evolcore 0.0.41-test.1 → 0.0.41

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (127) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +49 -36
  2. package/dist/agents/baseagent.js +68 -6
  3. package/dist/agents/codex-runner.js +62 -43
  4. package/dist/aun/aid/agentmd.js +98 -11
  5. package/dist/aun/aid/client.js +1 -1
  6. package/dist/aun/aid/control-aid.js +26 -2
  7. package/dist/aun/aid/identity.js +91 -0
  8. package/dist/aun/aid/index.js +1 -1
  9. package/dist/aun/aid/managed-operation.js +1 -1
  10. package/dist/aun/aid/ownership-operation.js +23 -22
  11. package/dist/aun/menu/client.js +27 -0
  12. package/dist/aun/msg/p2p.js +3 -8
  13. package/dist/aun/service-proxy.js +17 -0
  14. package/dist/channels/aun.js +321 -34
  15. package/dist/cli/agent-command.js +5 -2
  16. package/dist/cli/agent-create.js +991 -233
  17. package/dist/cli/agent.js +49 -10
  18. package/dist/cli/aid-bind-command.js +48 -19
  19. package/dist/cli/aun-commands.js +44 -16
  20. package/dist/cli/daemon-commands.js +1 -0
  21. package/dist/cli/index.js +24 -1
  22. package/dist/cli/init-channel.js +1 -1
  23. package/dist/cli/init.js +75 -1
  24. package/dist/cli/managed-command-guard.js +13 -1
  25. package/dist/cli/provider-command.js +57 -0
  26. package/dist/cli/restart-monitor.js +4 -2
  27. package/dist/cli/stats.js +10 -3
  28. package/dist/cli/task-context.js +19 -0
  29. package/dist/config/boot-log.js +3 -2
  30. package/dist/config/config-field-policy.js +12 -7
  31. package/dist/config/config-manager.js +138 -6
  32. package/dist/config/owner-config.js +2 -2
  33. package/dist/config/peer-role-resolver.js +2 -1
  34. package/dist/config/provider-ipc-service.js +132 -0
  35. package/dist/config/provider-menu-request.js +58 -0
  36. package/dist/config/providers-management.js +78 -5
  37. package/dist/config/resolved-config-op.js +8 -1
  38. package/dist/config/schema-migration.js +322 -8
  39. package/dist/config-store.js +10 -1
  40. package/dist/contracts/ecweb-service-protocol.js +2 -1
  41. package/dist/core/agent-application-service.js +60 -11
  42. package/dist/core/agent-create-status.js +203 -0
  43. package/dist/core/agent-creation-claim.js +177 -0
  44. package/dist/core/agent-ipc-registration.js +39 -18
  45. package/dist/core/agent-runtime.js +193 -23
  46. package/dist/core/auth/agent-delegation.js +4 -2
  47. package/dist/core/auth/auth-gateway.js +66 -1
  48. package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js +41 -5
  49. package/dist/core/auth/delegation-authorization.js +2 -1
  50. package/dist/core/auth/operation-authorizer.js +28 -6
  51. package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js +14 -1
  52. package/dist/core/channel-loader.js +2 -0
  53. package/dist/core/command/agent-control.js +257 -14
  54. package/dist/core/command/cli-intent-parser.js +6 -2
  55. package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js +64 -55
  56. package/dist/core/command/memory-slash.js +1 -1
  57. package/dist/core/command/menu-catalog.js +5 -0
  58. package/dist/core/command/menu-handler.js +64 -18
  59. package/dist/core/command/menu-protocol.js +15 -1
  60. package/dist/core/command/provider-menu.js +46 -0
  61. package/dist/core/command/slash-handler.js +2 -1
  62. package/dist/core/daemon-control.js +18 -13
  63. package/dist/core/event-catalog.js +10 -0
  64. package/dist/core/evolagent-registry.js +3 -1
  65. package/dist/core/evolagent.js +8 -6
  66. package/dist/core/file-integrity/store.js +11 -0
  67. package/dist/core/handoff/ipc-registration.js +3 -0
  68. package/dist/core/initialization/service.js +491 -0
  69. package/dist/core/ipc-registration.js +34 -22
  70. package/dist/core/memory/consolidation-ops-records.js +95 -0
  71. package/dist/core/memory/consolidation-trigger.js +19 -2
  72. package/dist/core/memory/consolidation.js +19 -8
  73. package/dist/core/memory/memory-admin.js +1 -1
  74. package/dist/core/memory/relation-sweep.js +11 -6
  75. package/dist/core/message/aun-ipc-sender.js +73 -67
  76. package/dist/core/message/im-renderer.js +18 -0
  77. package/dist/core/message/message-bridge.js +35 -3
  78. package/dist/core/message/response-engine.js +32 -28
  79. package/dist/core/model/catalog-service.js +1 -1
  80. package/dist/core/model/config-scope.js +5 -7
  81. package/dist/core/ownership/owner-resolver.js +755 -143
  82. package/dist/core/permission/approval-gateway.js +103 -403
  83. package/dist/core/permission/ec-command-parser.js +32 -4
  84. package/dist/core/permission/index.js +1 -0
  85. package/dist/core/permission/permission-result.js +78 -0
  86. package/dist/core/permission/tool-policy.js +7 -43
  87. package/dist/core/system-session/memory.js +37 -7
  88. package/dist/directory/owner-directory-cache.js +2 -2
  89. package/dist/ecweb/init-menu.js +32 -0
  90. package/dist/index.js +17 -5
  91. package/dist/ipc.js +85 -25
  92. package/dist/paths.js +3 -0
  93. package/dist/proxy/manager.js +6 -7
  94. package/dist/trigger/authorization.js +27 -17
  95. package/dist/trigger/feedback.js +2 -3
  96. package/dist/trigger/ipc-service.js +105 -78
  97. package/dist/trigger/local-files.js +2 -1
  98. package/dist/trigger/manager.js +5 -3
  99. package/dist/trigger/scheduler.js +88 -6
  100. package/dist/utils/atomic-write.js +28 -0
  101. package/dist/utils/error-utils.js +24 -0
  102. package/dist/utils/logger.js +68 -1
  103. package/dist/utils/welcome.js +1 -1
  104. package/kits/docs/INDEX.md +1 -0
  105. package/kits/docs/aun/SDK.md +4 -1
  106. package/kits/docs/evolcore/INDEX.md +1 -0
  107. package/kits/docs/evolcore/agent.md +8 -1
  108. package/kits/docs/evolcore/aid.md +67 -17
  109. package/kits/docs/evolcore/config.md +11 -1
  110. package/kits/docs/evolcore/group.md +1 -1
  111. package/kits/docs/evolcore/provider.md +50 -0
  112. package/kits/docs/identity/AID_PROFILE_SPEC.md +52 -17
  113. package/kits/rules/01-overview.md +3 -0
  114. package/kits/rules/04-relation.md +1 -1
  115. package/kits/schemas/_meta.json +2 -2
  116. package/kits/schemas/agent-config.schema.16.json +3 -3
  117. package/kits/schemas/relation-config.schema.11.json +17 -0
  118. package/kits/skills/.switches.json +8 -0
  119. package/kits/skills/ec-agent-create/SKILL.md +3 -0
  120. package/kits/skills/ec-identity/SKILL.md +2 -2
  121. package/kits/skills/ec-skill/scripts/skill.mjs +6 -0
  122. package/kits/skills/ec-trigger/SKILL.md +5 -13
  123. package/kits/skills/thread-ops/SKILL.md +5 -0
  124. package/kits/templates/system-fragments/venue.md +1 -1
  125. package/package.json +3 -3
  126. package/dist/core/memory/forget-log.js +0 -96
  127. package/dist/core/message/create-status.js +0 -96
@@ -1171,6 +1171,19 @@ export function parseCodexCarrierCommand(carrier, options = {}) {
1171
1171
  }
1172
1172
  : parsed;
1173
1173
  }
1174
+ export function literalShellParseRemedy(failure) {
1175
+ if (failure.issue === 'shell-composition') {
1176
+ return '一次调用只执行一条完整命令;查询和操作请拆成独立工具调用,不要拼接管道、重定向、分号或子表达式。';
1177
+ }
1178
+ if (failure.dialect !== 'powershell')
1179
+ return undefined;
1180
+ if (['invalid-quote', 'unsafe-expansion', 'unsupported-escape', 'structural-newline'].includes(failure.issue)) {
1181
+ return 'PowerShell 把 U+2018/U+2019/U+201A/U+201B 也当作单引号定界符。'
1182
+ + '纯文字用半角单引号包住,内部单引号定界符需双写;不要使用 Bash 的 ANSI-C quoting。'
1183
+ + '复杂正文可写入当前会话 $env:TMPDIR,再通过支持 --text-from-file 的命令读取;不要替换原文字符。';
1184
+ }
1185
+ return undefined;
1186
+ }
1174
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  function parseFailure(issue, input, offset, tokenIndex, dialect) {
1175
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  return {
1176
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  ok: false,
@@ -1965,7 +1978,7 @@ export function parseCodexToolCommand(input, options = {}) {
1965
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  if (stringCarrier) {
1966
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  return parseCodexCarrierCommand(stringCarrier, { allowManagedTmpDir: true, ...options });
1967
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  }
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- const outer = parseLiteralShellCommand(command, { allowManagedTmpDir: true });
1981
+ const outer = parseLiteralShellCommand(command, { allowManagedTmpDir: true, ...options });
1969
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  if (outer.ok) {
1970
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  const carrier = resolveCodexShellCarrierArgv(outer.argv);
1971
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  if (carrier !== undefined) {
@@ -3150,9 +3163,12 @@ const SEND_CONTENT_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set([
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  '--payload', '--title', '--description', '--text', '--transcript', '--handoff-context',
3151
3164
  ]);
3152
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  const TRIGGER_CONTENT_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['--prompt']);
3166
+ const THREAD_SUMMARY_CONTROL_FLAGS = new Set([
3167
+ '--if-rev', '--name', '--self', '--as-session', '--format', '--json', '--help', '-h',
3168
+ ]);
3153
3169
  /**
3154
- * A shell-escaped `$TMPDIR` in a msg/group text body or trigger prompt is
3155
- * ordinary content, not a path reference. Keep every other unresolved
3170
+ * A shell-escaped `$TMPDIR` in a msg/group text body, trigger prompt, or thread
3171
+ * summary is ordinary content, not a path reference. Keep every other unresolved
3156
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  * occurrence fail-closed so file and control arguments cannot bypass
3157
3173
  * managed-path checks.
3158
3174
  */
@@ -3166,9 +3182,21 @@ export function containsLiteralManagedTmpDirOutsideSendContent(argv) {
3166
3182
  && (argv[1] === 'msg' || argv[1] === 'group')
3167
3183
  && argv[2] === 'send';
3168
3184
  const isTriggerCommand = argv[0] === 'ec' && argv[1] === 'trigger';
3169
- if (!isSendCommand && !isTriggerCommand)
3185
+ const isThreadSummarySetCommand = argv[0] === 'ec' && argv[1] === 'thread'
3186
+ && argv[2] === 'summary' && argv[3] === 'set';
3187
+ if (!isSendCommand && !isTriggerCommand && !isThreadSummarySetCommand)
3170
3188
  return true;
3171
3189
  const textIndexes = new Set();
3190
+ if (isThreadSummarySetCommand) {
3191
+ // Match runThreadCommand's contentArgs filtering: the ref, known flags,
3192
+ // and their following arguments are control data rather than summary text.
3193
+ for (let index = 5; index < argv.length; index++) {
3194
+ if (THREAD_SUMMARY_CONTROL_FLAGS.has(argv[index])
3195
+ || index > 5 && THREAD_SUMMARY_CONTROL_FLAGS.has(argv[index - 1]))
3196
+ continue;
3197
+ textIndexes.add(index);
3198
+ }
3199
+ }
3172
3200
  if (isTriggerCommand) {
3173
3201
  for (let index = 2; index < argv.length; index++) {
3174
3202
  if (!TRIGGER_CONTENT_VALUE_FLAGS.has(argv[index]))
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ export * from './tool-policy.js';
2
2
  export * from './ec-command-parser.js';
3
3
  export * from './readonly-shell-query.js';
4
4
  export * from './approval-gateway.js';
5
+ export * from './permission-result.js';
5
6
  export * from './mode.js';
6
7
  // Tool summaries live in utils; keep the historical permission import path compatible.
7
8
  export { summarizeToolInput } from '../../utils/tool-summary.js';
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
1
+ const failureMessages = {
2
+ no_requester_approver: '无法发起审批:未能确定作为审批人的申请人;操作未执行。',
3
+ no_agent_owner_configured: '无法发起审批:未能确定 Agent owner 审批人;操作未执行。',
4
+ no_agent_manager_configured: '无法发起审批:未配置符合条件的 Agent 管理审批人;操作未执行。',
5
+ no_aun_owner_available: '无法发起审批:未找到符合条件的 owner 审批人;操作未执行。',
6
+ approver_candidates_unavailable: '无法发起审批:审批人候选身份查询失败;操作未执行。',
7
+ approval_identity_missing: '无法发起审批:申请人身份缺失;操作未执行。',
8
+ actor_operator_mismatch: '无法发起审批:申请人身份与审批上下文不一致;操作未执行。',
9
+ actor_channel_mismatch: '无法发起审批:申请人的认证渠道与当前审批渠道不一致;操作未执行。',
10
+ owner_approval_channel_unavailable: '无法发起审批:owner 审批接收渠道不可用;操作未执行。',
11
+ approval_gateway_unavailable: '无法发起审批:审批网关未初始化;操作未执行。',
12
+ approval_prompt_unavailable: '无法发起审批:审批消息发送回调不可用;操作未执行。',
13
+ approval_router_unavailable: '无法发起审批:审批交互路由不可用;操作未执行。',
14
+ approval_routing_context_unavailable: '无法发起审批:审批路由上下文缺失;操作未执行。',
15
+ channel_disconnected: '审批渠道连接已断开;操作未执行。',
16
+ delivery_failed: '审批请求投递失败:接收渠道未接受请求;操作未执行。',
17
+ expired: '审批已超时;操作未执行。',
18
+ timeout: '审批已超时;操作未执行。',
19
+ cancelled: '审批已取消;操作未执行。',
20
+ user_cancelled: '审批交互已取消;操作未执行。',
21
+ new_message: '收到新消息,原审批已取消;操作未执行。',
22
+ interrupted: '会话已中断,审批已终止;操作未执行。',
23
+ task_error: '任务发生错误,审批已终止;操作未执行。',
24
+ task_completed: '任务已结束,待处理审批已取消;操作未执行。',
25
+ tool_cancelled: '工具调用已取消,审批终止;操作未执行。',
26
+ daemon_restart: '宿主重启,审批已终止;操作未执行。',
27
+ permission_mode_denied: '当前权限策略禁止发起交互审批;操作未执行。',
28
+ ownership_authorization_failed: '当前会话的所有权授权校验失败;操作未执行。',
29
+ challenge_not_grantable: '当前权限策略不允许批准此请求;操作未执行。',
30
+ approver_role_requirement_invalid: '审批人角色要求无效;操作未执行。',
31
+ approver_identity_incomplete: '审批人身份信息不完整;操作未执行。',
32
+ approver_reauthorization_unavailable: '审批人身份重新校验服务不可用;操作未执行。',
33
+ approver_reauthorization_failed: '审批人身份重新校验发生错误;操作未执行。',
34
+ approver_identity_mismatch: '审批人身份校验不匹配;操作未执行。',
35
+ approver_identity_changed: '审批人身份已变更,本次审批失效;操作未执行。',
36
+ approver_identity_untrusted: '审批人身份未通过可信校验;操作未执行。',
37
+ principal_mapping_removed: '审批人的身份映射已移除;操作未执行。',
38
+ principal_mapping_conflict: '审批人的身份映射存在冲突;操作未执行。',
39
+ principal_mapping_changed: '审批人的身份映射已变更;操作未执行。',
40
+ approver_role_changed: '审批人已不具备本次请求要求的角色;操作未执行。',
41
+ approver_revoked: '审批人的授权资格已被撤销;操作未执行。',
42
+ approver_not_host_owner: '审批人不具备本次请求要求的宿主所有者资格;操作未执行。',
43
+ origin_authorization_changed: '申请人的原始授权已变更,本次审批失效;操作未执行。',
44
+ };
45
+ const policyFailures = new Set([
46
+ 'permission_mode_denied', 'ownership_authorization_failed', 'challenge_not_grantable',
47
+ 'actor_operator_mismatch', 'actor_channel_mismatch', 'approver_role_requirement_invalid',
48
+ 'approver_identity_incomplete', 'approver_identity_mismatch', 'approver_identity_changed',
49
+ 'approver_identity_untrusted', 'principal_mapping_removed', 'principal_mapping_conflict',
50
+ 'principal_mapping_changed', 'approver_role_changed', 'approver_revoked',
51
+ 'approver_not_host_owner', 'origin_authorization_changed',
52
+ ]);
53
+ export function permissionFailureResult(requestId, failure, approver = {}, policyCode) {
54
+ const known = Object.hasOwn(failureMessages, failure);
55
+ return {
56
+ decision: 'deny',
57
+ decisionSource: policyFailures.has(failure) ? 'policy' : 'infrastructure',
58
+ requestId,
59
+ policyCode: policyCode ?? (known ? `approval_${failure}` : 'approval_failure_unknown'),
60
+ errorDetailCode: known ? failure.toUpperCase() : 'APPROVAL_FAILURE_UNKNOWN',
61
+ reason: known ? failureMessages[failure] : '审批失败,具体原因未知;操作未执行。',
62
+ approverOperatorId: approver.approverOperatorId,
63
+ approverChannelKey: approver.approverChannelKey,
64
+ approverPrincipalId: approver.approverPrincipalId,
65
+ };
66
+ }
67
+ export function permissionApprovalResult(requestId, decision, approver = {}) {
68
+ return {
69
+ decision,
70
+ decisionSource: 'approval',
71
+ requestId,
72
+ reason: decision === 'deny' ? '审批人明确拒绝了本次操作;操作未执行。' : '审批人已批准本次操作。',
73
+ ...(decision === 'deny' ? { policyCode: 'user_approval_denied', errorDetailCode: 'USER_APPROVAL_DENIED' } : {}),
74
+ approverOperatorId: approver.approverOperatorId,
75
+ approverChannelKey: approver.approverChannelKey,
76
+ approverPrincipalId: approver.approverPrincipalId,
77
+ };
78
+ }
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
6
6
  import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
7
7
  import { resolveRoot } from '../../paths.js';
8
8
  import { containsHClassReference, containsAgentScopeReference, containsLClassReference, checkProtectedPathAccess, getExistingHClassMaskTargets, hClassGrantIncludesProtectedPath, isHClassPath, isSameOrDescendant, isLClassPath, lClassGrantIncludesProtectedPath, resolveProtectedCandidate, resolveProtectedCandidateWithoutFinalSymlink, } from './protected-paths.js';
9
- import { classifyEvolcoreShellCommand, canonicalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv, hasCodexCmdCarrierEcIntent, hasPowerShellCredentialAssignment, normalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv, parseCodexToolCommand, parseBoundedOutputShellCommand, buildCanonicalEvolcoreExecutionSpec, serializeCanonicalEvolcoreExecutionSpec, parseShellApplyPatchInvocation, parseLiteralShellArgv, resolveCodexShellCarrierArgv, resolveCodexShellCarrierString, } from './ec-command-parser.js';
9
+ import { classifyEvolcoreShellCommand, canonicalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv, hasCodexCmdCarrierEcIntent, hasPowerShellCredentialAssignment, normalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv, parseCodexToolCommand, literalShellParseRemedy, parseBoundedOutputShellCommand, buildCanonicalEvolcoreExecutionSpec, serializeCanonicalEvolcoreExecutionSpec, parseShellApplyPatchInvocation, parseLiteralShellArgv, resolveCodexShellCarrierArgv, resolveCodexShellCarrierString, } from './ec-command-parser.js';
10
10
  import { analyzeReadonlyShellQuery, } from './readonly-shell-query.js';
11
11
  import { applyPatchChangePaths, collectFileChangePaths } from './tool-canonical.js';
12
12
  /** Resolve the session-owned temporary root supplied by the execution host. */
@@ -1330,48 +1330,21 @@ function analyzeShellProtectedOperands(command, options) {
1330
1330
  analysis,
1331
1331
  hClass: !!hClassPath,
1332
1332
  lClass: !!lClassPath,
1333
- pathHClass: !!hClassPath,
1334
- lockDiagnostic: false,
1335
1333
  hClassPath,
1336
1334
  lClassPath,
1337
1335
  };
1338
1336
  }
1339
1337
  const operands = queryPathOperands(analysis);
1340
- // Only parsed path operands can establish a lock-file diagnostic. Searching
1341
- // the raw command would mistake a grep/rg pattern or report text for an
1342
- // actual protected filesystem target.
1343
- const lockDiagnostic = operands.some(({ operand }) => containsLockPathReference(operand.value))
1344
- || hasFindLockPattern(analysis);
1345
1338
  const hClassPath = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'h', options, accessKind)).find(Boolean);
1346
1339
  const lClassPath = operands.map(({ operand, accessKind }) => shellOperandMatchesClass(operand, 'l', options, accessKind)).find(Boolean);
1347
1340
  return {
1348
1341
  analysis,
1349
- hClass: lockDiagnostic || !!hClassPath,
1342
+ hClass: !!hClassPath,
1350
1343
  lClass: !!lClassPath,
1351
- pathHClass: !!hClassPath,
1352
- lockDiagnostic,
1353
1344
  hClassPath,
1354
1345
  lClassPath,
1355
1346
  };
1356
1347
  }
1357
- /** Detect a find pattern such as `-name '*.lock'` from parsed argv only. */
1358
- function hasFindLockPattern(analysis) {
1359
- if (analysis.kind !== 'proven-readonly')
1360
- return false;
1361
- return analysis.ir.pipelines.some(pipeline => pipeline.some(command => {
1362
- if (command.executable !== 'find')
1363
- return false;
1364
- for (let index = 0; index < command.argv.length - 1; index++) {
1365
- if (!['-name', '-iname', '-path', '-ipath', '-wholename'].includes(command.argv[index]))
1366
- continue;
1367
- if (/(?:^|[\\/])[^\\/]*\.lock(?:$|[\\/])/i.test(command.argv[index + 1]))
1368
- return true;
1369
- if (/^EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR$/i.test(command.argv[index + 1]))
1370
- return true;
1371
- }
1372
- return false;
1373
- }));
1374
- }
1375
1348
  function protectedReadToolPaths(toolName, input) {
1376
1349
  if (toolName === 'Read') {
1377
1350
  return typeof input.file_path === 'string' ? [input.file_path] : [];
@@ -1514,7 +1487,6 @@ function readonlySourceDiagnosticAllowed(analysis, projectPath) {
1514
1487
  if (!first || !READONLY_SOURCE_ROOTS.has(first) || segments.includes('node_modules'))
1515
1488
  return false;
1516
1489
  return !containsHClassReference(operand.value) && !containsLClassReference(operand.value)
1517
- && !containsLockPathReference(operand.value)
1518
1490
  && !isHClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() })
1519
1491
  && !isLClassPath(candidate, { root: resolveRoot() });
1520
1492
  });
@@ -1567,12 +1539,6 @@ function boundedRootSourceEnumeration(analysis, projectPath) {
1567
1539
  return pipeline.slice(1).every(command => ['head', 'sort', 'grep', 'wc'].includes(command.executable)
1568
1540
  && command.pathOperands.length === 0);
1569
1541
  }
1570
- /** A lock filename used as a query pattern is safe; an operand naming the
1571
- * actual lock path is still protected. */
1572
- function containsLockPathReference(value) {
1573
- return /(?:^|[\\/])(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)(?:$|[\\/])/i.test(value)
1574
- || /^(?:[^\\/]*\.lock|EVOLCORE_RUNTIME_LOCK_DIR)$/i.test(value);
1575
- }
1576
1542
  /**
1577
1543
  * 只读模式检查(用于 PreToolUse hook 和 canUseTool callback)。普通
1578
1544
  * 路径上的受限查询 Bash 可自动执行;H/L-class 和未建模 Shell 仍拒绝。
@@ -1633,8 +1599,7 @@ export function checkReadonly(toolName, input, projectPath, context) {
1633
1599
  const boundedSourceQueryAllowed = boundedRootSourceEnumeration(protectedOperands.analysis, projectPath);
1634
1600
  const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics
1635
1601
  && (!protectedOperands.lClass || boundedSourceQueryAllowed)
1636
- && ((sourceQueryAllowed
1637
- && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass)))
1602
+ && ((sourceQueryAllowed && !protectedOperands.hClass)
1638
1603
  || boundedSourceQueryAllowed);
1639
1604
  if (sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
1640
1605
  return { behavior: 'allow' };
@@ -1928,8 +1893,7 @@ export function checkHClassWrite(toolName, input, context) {
1928
1893
  const sourceDiagnosticAllowed = context?.permissionMode === 'readonly'
1929
1894
  && context.allowReadonlySourceDiagnostics === true
1930
1895
  && (!protectedOperands.lClass || boundedSourceQueryAllowed)
1931
- && ((sourceQueryAllowed
1932
- && (!protectedOperands.hClass || (protectedOperands.lockDiagnostic && !protectedOperands.pathHClass)))
1896
+ && ((sourceQueryAllowed && !protectedOperands.hClass)
1933
1897
  || boundedSourceQueryAllowed);
1934
1898
  if (protectedOperands.hClass && !sourceDiagnosticAllowed) {
1935
1899
  logger.warn(`[H-Class Protection] 🔒 Protected filesystem operand in shell command: tool=${toolName} ` +
@@ -2562,7 +2526,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2562
2526
  && managedAidArgv[3] === 'set'
2563
2527
  && !!context.selfAid
2564
2528
  && managedAidArgv[4]?.replace(/^@/, '') === context.selfAid.replace(/^@/, '')
2565
- && ['name', 'type', 'description', 'version', 'tags'].includes(managedAidArgv[5] ?? '')
2529
+ && ['name', 'type', 'description', 'version', 'tags', 'exttype'].includes(managedAidArgv[5] ?? '')
2566
2530
  && managedAidArgv[6] !== undefined;
2567
2531
  const avatarFileIndex = managedAidArgv?.indexOf('--file') ?? -1;
2568
2532
  const avatarUrlIndex = managedAidArgv?.indexOf('--url') ?? -1;
@@ -2584,7 +2548,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2584
2548
  const canUploadSelfAvatar = isSelfAvatarUpload
2585
2549
  && ['request', 'bypass'].includes(context.permissionMode ?? '');
2586
2550
  let isManagedOwnership = false;
2587
- if (managedAidArgs?.[0] === 'bind') {
2551
+ if (managedAidArgs?.[0] === 'bind' || managedAidArgs?.[0] === 'transfer') {
2588
2552
  try {
2589
2553
  const ownership = parseOwnershipCommand(managedAidArgs);
2590
2554
  isManagedOwnership = ownership.action === 'status'
@@ -2650,7 +2614,7 @@ export function evaluateToolPreflight(toolName, input, context) {
2650
2614
  }
2651
2615
  if (ecCommand.issue === 'invalid-quote') {
2652
2616
  const message = shellDialect === 'powershell'
2653
- ? '🔒 EC 命令引号未闭合或存在错误嵌套。Note: PowerShell 把 U+2018/U+2019/U+201A/U+201B 也当引号定界符——正文里出现这四个字符同样会报此错。正文一律用半角单引号(ASCII 0x27)包住,正文内部的半角撇号用 `ʼ`(U+02BC)或 `'`(U+FF07)代替,或把消息正文写入当前 $TMPDIR 后使用 --text-from-file'
2617
+ ? `🔒 EC 命令引号未闭合或存在错误嵌套。${literalShellParseRemedy({ issue: 'invalid-quote', dialect: 'powershell' })}`
2654
2618
  : shellDialect === 'cmd'
2655
2619
  ? '🔒 EC 命令引号未闭合或存在错误嵌套;cmd.exe carrier 的命令正文请保持一个完整参数,不要用未配对的双引号'
2656
2620
  : '🔒 EC 命令引号未闭合或存在错误嵌套。自由文本参数用单引号包住;正文含单引号时改用 $\'…\' 语法,内部用 \\\' 转义,如 $\'it\\\'s fine\'。';
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
17
17
  */
18
18
  import path from 'path';
19
19
  import { resolveRoot } from '../../paths.js';
20
- import { parseCodexToolCommand } from '../permission/ec-command-parser.js';
20
+ import { parseCodexToolCommand, resolveCodexShellCarrierArgv, resolveCodexShellCarrierString, literalShellParseRemedy, } from '../permission/ec-command-parser.js';
21
21
  import { canonicalToolCall } from '../permission/tool-canonical.js';
22
22
  import { checkReadonly } from '../permission/tool-policy.js';
23
23
  import { analyzeReadonlyShellQuery } from '../permission/readonly-shell-query.js';
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ const MEMORY_MANIFEST = 'eck_manifest.memory.json';
29
29
  const ALLOWED_MEMORY_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set(['create', 'update', 'archive']);
30
30
  const BASH_COMMAND_RULE = 'Bash 只允许两类命令:单条 `ec memory create|update|archive`(不能与其他命令拼接);'
31
31
  + '或路径落在可读根内、可证明只读的查询(如 ls / cat / grep),多条查询可用 `&&` 或 `;` 连接,最多 8 段。'
32
- + '读文件请用 Read / Glob / Grep;整理反馈用文件写入工具写到任务书指定的反馈文件。';
32
+ + '有文件工具时用 Read / Glob / Grep;只有 Bash/Shell 时可用 cat,明确的 pwsh/powershell -NoProfile -Command 包装内可用单条 Get-Content -LiteralPath <绝对路径> [-Raw]。'
33
+ + '整理反馈用文件写入工具写到任务书指定的反馈文件。';
33
34
  function layerDir(layer, ctx) {
34
35
  const root = resolveRoot();
35
36
  if (layer === 'agent')
@@ -166,17 +167,46 @@ function isAllowedMemoryCommand(argv) {
166
167
  return argv[0] === 'ec' && argv[1] === 'memory' && ALLOWED_MEMORY_SUBCOMMANDS.has(argv[2] ?? '');
167
168
  }
168
169
  function checkShell(input, ctx) {
169
- const parsed = parseCodexToolCommand(input);
170
+ const parsed = parseCodexToolCommand(input, { managedTempDir: ctx.managedTempDir });
170
171
  if (parsed.ok && isAllowedMemoryCommand(parsed.argv))
171
172
  return { allow: true, ecCommand: true };
173
+ const shellCarrier = Array.isArray(input.commandArgv) && input.commandArgv.every(value => typeof value === 'string')
174
+ ? resolveCodexShellCarrierArgv(input.commandArgv)
175
+ : typeof input.command === 'string' ? resolveCodexShellCarrierString(input.command) : undefined;
176
+ if (shellCarrier?.dialect === 'powershell' && parsed.ok && parsed.argv[0]?.toLowerCase() === 'get-content') {
177
+ const argv = parsed.argv;
178
+ if ((argv.length !== 3 && argv.length !== 4)
179
+ || argv[1].toLowerCase() !== '-literalpath'
180
+ || (argv.length === 4 && argv[3].toLowerCase() !== '-raw')
181
+ || !path.isAbsolute(argv[2])
182
+ || /[\0\r\n]/u.test(argv[2])
183
+ || (process.platform === 'win32' && /:/u.test(argv[2].replace(/^[a-z]:/i, '')))) {
184
+ return deny('memory_session_command_forbidden', BASH_COMMAND_RULE);
185
+ }
186
+ const result = checkReadWithinMatrix('Read', { file_path: argv[2] }, ctx);
187
+ return result.behavior === 'allow'
188
+ ? { allow: true }
189
+ : deny('memory_session_command_forbidden', result.message);
190
+ }
191
+ if (shellCarrier?.parseFailure || (shellCarrier && shellCarrier.dialect !== 'posix')) {
192
+ return deny('memory_session_command_forbidden', BASH_COMMAND_RULE);
193
+ }
194
+ if (Array.isArray(input.commandArgv) && !parsed.ok) {
195
+ return deny('memory_session_command_forbidden', BASH_COMMAND_RULE);
196
+ }
197
+ const readonlyInput = shellCarrier
198
+ ? { ...input, command: shellCarrier.command }
199
+ : Array.isArray(input.commandArgv) && parsed.ok
200
+ ? { ...input, command: parsed.argv.map(value => "'" + value.replaceAll("'", "'\\''") + "'").join(' ') }
201
+ : input;
172
202
  // Codex 没有 Read 工具,读任务书只能靠可证明只读的 shell 查询
173
- const readonly = checkReadWithinMatrix('Bash', input, ctx);
203
+ const readonly = checkReadWithinMatrix('Bash', readonlyInput, ctx);
174
204
  if (readonly.behavior === 'allow')
175
205
  return { allow: true };
176
- const rawCommand = typeof input.command === 'string' ? input.command : '';
206
+ const rawCommand = typeof readonlyInput.command === 'string' ? readonlyInput.command : '';
177
207
  // ec 命令按 ec 解析器归因;ec 解析器的 issue 只描述 ec 命令,不能拿来解释普通 shell 查询
178
208
  if (looksLikeMemoryCommand(rawCommand)) {
179
- const remedy = parsed.ok ? undefined : shellIssueRemedy(parsed.issue);
209
+ const remedy = parsed.ok ? undefined : literalShellParseRemedy(parsed) ?? shellIssueRemedy(parsed.issue);
180
210
  if (remedy) {
181
211
  return deny('memory_session_command_forbidden', `这条命令本身就是 \`ec memory\`,但未能解析成单条字面命令。${remedy}`);
182
212
  }
@@ -215,7 +245,7 @@ function readonlyDenialHint(command, policyCode, ctx) {
215
245
  + '静态确定不了会读哪些文件。列文件请用 Glob 并给绝对 path。';
216
246
  case 'unsupported-command-or-option':
217
247
  return '命令或选项不在只读查询白名单内。不需要 `cd`:把绝对路径直接写进命令里。'
218
- + '读文件用 Read,列文件用 Glob,搜索用 Grep。';
248
+ + '只有 Shell 时用 cat,或在明确的 pwsh/powershell -NoProfile -Command 包装内使用 Get-Content -LiteralPath <绝对路径> [-Raw];有文件工具时也可用 Read / Glob / Grep。';
219
249
  case 'unsupported-pipeline-filter':
220
250
  return '管道 `|` 后面的命令不是纯 stdin 过滤命令。';
221
251
  case 'pipeline-filter-must-use-stdin':
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ export class OwnerDirectoryCache {
118
118
  /** At startup, wait at most three seconds for first snapshots; stale refreshes stay in background. */
119
119
  async refreshIfNeeded() {
120
120
  const grant = this.loadGrant();
121
- logger.info(`[OwnerDirectoryCache] refreshIfNeeded called for ${this.options.ownerAid}, grant exists: ${!!grant}`);
121
+ logger.debug(`[OwnerDirectoryCache] refreshIfNeeded called for ${this.options.ownerAid}, grant exists: ${!!grant}`);
122
122
  if (!grant) {
123
- logger.warn(`[OwnerDirectoryCache] No authorization grant found, cannot refresh`);
123
+ logger.debug(`[OwnerDirectoryCache] No authorization grant found, cannot refresh`);
124
124
  return {};
125
125
  }
126
126
  logger.info(`[OwnerDirectoryCache] Active scopes: ${JSON.stringify(grant.activeScopes)}`);
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
1
+ import { menuFailure, menuSuccess, validateMenuRequest } from '../core/command/menu-protocol.js';
2
+ import { ecwebInitializationService } from '../core/initialization/service.js';
3
+ export function isInitializationBindingMenu(request) {
4
+ return request.type === 'menu.action' && request.name === 'initialization' && request.action === 'bind';
5
+ }
6
+ export async function handleInitializationBindingMenu(request, auth, service = ecwebInitializationService) {
7
+ const header = { id: String(request.id ?? ''), name: 'initialization' };
8
+ if (!isInitializationBindingMenu(request))
9
+ return menuFailure(header, { code: 'NOT_SUPPORTED', message: 'Only initialization.bind is allowed' });
10
+ if (!auth.encrypted || auth.remoteToken)
11
+ return menuFailure(header, { code: 'NOT_ALLOWED', message: 'Encrypted AUN identity authentication is required' });
12
+ const invalid = validateMenuRequest(request);
13
+ if (invalid || typeof request.id !== 'string' || !request.id.trim())
14
+ return menuFailure(header, invalid ?? { code: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT', message: 'Request ID is required' });
15
+ const args = request.args;
16
+ if (!args || Object.keys(args).some(key => !['sessionId', 'token'].includes(key))) {
17
+ return menuFailure(header, { code: 'INVALID_ARGUMENT', message: 'Expected sessionId and token' });
18
+ }
19
+ try {
20
+ const state = await service.submitOwner(auth.peerAid, args.sessionId, args.token);
21
+ return menuSuccess(header, {
22
+ accepted: true, subjectAid: state.controlAid, ownerAid: auth.peerAid,
23
+ status: state.binding?.status ?? 'unknown',
24
+ });
25
+ }
26
+ catch (error) {
27
+ return menuFailure(header, {
28
+ code: error.code ?? 'INIT_UNAVAILABLE',
29
+ message: error.code && error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Initialization binding unavailable',
30
+ });
31
+ }
32
+ }
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import { loadDefaults, loadAllAgents, migrateIdentitiesIfNeeded, loadDaemonConfi
17
17
  import { inspectClaudeSandboxDependencies, formatClaudeSandboxDependencies } from './core/permission/sandbox-runtime.js';
18
18
  import { migrateRelationSharedDirectories } from './core/relation/shared-data.js';
19
19
  import { DEFAULT_ECWEB_PORT, ecwebService, serviceRuntimeMode } from './config/daemon-services.js';
20
- import { ConfigTarget, onConfigWrite } from './config/config-manager.js';
20
+ import { ConfigTarget, clearConfiguredOwnerAfterConsensus, onConfigWrite, } from './config/config-manager.js';
21
21
  import { expirePendingContactRequests } from './config/contact-request-service.js';
22
22
  import { synchronizeOwnershipContactsSync } from './config/contact-book-store.js';
23
23
  import { createSessionIdentityResolver } from './config/peer-role-resolver.js';
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ import { AgentLoader } from './core/baseagent-loader.js';
77
77
  import { EvolAgentRegistry } from './core/evolagent-registry.js';
78
78
  import { createAgentInitializationRuntime, createAgentReloadRuntime, createAgentRuntimeOperations, createStartupAgentRunners, completeStartupAgentRuntime, loadStartupAgentRegistry, recoverIncompleteAgentInitializations, } from './core/agent-runtime.js';
79
79
  import { IpcServer } from './ipc.js';
80
- import { installChannelSdkConsoleFilter, logger, setLogLevel } from './utils/logger.js';
80
+ import { installChannelSdkConsoleFilter, logger, logOwnershipEvent, ownershipErrorCode, setLogLevel } from './utils/logger.js';
81
81
  import { DiagService } from './core/command/diag-service.js';
82
82
  import { createEcwebSupervisor } from './utils/ecweb-supervisor.js';
83
83
  import { writeMain, removeAll, isMainWinner, scanInstances } from './utils/instance-registry.js';
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ import { loadKitManifest, cleanEckDebug } from './eck/kit-renderer.js';
85
85
  import { initEck } from './eck/init.js';
86
86
  import { TriggerAuditLogger } from './trigger/audit.js';
87
87
  import { TriggerScriptExecutor } from './trigger/script-executor.js';
88
- import { authenticatedTriggerActor as authenticateTriggerActor, authorizeTriggerExecution as authorizeTriggerRun, validateTriggerDefinitionForActor as validateTriggerActorDefinition, validateTriggerFeedbackChannels as validateTriggerFeedbackChannelBindings, } from './trigger/authorization.js';
88
+ import { authenticatedTriggerActor as authenticateTriggerActor, authenticatedTriggerActorFromGrant, authorizeTriggerExecution as authorizeTriggerRun, validateTriggerDefinitionForActor as validateTriggerActorDefinition, validateTriggerFeedbackChannels as validateTriggerFeedbackChannelBindings, } from './trigger/authorization.js';
89
89
  import { TargetSessionLockRegistry } from './trigger/session-lock.js';
90
90
  import { buildTriggerScheduler, createTriggerChannelResolver, TriggerSchedulerRegistry } from './trigger/application-service.js';
91
91
  import { DaemonChannel } from './channels/daemon.js';
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ async function main() {
249
249
  logger.warn(`ECWeb supervisor 启动失败(不影响 daemon 主流程): ${error?.message || error}`);
250
250
  });
251
251
  }
252
- if (bindBootstrapMode && daemonCfg.aid && loadAllAgents().agents.length === 0) {
252
+ if (bindBootstrapMode && process.env.EVOLCORE_WEB_INIT !== '1' && daemonCfg.aid && loadAllAgents().agents.length === 0) {
253
253
  await runBindBootstrapDaemon(daemonCfg);
254
254
  return;
255
255
  }
@@ -378,13 +378,23 @@ async function main() {
378
378
  synchronizeOwnershipContactsSync(subjectAid);
379
379
  }
380
380
  catch (error) {
381
- logger.warn(`[ownership] Contact role synchronization failed: self=${subjectAid} error=${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`);
381
+ logOwnershipEvent('contacts.sync_failed', { subjectAid, ownerAid, errorCode: ownershipErrorCode(error) }, true);
382
382
  }
383
383
  }
384
384
  if (!ownerAid)
385
385
  return;
386
386
  initializationServiceForOwnerRecovery?.resumeForOwner(subjectAid, ownerAid);
387
387
  onProtocolOwnerBound(subjectAid, ownerAid);
388
+ if (agentRegistry.get(subjectAid)) {
389
+ try {
390
+ if (clearConfiguredOwnerAfterConsensus(subjectAid, ownerAid)) {
391
+ logOwnershipEvent('compatibility.cleared', { subjectAid, ownerAid });
392
+ }
393
+ }
394
+ catch (error) {
395
+ logOwnershipEvent('compatibility.cleanup_failed', { subjectAid, ownerAid, errorCode: ownershipErrorCode(error) }, true);
396
+ }
397
+ }
388
398
  });
389
399
  onShutdown(() => { stopOwnerNotifications(); ownerResolver.stop(); });
390
400
  const agentDelegationRegistry = new AgentDelegationRegistry();
@@ -949,8 +959,10 @@ async function main() {
949
959
  primaryAgent,
950
960
  triggerAuthorization: {
951
961
  authenticateActor: authenticatedTriggerActor,
962
+ authenticateDelegatedActor: (agentAid, grant) => authenticatedTriggerActorFromGrant(triggerAuthorizationDependencies, agentAid, grant),
952
963
  validateTriggerDefinitionForActor,
953
964
  validateTriggerFeedbackChannels,
965
+ authorizeExecution: authorizeTriggerExecution,
954
966
  },
955
967
  });
956
968
  recoverIncompleteAgentInitializations(agentInitializationService, paths.agentsDir);