evolcore 0.0.28 → 0.0.29-test.0

package/dist/config/runtime-env.js

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import fs from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
+import { agentDir, resolvePaths } from '../paths.js';
+export const RUNTIME_ENVIRONMENT_NAMES = [
+    'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
+    'ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN',
+    'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
+];
+const cache = new Map();
+const overrides = new Map();
+const startupValues = new Map();
+function captureStartupValues() {
+    startupValues.clear();
+    for (const name of RUNTIME_ENVIRONMENT_NAMES)
+        startupValues.set(name, process.env[name]);
+}
+captureStartupValues();
+function isSafeAid(aid) {
+    const labels = aid.split('.');
+    return aid.length > 0 && aid.length <= 256 && path.basename(aid) === aid
+        && labels.length >= 3
+        && labels.every(label => /^[A-Za-z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?$/u.test(label));
+}
+function normalizeScope(aid) {
+    if (!aid || aid === '*')
+        return '*';
+    if (!isSafeAid(aid))
+        throw new Error('Invalid agent aid');
+    return aid;
+}
+function envFileValue(file, name) {
+    try {
+        for (const line of fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').split(/\r?\n/u)) {
+            const match = line.match(/^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=\s*(.*?)\s*$/u);
+            if (!match || match[1] !== name)
+                continue;
+            const value = match[2].trim();
+            return value.length > 1 && ((value[0] === '"' && value.at(-1) === '"')
+                || (value[0] === "'" && value.at(-1) === "'")) ? value.slice(1, -1) : value;
+        }
+    }
+    catch { }
+    return undefined;
+}
+function windowsValue(hive, name) {
+    if (process.platform !== 'win32')
+        return undefined;
+    const registryPath = hive === 'user' ? 'HKCU\\Environment'
+        : 'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Environment';
+    try {
+        const output = execFileSync(path.join(process.env.SystemRoot || 'C:\\Windows', 'System32', 'reg.exe'), ['query', registryPath, '/v', name], {
+            encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true, timeout: 1500, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
+        });
+        const line = output.split(/\r?\n/u).find(entry => entry.trimStart().startsWith(`${name} `));
+        return line?.match(/\sREG_[A-Z0-9_]+\s+(.+?)\s*$/u)?.[1];
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+function readOverride(name, aid) {
+    return overrides.get(normalizeScope(aid))?.get(name) ?? overrides.get('*')?.get(name);
+}
+export function readRuntimeEnvironmentVariable(name, aid, projectPath) {
+    if (!RUNTIME_ENVIRONMENT_NAMES.includes(name)) {
+        throw new Error('Unsupported gateway environment variable');
+    }
+    const typedName = name;
+    const scope = normalizeScope(aid);
+    const cacheKey = `${scope}:${projectPath || ''}:${typedName}`;
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const hit = cache.get(cacheKey);
+    if (hit && hit.expires > now)
+        return hit.result;
+    const agentValue = aid && isSafeAid(aid)
+        ? envFileValue(path.join(agentDir(aid), '.env'), typedName)
+        : undefined;
+    const projectValue = projectPath
+        ? envFileValue(path.join(projectPath, '.env'), typedName)
+        : undefined;
+    const rootValue = envFileValue(path.join(resolvePaths().root, '.env'), typedName);
+    const localSelections = [
+        [readOverride(typedName, aid), 'ipc-process'],
+        [agentValue, 'agent-env'],
+        [projectValue, 'project-env'],
+        [rootValue, 'root-env'],
+    ];
+    const local = localSelections.find(([value]) => value !== undefined && value !== '');
+    if (local) {
+        const result = { name: typedName, value: local[0], source: local[1], checkedAt: now };
+        cache.set(cacheKey, { result, expires: now + 3000 });
+        return result;
+    }
+    const startup = startupValues.get(typedName);
+    const user = windowsValue('user', typedName);
+    const machine = windowsValue('machine', typedName);
+    const selections = [
+        [user && user !== startup ? user : undefined, 'windows-user'],
+        [machine && machine !== startup ? machine : undefined, 'windows-machine'],
+        [startup, 'process-startup'],
+        [user, 'windows-user'],
+        [machine, 'windows-machine'],
+    ];
+    const selected = selections.find(([value]) => value !== undefined && value !== '');
+    const result = {
+        name: typedName,
+        value: selected?.[0],
+        source: selected?.[1] ?? 'unset',
+        checkedAt: now,
+    };
+    cache.set(cacheKey, { result, expires: now + 3000 });
+    return result;
+}
+export function setRuntimeEnvironmentOverride(aid, values) {
+    const scope = normalizeScope(aid);
+    const next = new Map(overrides.get(scope));
+    for (const name of RUNTIME_ENVIRONMENT_NAMES) {
+        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(values, name))
+            continue;
+        const value = values[name]?.trim();
+        if (value)
+            next.set(name, value);
+        else
+            next.delete(name);
+    }
+    if (next.size)
+        overrides.set(scope, next);
+    else
+        overrides.delete(scope);
+    cache.clear();
+}
+export function resetRuntimeEnvironmentForTests() {
+    overrides.clear();
+    cache.clear();
+    captureStartupValues();
+}

package/dist/config/schema-registry.js

@@ -99,12 +99,20 @@ function schemaFilePath(name, version) {
     return path.join(kitsSchemasDir(), `${name}.schema.${version}.json`);
 }
 function extractFields(raw) {
+    return extractFieldsFromProps(raw.properties || {});
+}
+function extractFieldsFromProps(props) {
     const fields = new Map();
-    const props = raw.properties || {};
     for (const [name, spec] of Object.entries(props)) {
         if (name === '$schema_version')
             continue;
         const merge = spec['x-merge'] || inferMerge(spec);
+        const mergeLogic = spec['x-merge-logic'] === 'AND' ? 'AND' : undefined;
+        // 递归提取嵌套 object 字段的子字段，用于 mergeLayers 感知嵌套字段的 x-merge-logic
+        const childProps = spec.properties;
+        const children = (childProps && typeof childProps === 'object')
+            ? extractFieldsFromProps(childProps)
+            : undefined;
         fields.set(name, {
             name,
             type: spec.type,
@@ -112,6 +120,8 @@ function extractFields(raw) {
             enum: spec.enum,
             default: spec.default,
             description: spec.description,
+            ...(mergeLogic ? { mergeLogic } : {}),
+            ...(children && children.size > 0 ? { children } : {}),
         });
     }
     return fields;

package/dist/config-store.js

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ export function loadDaemonConfig() {
     const sanitized = stripLegacyAunGatewayConfig(raw ?? {}, resolvePaths().daemonConfig, message => logger.warn(message));
     return validateDaemonConfig(normalizeProcessConfigCompat(normalizeDaemonServices(sanitized)), false);
 }
-export function isFullAccessEnabled(config = loadDaemonConfig()) {
-    return config.fullaccess?.enabled === undefined || config.fullaccess.enabled === true;
+export function isRestartRecoveryEnabled(config = loadDaemonConfig()) {
+    return config.restartRecovery?.enabled === true;
 }
 let eckSnapshotsConfigCache;
 /** Parse the process-level snapshot gate once for the current daemon lifecycle. */
@@ -91,16 +91,16 @@ export function saveDaemonConfig(value) {
     atomicWriteJson(configPath, validateDaemonConfig({ ...normalized, $schema_version: currentVersion('daemon') }, validateAidDomain));
 }
 function validateDaemonConfig(value, validateAidDomain) {
-    if (value.fullaccess !== undefined) {
-        if (!value.fullaccess || typeof value.fullaccess !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value.fullaccess)) {
-            throw new Error('daemon.json.fullaccess must be an object');
+    if (value.restartRecovery !== undefined) {
+        if (!value.restartRecovery || typeof value.restartRecovery !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value.restartRecovery)) {
+            throw new Error('daemon.json.restartRecovery must be an object');
         }
-        const unknownFullAccessFields = Object.keys(value.fullaccess).filter(key => key !== 'enabled');
-        if (unknownFullAccessFields.length > 0) {
-            throw new Error(`daemon.json.fullaccess contains unsupported fields: ${unknownFullAccessFields.join(', ')}`);
+        const unknownRestartRecoveryFields = Object.keys(value.restartRecovery).filter(key => key !== 'enabled');
+        if (unknownRestartRecoveryFields.length > 0) {
+            throw new Error('daemon.json.restartRecovery contains unsupported fields: ' + unknownRestartRecoveryFields.join(', '));
         }
-        if (value.fullaccess.enabled !== undefined && typeof value.fullaccess.enabled !== 'boolean') {
-            throw new Error('daemon.json.fullaccess.enabled must be a boolean');
+        if (value.restartRecovery.enabled !== undefined && typeof value.restartRecovery.enabled !== 'boolean') {
+            throw new Error('daemon.json.restartRecovery.enabled must be a boolean');
         }
     }
     const minEvolVersion = value.aun?.minEvolVersion;

package/dist/core/audit/event-key.js

@@ -40,5 +40,7 @@ export function buildAuthorizationEventKey(input) {
             requestId: input.requestId,
         })}:authorization:${stableDigest([input.operation])}`;
     }
-    return `authorization:${stableDigest([input.sessionId ?? 'unknown', input.operation])}`;
+    // Anonymous authorizations cannot be joined safely. Keep them as distinct
+    // records so daily analysis never merges unrelated calls by session/operation.
+    return `authorization:unlinked:${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
 }

package/dist/core/audit/log-integrity.js

@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ function stableHash(value) {
         permissionMode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['permissionMode', 'permission_mode']),
         isError: firstDefined(value, nested, ['isError', 'is_error']) ?? (value.ok === false || nested?.ok === false ? true : undefined),
         errorCode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['errorCode', 'error_code']),
+        errorDetailCode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['errorDetailCode', 'detail_code', 'detailCode']),
+        classificationMissing: firstDefined(value, nested, ['classificationMissing', 'classification_missing']),
+        classificationConflict: firstDefined(value, nested, ['classificationConflict', 'classification_conflict']),
+        exitCode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['exitCode', 'exit_code']),
         decision: firstDefined(value, nested, ['decision']),
         decisionSource: firstDefined(value, nested, ['decisionSource', 'decision_source']),
         policyCode: firstDefined(value, nested, ['policyCode', 'policy_code']),

package/dist/core/auth/agent-delegation.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from './auth-gateway.js';
 import { formatPeerKey, parsePeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
 import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
+import { canonicalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv } from '../permission/ec-command-parser.js';
 export const AGENT_DELEGATION_TOKEN_ENV = 'EVOLCORE_DELEGATION_TOKEN';
 export const CODEX_SESSION_TOKEN_ENV = 'EVOLCORE_CODEX_SESSION_TOKEN';
 export const AGENT_DELEGATION_COMMAND_TTL_MS = 5 * 60_000;
@@ -279,5 +280,5 @@ export function hashDelegatedCommandArgv(argv) {
 export function hashCurrentDelegatedCommand(processArgv = process.argv) {
     if (processArgv.length < 3)
         return undefined;
-    return hashDelegatedCommandArgv(['ec', ...processArgv.slice(2)]);
+    return hashDelegatedCommandArgv(canonicalizeEvolcoreCommandArgv(['ec', ...processArgv.slice(2)]));
 }

package/dist/core/auth/auth-gateway.js

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ export function buildAuthSubject(input) {
             : roleDetail.allowAccess && checkRoleAccess(role, input.selfAid)),
         canApprovePersistentFullAccess: input.canApprovePersistentFullAccess
             ?? (isDaemonOwner && !isDaemonService),
+        auditMetadata: input.auditMetadata,
         permissionMode: isFullAccessRun
             ? 'fullaccess'
             : input.permissionMode
@@ -184,9 +185,12 @@ function resolveRoleDetail(input) {
     });
 }
 function auditDecision(params, decision) {
+    const roleDenial = !decision.allow && decision.code === 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED';
     auditCommandAuthorization({
         ts: Date.now(),
         ...params.auditMetadata,
+        ...params.subject.auditMetadata,
+        eventPhase: params.auditMetadata?.eventPhase ?? 'final',
         correlationId: params.auditMetadata?.correlationId ?? params.auditMetadata?.requestId ?? params.subject.requestId,
         requestId: params.auditMetadata?.requestId ?? params.subject.requestId,
         sessionId: params.auditMetadata?.sessionId ?? params.subject.sessionId,
@@ -198,13 +202,16 @@ function auditDecision(params, decision) {
         errorCode: params.auditMetadata?.errorCode
             ?? (decision.allow
                 ? undefined
-                : params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource === 'approval'
-                    ? 'USER_DENIED'
-                    : params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource === 'infrastructure'
-                        ? 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
-                        : 'POLICY_DENIED'),
+                : roleDenial
+                    ? 'ROLE_DENIED'
+                    : params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource === 'approval'
+                        ? 'USER_DENIED'
+                        : params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource === 'infrastructure'
+                            ? 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
+                            : 'POLICY_DENIED'),
         policyCode: params.auditMetadata?.policyCode ?? (decision.allow ? undefined : decision.code),
-        decisionSource: params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource ?? (decision.allow ? 'command' : 'policy'),
+        decisionSource: params.auditMetadata?.decisionSource
+            ?? (decision.allow ? 'command' : roleDenial ? 'role' : 'policy'),
         source: params.source,
         operation: params.intent.operation,
         scope: params.intent.scope,

package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { resolvePaths } from '../../paths.js';
 import crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { buildAuthorizationEventKey, buildToolLifecycleEventKey, normalizeToolCorrelation } from '../audit/event-key.js';
 import { normalizeExecutionPermissionMode } from '../permission/mode.js';
+import { normalizeToolErrorClassification } from '../permission/tool-error-code.js';
 export function auditCommandAuthorization(event) {
     const shouldAudit = event.source === 'menu.cli' ||
         event.decision === 'deny' ||
@@ -101,6 +102,13 @@ export function auditFullAccessEvent(input) {
  * denials otherwise only reach `logger.warn` and `TriggerExecutionAnomaly`.
  */
 export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
+    const classification = normalizeToolErrorClassification({
+        errorCode: 'POLICY_DENIED',
+        decisionSource: 'policy',
+        policyCode: input.policyCode,
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: 'blocked',
+    });
     auditCommandAuthorization({
         ts: Date.now(),
         eventKey: buildToolLifecycleEventKey(input),
@@ -114,7 +122,8 @@ export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
         executed: false,
         executionState: 'blocked',
         decisionSource: 'policy',
-        errorCode: 'POLICY_DENIED',
+        errorCode: classification.errorCode,
+        ...(classification.errorDetailCode ? { errorDetailCode: classification.errorDetailCode } : {}),
         toolName: input.toolName,
         policyCode: input.policyCode,
         protectionClass: input.protectionClass ?? protectionClassForPolicy(input.policyCode),
@@ -158,6 +167,7 @@ export function auditCodexApprovalDecision(input) {
         errorCode: input.decision === 'deny'
             ? input.decisionSource === 'approval' ? 'USER_DENIED' : input.decisionSource === 'policy' ? 'POLICY_DENIED' : infrastructureErrorCode(input.policyCode)
             : undefined,
+        ...(input.errorDetailCode ? { errorDetailCode: input.errorDetailCode } : {}),
         sessionId: input.sessionId ?? 'unknown',
         agentAid: input.agentAid ?? 'unknown',
         agentName: input.agentName,
@@ -313,14 +323,25 @@ function infrastructureErrorCode(policyCode) {
 }
 function buildAuditRecord(event) {
     const executed = event.executed ?? false;
-    const decisionSource = event.decisionSource ?? (event.decision === 'deny' ? 'policy' : event.decision === 'pending' ? 'approval' : 'command');
-    const errorCode = event.errorCode ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
-        ? decisionSource === 'approval'
-            ? 'USER_DENIED'
-            : decisionSource === 'policy'
-                ? 'POLICY_DENIED'
-                : 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
-        : undefined);
+    const roleDenial = event.decision === 'deny'
+        && (event.errorCode === 'ROLE_DENIED'
+            || event.code === 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED'
+            || event.policyCode === 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED');
+    const decisionSource = event.decisionSource
+        ?? (roleDenial
+            ? 'role'
+            : event.decision === 'deny' ? 'policy' : event.decision === 'pending' ? 'approval' : 'command');
+    const executionFailed = executed
+        && (event.executionState === 'failed' || (event.exitCode !== undefined && event.exitCode !== 0));
+    const rawErrorCode = event.errorCode ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
+        ? decisionSource === 'role'
+            ? 'ROLE_DENIED'
+            : decisionSource === 'approval'
+                ? 'USER_DENIED'
+                : decisionSource === 'policy'
+                    ? 'POLICY_DENIED'
+                    : 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
+        : executionFailed ? 'EXECUTION_FAILED' : undefined);
     const executionState = event.executionState
         ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
             ? 'blocked'
@@ -329,25 +350,35 @@ function buildAuditRecord(event) {
                 : executed
                     ? (event.exitCode === undefined || event.exitCode === 0 ? 'completed' : 'failed')
                     : 'authorized');
+    const classification = rawErrorCode !== undefined
+        ? normalizeToolErrorClassification({
+            errorCode: rawErrorCode,
+            errorDetailCode: event.errorDetailCode,
+            decisionSource,
+            executed,
+            executionState,
+            exitCode: event.exitCode,
+            policyCode: event.policyCode,
+        })
+        : undefined;
+    const errorCode = classification?.errorCode;
     const ecwebRequestId = event.source === 'ecweb' ? event.ecwebRequestId : undefined;
     const requestId = event.requestId ?? ecwebRequestId;
     const correlationId = event.correlationId ?? event.callId ?? requestId;
-    const lifecycleId = event.callId ?? correlationId ?? requestId;
     return {
+        type: 'authorization:audit',
         ts: event.ts,
         eventKey: event.eventKey ?? (ecwebRequestId
             ? `ecweb:${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
                 ecwebRequestId, event.targetAgentAid ?? event.selfAid, event.operation,
             ])).digest('hex').slice(0, 20)}`
-            : lifecycleId
-                ? buildAuthorizationEventKey({
-                    sessionId: event.sessionId,
-                    callId: event.callId,
-                    correlationId,
-                    requestId,
-                    operation: event.operation,
-                })
-                : undefined),
+            : buildAuthorizationEventKey({
+                sessionId: event.sessionId,
+                callId: event.callId,
+                correlationId,
+                requestId,
+                operation: event.operation,
+            })),
         eventPhase: event.eventPhase,
         callId: event.callId,
         correlationId,
@@ -360,6 +391,9 @@ function buildAuditRecord(event) {
         toolName: event.toolName,
         approvalMethod: event.approvalMethod,
         errorCode,
+        errorDetailCode: classification?.errorDetailCode,
+        classificationMissing: classification?.classificationMissing || event.classificationMissing,
+        classificationConflict: classification?.classificationConflict || event.classificationConflict,
         policyCode: event.policyCode ?? event.code,
         protectionClass: event.protectionClass,
         matchedPath: event.matchedPath,
@@ -459,6 +493,7 @@ function logAuditEvent(record) {
         record.correlationId ? `correlation=${record.correlationId}` : null,
         record.eventKey ? `eventKey=${record.eventKey}` : null,
         record.eventPhase ? `eventPhase=${record.eventPhase}` : null,
+        record.sessionScope ? `sessionScope=${record.sessionScope}` : null,
         record.sessionId ? `session=${record.sessionId}` : null,
         record.agentName ? `agentName=${JSON.stringify(record.agentName)}` : null,
         record.agentAid ? `agent=${record.agentAid}` : null,

package/dist/core/auth/operation-authorizer.js

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ const DAEMON_SERVICE_OPERATIONS = new Set([
     'system.restart',
     'system.upgrade',
 ]);
+const DAEMON_OWNER_MODEL_OPTION_READ_OPERATIONS = new Set([
+    'model.list',
+    'model.effort.current',
+]);
 export function authorizeCommand(ctx) {
     return authorizeCommandInternal(ctx);
 }
@@ -186,6 +190,19 @@ function authorizeCommandInternal(ctx, resolvedConfigCommand) {
             matchedRule: 'daemon-service',
         };
     }
+    if (ctx.processRole === 'daemon-owner'
+        && ctx.fromControlChannel
+        && (intent.scope === 'relation' || intent.scope === 'agent')
+        && DAEMON_OWNER_MODEL_OPTION_READ_OPERATIONS.has(operation)) {
+        return {
+            allow: true,
+            operation,
+            scope: intent.scope,
+            role: 'daemon-owner',
+            dangerous: opMeta.dangerous,
+            matchedRule: 'daemon-owner-model-options-read',
+        };
+    }
     if (requiresDaemonOwner(ctx, resolvedConfigCommand)) {
         if (!hasDaemonOwnerRole(ctx)) {
             const reasonCode = daemonOwnerDenialReasonCode(ctx);

package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ const GROUP_MANAGEMENT_OPERATIONS = [
     ['ec.group.blocklist', 'read', ['agent'], 'Read the group block list'],
     ['ec.group.report-status', 'write-own', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Report the current Agent group status'],
     ['ec.group.member-statuses', 'read', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Read reported group member statuses'],
+    ['ec.group.mention', 'write-own', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Read or update the group mention mode'],
     ['ec.group.rules.set', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Upload and publish group rules content'],
     ['ec.group.rules.publish', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Publish the current group rules file'],
     ['ec.group.rules.update', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Update group join rules'],
@@ -799,6 +800,14 @@ const OPERATIONS = [
         description: '查看当前中间活动显示策略',
         sources: ['menu'],
     },
+    {
+        id: 'task.activity.read',
+        category: 'read',
+        dangerous: false,
+        defaultScopes: ['relation'],
+        description: '读取当前关系内任务的 Activity 列表和详情',
+        sources: ['menu'],
+    },
     {
         id: 'activity.update',
         category: 'write-agent',

package/dist/core/causation/context.js

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { CAUSATION_VERSION, MAX_TRIGGER_CAUSATION_DEPTH, } from './types.js';
-const ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$/;
+// Trigger identifiers may be daemon-owned and conventionally begin with
+// underscores (for example, `__session-idle-check`). Internal trace/span IDs
+// are still generated with alphabetic prefixes, so accepting `_` here only
+// broadens validation for persisted/propagated trigger and run IDs.
+const ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$/;
 function newId(prefix) {
     return `${prefix}_${crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
 }

package/dist/core/command/agent-control.js

@@ -750,8 +750,7 @@ export async function execAgentQuery(args, service, subject) {
             canConfigure: subject?.ecwebManagement === true
                 && subject?.isDaemonOwner === true
                 && subject.canApprovePersistentFullAccess !== false
-                && subject.chatType !== 'group'
-                && fullaccessStatus.hostEnabled,
+                && subject.chatType !== 'group',
         },
     };
     // 叠加构建进度（create 受理后、ready 前可见；ready 后文件仍在，可反映软失败 warn）