evolcore 0.0.43-test.3 → 0.0.43-test.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +82 -0
- package/bin/ecmsg.js +492 -0
- package/bin/install-codex-managed-hooks.mjs +130 -8
- package/dist/ability/application-service.js +37 -0
- package/dist/ability/resources.js +28 -0
- package/dist/ability/runtime.js +6 -1
- package/dist/agents/claude-runner.js +7 -5
- package/dist/agents/codex/app-server-client.js +0 -12
- package/dist/agents/codex-runner.js +12 -54
- package/dist/agents/ecagent-runner.js +130 -35
- package/dist/aun/aid/agentmd.js +56 -12
- package/dist/aun/aid/control-aid.js +15 -0
- package/dist/aun/aid/identity.js +8 -0
- package/dist/aun/aid/ownership-operation.js +12 -3
- package/dist/aun/menu/client.js +8 -7
- package/dist/aun/menu/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/aun/menu/transport.js +8 -5
- package/dist/aun/service-proxy.js +3 -0
- package/dist/channels/aun.js +56 -22
- package/dist/channels/daemon.js +12 -4
- package/dist/cli/agent-command.js +5 -0
- package/dist/cli/agent-create.js +32 -8
- package/dist/cli/agent.js +9 -3
- package/dist/cli/aid-bind-command.js +3 -0
- package/dist/cli/aun-commands.js +12 -5
- package/dist/cli/code-stats.js +451 -213
- package/dist/cli/ctl-command.js +1 -3
- package/dist/cli/daemon-commands.js +42 -21
- package/dist/cli/directory.js +7 -8
- package/dist/cli/ecmsg-gateway.js +204 -0
- package/dist/cli/getmeta-command.js +2 -1
- package/dist/cli/index.js +6 -0
- package/dist/cli/init.js +58 -18
- package/dist/cli/provider-command.js +82 -5
- package/dist/cli/restart-monitor.js +11 -19
- package/dist/cli/stats.js +8 -1
- package/dist/cli/task-context.js +3 -0
- package/dist/cli/trigger-command.js +20 -14
- package/dist/config/boot-log.js +23 -2
- package/dist/config/config-field-policy.js +2 -0
- package/dist/config/config-manager.js +13 -17
- package/dist/config/daemon-services.js +1 -0
- package/dist/config/peer-role-resolver.js +6 -6
- package/dist/config/provider-identity-migration.js +202 -0
- package/dist/config/provider-identity.js +37 -0
- package/dist/config/provider-ipc-service.js +40 -3
- package/dist/config/provider-local-sync.js +153 -0
- package/dist/config/providers-config.js +32 -4
- package/dist/config/providers-management.js +144 -68
- package/dist/config/providers.js +4 -1
- package/dist/config/role-schema.js +3 -3
- package/dist/config/schema-migration.js +188 -3
- package/dist/core/agent-application-service.js +11 -0
- package/dist/core/agent-ipc-registration.js +2 -0
- package/dist/core/agent-runtime.js +45 -11
- package/dist/core/auth/auth-gateway.js +8 -6
- package/dist/core/auth/delegation-diagnostics.js +6 -2
- package/dist/core/auth/operation-authorizer.js +5 -2
- package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js +6 -4
- package/dist/core/baseagent-loader.js +11 -3
- package/dist/core/bootstrap-service.js +8 -0
- package/dist/core/channel-loader.js +61 -23
- package/dist/core/command/agent-control.js +4 -1
- package/dist/core/command/chatmode-config.js +46 -0
- package/dist/core/command/cli-intent-parser.js +2 -1
- package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js +16 -20
- package/dist/core/command/daemon-diagnostics.js +2 -1
- package/dist/core/command/menu-catalog.js +1 -1
- package/dist/core/command/menu-handler.js +16 -16
- package/dist/core/command/menu-protocol.js +4 -2
- package/dist/core/command/provider-menu.js +4 -2
- package/dist/core/command/role-menu.js +2 -2
- package/dist/core/command/slash-handler.js +56 -42
- package/dist/core/daemon-lifecycle.js +35 -17
- package/dist/core/event-catalog.js +19 -0
- package/dist/core/evolagent-registry.js +3 -0
- package/dist/core/handoff/runtime.js +9 -3
- package/dist/core/initialization/service.js +4 -3
- package/dist/core/ipc-registration.js +6 -0
- package/dist/core/message/aun-ipc-sender.js +81 -3
- package/dist/core/message/im-renderer.js +24 -19
- package/dist/core/message/message-admission.js +13 -2
- package/dist/core/message/response-engine.js +40 -41
- package/dist/core/message/send-options.js +40 -0
- package/dist/core/message/send-routing.js +310 -0
- package/dist/core/model/model-capabilities.js +37 -0
- package/dist/core/model/model-catalog.js +6 -2
- package/dist/core/ownership/owner-resolver.js +117 -14
- package/dist/core/permission/ec-command-parser.js +195 -27
- package/dist/core/permission/readonly-shell-query.js +66 -7
- package/dist/core/permission/tool-error-code.js +13 -1
- package/dist/core/permission/tool-policy.js +74 -20
- package/dist/core/plugin-lifecycle.js +6 -2
- package/dist/core/relation/pa-team.js +7 -2
- package/dist/core/relation/same-owner-proof.js +131 -0
- package/dist/core/session/session-idle-monitor.js +94 -16
- package/dist/core/session/session-manager.js +69 -16
- package/dist/core/thread/thread-route.js +5 -2
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-cache.js +690 -99
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-markdown.js +146 -36
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-query-operation.js +7 -9
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-scope.js +12 -0
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-search.js +5 -1
- package/dist/directory/owner-directory-store.js +28 -0
- package/dist/ecweb/basic-settings-service.js +15 -1
- package/dist/ecweb/message-context-service.js +2 -2
- package/dist/ecweb/providers-service.js +3 -1
- package/dist/ecweb/runtime/lifecycle.js +38 -5
- package/dist/ecweb/runtime/supervisor.js +157 -49
- package/dist/index.js +202 -38
- package/dist/paths.js +2 -1
- package/dist/proxy/manager.js +2 -0
- package/dist/proxy/service-supervisor.js +379 -143
- package/dist/response-system/engines/v1/proactive-flow.js +4 -0
- package/dist/trigger/application-service.js +1 -0
- package/dist/trigger/audit.js +3 -2
- package/dist/trigger/authorization.js +2 -3
- package/dist/trigger/event-source.js +4 -0
- package/dist/trigger/feedback.js +26 -2
- package/dist/trigger/history.js +4 -3
- package/dist/trigger/ipc-service.js +24 -19
- package/dist/trigger/manager.js +3 -5
- package/dist/trigger/parser.js +4 -21
- package/dist/trigger/patch.js +3 -15
- package/dist/trigger/scheduler.js +48 -13
- package/dist/trigger/system-definitions.js +2 -2
- package/dist/trigger/validation.js +4 -13
- package/dist/utils/autostart.js +2 -2
- package/dist/utils/cross-platform.js +36 -8
- package/dist/utils/error-utils.js +8 -0
- package/dist/utils/macos-autostart.js +31 -0
- package/dist/utils/model-prices.jsonl +15 -8
- package/dist/utils/process-introspect.js +21 -1
- package/dist/utils/public-suffix.js +5811 -0
- package/dist/utils/startup-trace.js +7 -1
- package/dist/utils/windows-autostart.js +42 -7
- package/ecagent/dist/harness/compaction/branch-summarization.js +1 -1
- package/ecagent/dist/harness/compaction/compaction.js +4 -4
- package/ecagent/dist/harness/env/nodejs.js +46 -2
- package/kits/docs/aun/ABILITY_CALLING.md +3 -3
- package/kits/docs/channels/aun.md +1 -1
- package/kits/docs/channels/feishu.md +2 -2
- package/kits/docs/context-assembly.md +20 -4
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/INDEX.md +3 -2
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/agent.md +2 -2
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/aid.md +8 -2
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/ctl.md +13 -4
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/directory.md +48 -15
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/file-navigation.md +63 -49
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/group.md +6 -6
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/memory-consolidation.md +1 -1
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/menu-protocol.md +33 -3
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/model.md +5 -3
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/msg.md +28 -27
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/provider.md +39 -5
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/response.md +3 -1
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/thread-chain.md +12 -14
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/tool-authorization.md +21 -1
- package/kits/docs/evolcore/trigger.md +12 -9
- package/kits/docs/identity/ROLE_DETAIL.md +1 -1
- package/kits/docs/prompt-loading-architecture.md +30 -20
- package/kits/eck_manifest.auxiliary.json +5 -5
- package/kits/eck_manifest.json +28 -49
- package/kits/eck_manifest.memory.json +18 -18
- package/kits/rules/01-overview.md +43 -45
- package/kits/rules/02-navigation.md +44 -53
- package/kits/rules/03-identity.md +21 -25
- package/kits/rules/04-relation.md +23 -33
- package/kits/rules/05-venue.md +24 -25
- package/kits/rules/06-channel.md +3 -3
- package/kits/schemas/_meta.json +20 -27
- package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.19.json +10 -6
- package/kits/schemas/providers.schema.2.json +74 -0
- package/kits/schemas/relation-config.schema.12.json +2 -2
- package/kits/schemas/role-config.schema.2.json +5 -5
- package/kits/schemas/role-registry.schema.1.json +1 -1
- package/kits/skills/ec-agent-create/SKILL.md +1 -0
- package/kits/skills/ec-service-proxy/SKILL.md +3 -0
- package/kits/skills/ec-trigger/SKILL.md +4 -4
- package/kits/skills/ec-trigger/references/examples.md +1 -1
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/channel.md +5 -5
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/commands.md +3 -2
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/directory-contacts.md +10 -3
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/identity.md +0 -1
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/personal-assistant.md +22 -3
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/reply.md +47 -28
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/session.md +2 -9
- package/kits/templates/system-fragments/thread.md +5 -5
- package/package.json +17 -13
- package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.20.json +0 -925
- package/kits/schemas/relation-config.schema.13.json +0 -289
- package/kits/schemas/role-config.schema.3.json +0 -1038
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const MAX_PIPELINE_STAGES = 3;
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const SUPPORTED_EXECUTABLES = new Set([
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'echo', 'pwd', 'ls', 'cat', 'grep', 'rg', 'find', 'sed', 'head', 'tail', 'sort', 'uniq', 'git', 'wc', 'stat', 'lstat', 'awk',
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'bash', 'sh',
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'ps', 'pgrep', 'env',
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]);
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const FIND_MUTATING_PRIMARY_RE = /^-(?:delete|exec|execdir|ok|okdir|fprint|fprint0|fprintf|fls)$/;
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const RG_PROCESS_SPAWNING_OPTION_RE = /^(?:--pre|--hostname-bin|--pre-glob|--search-zip)(?:=|$)/;
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return paths;
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}
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function analyzeRg(args, hasPipelineInput = false) {
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if (args.length === 1 && ['--help', '-h', '--version', '-V', '--type-list'].includes(args[0]))
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return [];
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if (args.some(argument => RG_PROCESS_SPAWNING_OPTION_RE.test(argument)
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|| argument === '--follow'
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// `-z` is the short form of `--search-zip`; it may also appear in a
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}
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return null;
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return null;
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if (!inputOperandSeen && !hasPipelineInput)
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paths.push(recursive('.'));
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if (!inputOperandSeen && (!hasPipelineInput || filesMode))
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paths.push({ ...recursive('.'), implicit: true });
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return paths;
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}
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/** Process/environment queries have no filesystem operands or child command. */
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function analyzeProcessQuery(executable, args) {
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if (executable === 'env') {
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// `env NAME=value command`, -S and -C can execute/change scope. Only
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// printing the current environment is a passthrough query.
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return args.every(arg => ['-0', '--null'].includes(arg)) ? [] : null;
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}
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if (executable === 'ps') {
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const flags = new Set(['-e', '-A', '-a', '-x', '-f', '-l', '-w', '-ww', '--no-headers', '--headers', '--forest']);
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const values = new Set(['-o', '-eo', '-efo', '--format', '-p', '--pid', '--ppid', '-u', '--user', '-U', '--User', '-C', '--sort']);
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for (let index = 0; index < args.length; index++) {
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const arg = args[index];
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const option = arg.split('=', 1)[0];
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const value = arg.includes('=') ? arg.slice(arg.indexOf('=') + 1) : args[++index];
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return null;
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}
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else if (!flags.has(arg) && !/^-[eAaxflw]+$/.test(arg) && !/^[auxflw]+$/.test(arg))
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}
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return [];
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}
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let pattern = false;
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let optionsEnded = false;
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const values = new Set(['-P', '--parent', '-u', '--euid', '-U', '--uid', '-g', '--pgroup', '-s', '--session', '-t', '--terminal', '-d', '--delimiter', '-r', '--runstates']);
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const flags = new Set(['--full', '--list-full', '--list-name', '--count', '--exact', '--ignore-case', '--newest', '--oldest', '--inverse']);
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const arg = args[index];
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continue;
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}
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const option = arg.split('=', 1)[0];
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const value = arg.includes('=') ? arg.slice(arg.indexOf('=') + 1) : args[++index];
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return null;
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}
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else if (!optionsEnded && (flags.has(arg) || /^-[aflcxinov]+$/.test(arg))) {
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continue;
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}
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else {
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pattern = true;
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}
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}
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}
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pathOperands = analyzeProcessQuery(executable, args);
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purpose = 'passthrough';
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&& ['sort', 'uniq', 'wc', 'awk', 'grep', 'rg', 'head', 'tail', 'sed'].includes(executable)
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&& ['sort', 'uniq', 'wc', 'awk', 'grep', 'rg', 'head', 'tail', 'sed'].includes(executable)
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&& !(executable === 'rg' && args.some(arg => ['--files', '--type-list', '--help', '-h', '--version', '-V'].includes(arg)));
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'apply_patch_invalid_argument',
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'apply_patch_unparseable',
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'file_change_invalid_argument',
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]);
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const DETAIL_CODE_BY_POLICY_CODE = {
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h_class_protection: 'H_CLASS_PROTECTION',
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shell_implicit_cwd: 'IMPLICIT_CWD',
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l_class_protection: 'L_CLASS_PROTECTION',
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native_file_change_required: 'NATIVE_FILE_CHANGE_REQUIRED',
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apply_patch_invalid_argument: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT',
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apply_patch_unparseable: 'APPLY_PATCH_UNPARSEABLE',
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file_change_invalid_argument: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT',
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apply_patch_workspace_escape: 'APPLY_PATCH_WORKSPACE_ESCAPE',
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ec_shell_invalid_quote: 'INVALID_QUOTE',
|
|
55
62
|
ec_command_not_canonical: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT',
|
|
@@ -121,7 +128,12 @@ export function normalizeToolErrorClassification(input) {
|
|
|
121
128
|
if (explicitPermission && facts.started)
|
|
122
129
|
classificationConflict = true;
|
|
123
130
|
let errorCode;
|
|
124
|
-
if (
|
|
131
|
+
if (decisionSource === 'policy' && facts.blocked && !facts.started
|
|
132
|
+
&& typeof input.policyCode === 'string' && INVALID_ARGUMENT_POLICY_CODES.has(input.policyCode)
|
|
133
|
+
&& (explicit === undefined || explicit === 'POLICY_DENIED' || explicit === 'INVALID_ARGUMENT')) {
|
|
134
|
+
errorCode = 'INVALID_ARGUMENT';
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
else if (explicitPermission) {
|
|
125
137
|
errorCode = exactPermissionBlock && !facts.started
|
|
126
138
|
? explicit
|
|
127
139
|
: 'EXECUTION_FAILED';
|
|
@@ -43,6 +43,26 @@ export function expandManagedTempPath(value, options = {}) {
|
|
|
43
43
|
}
|
|
44
44
|
const WRITE_INTENT_RE = /(?:^|[\s;&|])(?:mkdir|mktemp|touch|tee|cp|mv|install|chmod|chown|ln|rm)(?:[\s;&|]|$)|(?:^|[\s])(?:\d>>?|>>?)\s*/i;
|
|
45
45
|
const TEMP_TOKEN_RE = /(?:\$TMPDIR|\$\{TMPDIR\}|\/(?:[^\s'";&|<>)]*\/)?(?:tmp|var\/tmp|dev\/shm)(?:\/|$))[^\s'";&|<>)]*/g;
|
|
46
|
+
/** Strip only literal trailing output redirects from a proven query. */
|
|
47
|
+
function readonlyStageWriteTargets(stage, managedTempDir) {
|
|
48
|
+
let query = stage.text;
|
|
49
|
+
const targets = [];
|
|
50
|
+
const options = { managedTempDir, hasPipelineInput: stage.hasPipelineInput };
|
|
51
|
+
while (true) {
|
|
52
|
+
if (analyzeReadonlyShellQuery(query, options).kind === 'proven-readonly')
|
|
53
|
+
return targets;
|
|
54
|
+
const match = query.match(/^(.*?)[ \t]+(?:[012])?>>?[ \t]*("[^"\r\n]*"|'[^'\r\n]*'|[^\s'"<>;&|]+)[ \t]*$/);
|
|
55
|
+
if (!match)
|
|
56
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
57
|
+
const argv = parseLiteralShellArgv(match[2], managedTempDir
|
|
58
|
+
? { allowManagedTmpDir: true, managedTempDir } : undefined);
|
|
59
|
+
if (argv?.length !== 1)
|
|
60
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
61
|
+
if (argv[0] !== '/dev/null')
|
|
62
|
+
targets.push(argv[0]);
|
|
63
|
+
query = match[1];
|
|
64
|
+
}
|
|
65
|
+
}
|
|
46
66
|
function windowsTempRoots(options) {
|
|
47
67
|
if (process.platform !== 'win32')
|
|
48
68
|
return [];
|
|
@@ -60,7 +80,15 @@ export function checkManagedTempShellCommand(command, options = {}) {
|
|
|
60
80
|
if (!WRITE_INTENT_RE.test(command))
|
|
61
81
|
return { kind: 'none' };
|
|
62
82
|
const root = resolveManagedTempDir(options.env);
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
83
|
+
// Inspect each stage independently. A readonly query's path/pattern
|
|
84
|
+
// operands are not write targets, even when another stage writes output.
|
|
85
|
+
// The query parser only permits the inert stderr sink `2>/dev/null`.
|
|
86
|
+
const writeOperands = splitShellCommandStages(command).flatMap(stage => {
|
|
87
|
+
if (!WRITE_INTENT_RE.test(stage.text))
|
|
88
|
+
return [];
|
|
89
|
+
return readonlyStageWriteTargets(stage, root) ?? [stage.text];
|
|
90
|
+
});
|
|
91
|
+
const normalized = substituteTmpDir(writeOperands.join('; '), root);
|
|
64
92
|
const candidates = [...normalized.matchAll(TEMP_TOKEN_RE)].map(match => match[0].replace(/[.,:]+$/, ''));
|
|
65
93
|
// Windows has no portable `/tmp` spelling. Treat absolute paths below the
|
|
66
94
|
// host temporary roots as temporary operands too, so a sibling session
|
|
@@ -397,14 +425,18 @@ const DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
|
|
|
397
425
|
{ kind: 'reg-delete', pattern: /\breg\s+delete/i, reason: '删除注册表项(Windows 系统配置)', approvalScope: 'request' },
|
|
398
426
|
];
|
|
399
427
|
function splitShellCommandSegments(command) {
|
|
428
|
+
return splitShellCommandStages(command).map(stage => stage.text);
|
|
429
|
+
}
|
|
430
|
+
function splitShellCommandStages(command) {
|
|
400
431
|
const segments = [];
|
|
432
|
+
let hasPipelineInput = false;
|
|
401
433
|
let segment = '';
|
|
402
434
|
let quote = null;
|
|
403
435
|
let escaped = false;
|
|
404
436
|
let substitutionDepth = 0;
|
|
405
437
|
const finish = () => {
|
|
406
438
|
if (segment.trim())
|
|
407
|
-
segments.push(segment.trim());
|
|
439
|
+
segments.push({ text: segment.trim(), hasPipelineInput });
|
|
408
440
|
segment = '';
|
|
409
441
|
};
|
|
410
442
|
for (let index = 0; index < command.length; index++) {
|
|
@@ -449,6 +481,7 @@ function splitShellCommandSegments(command) {
|
|
|
449
481
|
}
|
|
450
482
|
if (substitutionDepth === 0 && (char === ';' || char === '\n' || char === '|' || char === '&')) {
|
|
451
483
|
finish();
|
|
484
|
+
hasPipelineInput = char === '|' && command[index + 1] !== '|';
|
|
452
485
|
if ((char === '|' || char === '&') && command[index + 1] === char)
|
|
453
486
|
index++;
|
|
454
487
|
continue;
|
|
@@ -1194,21 +1227,27 @@ function literalScriptFilesystemOperands(argv) {
|
|
|
1194
1227
|
* explicit literal path in an otherwise unsupported command.
|
|
1195
1228
|
*/
|
|
1196
1229
|
function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
|
|
1197
|
-
|
|
1230
|
+
let implicitMatch;
|
|
1231
|
+
for (const stage of splitShellCommandStages(command)) {
|
|
1232
|
+
const segment = stage.text;
|
|
1198
1233
|
for (const value of literalShellRedirectOperands(segment)) {
|
|
1199
1234
|
const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
|
|
1200
1235
|
if (matched)
|
|
1201
|
-
return matched;
|
|
1236
|
+
return { path: matched };
|
|
1202
1237
|
}
|
|
1203
1238
|
// A segment that is itself a proven readonly query already has precise
|
|
1204
1239
|
// path operands. Reusing that IR avoids treating patterns/revisions as
|
|
1205
1240
|
// paths and also lets a valid segment coexist with a protected one.
|
|
1206
|
-
const segmentAnalysis = analyzeReadonlyShellQuery(segment);
|
|
1241
|
+
const segmentAnalysis = analyzeReadonlyShellQuery(segment, { hasPipelineInput: stage.hasPipelineInput });
|
|
1207
1242
|
if (segmentAnalysis.kind === 'proven-readonly') {
|
|
1208
1243
|
for (const operand of queryPathOperands(segmentAnalysis)) {
|
|
1209
1244
|
const matched = shellOperandMatchesClass(operand.operand, className, options, operand.accessKind);
|
|
1210
|
-
if (matched)
|
|
1211
|
-
|
|
1245
|
+
if (matched) {
|
|
1246
|
+
if (operand.operand.implicit)
|
|
1247
|
+
implicitMatch = { path: resolveProtectedCandidate('.', options.cwd), implicitCwd: true };
|
|
1248
|
+
else
|
|
1249
|
+
return { path: matched };
|
|
1250
|
+
}
|
|
1212
1251
|
}
|
|
1213
1252
|
continue;
|
|
1214
1253
|
}
|
|
@@ -1218,12 +1257,12 @@ function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
|
|
|
1218
1257
|
for (const value of literalMutationOperands(argv)) {
|
|
1219
1258
|
const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
|
|
1220
1259
|
if (matched)
|
|
1221
|
-
return matched;
|
|
1260
|
+
return { path: matched };
|
|
1222
1261
|
}
|
|
1223
1262
|
for (const value of literalReadonlyOperands(argv)) {
|
|
1224
1263
|
const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
|
|
1225
1264
|
if (matched)
|
|
1226
|
-
return matched;
|
|
1265
|
+
return { path: matched };
|
|
1227
1266
|
if (className === 'h' && commandName(argv[0]) === 'rg'
|
|
1228
1267
|
&& hClassReadScopeIncludesProtectedPath(value, options)) {
|
|
1229
1268
|
const root = resolveProtectedCandidate(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
|
|
@@ -1231,13 +1270,13 @@ function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
|
|
|
1231
1270
|
const target = getExistingHClassMaskTargets(root, { selfAid: options.selfAid })
|
|
1232
1271
|
.find(candidate => isSameOrDescendant(candidate.path, scope));
|
|
1233
1272
|
if (target)
|
|
1234
|
-
return target.path;
|
|
1273
|
+
return { path: target.path };
|
|
1235
1274
|
}
|
|
1236
1275
|
}
|
|
1237
1276
|
for (const value of literalScriptFilesystemOperands(argv)) {
|
|
1238
1277
|
const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
|
|
1239
1278
|
if (matched)
|
|
1240
|
-
return matched;
|
|
1279
|
+
return { path: matched };
|
|
1241
1280
|
}
|
|
1242
1281
|
// Explicit nested shell carriers are parsed recursively. A nested query
|
|
1243
1282
|
// still goes through the same segment-aware rules; arbitrary unsupported
|
|
@@ -1249,13 +1288,15 @@ function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
|
|
|
1249
1288
|
const nested = commandIndex >= 0 ? argv[commandIndex + 1] : undefined;
|
|
1250
1289
|
if (nested) {
|
|
1251
1290
|
const matched = literalProtectedShellOperand(nested, className, options, depth + 1);
|
|
1252
|
-
if (matched)
|
|
1291
|
+
if (matched?.implicitCwd)
|
|
1292
|
+
implicitMatch = { path: matched.path, implicitCwd: true };
|
|
1293
|
+
else if (matched)
|
|
1253
1294
|
return matched;
|
|
1254
1295
|
}
|
|
1255
1296
|
}
|
|
1256
1297
|
}
|
|
1257
1298
|
}
|
|
1258
|
-
return
|
|
1299
|
+
return implicitMatch;
|
|
1259
1300
|
}
|
|
1260
1301
|
function shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, className, options, accessKind = operand.access === 'recursive' ? 'enumerate' : 'content') {
|
|
1261
1302
|
// `$TMPDIR` is a private session namespace, so names such as `CA` or
|
|
@@ -1372,8 +1413,9 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
|
|
|
1372
1413
|
analysis,
|
|
1373
1414
|
hClass: !!hClassPath,
|
|
1374
1415
|
lClass: !!lClassPath,
|
|
1375
|
-
hClassPath,
|
|
1376
|
-
lClassPath,
|
|
1416
|
+
hClassPath: hClassPath?.path,
|
|
1417
|
+
lClassPath: lClassPath?.path,
|
|
1418
|
+
implicitCwd: hClassPath?.implicitCwd,
|
|
1377
1419
|
};
|
|
1378
1420
|
}
|
|
1379
1421
|
const operands = analysis.ir.pipelines.flatMap(pipeline => pipeline.flatMap(query => {
|
|
@@ -1383,7 +1425,11 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
|
|
|
1383
1425
|
accessKind: query.accessKind ?? (operand.access === 'recursive' ? 'enumerate' : 'content'),
|
|
1384
1426
|
}));
|
|
1385
1427
|
}));
|
|
1386
|
-
const
|
|
1428
|
+
const hMatches = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => ({ operand,
|
|
1429
|
+
path: shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', analyzedOptions, accessKind) })).filter(item => item.path);
|
|
1430
|
+
const hMatch = hMatches.find(item => !item.operand.implicit) ?? hMatches[0];
|
|
1431
|
+
const hClassPath = hMatch?.operand.implicit
|
|
1432
|
+
? resolveProtectedCandidate('.', analyzedOptions.cwd) : hMatch?.path;
|
|
1387
1433
|
const lClassPath = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'l', analyzedOptions, accessKind)).find(Boolean);
|
|
1388
1434
|
if (logDiagnosticRoot && operands.some(({ operand }) => !isSameOrDescendant(resolveProtectedCandidate(operand.value, analyzedOptions.cwd), logDiagnosticRoot))) {
|
|
1389
1435
|
analysis = { kind: 'unproven', reason: 'log-diagnostic-scope-escape' };
|
|
@@ -1394,6 +1440,7 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
|
|
|
1394
1440
|
lClass: !!lClassPath,
|
|
1395
1441
|
hClassPath,
|
|
1396
1442
|
lClassPath,
|
|
1443
|
+
implicitCwd: hMatch?.operand.implicit,
|
|
1397
1444
|
};
|
|
1398
1445
|
}
|
|
1399
1446
|
function protectedReadToolPaths(toolName, input) {
|
|
@@ -1720,6 +1767,9 @@ export function checkReadonly(toolName, input, projectPath, context) {
|
|
|
1720
1767
|
}
|
|
1721
1768
|
if (protectedOperands.hClass) {
|
|
1722
1769
|
logger.warn(`[ReadonlyCheck] 🔒 H-class path blocked in readonly shell: cmd="${cmd}" session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
|
|
1770
|
+
if (protectedOperands.implicitCwd) {
|
|
1771
|
+
return { behavior: 'deny', message: IMPLICIT_CWD_SEARCH_NOTICE, policyCode: 'shell_implicit_cwd', matchedPath: protectedOperands.hClassPath };
|
|
1772
|
+
}
|
|
1723
1773
|
if (protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'proven-readonly') {
|
|
1724
1774
|
return { behavior: 'deny', message: '🔒 只读模式:不允许读取 H 类受保护路径', policyCode: 'readonly_h_class_read', matchedPath: protectedOperands.hClassPath };
|
|
1725
1775
|
}
|
|
@@ -1944,6 +1994,8 @@ function requestsFilesystemRoot(value) {
|
|
|
1944
1994
|
const PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT = '\n\n💡 只读检索请显式指定普通源码目录,例如:' +
|
|
1945
1995
|
"\n rg -n -g '!*.json_' -g '!*.json.migrated' -- '<关键词>' src tests kits docs" +
|
|
1946
1996
|
'\n 不要把项目根目录作为递归搜索范围;若子目录仍含受保护文件,请继续缩小到明确文件。';
|
|
1997
|
+
const IMPLICIT_CWD_SEARCH_NOTICE = '🔒 查询未指定文件路径,默认递归扫描当前目录;该范围可能包含受保护路径,已拒绝。' +
|
|
1998
|
+
PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT;
|
|
1947
1999
|
export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
|
|
1948
2000
|
const paths = [];
|
|
1949
2001
|
const grantPaths = [];
|
|
@@ -2012,10 +2064,12 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
|
|
|
2012
2064
|
`session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
|
|
2013
2065
|
return {
|
|
2014
2066
|
behavior: 'deny',
|
|
2015
|
-
message:
|
|
2016
|
-
|
|
2067
|
+
message: protectedOperands.implicitCwd ? IMPLICIT_CWD_SEARCH_NOTICE
|
|
2068
|
+
: '🔒 Shell 命令涉及受保护的 H 类配置/证书/快照路径,agent 不可直接操作' +
|
|
2069
|
+
(protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'proven-readonly' ? PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT : ''),
|
|
2017
2070
|
matchedPath: protectedOperands.hClassPath,
|
|
2018
|
-
matchedRule: protectedOperands.
|
|
2071
|
+
matchedRule: protectedOperands.implicitCwd ? 'implicit-cwd'
|
|
2072
|
+
: protectedOperands.hClassPath ? 'h-class-shell-operand' : 'h-class-shell-unproven',
|
|
2019
2073
|
};
|
|
2020
2074
|
}
|
|
2021
2075
|
collectFilesystemGrantPaths(input.additionalPermissions, grantPaths, projectRootGrantSubpaths);
|
|
@@ -2753,7 +2807,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
|
|
|
2753
2807
|
allowProtectedMetadata: context.allowProtectedMetadata,
|
|
2754
2808
|
});
|
|
2755
2809
|
if (hClass.behavior === 'deny') {
|
|
2756
|
-
return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: `${hClass.message}${hClass.matchedRule ? ` (matchedRule=${hClass.matchedRule})` : ''}`, policyCode: 'h_class_protection', matchedPath: hClass.matchedPath, matchedRule: hClass.matchedRule };
|
|
2810
|
+
return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: `${hClass.message}${hClass.matchedRule ? ` (matchedRule=${hClass.matchedRule})` : ''}`, policyCode: hClass.matchedRule === 'implicit-cwd' ? 'shell_implicit_cwd' : 'h_class_protection', matchedPath: hClass.matchedPath, matchedRule: hClass.matchedRule };
|
|
2757
2811
|
}
|
|
2758
2812
|
const lClass = checkLClassWrite(policyToolName, protectedPolicyInput, {
|
|
2759
2813
|
sessionId: context.sessionId,
|
|
@@ -97,7 +97,11 @@ export class PluginHandle {
|
|
|
97
97
|
this.timeouts.set(timer, release);
|
|
98
98
|
return timer;
|
|
99
99
|
}
|
|
100
|
-
|
|
100
|
+
/**
|
|
101
|
+
* `options.teardownBudgetMs` 只给进程退出路径用,透传给 teardown(目前只有 AUN 渠道
|
|
102
|
+
* 的 `client.close()` 关心):daemon 反正马上 `exit(0)`,等不满的网络握手没有意义。
|
|
103
|
+
*/
|
|
104
|
+
dispose(options = {}) {
|
|
101
105
|
if (this.disposal)
|
|
102
106
|
return this.disposal;
|
|
103
107
|
this.currentState = 'disposing';
|
|
@@ -118,7 +122,7 @@ export class PluginHandle {
|
|
|
118
122
|
...pending.map(([operation, label]) => cleanup(operation, label)),
|
|
119
123
|
]);
|
|
120
124
|
try {
|
|
121
|
-
await this.teardown?.();
|
|
125
|
+
await this.teardown?.(options.teardownBudgetMs);
|
|
122
126
|
}
|
|
123
127
|
catch (cause) {
|
|
124
128
|
errors.push(new Error(`Plugin ${this.owner}: teardown`, { cause }));
|
|
@@ -73,8 +73,13 @@ export async function preparePaTeamQualification(selfAid, peerAid) {
|
|
|
73
73
|
throw new Error('Mismatched PA profile');
|
|
74
74
|
return profile;
|
|
75
75
|
});
|
|
76
|
-
|
|
77
|
-
|
|
76
|
+
// The same-owner proof is now the internal-agent qualification. Keep the
|
|
77
|
+
// pa-team API names for registry/config compatibility, but do not require
|
|
78
|
+
// an exttype prefix: non-PA agents owned by the same Owner are internal
|
|
79
|
+
// contacts as well. Human/service/device identities do not participate in
|
|
80
|
+
// this automatic role because they cannot provide the required agent.md
|
|
81
|
+
// ownership statement used by the protocol consensus check.
|
|
82
|
+
if (!profiles.every(profile => String(profile.type || '').trim().toLowerCase() === 'agent'))
|
|
78
83
|
return 'unmatched';
|
|
79
84
|
const consensuses = await Promise.all([selfAid, peerAid].map(aid => runtime.client.checkOwnershipConsensus(aid, true)));
|
|
80
85
|
for (const [index, consensus] of consensuses.entries()) {
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { createHash } from 'crypto';
|
|
2
|
+
import { agentmdGet } from '../../aun/aid/agentmd.js';
|
|
3
|
+
import { isValidAid } from '../../aun/aid/validation.js';
|
|
4
|
+
import { parseAgentMdFrontmatter } from './peer-identity.js';
|
|
5
|
+
export const SAME_OWNER_MAX_AGE_MS = 30_000;
|
|
6
|
+
const SAME_OWNER_TIMEOUT_MS = 8_000;
|
|
7
|
+
const runtimes = new Map();
|
|
8
|
+
const knownTeams = new Map();
|
|
9
|
+
let revision = 0;
|
|
10
|
+
export function registerSameOwnerClient(selfAid, client, store) {
|
|
11
|
+
unregisterSameOwnerClient(selfAid);
|
|
12
|
+
const peers = knownTeams.get(selfAid) ?? new Set();
|
|
13
|
+
knownTeams.set(selfAid, peers);
|
|
14
|
+
const runtime = { client, store, generation: 0, entries: new Map(), pending: new Map(), knownTeams: peers, subscriptions: [] };
|
|
15
|
+
runtimes.set(selfAid, runtime);
|
|
16
|
+
const invalidate = () => {
|
|
17
|
+
if (runtimes.get(selfAid) !== runtime)
|
|
18
|
+
return;
|
|
19
|
+
runtime.generation++;
|
|
20
|
+
runtime.entries.clear();
|
|
21
|
+
runtime.pending.clear();
|
|
22
|
+
revision++;
|
|
23
|
+
};
|
|
24
|
+
for (const event of ['agentmd.changed', 'storage.object_changed', 'ownership.completed', 'ownership.rejected',
|
|
25
|
+
'ownership.stopped', 'ownership.error', 'disconnected']) {
|
|
26
|
+
runtime.subscriptions.push(client.on(event, invalidate));
|
|
27
|
+
}
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
export function unregisterSameOwnerClient(selfAid, client) {
|
|
30
|
+
const runtime = runtimes.get(selfAid);
|
|
31
|
+
if (!runtime || (client && runtime.client !== client))
|
|
32
|
+
return;
|
|
33
|
+
runtimes.delete(selfAid);
|
|
34
|
+
revision++;
|
|
35
|
+
for (const subscription of runtime.subscriptions)
|
|
36
|
+
subscription.unsubscribe();
|
|
37
|
+
}
|
|
38
|
+
export function sameOwnerQualification(selfAid, peerAid) {
|
|
39
|
+
const runtime = runtimes.get(selfAid);
|
|
40
|
+
const entry = runtime?.entries.get(peerAid);
|
|
41
|
+
return runtime?.client.isReady && entry && entry.expiresAt > Date.now()
|
|
42
|
+
? entry.qualification : 'unavailable';
|
|
43
|
+
}
|
|
44
|
+
export function sameOwnerRevision(selfAid) {
|
|
45
|
+
const runtime = runtimes.get(selfAid);
|
|
46
|
+
const entries = [...(runtime?.entries ?? [])].map(([peerAid, entry]) => [peerAid, entry.revision, entry.expiresAt > Date.now()]);
|
|
47
|
+
return JSON.stringify([revision, runtime?.client.isReady === true, entries]);
|
|
48
|
+
}
|
|
49
|
+
export function requiresSameOwnerProof(selfAid, peerAid) {
|
|
50
|
+
return knownTeams.get(selfAid)?.has(peerAid) === true;
|
|
51
|
+
}
|
|
52
|
+
export async function prepareSameOwnerProof(selfAid, peerAid) {
|
|
53
|
+
if (!selfAid || !peerAid || selfAid === peerAid || !isValidAid(selfAid) || !isValidAid(peerAid))
|
|
54
|
+
return;
|
|
55
|
+
const runtime = runtimes.get(selfAid);
|
|
56
|
+
if (!runtime?.client.isReady)
|
|
57
|
+
return;
|
|
58
|
+
const cached = runtime.entries.get(peerAid);
|
|
59
|
+
if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now())
|
|
60
|
+
return;
|
|
61
|
+
const pending = runtime.pending.get(peerAid);
|
|
62
|
+
if (pending)
|
|
63
|
+
return pending;
|
|
64
|
+
const generation = runtime.generation;
|
|
65
|
+
const startedAt = Date.now();
|
|
66
|
+
const query = async () => {
|
|
67
|
+
const cards = await Promise.all([selfAid, peerAid].map(aid => agentmdGet(aid, { store: runtime.store, withVerification: true, remoteOnly: true })));
|
|
68
|
+
const profiles = cards.map((card, index) => {
|
|
69
|
+
if (card.source !== 'remote' || card.verification.status !== 'verified')
|
|
70
|
+
throw new Error('Unverified agent profile');
|
|
71
|
+
const profile = parseAgentMdFrontmatter(card.content);
|
|
72
|
+
if (profile.aid !== [selfAid, peerAid][index])
|
|
73
|
+
throw new Error('Mismatched agent profile');
|
|
74
|
+
return profile;
|
|
75
|
+
});
|
|
76
|
+
// 这里证明的是「同一个 Owner 名下的内部 agent」,**不是** PA Team 成员关系:
|
|
77
|
+
// 团队归属由 contacts.json 的 open_pa_context 决定(见 owner-directory-scope.ts
|
|
78
|
+
// 的 isInPaTeam),本模块不读那份名单。判据也不看 exttype 前缀——同 Owner 的
|
|
79
|
+
// 非 PA agent 同样是内部联系人。human/service/device 不参与:它们拿不到
|
|
80
|
+
// agent.md 里协议共识校验所需的 ownership statement。
|
|
81
|
+
if (!profiles.every(profile => String(profile.type || '').trim().toLowerCase() === 'agent'))
|
|
82
|
+
return 'unmatched';
|
|
83
|
+
const consensuses = await Promise.all([selfAid, peerAid].map(aid => runtime.client.checkOwnershipConsensus(aid, true)));
|
|
84
|
+
for (const [index, consensus] of consensuses.entries()) {
|
|
85
|
+
const digest = createHash('sha256').update(cards[index].content, 'utf8').digest('hex');
|
|
86
|
+
if (consensus.status !== 'consensus' || consensus.sub_aid !== [selfAid, peerAid][index]
|
|
87
|
+
|| consensus.lock !== 'locked' || !consensus.owner_aid || !isValidAid(consensus.owner_aid)
|
|
88
|
+
|| !Number.isSafeInteger(consensus.relation_version) || consensus.relation_version < 1
|
|
89
|
+
|| consensus.agent_md_sha256 !== digest
|
|
90
|
+
|| profiles[index].owner !== consensus.owner_aid)
|
|
91
|
+
return 'unavailable';
|
|
92
|
+
}
|
|
93
|
+
return consensuses[0].owner_aid === consensuses[1].owner_aid ? 'matched' : 'unmatched';
|
|
94
|
+
};
|
|
95
|
+
const task = (async () => {
|
|
96
|
+
let timeout;
|
|
97
|
+
let qualification = 'unavailable';
|
|
98
|
+
try {
|
|
99
|
+
qualification = await Promise.race([query(), new Promise(resolve => {
|
|
100
|
+
timeout = setTimeout(() => resolve('unavailable'), SAME_OWNER_TIMEOUT_MS);
|
|
101
|
+
timeout.unref?.();
|
|
102
|
+
})]);
|
|
103
|
+
}
|
|
104
|
+
catch {
|
|
105
|
+
qualification = 'unavailable';
|
|
106
|
+
}
|
|
107
|
+
finally {
|
|
108
|
+
if (timeout)
|
|
109
|
+
clearTimeout(timeout);
|
|
110
|
+
}
|
|
111
|
+
if (runtimes.get(selfAid) !== runtime || runtime.generation !== generation || !runtime.client.isReady)
|
|
112
|
+
return;
|
|
113
|
+
if (qualification === 'matched')
|
|
114
|
+
runtime.knownTeams.add(peerAid);
|
|
115
|
+
if (qualification === 'unmatched')
|
|
116
|
+
runtime.knownTeams.delete(peerAid);
|
|
117
|
+
runtime.entries.set(peerAid, {
|
|
118
|
+
qualification,
|
|
119
|
+
expiresAt: startedAt + (qualification === 'unavailable' ? 2_000 : SAME_OWNER_MAX_AGE_MS),
|
|
120
|
+
revision: ++revision,
|
|
121
|
+
});
|
|
122
|
+
})();
|
|
123
|
+
runtime.pending.set(peerAid, task);
|
|
124
|
+
try {
|
|
125
|
+
await task;
|
|
126
|
+
}
|
|
127
|
+
finally {
|
|
128
|
+
if (runtime.pending.get(peerAid) === task)
|
|
129
|
+
runtime.pending.delete(peerAid);
|
|
130
|
+
}
|
|
131
|
+
}
|