_match(?s), policyUid(policyQi, ?uid).
+matchedPolicyUid(?s, ?uid) :- research_policy_match(?s), policyUid(policyResearch, ?uid).
+matchedProhibition(?s, policyDenyInsurance) :- insurance_prohibition_match(?s).
+
+reason(?s, "Permitted: clinician in the patient's care team, and the primary-care policy matched.") :- primary_policy_match(?s).
+reason(?s, "Permitted: ODRL/DPV policy matched for secondary use.") :- qi_policy_match(?s).
+reason(?s, "Permitted: subject opted in and an ODRL/DPV policy matched (anonymised dataset in secure environment).") :- research_policy_match(?s).
+reason(?s, "Denied: the requested purpose (insurance management) is prohibited by policy.") :- insurance_prohibition_match(?s).
+reason(?s, "Denied: you opted out of your data being used to train AI systems.") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(?s).
+reason(scenarioC, "Denied: no policy matched (purpose, environment, TOMs, or categories out of scope).") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+
+trace(?s, "permit:primary_care_allowed") :- primary_policy_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "urn:policy:primary-care-001:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- primary_policy_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- qi_policy_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes:permit:odrl:permission_matched") :- research_policy_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "deny:prohibited_purpose") :- insurance_prohibition_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "urn:policy:deny-insurance:deny:odrl:prohibition_matched") :- insurance_prohibition_match(?s).
+trace(?s, "deny:subject_opted_out_ai_training") :- ai_training_opt_out_match(?s).
+trace(scenarioC, "urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora:deny:odrl:no_permission_matched") :- purpose(scenarioC, ensureQualitySafetyHealthcare).
+
+% C1-C10 below are the ARC-style checklist lines from the upstream output.
+checkC1(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC2(scenarioA, "OK - clinician") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC3(scenarioA, "OK - care-team linked") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC4(scenarioA, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC5(scenarioA, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"]") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC6(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC7(scenarioA, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC8(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC9(scenarioA, "SKIPPED - policy has no environment constraint") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+checkC10Text(scenarioA, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:primary-care-001") :- decision(scenarioA, "PERMIT").
+
+checkC1(scenarioB, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC2(scenarioB, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC3(scenarioB, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC4(scenarioB, "OK - opt-in present and policy matched") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC5(scenarioB, "OK - operator=isAllOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\"]") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC6(scenarioB, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC7(scenarioB, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC8(scenarioB, "INFO - duties attached: duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#requireConsent, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noExfiltration") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC9(scenarioB, "OK - operator=eq, allowed=\"secure_env\", requested=\"secure_env\"") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+checkC10Text(scenarioB, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:qi-2025-aurora") :- decision(scenarioB, "PERMIT").
+
+checkC1(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC2(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC3(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC4(scenarioC, "OK - denied because opt-in missing or no policy match") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC5(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC6(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC7(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC8(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC9(scenarioC, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+checkC10Text(scenarioC, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioC, "DENY").
+
+checkC1(scenarioD, "OK - denied prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC2(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC3(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC4(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC5(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC6(scenarioD, "OK - denied due to prohibition") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC7(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC8(scenarioD, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC9(scenarioD, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+checkC10Text(scenarioD, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioD, "DENY").
+
+checkC1(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC2(scenarioE, "OK - clinician") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC3(scenarioE, "OK - care-team linked") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC4(scenarioE, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC5(scenarioE, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"]") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC6(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC7(scenarioE, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC8(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC9(scenarioE, "SKIPPED - policy has no environment constraint") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+checkC10Text(scenarioE, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:primary-care-001") :- decision(scenarioE, "PERMIT").
+
+checkC1(scenarioF, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC2(scenarioF, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC3(scenarioF, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC4(scenarioF, "OK - opt-in present and policy matched") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC5(scenarioF, "OK - operator=isAnyOf, allowed=[\"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\", \"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#IMAGING_REPORT\"], requested=[\"https://example.org/health#PATIENT_SUMMARY\", \"https://example.org/health#LAB_RESULTS\"]") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC6(scenarioF, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC7(scenarioF, "OK - trace shows matching permission") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC8(scenarioF, "INFO - duties attached: duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#annualOutcomeReport, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noReidentification, duty:https://w3id.org/dpv/legal/eu/ehds#noExfiltration") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC9(scenarioF, "OK - operator=eq, allowed=\"secure_env\", requested=\"secure_env\"") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+checkC10Text(scenarioF, "INFO - matched policy: urn:policy:research-aurora-diabetes") :- decision(scenarioF, "PERMIT").
+
+checkC1(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - not a prohibited purpose") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC2(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC3(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC4(scenarioG, "OK - denied because opt-in missing or no policy match") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC5(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC6(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no prohibition matched") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC7(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC8(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no matched policy or no duties") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC9(scenarioG, "SKIPPED") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").
+checkC10Text(scenarioG, "SKIPPED - no matched policy") :- decision(scenarioG, "DENY").

package/examples/backward.eye

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+% Backward-rule example adapted from Eyeling backward.n3.
+% Eyeling writes the interestingness rule in a backward style; eyelang records
+% the same dependency as an ordinary Horn rule.  The example is intentionally
+% tiny: it demonstrates that a derived fact can be justified by a numeric
+% comparison in the rule body.
+
+materialize(isIndeedMoreInterestingThan, 2).
+
+moreInterestingThan(?x, ?y) :- gt(?x, ?y).
+
+isIndeedMoreInterestingThan(5, 3) :- moreInterestingThan(5, 3).