evolcore 0.0.42 → 0.0.43-test.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (189) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +35 -0
  2. package/bin/ec-safe-output.js +4 -1
  3. package/dist/ability/application-service.js +882 -0
  4. package/dist/ability/authorization.js +70 -0
  5. package/dist/ability/command-contract.js +105 -0
  6. package/dist/ability/daemon.js +137 -0
  7. package/dist/ability/development.js +450 -0
  8. package/dist/ability/environment.js +75 -0
  9. package/dist/ability/interop-v1.js +547 -0
  10. package/dist/ability/management.js +79 -0
  11. package/dist/ability/package.js +264 -0
  12. package/dist/ability/provider.js +73 -0
  13. package/dist/ability/publication.js +107 -0
  14. package/dist/ability/resources.js +106 -0
  15. package/dist/ability/runtime.js +212 -0
  16. package/dist/ability/secrets.js +47 -0
  17. package/dist/ability/store.js +112 -0
  18. package/dist/ability/toolchain.js +69 -0
  19. package/dist/ability/types.js +14 -0
  20. package/dist/ability/versions.js +32 -0
  21. package/dist/agents/baseagent.js +2 -2
  22. package/dist/agents/claude-runner.js +4 -0
  23. package/dist/agents/codex-runner.js +81 -17
  24. package/dist/agents/ecagent-plugin-lazy.js +41 -0
  25. package/dist/agents/ecagent-runner.js +18 -11
  26. package/dist/aun/ability-device-routing.js +12 -1
  27. package/dist/aun/aid/agentmd.js +2 -2
  28. package/dist/aun/aid/client.js +1 -1
  29. package/dist/aun/aid/identity.js +45 -0
  30. package/dist/aun/aid/index.js +1 -0
  31. package/dist/aun/aid/managed-operation.js +73 -2
  32. package/dist/channels/aun.js +64 -18
  33. package/dist/channels/builtin-plugins.js +14 -0
  34. package/dist/channels/dingtalk.js +78 -26
  35. package/dist/channels/feishu.js +89 -14
  36. package/dist/channels/qqbot.js +84 -19
  37. package/dist/channels/wechat.js +77 -19
  38. package/dist/channels/wecom.js +67 -22
  39. package/dist/cli/ability-command.js +92 -0
  40. package/dist/cli/aun-commands.js +124 -85
  41. package/dist/cli/daemon-commands.js +37 -85
  42. package/dist/cli/index.js +14 -0
  43. package/dist/cli/init.js +11 -13
  44. package/dist/cli/managed-command-guard.js +6 -0
  45. package/dist/cli/model.js +101 -104
  46. package/dist/cli/provider-command.js +6 -4
  47. package/dist/cli/restart-monitor.js +52 -11
  48. package/dist/cli/upgrade-command.js +102 -0
  49. package/dist/cli/version.js +1 -1
  50. package/dist/config/access-policy.js +4 -2
  51. package/dist/config/builtin-roles.js +1 -0
  52. package/dist/config/config-field-policy.js +4 -0
  53. package/dist/config/config-manager.js +7 -0
  54. package/dist/config/provider-ipc-service.js +10 -0
  55. package/dist/config/providers-config.js +12 -3
  56. package/dist/config/providers-management.js +45 -9
  57. package/dist/config/schema-migration.js +40 -22
  58. package/dist/contracts/ecweb-service-protocol.js +2 -1
  59. package/dist/core/agent-runtime.js +2 -1
  60. package/dist/core/auth/agent-delegation.js +21 -5
  61. package/dist/core/auth/auth-gateway.js +31 -9
  62. package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js +52 -4
  63. package/dist/core/auth/delegation-authorization.js +140 -4
  64. package/dist/core/auth/operation-authorizer.js +114 -13
  65. package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js +118 -4
  66. package/dist/core/baseagent-loader.js +14 -1
  67. package/dist/core/channel-loader.js +47 -9
  68. package/dist/core/channel-runtime.js +1 -1
  69. package/dist/core/command/agent-storage-menu.js +1 -1
  70. package/dist/core/command/cli-intent-parser.js +26 -13
  71. package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js +232 -76
  72. package/dist/core/command/connect-menu.js +10 -4
  73. package/dist/core/command/daemon-diagnostics.js +3 -3
  74. package/dist/core/command/data-root-resolver.js +2 -3
  75. package/dist/core/command/menu-catalog.js +10 -3
  76. package/dist/core/command/menu-handler.js +321 -46
  77. package/dist/core/command/menu-protocol.js +53 -7
  78. package/dist/core/command/pa-workspace-calendar.js +1 -2
  79. package/dist/core/command/pa-workspace-items.js +486 -0
  80. package/dist/core/command/pa-workspace-store.js +10 -1
  81. package/dist/core/command/slash-gate.js +2 -2
  82. package/dist/core/command/slash-handler.js +67 -25
  83. package/dist/core/contact-bind-registry.js +27 -0
  84. package/dist/core/daemon-control.js +3 -3
  85. package/dist/core/daemon-lifecycle.js +2 -1
  86. package/dist/core/event-bus.js +9 -2
  87. package/dist/core/handoff/ipc-registration.js +1 -0
  88. package/dist/core/host-snapshot.js +1 -2
  89. package/dist/core/initialization/service.js +32 -11
  90. package/dist/core/ipc-registration.js +18 -5
  91. package/dist/core/memory/consolidation-context.js +2 -2
  92. package/dist/core/message/aun-request-registry.js +99 -18
  93. package/dist/core/message/im-renderer.js +16 -11
  94. package/dist/core/message/message-admission.js +25 -20
  95. package/dist/core/message/message-bridge.js +21 -47
  96. package/dist/core/message/message-queue.js +3 -0
  97. package/dist/core/message/response-engine.js +7 -5
  98. package/dist/core/model/catalog-service.js +1 -1
  99. package/dist/core/permission/ec-command-parser.js +41 -9
  100. package/dist/core/permission/permission-result.js +1 -0
  101. package/dist/core/permission/protected-paths.js +25 -14
  102. package/dist/core/permission/tool-policy.js +108 -107
  103. package/dist/core/plugin-lifecycle.js +133 -0
  104. package/dist/core/runner-reload-transaction.js +4 -1
  105. package/dist/core/system-session/memory.js +16 -3
  106. package/dist/core/task/task-activity-store.js +50 -0
  107. package/dist/core/task/task-image-resources.js +140 -0
  108. package/dist/core/thread/ipc-operation.js +1 -1
  109. package/dist/core/thread/thread-service.js +0 -1
  110. package/dist/directory/canonical-digest.js +5 -3
  111. package/dist/directory/owner-directory-admission.js +22 -2
  112. package/dist/directory/owner-directory-cache.js +394 -60
  113. package/dist/directory/owner-directory-markdown.js +29 -2
  114. package/dist/directory/owner-directory-scope.js +35 -16
  115. package/dist/ecweb/basic-settings-service.js +4 -1
  116. package/dist/ecweb/pairing.js +41 -0
  117. package/dist/ecweb/providers-service.js +8 -1
  118. package/dist/{utils/ecweb-utils.js → ecweb/runtime/launch.js} +3 -27
  119. package/dist/ecweb/runtime/lifecycle.js +184 -0
  120. package/dist/{utils/ecweb-supervisor.js → ecweb/runtime/supervisor.js} +32 -27
  121. package/dist/index.js +34 -25
  122. package/dist/ipc.js +124 -7
  123. package/dist/response-system/engines/v1/proactive-flow.js +1 -1
  124. package/dist/trigger/authorization.js +2 -2
  125. package/dist/utils/atomic-write.js +24 -0
  126. package/dist/utils/avatar-upload.js +3 -1
  127. package/dist/utils/cross-platform.js +31 -2
  128. package/dist/utils/host-info.js +36 -0
  129. package/dist/utils/instance-registry.js +38 -11
  130. package/dist/utils/logger.js +9 -0
  131. package/dist/utils/{process-tree-stats.js → process-tree.js} +29 -0
  132. package/dist/utils/tool-summary.js +9 -1
  133. package/dist/utils/upgrade-jobs.js +96 -15
  134. package/dist/utils/windows-autostart.js +1 -1
  135. package/ecagent/README.md +19 -0
  136. package/ecagent/dist/harness/agent-harness.js +9 -0
  137. package/ecagent/dist/harness/env/nodejs.js +71 -11
  138. package/ecagent/dist/harness/env/windows-shell.d.ts +7 -0
  139. package/ecagent/dist/harness/env/windows-shell.js +132 -0
  140. package/kits/docs/aun/ABILITY_CALLING.md +38 -9
  141. package/kits/docs/evolcore/INDEX.md +5 -1
  142. package/kits/docs/evolcore/ability.md +181 -0
  143. package/kits/docs/evolcore/aid.md +20 -0
  144. package/kits/docs/evolcore/config.md +10 -6
  145. package/kits/docs/evolcore/menu-protocol.md +40 -1
  146. package/kits/docs/evolcore/provider.md +2 -2
  147. package/kits/docs/evolcore/tool-authorization.md +270 -0
  148. package/kits/runtime/ability-job.ps1 +41 -0
  149. package/kits/runtime/ability-runner.mjs +67 -0
  150. package/kits/runtime/ability-secret.ps1 +59 -0
  151. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/go/main.go +59 -0
  152. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/java/Json.java +67 -0
  153. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/java/Runner.java +42 -0
  154. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/python/runner.py +48 -0
  155. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/rust/json.rs +87 -0
  156. package/kits/runtime/ability-templates/rust/runner.rs +35 -0
  157. package/kits/schemas/_meta.json +12 -1
  158. package/kits/schemas/ability-plugin.schema.1.json +107 -0
  159. package/kits/schemas/ability-project.schema.1.json +31 -0
  160. package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.16.json +20 -0
  161. package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.17.json +20 -0
  162. package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.18.json +917 -0
  163. package/kits/skills/.switches.json +4 -0
  164. package/kits/skills/aid-ability/SKILL.md +5 -4
  165. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/SKILL.md +67 -0
  166. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/contract-checklist.md +37 -0
  167. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/development.md +104 -0
  168. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/management.md +117 -0
  169. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/recovery.md +27 -0
  170. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/runtime-protocol.md +109 -0
  171. package/kits/skills/ec-ability/references/workflows.md +15 -0
  172. package/kits/skills/ec-service-proxy/SKILL.md +12 -0
  173. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/SKILL.md +240 -6
  174. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/references/02-bootstrap.md +78 -4
  175. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/clean.mjs +397 -0
  176. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/init.mjs +113 -25
  177. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/lock.mjs +189 -0
  178. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/migrate.mjs +35 -10
  179. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/scripts/verify.mjs +2 -1
  180. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/templates/persona-section.md +54 -0
  181. package/kits/skills/personal-assistant/triggers/ingest-daily.json +1 -1
  182. package/kits/templates/memory-consolidation/notes.md +1 -1
  183. package/kits/templates/system-fragments/channel.md +2 -1
  184. package/kits/templates/system-fragments/commands.md +1 -0
  185. package/package.json +5 -3
  186. package/dist/core/command/data-root-error.js +0 -10
  187. package/dist/utils/machine-info.js +0 -46
  188. package/dist/utils/process-tree-worker.js +0 -31
  189. package/dist/utils/windows-output.js +0 -36
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ export function buildCanonicalEvolcoreExecutionSpec(input) {
37
37
  spec.cwd = input.cwd;
38
38
  if (input.command?.mergeStderr)
39
39
  spec.mergeStderr = true;
40
+ if (input.command?.discardStdout)
41
+ spec.discardStdout = true;
42
+ if (input.command?.discardStderr)
43
+ spec.discardStderr = true;
40
44
  if (input.command?.filterChain?.length)
41
45
  spec.filterChain = input.command.filterChain.map(stage => [...stage]);
42
46
  if (input.command?.suffixArgv?.length)
@@ -333,11 +337,11 @@ const APPLY_PATCH_EXECUTABLE_BASENAMES = new Set([
333
337
  'apply_patch.ps1',
334
338
  ]);
335
339
  const EVOLCORE_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set([
336
- 'agent', 'aid', 'bench', 'config', 'peer', 'ctl', 'data', 'diag', 'diagnose',
340
+ 'ability', 'agent', 'aid', 'bench', 'config', 'peer', 'ctl', 'data', 'diag', 'diagnose',
337
341
  'fs', 'gateway', 'group', 'handoff', 'init', 'link-rules', 'logs', 'menu-client',
338
342
  'mode', 'model', 'msg', 'mv', 'net', 'queue', 'response', 'restart',
339
343
  'restart-monitor', 'rpc', 'start', 'stats', 'status', 'stop', 'storage', 'task',
340
- 'trigger', 'proxy', 'version', 'watch', 'session', 'pa-workspace',
344
+ 'trigger', 'proxy', 'version', 'watch', 'session', 'pa-workspace', 'upgrade', 'update',
341
345
  ]);
342
346
  // Development/install entrypoints that are part of this repository's CLI.
343
347
  // Only these exact relative paths are canonicalized; arbitrary Node scripts
@@ -2668,7 +2672,16 @@ function scanBoundedOutputOperators(command) {
2668
2672
  if (char === '>') {
2669
2673
  if (command[index + 1] === '>')
2670
2674
  return null;
2671
- operators.push({ kind: 'redirect', start: index, end: index + 1 });
2675
+ // An adjacent, unquoted IO number is shell syntax, never an EC argv
2676
+ // operand. Do not mistake `2 > ...` or a quoted '2' for stderr.
2677
+ const fd = command.slice(0, index).match(/(?:^|[ \t])(\d+)$/)?.[1];
2678
+ if (fd && fd !== '1' && fd !== '2')
2679
+ return null;
2680
+ operators.push({
2681
+ kind: fd === '2' ? 'redirect-stderr' : 'redirect',
2682
+ start: fd ? index - fd.length : index,
2683
+ end: index + 1,
2684
+ });
2672
2685
  continue;
2673
2686
  }
2674
2687
  if (char === '$' || char === '`' || char === ';' || char === '&' || char === '<'
@@ -2800,22 +2813,39 @@ export function parseBoundedOutputShellCommand(command) {
2800
2813
  return null;
2801
2814
  const filterChain = [];
2802
2815
  let outputPath;
2816
+ let discardStdout = false;
2817
+ let discardStderr = false;
2803
2818
  let prevEnd = mergeStderr ? operators[0].end : first.start;
2804
2819
  while (cursor < operators.length) {
2805
2820
  const operator = operators[cursor];
2806
2821
  // 段与段之间只允许空白(合并 stderr 与首个管道之间同理)。
2807
2822
  if (trimShellSpacing(input.slice(prevEnd, operator.start)))
2808
2823
  return null;
2809
- if (operator.kind === 'redirect') {
2810
- // 重定向必须是最后一段;其后再出现操作符即拒绝。
2811
- if (cursor !== operators.length - 1)
2812
- return null;
2813
- const outputArgv = parseLiteralShellArgv(trimShellSpacing(input.slice(operator.end)));
2824
+ if (operator.kind === 'redirect' || operator.kind === 'redirect-stderr') {
2825
+ const next = operators[cursor + 1];
2826
+ const segmentEnd = next ? next.start : input.length;
2827
+ const outputArgv = parseLiteralShellArgv(trimShellSpacing(input.slice(operator.end, segmentEnd)));
2814
2828
  if (!outputArgv || outputArgv.length !== 1)
2815
2829
  return null;
2816
2830
  if (outputArgv[0].includes('$') && !outputArgv[0].includes(MANAGED_TMPDIR_TOKEN))
2817
2831
  return null;
2818
- outputPath = restoreManagedTmpDirToken(outputArgv[0]);
2832
+ if (operator.kind === 'redirect-stderr') {
2833
+ // Only the source process' stderr may be discarded. A redirection
2834
+ // on a filter, a file target, or a merge/discard ordering is unproven.
2835
+ if (cursor !== 0 || mergeStderr || outputArgv[0] !== '/dev/null')
2836
+ return null;
2837
+ discardStderr = true;
2838
+ prevEnd = segmentEnd;
2839
+ cursor++;
2840
+ continue;
2841
+ }
2842
+ // stdout belongs to the last filter (or the source without filters).
2843
+ if (next)
2844
+ return null;
2845
+ if (outputArgv[0] === '/dev/null')
2846
+ discardStdout = true;
2847
+ else
2848
+ outputPath = restoreManagedTmpDirToken(outputArgv[0]);
2819
2849
  cursor++;
2820
2850
  break;
2821
2851
  }
@@ -2834,6 +2864,8 @@ export function parseBoundedOutputShellCommand(command) {
2834
2864
  return {
2835
2865
  argv,
2836
2866
  mergeStderr,
2867
+ ...(discardStdout ? { discardStdout } : {}),
2868
+ ...(discardStderr ? { discardStderr } : {}),
2837
2869
  ...(filterChain.length > 0 ? { filterChain } : {}),
2838
2870
  ...(outputPath ? { outputPath } : {}),
2839
2871
  };
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ export function permissionApprovalResult(requestId, decision, approver = {}) {
69
69
  decision,
70
70
  decisionSource: 'approval',
71
71
  requestId,
72
+ approvalMechanism: 'human',
72
73
  reason: decision === 'deny' ? '审批人明确拒绝了本次操作;操作未执行。' : '审批人已批准本次操作。',
73
74
  ...(decision === 'deny' ? { policyCode: 'user_approval_denied', errorDetailCode: 'USER_APPROVAL_DENIED' } : {}),
74
75
  approverOperatorId: approver.approverOperatorId,
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ const H_CLASS_RELATIVE_PATTERNS = [
17
17
  /^\.lock$/,
18
18
  /^daemon\.pid$/,
19
19
  /^agents\/[^/]+\/data\/codex-tokens(?:\/|$)/,
20
+ /^agents\/[^/]+\/data\/task-resources(?:\/|$)/,
20
21
  /^agents\/[^/]+\/data\/(?:.*\/)?(?:context-tokens|menu-tokens)\.json(?:_|__|\.tmp-.*)?$/,
21
22
  ];
22
23
  const H_CLASS_REFERENCE_PATTERNS = [
@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ const H_CLASS_REFERENCE_PATTERNS = [
24
25
  /(?:^|[/\\\s"'=<>])data[\\/]/,
25
26
  /(?:^|[/\\\s"'=<>])(?:AIDs|aids)[\\/]/,
26
27
  /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.-])(?:\.device_id|\.env|\.seed(?:\.[^/\\\s"']*)?|\.migrated-[^/\\\s"']*|\.lock|daemon\.pid)(?=$|[\s"';&|<>)},])/,
27
- /(?:^|[/\\\s"'=<>])agents[\\/][^/\\\s"']+[\\/]data[\\/](?:codex-tokens|(?:.*[\\/])?(?:context-tokens|menu-tokens)\.json)(?:[\\/]|$|[\s"';&|<>)},])/,
28
+ /(?:^|[/\\\s"'=<>])agents[\\/][^/\\\s"']+[\\/]data[\\/](?:codex-tokens|task-resources|(?:.*[\\/])?(?:context-tokens|menu-tokens)\.json)(?:[\\/]|$|[\s"';&|<>)},])/,
28
29
  ];
29
30
  // H-class directory roots are kept separately from the full path matcher so
30
31
  // an exact metadata query can distinguish a protected directory from a
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ const H_CLASS_DIRECTORY_RELATIVE_PATTERNS = [
36
37
  /^\.snapshots(?:\/|$)/,
37
38
  /^CA(?:\/|$)/,
38
39
  /^agents\/[^/]+\/data\/codex-tokens(?:\/|$)/,
40
+ /^agents\/[^/]+\/data\/task-resources(?:\/|$)/,
39
41
  ];
40
42
  const L_CLASS_RELATIVE_PATTERNS = [
41
43
  /^daemon\.json$/,
@@ -59,6 +61,12 @@ function normalizeForComparison(value) {
59
61
  const resolved = path.resolve(value);
60
62
  return process.platform === 'win32' ? resolved.toLowerCase() : resolved;
61
63
  }
64
+ function normalizeWindowsDrivePath(value) {
65
+ if (process.platform !== 'win32')
66
+ return value;
67
+ const match = value.match(/^\/([A-Za-z])(?:\/(.*))?$/);
68
+ return match ? `${match[1].toUpperCase()}:\\${(match[2] ?? '').replace(/\//g, '\\')}` : value;
69
+ }
62
70
  function resolveThroughExistingAncestor(value) {
63
71
  const absolute = path.resolve(value);
64
72
  const missing = [];
@@ -119,7 +127,7 @@ function agentScopeCandidate(value, options = {}) {
119
127
  if (!normalizeAid(options.selfAid))
120
128
  return undefined;
121
129
  const root = resolveThroughExistingAncestor(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
122
- const lexical = lexicalCandidate(value, options.cwd);
130
+ const lexical = resolveLexicalCandidate(value, options.cwd);
123
131
  if (isSameOrDescendant(lexical, root)) {
124
132
  const relative = path.relative(root, lexical).split(path.sep).join('/');
125
133
  if (matchesAgentScopeRelative(relative, options.selfAid))
@@ -167,7 +175,7 @@ function matchesSelfAwareHClassRelative(relative, selfAid) {
167
175
  if (!own)
168
176
  return false;
169
177
  const escaped = own.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
170
- return new RegExp(`^agents/${escaped}/data/codex-tokens(?:/|$)`).test(relative)
178
+ return new RegExp(`^agents/${escaped}/data/(?:codex-tokens|task-resources)(?:/|$)`).test(relative)
171
179
  || new RegExp(`^agents/${escaped}/data/(?:.*\/)?(?:context-tokens|menu-tokens)\\.json(?:_|__|\\.tmp-.*)?$`).test(relative);
172
180
  }
173
181
  export function isSameOrDescendant(candidate, parent) {
@@ -177,14 +185,13 @@ export function isSameOrDescendant(candidate, parent) {
177
185
  return relative === '' || (!relative.startsWith('..' + path.sep) && relative !== '..' && !path.isAbsolute(relative));
178
186
  }
179
187
  export function resolveProtectedCandidate(value, cwd = process.cwd()) {
180
- const absolute = path.isAbsolute(value) ? value : path.resolve(cwd, value);
188
+ const normalized = normalizeWindowsDrivePath(value);
189
+ const absolute = path.isAbsolute(normalized) ? normalized : path.resolve(cwd, normalized);
181
190
  return resolveThroughExistingAncestor(absolute);
182
191
  }
183
192
  export function isHClassPath(value, options = {}) {
184
193
  const root = resolveThroughExistingAncestor(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
185
- const lexicalCandidate = path.isAbsolute(value)
186
- ? path.resolve(value)
187
- : path.resolve(options.cwd ?? process.cwd(), value);
194
+ const lexicalCandidate = resolveLexicalCandidate(value, options.cwd);
188
195
  if (hasInvalidExplicitSelfAid(options))
189
196
  return isSameOrDescendant(lexicalCandidate, root);
190
197
  if (agentScopeCandidate(value, options))
@@ -205,11 +212,12 @@ export function isHClassPath(value, options = {}) {
205
212
  function hasPathSyntax(value) {
206
213
  return /[\0\r\n$`*?\[\]{}<>|;&]/.test(value);
207
214
  }
208
- function lexicalCandidate(value, cwd = process.cwd()) {
209
- return path.isAbsolute(value) ? path.resolve(value) : path.resolve(cwd, value);
215
+ function resolveLexicalCandidate(value, cwd = process.cwd()) {
216
+ const normalized = normalizeWindowsDrivePath(value);
217
+ return path.isAbsolute(normalized) ? path.resolve(normalized) : path.resolve(cwd, normalized);
210
218
  }
211
219
  function resolveWithoutFinalSymlink(value, cwd = process.cwd()) {
212
- const absolute = lexicalCandidate(value, cwd);
220
+ const absolute = resolveLexicalCandidate(value, cwd);
213
221
  const basename = path.basename(absolute);
214
222
  const parent = resolveThroughExistingAncestor(path.dirname(absolute));
215
223
  return basename ? path.join(parent, basename) : parent;
@@ -337,9 +345,7 @@ export function isLClassPath(value, options = {}) {
337
345
  if (hasInvalidExplicitSelfAid(options))
338
346
  return false;
339
347
  const root = resolveThroughExistingAncestor(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
340
- const lexicalCandidate = path.isAbsolute(value)
341
- ? path.resolve(value)
342
- : path.resolve(options.cwd ?? process.cwd(), value);
348
+ const lexicalCandidate = resolveLexicalCandidate(value, options.cwd);
343
349
  if (isSameOrDescendant(lexicalCandidate, root)) {
344
350
  const lexicalRelative = path.relative(root, lexicalCandidate).split(path.sep).join('/');
345
351
  if (!matchesAgentScopeRelative(lexicalRelative, options.selfAid)
@@ -390,6 +396,7 @@ function getLegacyHClassSandboxPatterns(root) {
390
396
  path.join('agents', '*', 'sessions', '**'), path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'channels', '**'),
391
397
  path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'handoff', '**'), path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'async-questions', '**'),
392
398
  path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'task-activity', '**'), path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'aun', '**'),
399
+ path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'task-resources', '**'),
393
400
  path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'outbox.jsonl*'), path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'activity-outbox.jsonl*'),
394
401
  path.join('agents', '*', 'data', 'contact-audit.jsonl'),
395
402
  ];
@@ -409,6 +416,8 @@ export function getHClassSandboxPatterns(root = resolveRoot(), options = {}) {
409
416
  '.device_id', '.env', '.seed', '.seed.*', '.lock', 'daemon.pid',
410
417
  path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', 'codex-tokens'),
411
418
  path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', 'codex-tokens', '**'),
419
+ path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', 'task-resources'),
420
+ path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', 'task-resources', '**'),
412
421
  path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', '**', 'context-tokens.json'),
413
422
  path.join('agents', options.selfAid, 'data', '**', 'menu-tokens.json'),
414
423
  ];
@@ -473,6 +482,7 @@ function getAgentAwareHClassMaskTargets(root, selfAid) {
473
482
  continue;
474
483
  }
475
484
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'codex-tokens'));
485
+ addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'task-resources'));
476
486
  const walk = (directory, depth = 0) => {
477
487
  if (depth > 8)
478
488
  return;
@@ -561,6 +571,7 @@ export function getExistingHClassMaskTargets(root = resolveRoot(), options = {})
561
571
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'handoff'));
562
572
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'async-questions'));
563
573
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'task-activity'));
574
+ addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'task-resources'));
564
575
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'aun'));
565
576
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'outbox.jsonl'));
566
577
  addExistingTarget(targets, path.join(agentRoot, 'data', 'activity-outbox.jsonl'));
@@ -965,7 +976,7 @@ export function hClassGrantIncludesProtectedPath(value, options = {}) {
965
976
  return true;
966
977
  if (relative.length <= 2)
967
978
  return true;
968
- if (relative[2] === 'data' && (!relative[3] || ['codex-tokens', 'channels'].includes(relative[3])))
979
+ if (relative[2] === 'data' && (!relative[3] || ['codex-tokens', 'channels', 'task-resources'].includes(relative[3])))
969
980
  return true;
970
981
  }
971
982
  // A grant scoped to an ordinary self-Agent subtree does not automatically
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
1
1
  import fs from 'fs';
2
- import { parseOwnershipCommand } from '../../aun/aid/ownership-operation.js';
3
2
  import path from 'path';
4
3
  import os from 'os';
5
4
  import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
@@ -1207,7 +1206,7 @@ function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
1207
1206
  const segmentAnalysis = analyzeReadonlyShellQuery(segment);
1208
1207
  if (segmentAnalysis.kind === 'proven-readonly') {
1209
1208
  for (const operand of queryPathOperands(segmentAnalysis)) {
1210
- const matched = protectedClassPath(operand.operand.value, className, options);
1209
+ const matched = shellOperandMatchesClass(operand.operand, className, options, operand.accessKind);
1211
1210
  if (matched)
1212
1211
  return matched;
1213
1212
  }
@@ -1225,6 +1224,15 @@ function literalProtectedShellOperand(command, className, options, depth = 0) {
1225
1224
  const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
1226
1225
  if (matched)
1227
1226
  return matched;
1227
+ if (className === 'h' && commandName(argv[0]) === 'rg'
1228
+ && hClassReadScopeIncludesProtectedPath(value, options)) {
1229
+ const root = resolveProtectedCandidate(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
1230
+ const scope = resolveProtectedCandidate(value, options.cwd);
1231
+ const target = getExistingHClassMaskTargets(root, { selfAid: options.selfAid })
1232
+ .find(candidate => isSameOrDescendant(candidate.path, scope));
1233
+ if (target)
1234
+ return target.path;
1235
+ }
1228
1236
  }
1229
1237
  for (const value of literalScriptFilesystemOperands(argv)) {
1230
1238
  const matched = protectedClassPath(value, className, options);
@@ -1294,6 +1302,14 @@ function shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, className, options, accessKind = oper
1294
1302
  if (reference)
1295
1303
  return resolveProtectedCandidate(operand.value, options.cwd);
1296
1304
  if (operand.access === 'recursive') {
1305
+ if (className === 'h') {
1306
+ const scope = resolveProtectedCandidate(operand.value, options.cwd);
1307
+ const root = resolveProtectedCandidate(options.root ?? resolveRoot());
1308
+ const target = getExistingHClassMaskTargets(root, { selfAid: options.selfAid })
1309
+ .find(candidate => isSameOrDescendant(candidate.path, scope));
1310
+ if (target)
1311
+ return target.path;
1312
+ }
1297
1313
  const matched = className === 'h'
1298
1314
  ? hClassReadScopeIncludesProtectedPath(operand.value, options)
1299
1315
  : lClassGrantIncludesProtectedPath(operand.value, options);
@@ -1334,7 +1350,13 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
1334
1350
  lClassPath,
1335
1351
  };
1336
1352
  }
1337
- const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
1353
+ const operands = analysis.ir.pipelines.flatMap(pipeline => pipeline.flatMap(query => {
1354
+ const scopes = boundedRgSourceScopes(query, options);
1355
+ return (scopes ?? query.pathOperands).map(operand => ({
1356
+ operand,
1357
+ accessKind: query.accessKind ?? (operand.access === 'recursive' ? 'enumerate' : 'content'),
1358
+ }));
1359
+ }));
1338
1360
  const hClassPath = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind)).find(Boolean);
1339
1361
  const lClassPath = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'l', options, accessKind)).find(Boolean);
1340
1362
  return {
@@ -1539,6 +1561,63 @@ function boundedRootSourceEnumeration(analysis, projectPath) {
1539
1561
  return pipeline.slice(1).every(command => ['head', 'sort', 'grep', 'wc'].includes(command.executable)
1540
1562
  && command.pathOperands.length === 0);
1541
1563
  }
1564
+ function boundedRgSourceScopes(query, options) {
1565
+ if (query.executable !== 'rg' || !options.cwd || query.pathOperands.length !== 1
1566
+ || query.pathOperands[0].access !== 'recursive')
1567
+ return undefined;
1568
+ const workspace = resolveProtectedCandidate(options.cwd);
1569
+ if (resolveProtectedCandidate(query.pathOperands[0].value, options.cwd) !== workspace)
1570
+ return undefined;
1571
+ const sourceRoots = new Set(['src', 'kits', 'docs', 'tests', 'test', 'lib', 'scripts']);
1572
+ const sourceGlob = /^(?:src|kits|docs|tests|test|lib|scripts)\/\*\*$/;
1573
+ const scopes = new Set();
1574
+ const flags = new Set(['--no-config', '-n', '--line-number', '--files', '--hidden', '--no-ignore', '-i', '--ignore-case', '-F', '--fixed-strings']);
1575
+ let noConfig = false;
1576
+ let sawPattern = false;
1577
+ let files = false;
1578
+ let optionsEnded = false;
1579
+ for (let index = 1; index < query.argv.length; index++) {
1580
+ const argument = query.argv[index];
1581
+ if (!optionsEnded && argument === '--') {
1582
+ optionsEnded = true;
1583
+ continue;
1584
+ }
1585
+ if (!optionsEnded && (argument === '-g' || argument === '--glob')) {
1586
+ const glob = query.argv[++index];
1587
+ if (!glob || !sourceGlob.test(glob))
1588
+ return undefined;
1589
+ const prefix = glob.split('/')[0];
1590
+ if (!sourceRoots.has(prefix) || !glob.startsWith(`${prefix}/`))
1591
+ return undefined;
1592
+ scopes.add(path.join(workspace, prefix));
1593
+ continue;
1594
+ }
1595
+ if (!optionsEnded && (argument === '-e' || argument === '--regexp')) {
1596
+ if (++index >= query.argv.length)
1597
+ return undefined;
1598
+ sawPattern = true;
1599
+ continue;
1600
+ }
1601
+ if (!optionsEnded && argument.startsWith('-')) {
1602
+ if (!flags.has(argument))
1603
+ return undefined;
1604
+ if (argument === '--no-config')
1605
+ noConfig = true;
1606
+ if (argument === '--files')
1607
+ files = true;
1608
+ continue;
1609
+ }
1610
+ if (!files && !sawPattern) {
1611
+ sawPattern = true;
1612
+ continue;
1613
+ }
1614
+ if (argument !== query.pathOperands[0].value)
1615
+ return undefined;
1616
+ }
1617
+ if (!noConfig || scopes.size === 0)
1618
+ return undefined;
1619
+ return [...scopes].map(value => ({ value, access: 'recursive' }));
1620
+ }
1542
1621
  /**
1543
1622
  * 只读模式检查(用于 PreToolUse hook 和 canUseTool callback)。普通
1544
1623
  * 路径上的受限查询 Bash 可自动执行;H/L-class 和未建模 Shell 仍拒绝。
@@ -1833,6 +1912,9 @@ function requestsFilesystemRoot(value) {
1833
1912
  }
1834
1913
  return Object.values(record).some(requestsFilesystemRoot);
1835
1914
  }
1915
+ const PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT = '\n\n💡 只读检索请显式指定普通源码目录,例如:' +
1916
+ "\n rg -n -g '!*.json_' -g '!*.json.migrated' -- '<关键词>' src tests kits docs" +
1917
+ '\n 不要把项目根目录作为递归搜索范围;若子目录仍含受保护文件,请继续缩小到明确文件。';
1836
1918
  export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1837
1919
  const paths = [];
1838
1920
  const grantPaths = [];
@@ -1872,6 +1954,7 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1872
1954
  behavior: 'deny',
1873
1955
  message: '🔒 临时文件必须位于当前会话的 $TMPDIR 内',
1874
1956
  matchedPath: tempCheck.paths[0],
1957
+ matchedRule: 'managed-temp-boundary',
1875
1958
  };
1876
1959
  }
1877
1960
  // A managed temp write is intentionally allowed to contain names such as
@@ -1900,8 +1983,10 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1900
1983
  `session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
1901
1984
  return {
1902
1985
  behavior: 'deny',
1903
- message: '🔒 Shell 命令涉及受保护的 H 类配置/证书/快照路径,agent 不可直接操作',
1986
+ message: '🔒 Shell 命令涉及受保护的 H 类配置/证书/快照路径,agent 不可直接操作' +
1987
+ (protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'proven-readonly' ? PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT : ''),
1904
1988
  matchedPath: protectedOperands.hClassPath,
1989
+ matchedRule: protectedOperands.hClassPath ? 'h-class-shell-operand' : 'h-class-shell-unproven',
1905
1990
  };
1906
1991
  }
1907
1992
  collectFilesystemGrantPaths(input.additionalPermissions, grantPaths, projectRootGrantSubpaths);
@@ -1927,8 +2012,9 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1927
2012
  `session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
1928
2013
  return {
1929
2014
  behavior: 'deny',
1930
- message: '🔒 文件读取范围包含受保护的 H 类配置/证书/快照路径,agent 不可直接操作',
2015
+ message: '🔒 文件读取范围包含受保护的 H 类配置/证书/快照路径,agent 不可直接操作' + PROTECTED_READ_SEARCH_HINT,
1931
2016
  matchedPath: matchedReadPath,
2017
+ matchedRule: 'h-class-read-scope',
1932
2018
  };
1933
2019
  }
1934
2020
  }
@@ -1938,6 +2024,7 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1938
2024
  return {
1939
2025
  behavior: 'deny',
1940
2026
  message: '🔒 请求的文件系统根权限包含受保护的 H 类路径,已拒绝授权',
2027
+ matchedRule: 'h-class-filesystem-root-grant',
1941
2028
  };
1942
2029
  }
1943
2030
  for (const grantPath of grantPaths) {
@@ -1951,6 +2038,7 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1951
2038
  behavior: 'deny',
1952
2039
  message: '🔒 请求的文件系统权限范围包含受保护的 H 类路径,已拒绝授权',
1953
2040
  matchedPath: resolveProtectedCandidate(grantPath, pathOptions.cwd),
2041
+ matchedRule: 'h-class-grant',
1954
2042
  };
1955
2043
  }
1956
2044
  }
@@ -1976,6 +2064,7 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1976
2064
  behavior: 'deny',
1977
2065
  message: '🔒 请求的 project_roots 权限范围包含受保护的 H 类路径,已拒绝授权',
1978
2066
  matchedPath: resolveProtectedCandidate(candidate, permissionWorkspace),
2067
+ matchedRule: 'h-class-project-root-grant',
1979
2068
  };
1980
2069
  }
1981
2070
  }
@@ -2011,9 +2100,10 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2011
2100
  return {
2012
2101
  behavior: 'deny',
2013
2102
  message: `🔒 此文件受保护,agent 不可直接写入\n\n` +
2014
- `文件:${filePath}\n` +
2103
+ `文件:${resolveProtectedCandidate(filePath, pathOptions.cwd)}\n` +
2015
2104
  `类型:配置/快照/证书等系统关键文件${suggestion}`,
2016
2105
  matchedPath: resolveProtectedCandidate(filePath, pathOptions.cwd),
2106
+ matchedRule: 'h-class-file-path',
2017
2107
  };
2018
2108
  }
2019
2109
  }
@@ -2028,7 +2118,7 @@ export function checkLClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2028
2118
  const pathOptions = { cwd: context?.projectPath, root: context?.root, selfAid: context?.selfAid };
2029
2119
  const lClassRead = protectedReadToolMatchesLClass(toolName, input, pathOptions);
2030
2120
  if (lClassRead && context?.permissionMode === 'readonly') {
2031
- return { behavior: 'deny', message: '🔒 只读模式:visitor 最低权限不允许读取 L-class 路径', matchedPath: lClassRead };
2121
+ return { behavior: 'deny', message: '🔒 只读模式:visitor 最低权限不允许读取 L-class 路径', matchedPath: lClassRead, matchedRule: 'l-class-read' };
2032
2122
  }
2033
2123
  return { behavior: 'allow' };
2034
2124
  }
@@ -2073,6 +2163,9 @@ export function checkLClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2073
2163
  ? '🔒 只读模式:visitor 最低权限不允许读取 L-class 路径'
2074
2164
  : `🔒 L-class 路径允许读取,但当前 Bash 命令无法证明为只读${protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'unproven' ? `(原因码:${protectedOperands.analysis.reason})` : ''},已拒绝执行。请改用受控的 EvolCore 读取命令或白名单只读命令`,
2075
2165
  matchedPath: protectedOperands.lClassPath,
2166
+ matchedRule: protectedOperands.analysis.kind === 'unproven'
2167
+ ? `l-class-shell-unproven:${protectedOperands.analysis.reason}`
2168
+ : 'l-class-shell-operand',
2076
2169
  };
2077
2170
  }
2078
2171
  collectFilesystemWriteGrantPaths(input.additionalPermissions, writeGrantPaths, projectRootWriteSubpaths);
@@ -2092,6 +2185,7 @@ export function checkLClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2092
2185
  behavior: 'deny',
2093
2186
  message: '🔒 请求的文件系统写权限包含 L-class 只读路径,已拒绝授权',
2094
2187
  matchedPath: resolveProtectedCandidate(grantPath, pathOptions.cwd),
2188
+ matchedRule: 'l-class-grant',
2095
2189
  };
2096
2190
  }
2097
2191
  }
@@ -2102,7 +2196,7 @@ export function checkLClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2102
2196
  }
2103
2197
  const candidate = path.isAbsolute(subpath) ? subpath : path.resolve(permissionWorkspace, subpath);
2104
2198
  if (lClassGrantIncludesProtectedPath(candidate, { root: context?.root, selfAid: context?.selfAid })) {
2105
- return { behavior: 'deny', message: '🔒 请求的 project_roots 写权限包含 L-class 只读路径,已拒绝授权' };
2199
+ return { behavior: 'deny', message: '🔒 请求的 project_roots 写权限包含 L-class 只读路径,已拒绝授权', matchedRule: 'l-class-project-root-grant' };
2106
2200
  }
2107
2201
  }
2108
2202
  for (const filePath of paths) {
@@ -2112,8 +2206,9 @@ export function checkLClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
2112
2206
  `session=${context?.sessionId} channel=${context?.channel} peer=${context?.peerId} role=${context?.role}`);
2113
2207
  return {
2114
2208
  behavior: 'deny',
2115
- message: `🔒 L-class 路径允许读取但禁止 Agent 直接修改、删除或移动\n\n文件:${filePath}\n\n💡 请使用对应的 EvolCore 受控命令修改`,
2209
+ message: `🔒 L-class 路径允许读取但禁止 Agent 直接修改、删除或移动\n\n文件:${resolveProtectedCandidate(filePath, pathOptions.cwd)}\n\n💡 请使用对应的 EvolCore 受控命令修改`,
2116
2210
  matchedPath: resolveProtectedCandidate(filePath, pathOptions.cwd),
2211
+ matchedRule: 'l-class-file-path',
2117
2212
  };
2118
2213
  }
2119
2214
  return { behavior: 'allow' };
@@ -2283,6 +2378,8 @@ function prepareBoundedOutputInput(input, command, kind, context) {
2283
2378
  cwd: executionCwd,
2284
2379
  argv: executionArgv,
2285
2380
  mergeStderr: command.mergeStderr,
2381
+ ...(command.discardStdout ? { discardStdout: true } : {}),
2382
+ ...(command.discardStderr ? { discardStderr: true } : {}),
2286
2383
  ...(command.filterChain?.length ? { filterChain: command.filterChain } : {}),
2287
2384
  ...(command.suffixArgv?.length ? { suffixArgv: command.suffixArgv } : {}),
2288
2385
  ...(executionOutputPath ? { outputPath: executionOutputPath } : {}),
@@ -2505,102 +2602,6 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2505
2602
  const argv = parsedCodex?.ok
2506
2603
  ? parsedCodex.argv
2507
2604
  : classifiedEcArgv ? normalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv(classifiedEcArgv) : null;
2508
- const managedAidArgs = argv?.[0] === 'ec' && argv[1] === 'aid'
2509
- ? argv.slice(2)
2510
- : undefined;
2511
- const managedAidHelpEnd = managedAidArgs?.indexOf('--') ?? -1;
2512
- const managedAidHelpArgs = managedAidArgs?.slice(0, managedAidHelpEnd < 0 ? undefined : managedAidHelpEnd) ?? [];
2513
- const isManagedAidHelp = managedAidArgs !== undefined && (managedAidArgs.length === 0
2514
- || managedAidHelpArgs.some(arg => arg === '--help' || arg === '-h')
2515
- || managedAidHelpArgs[0] === 'help'
2516
- || (managedAidHelpArgs[0] === 'agentmd'
2517
- && (managedAidArgs.length === 1 || managedAidHelpArgs[1] === 'help')));
2518
- const managedAidArgv = argv?.at(-2) === '--format' && argv.at(-1) === 'json'
2519
- ? argv.slice(0, -2)
2520
- : argv;
2521
- const ownAid = !!managedAidArgv
2522
- && !!context.selfAid
2523
- && managedAidArgv.at(-1)?.replace(/^@/, '') === context.selfAid.replace(/^@/, '');
2524
- const isManagedAidPublicRead = !!context.selfAid
2525
- && !!managedAidArgv
2526
- && managedAidArgv[0] === 'ec'
2527
- && managedAidArgv[1] === 'aid'
2528
- && ((managedAidArgv.length === 4 && managedAidArgv[2] === 'lookup')
2529
- || (managedAidArgv.length === 5
2530
- && managedAidArgv[2] === 'agentmd'
2531
- && managedAidArgv[3] === 'get'));
2532
- const isSelfManagedAidShow = !!managedAidArgv
2533
- && managedAidArgv.length === 4
2534
- && managedAidArgv[0] === 'ec'
2535
- && managedAidArgv[1] === 'aid'
2536
- && managedAidArgv[2] === 'show'
2537
- && ownAid;
2538
- const isSelfAgentMdPublish = !!managedAidArgv
2539
- && managedAidArgv.length === 5
2540
- && managedAidArgv[0] === 'ec'
2541
- && managedAidArgv[1] === 'aid'
2542
- && managedAidArgv[2] === 'agentmd'
2543
- && managedAidArgv[3] === 'put'
2544
- && ownAid;
2545
- const isSelfAgentMdSet = !!managedAidArgv
2546
- && managedAidArgv.length === 7
2547
- && managedAidArgv[0] === 'ec'
2548
- && managedAidArgv[1] === 'aid'
2549
- && managedAidArgv[2] === 'agentmd'
2550
- && managedAidArgv[3] === 'set'
2551
- && !!context.selfAid
2552
- && managedAidArgv[4]?.replace(/^@/, '') === context.selfAid.replace(/^@/, '')
2553
- && ['name', 'type', 'description', 'version', 'tags', 'exttype'].includes(managedAidArgv[5] ?? '')
2554
- && managedAidArgv[6] !== undefined;
2555
- const avatarFileIndex = managedAidArgv?.indexOf('--file') ?? -1;
2556
- const avatarUrlIndex = managedAidArgv?.indexOf('--url') ?? -1;
2557
- const avatarSourceIndex = avatarFileIndex >= 0 ? avatarFileIndex : avatarUrlIndex;
2558
- const isSelfAvatarUpload = !!managedAidArgv
2559
- && (avatarSourceIndex === 4)
2560
- && managedAidArgv.length === 6
2561
- && managedAidArgv[0] === 'ec'
2562
- && managedAidArgv[1] === 'aid'
2563
- && managedAidArgv[2] === 'avatar'
2564
- && !!context.selfAid
2565
- && managedAidArgv[3]?.replace(/^@/, '') === context.selfAid.replace(/^@/, '')
2566
- && !!managedAidArgv[5]
2567
- && !managedAidArgv[5].startsWith('-');
2568
- const canPublishSelfAgentMd = isSelfAgentMdPublish
2569
- && ['request', 'bypass'].includes(context.permissionMode ?? '');
2570
- const canSetSelfAgentMd = isSelfAgentMdSet
2571
- && ['request', 'bypass'].includes(context.permissionMode ?? '');
2572
- const canUploadSelfAvatar = isSelfAvatarUpload
2573
- && ['request', 'bypass'].includes(context.permissionMode ?? '');
2574
- let isManagedOwnership = false;
2575
- if (managedAidArgs?.[0] === 'bind' || managedAidArgs?.[0] === 'transfer') {
2576
- try {
2577
- const ownership = parseOwnershipCommand(managedAidArgs);
2578
- isManagedOwnership = ownership.action === 'status'
2579
- || ['request', 'bypass'].includes(context.permissionMode ?? '');
2580
- }
2581
- catch { }
2582
- }
2583
- const isAllowedManagedAidCommand = isManagedAidPublicRead
2584
- || isManagedOwnership
2585
- || isSelfManagedAidShow
2586
- || canPublishSelfAgentMd
2587
- || canSetSelfAgentMd
2588
- || canUploadSelfAvatar;
2589
- if (context.sessionId && managedAidArgs !== undefined
2590
- && !isManagedAidHelp && !isAllowedManagedAidCommand) {
2591
- return {
2592
- behavior: 'deny',
2593
- input,
2594
- message: isSelfAgentMdPublish && (context.permissionMode === 'readonly' || context.permissionMode === 'auto')
2595
- ? `🔒 ${context.permissionMode} 模式禁止发布 agent.md;请切换到 request 或 bypass 后再执行 \`ec aid agentmd put <当前 self AID>\`。`
2596
- : isSelfAgentMdSet && (context.permissionMode === 'readonly' || context.permissionMode === 'auto')
2597
- ? `🔒 ${context.permissionMode} 模式禁止修改 agent.md;请切换到 request 或 bypass 后再执行 \`ec aid agentmd set <当前 self AID> <field> <value>\`。`
2598
- : isSelfAvatarUpload && (context.permissionMode === 'readonly' || context.permissionMode === 'auto')
2599
- ? `🔒 ${context.permissionMode} 模式禁止上传头像;请切换到 request 或 bypass 后再执行 \`ec aid avatar <当前 self AID> (--file <path> 或 --url <https-url>)\`。`
2600
- : '🔒 EvolCore 托管会话允许 `ec aid show <当前 self AID>`、`ec aid lookup <任意合法 AID>` 或 `ec aid agentmd get <任意合法 AID>`;`ec aid agentmd put/set` 及 `ec aid avatar` 还要求针对当前 self AID 且处于 request 或 bypass。可选后缀仅限 `--format json`。禁止列举本地身份、切换身份或对其它 AID 执行 show/put/set/avatar。',
2601
- policyCode: 'managed_ec_aid_scope_forbidden',
2602
- };
2603
- }
2604
2605
  if (ecCommand.kind === 'literal') {
2605
2606
  return { behavior: 'allow', input, reason: 'ec-command' };
2606
2607
  }
@@ -2707,7 +2708,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2707
2708
  allowProtectedMetadata: context.allowProtectedMetadata,
2708
2709
  });
2709
2710
  if (hClass.behavior === 'deny') {
2710
- return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: hClass.message, policyCode: 'h_class_protection', matchedPath: hClass.matchedPath };
2711
+ return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: `${hClass.message}${hClass.matchedRule ? ` (matchedRule=${hClass.matchedRule})` : ''}`, policyCode: 'h_class_protection', matchedPath: hClass.matchedPath, matchedRule: hClass.matchedRule };
2711
2712
  }
2712
2713
  const lClass = checkLClassWrite(policyToolName, protectedPolicyInput, {
2713
2714
  sessionId: context.sessionId,
@@ -2723,7 +2724,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2723
2724
  allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics: context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics,
2724
2725
  });
2725
2726
  if (lClass.behavior === 'deny') {
2726
- return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: lClass.message, policyCode: 'l_class_protection', matchedPath: lClass.matchedPath };
2727
+ return { behavior: 'deny', input: checkedInput, message: `${lClass.message}${lClass.matchedRule ? ` (matchedRule=${lClass.matchedRule})` : ''}`, policyCode: 'l_class_protection', matchedPath: lClass.matchedPath, matchedRule: lClass.matchedRule };
2727
2728
  }
2728
2729
  const dangerous = checkDangerousCommand(toolName, checkedInput);
2729
2730
  if (dangerous.isDangerous