evolcore 0.0.27 → 0.0.29-test.0

package/dist/core/auth/authorization-audit.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { resolvePaths } from '../../paths.js';
 import crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { buildAuthorizationEventKey, buildToolLifecycleEventKey, normalizeToolCorrelation } from '../audit/event-key.js';
 import { normalizeExecutionPermissionMode } from '../permission/mode.js';
+import { normalizeToolErrorClassification } from '../permission/tool-error-code.js';
 export function auditCommandAuthorization(event) {
     const shouldAudit = event.source === 'menu.cli' ||
         event.decision === 'deny' ||
@@ -101,6 +102,13 @@ export function auditFullAccessEvent(input) {
  * denials otherwise only reach `logger.warn` and `TriggerExecutionAnomaly`.
  */
 export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
+    const classification = normalizeToolErrorClassification({
+        errorCode: 'POLICY_DENIED',
+        decisionSource: 'policy',
+        policyCode: input.policyCode,
+        executed: false,
+        executionState: 'blocked',
+    });
     auditCommandAuthorization({
         ts: Date.now(),
         eventKey: buildToolLifecycleEventKey(input),
@@ -114,7 +122,8 @@ export function auditToolPreflightDenial(input) {
         executed: false,
         executionState: 'blocked',
         decisionSource: 'policy',
-        errorCode: 'POLICY_DENIED',
+        errorCode: classification.errorCode,
+        ...(classification.errorDetailCode ? { errorDetailCode: classification.errorDetailCode } : {}),
         toolName: input.toolName,
         policyCode: input.policyCode,
         protectionClass: input.protectionClass ?? protectionClassForPolicy(input.policyCode),
@@ -158,6 +167,7 @@ export function auditCodexApprovalDecision(input) {
         errorCode: input.decision === 'deny'
             ? input.decisionSource === 'approval' ? 'USER_DENIED' : input.decisionSource === 'policy' ? 'POLICY_DENIED' : infrastructureErrorCode(input.policyCode)
             : undefined,
+        ...(input.errorDetailCode ? { errorDetailCode: input.errorDetailCode } : {}),
         sessionId: input.sessionId ?? 'unknown',
         agentAid: input.agentAid ?? 'unknown',
         agentName: input.agentName,
@@ -313,14 +323,25 @@ function infrastructureErrorCode(policyCode) {
 }
 function buildAuditRecord(event) {
     const executed = event.executed ?? false;
-    const decisionSource = event.decisionSource ?? (event.decision === 'deny' ? 'policy' : event.decision === 'pending' ? 'approval' : 'command');
-    const errorCode = event.errorCode ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
-        ? decisionSource === 'approval'
-            ? 'USER_DENIED'
-            : decisionSource === 'policy'
-                ? 'POLICY_DENIED'
-                : 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
-        : undefined);
+    const roleDenial = event.decision === 'deny'
+        && (event.errorCode === 'ROLE_DENIED'
+            || event.code === 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED'
+            || event.policyCode === 'ROLE_ACCESS_DENIED');
+    const decisionSource = event.decisionSource
+        ?? (roleDenial
+            ? 'role'
+            : event.decision === 'deny' ? 'policy' : event.decision === 'pending' ? 'approval' : 'command');
+    const executionFailed = executed
+        && (event.executionState === 'failed' || (event.exitCode !== undefined && event.exitCode !== 0));
+    const rawErrorCode = event.errorCode ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
+        ? decisionSource === 'role'
+            ? 'ROLE_DENIED'
+            : decisionSource === 'approval'
+                ? 'USER_DENIED'
+                : decisionSource === 'policy'
+                    ? 'POLICY_DENIED'
+                    : 'EXECUTION_FAILED'
+        : executionFailed ? 'EXECUTION_FAILED' : undefined);
     const executionState = event.executionState
         ?? (event.decision === 'deny'
             ? 'blocked'
@@ -329,25 +350,35 @@ function buildAuditRecord(event) {
                 : executed
                     ? (event.exitCode === undefined || event.exitCode === 0 ? 'completed' : 'failed')
                     : 'authorized');
+    const classification = rawErrorCode !== undefined
+        ? normalizeToolErrorClassification({
+            errorCode: rawErrorCode,
+            errorDetailCode: event.errorDetailCode,
+            decisionSource,
+            executed,
+            executionState,
+            exitCode: event.exitCode,
+            policyCode: event.policyCode,
+        })
+        : undefined;
+    const errorCode = classification?.errorCode;
     const ecwebRequestId = event.source === 'ecweb' ? event.ecwebRequestId : undefined;
     const requestId = event.requestId ?? ecwebRequestId;
     const correlationId = event.correlationId ?? event.callId ?? requestId;
-    const lifecycleId = event.callId ?? correlationId ?? requestId;
     return {
+        type: 'authorization:audit',
         ts: event.ts,
         eventKey: event.eventKey ?? (ecwebRequestId
             ? `ecweb:${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
                 ecwebRequestId, event.targetAgentAid ?? event.selfAid, event.operation,
             ])).digest('hex').slice(0, 20)}`
-            : lifecycleId
-                ? buildAuthorizationEventKey({
-                    sessionId: event.sessionId,
-                    callId: event.callId,
-                    correlationId,
-                    requestId,
-                    operation: event.operation,
-                })
-                : undefined),
+            : buildAuthorizationEventKey({
+                sessionId: event.sessionId,
+                callId: event.callId,
+                correlationId,
+                requestId,
+                operation: event.operation,
+            })),
         eventPhase: event.eventPhase,
         callId: event.callId,
         correlationId,
@@ -360,6 +391,9 @@ function buildAuditRecord(event) {
         toolName: event.toolName,
         approvalMethod: event.approvalMethod,
         errorCode,
+        errorDetailCode: classification?.errorDetailCode,
+        classificationMissing: classification?.classificationMissing || event.classificationMissing,
+        classificationConflict: classification?.classificationConflict || event.classificationConflict,
         policyCode: event.policyCode ?? event.code,
         protectionClass: event.protectionClass,
         matchedPath: event.matchedPath,
@@ -459,6 +493,7 @@ function logAuditEvent(record) {
         record.correlationId ? `correlation=${record.correlationId}` : null,
         record.eventKey ? `eventKey=${record.eventKey}` : null,
         record.eventPhase ? `eventPhase=${record.eventPhase}` : null,
+        record.sessionScope ? `sessionScope=${record.sessionScope}` : null,
         record.sessionId ? `session=${record.sessionId}` : null,
         record.agentName ? `agentName=${JSON.stringify(record.agentName)}` : null,
         record.agentAid ? `agent=${record.agentAid}` : null,

package/dist/core/auth/operation-authorizer.js

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ const DAEMON_SERVICE_OPERATIONS = new Set([
     'system.restart',
     'system.upgrade',
 ]);
+const DAEMON_OWNER_MODEL_OPTION_READ_OPERATIONS = new Set([
+    'model.list',
+    'model.effort.current',
+]);
 export function authorizeCommand(ctx) {
     return authorizeCommandInternal(ctx);
 }
@@ -186,6 +190,19 @@ function authorizeCommandInternal(ctx, resolvedConfigCommand) {
             matchedRule: 'daemon-service',
         };
     }
+    if (ctx.processRole === 'daemon-owner'
+        && ctx.fromControlChannel
+        && (intent.scope === 'relation' || intent.scope === 'agent')
+        && DAEMON_OWNER_MODEL_OPTION_READ_OPERATIONS.has(operation)) {
+        return {
+            allow: true,
+            operation,
+            scope: intent.scope,
+            role: 'daemon-owner',
+            dangerous: opMeta.dangerous,
+            matchedRule: 'daemon-owner-model-options-read',
+        };
+    }
     if (requiresDaemonOwner(ctx, resolvedConfigCommand)) {
         if (!hasDaemonOwnerRole(ctx)) {
             const reasonCode = daemonOwnerDenialReasonCode(ctx);

package/dist/core/auth/operation-catalog.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ const GROUP_MANAGEMENT_OPERATIONS = [
     ['ec.group.blocklist', 'read', ['agent'], 'Read the group block list'],
     ['ec.group.report-status', 'write-own', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Report the current Agent group status'],
     ['ec.group.member-statuses', 'read', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Read reported group member statuses'],
+    ['ec.group.mention', 'write-own', ['relation', 'agent'], 'Read or update the group mention mode'],
     ['ec.group.rules.set', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Upload and publish group rules content'],
     ['ec.group.rules.publish', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Publish the current group rules file'],
     ['ec.group.rules.update', 'write-agent', ['agent'], 'Update group join rules'],
@@ -799,6 +800,14 @@ const OPERATIONS = [
         description: '查看当前中间活动显示策略',
         sources: ['menu'],
     },
+    {
+        id: 'task.activity.read',
+        category: 'read',
+        dangerous: false,
+        defaultScopes: ['relation'],
+        description: '读取当前关系内任务的 Activity 列表和详情',
+        sources: ['menu'],
+    },
     {
         id: 'activity.update',
         category: 'write-agent',

package/dist/core/causation/context.js

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 import crypto from 'crypto';
 import { CAUSATION_VERSION, MAX_TRIGGER_CAUSATION_DEPTH, } from './types.js';
-const ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$/;
+// Trigger identifiers may be daemon-owned and conventionally begin with
+// underscores (for example, `__session-idle-check`). Internal trace/span IDs
+// are still generated with alphabetic prefixes, so accepting `_` here only
+// broadens validation for persisted/propagated trigger and run IDs.
+const ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$/;
 function newId(prefix) {
     return `${prefix}_${crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`;
 }

package/dist/core/command/agent-control.js

@@ -750,8 +750,7 @@ export async function execAgentQuery(args, service, subject) {
             canConfigure: subject?.ecwebManagement === true
                 && subject?.isDaemonOwner === true
                 && subject.canApprovePersistentFullAccess !== false
-                && subject.chatType !== 'group'
-                && fullaccessStatus.hostEnabled,
+                && subject.chatType !== 'group',
         },
     };
     // 叠加构建进度（create 受理后、ready 前可见；ready 后文件仍在，可反映软失败 warn）

package/dist/core/command/command-handler.js

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 import { BaseagentRunnerUnavailableError } from '../../agents/runner-types.js';
 import { loadedBaseagentIds } from '../../agents/baseagent-availability.js';
+import { closeDiagnosticSession, diagnosticTokenHash, isDiagnosticSessionActive } from './diag-service.js';
 import { parseMenuClientArgs } from '../../cli/menu-client.js';
 import { ensureSessionRuntimeDir } from '../../cli/task-context.js';
 import { renderCommandCardAsText } from '../interaction-router.js';
 import { buildEnvelope, deliveryTargetFromSession, isInteractionSendAccepted, replyContextFromSession, sendInteractionPayload } from '../message/message-utils.js';
 import { resolvePaths, getPackageRoot } from '../../paths.js';
-import { isFullAccessEnabled, loadDaemonConfig } from '../../config-store.js';
+import { loadDaemonConfig } from '../../config-store.js';
 import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
 import { resolvePeerRoleDetail, roleToSessionIdentity } from '../../config/peer-role-resolver.js';
 import { isManagementRole } from '../../config/builtin-roles.js';
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ import { applyTriggerPatch, replaceEditableTriggerDefinition } from '../../trigg
 import { definitionRevision } from '../../trigger/validation.js';
 import { tryParseChannelKey } from '../channel-loader.js';
 import { displaySessionTitle } from '../session/session-title.js';
-import { buildSessionTurnList } from '../session/session-turns.js';
+import { buildTranscriptTurns } from '../session/session-transcript.js';
 import { resolveConfigCommand } from '../../config/resolved-config-op.js';
 import { AUTHENTICATED_CONFIG_ROLE_ENV, executeResolvedConfigCommandAsync } from '../../config/config-operation-service.js';
 import { splitConfigBatchGetArgv } from '../../cli/cli-argv.js';
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ import { auditCommandAuthorization, auditFullAccessEvent, hashArgv } from '../au
 import { executeResolvedContactCommand, resolveContactCommand } from '../../config/contact-operation-service.js';
 import { hasTrustedFullAccessDelegation, trustedExecutionIdentityInput } from '../auth/agent-delegation.js';
 import { executeManagedAidOperation, ManagedAidOperationError, managedAidShowViewForRole, resolveManagedAidOperation, } from '../../aun/aid/managed-operation.js';
+import { MAX_AVATAR_SOURCE_BYTES } from '../../utils/avatar-upload.js';
 import { executeManagedGroupOperation, isManagedGroupRelationRead, isManagedGroupRelationWrite, ManagedGroupOperationError, resolveManagedGroupOperation, executeManagedMsgOperation, ManagedMsgOperationError, resolveManagedMsgOperation, executeManagedFsOperation, ManagedFsOperationError, resolveManagedFsOperation, } from '../../aun/msg/managed-operation.js';
 import { authorizeOperation, buildAuthSubject } from '../auth/auth-gateway.js';
 import { isHClassPath, isLClassPath, isSameOrDescendant } from '../permission/protected-paths.js';
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ import { parsePeerKey } from '../relation/peer-identity.js';
 import { isQuickCommand } from './slash-gate.js';
 import { handleSlashCommand } from './slash-handler.js';
 import { resolveChatMode } from '../message/peer-mode.js';
-import { execMenuAction as menuExecMenuAction, execMenuForEcweb as menuExecMenuForEcweb, execMenuForControl as menuExecMenuForControl, execMenuQuery as menuExecMenuQuery, execMenuUpdate as menuExecMenuUpdate, getMenuItems as menuGetMenuItems, getSubMenuItems as menuGetSubMenuItems, } from './menu-handler.js';
+import { execMenuAction as menuExecMenuAction, execMenuForEcweb as menuExecMenuForEcweb, execMenuForControl as menuExecMenuForControl, execMenuQuery as menuExecMenuQuery, execMenuUpdate as menuExecMenuUpdate, getMenuItems as menuGetMenuItems, getSubMenuItems as menuGetSubMenuItems, buildTopicForkSourcePayload, } from './menu-handler.js';
 import { getMenuCatalog, execMenuValueBatch, validateMenuValueBatchArgs } from './menu-catalog.js';
 export { isProcessLevelOwner } from './menu-handler.js';
 const CLI_EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     legacySingleRunnerMode;
     primaryRunnerKey;
     agentRegistry;
+    memoryConsolidationLauncher;
     agentApplicationService;
     triggerSchedulerResolver;
     triggerSchedulerFallback;
@@ -166,7 +169,34 @@ export class CommandHandler {
                     throw new Error('Menu request file must be a regular file of at most 128 KiB');
                 return fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8');
             });
-            return { ok: true, response: await send(options) };
+            const binding = session.metadata?.diagnostic;
+            if (binding || session.metadata?.diagnosticStatus === 'cancelled') {
+                if (!isDiagnosticSessionActive(session, this.sessionManager.getChatDir(session))) {
+                    return { ok: false, code: 'DIAG_CLOSED', error: '诊断授权已结束，禁止旧会话继续访问' };
+                }
+                if (binding && (options.targetAid !== binding.controlAid
+                    || diagnosticTokenHash(options.remoteAccessToken ?? options.ecwebToken ?? '') !== binding.tokenHash)) {
+                    return { ok: false, code: 'DIAG_SCOPE_MISMATCH', error: '诊断请求必须使用本会话绑定的主机和 Token' };
+                }
+            }
+            const guardedOptions = binding
+                ? {
+                    ...options,
+                    beforeSend: () => {
+                        if (!isDiagnosticSessionActive(session, this.sessionManager.getChatDir(session))) {
+                            const error = new Error('诊断授权已结束，禁止旧会话继续访问');
+                            error.code = 'DIAG_CLOSED';
+                            throw error;
+                        }
+                    },
+                }
+                : options;
+            const response = await send(guardedOptions);
+            if (binding && response?.error?.code === 'REMOTE_ACCESS_TOKEN_INVALID') {
+                closeDiagnosticSession(session, this.sessionManager.getChatDir(session));
+                this.messageQueue?.clearBySession(session.id);
+            }
+            return { ok: true, response };
         }
         catch (error) {
             return { ok: false, code: error.code ?? 'MENU_REQUEST_FAILED', error: error.message };
@@ -482,8 +512,6 @@ export class CommandHandler {
         if (!mode)
             return undefined;
         if (mode === 'fullaccess') {
-            if (!isFullAccessEnabled())
-                return 'fullaccess 功能未启用';
             return canApprovePersistentFullAccess ? undefined : '无权限：只有 daemon-owner 可以配置 fullaccess Trigger';
         }
         if (!role) {
@@ -901,6 +929,10 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     setStatsCollector(collector) {
         this.statsCollector = collector;
     }
+    /** 注入记忆整理入口（daemon 的统一整理队列），供 /memory consolidate 使用。返回 null 表示已入队。 */
+    setMemoryConsolidationLauncher(launcher) {
+        this.memoryConsolidationLauncher = launcher;
+    }
     registerAdapter(adapter) {
         this.adapters.set(adapter.channelName, adapter);
     }
@@ -1017,8 +1049,12 @@ export class CommandHandler {
         const item = {
             value: s.threadId,
             label: displayName,
-            lable: s.lable || null,
+            topicLabel: s.label || null,
+            topicStatus: s.topicStatus ?? 'pending',
         };
+        const forkSource = buildTopicForkSourcePayload(s);
+        if (forkSource)
+            item.forkSource = forkSource;
         if (s.agentSessionId) {
             item.agentSessionId = s.agentSessionId;
             const fileInfo = this.sessionManager.getSessionFileInfo(s.projectPath, s.agentSessionId, s.baseagent, s.selfAID);
@@ -1332,8 +1368,8 @@ export class CommandHandler {
         }
         if (sub.startsWith('enable ')) {
             const { definition } = extractAndFindTrigger(sub, 'enable ', 'enable');
-            if (definition.execution.permissionMode === 'fullaccess' && (!isDaemonOwner || !isFullAccessEnabled())) {
-                return '❌ 只有 daemon-owner 可以启用 fullaccess Trigger，且 daemon.json.fullaccess.enabled 必须为 true';
+            if (definition.execution.permissionMode === 'fullaccess' && !isDaemonOwner) {
+                return '❌ 只有 daemon-owner 可以启用 fullaccess Trigger';
             }
             if (definition.execution.permissionMode === 'fullaccess' && !canApprovePersistentFullAccess) {
                 return '❌ 当前认证通道不能批准持久 fullaccess Trigger';
@@ -1543,9 +1579,7 @@ export class CommandHandler {
             return {
                 ok: false,
                 error: permissionError,
-                code: /fullaccess 功能未启用/.test(permissionError) ? 'NOT_SUPPORTED'
-                    : /无权限|只有 daemon-owner/.test(permissionError) ? 'FORBIDDEN'
-                        : undefined,
+                code: /无权限|只有 daemon-owner/.test(permissionError) ? 'FORBIDDEN' : undefined,
             };
         }
         const runtimeFieldError = this.validateTriggerRuntimeFields(updated, triggerRole.role, triggerRole.baseagent);
@@ -1631,7 +1665,7 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     async handleRewindList(session, agent) {
         try {
             const messages = await agent.getSessionMessages(session.agentSessionId, session.projectPath);
-            const turns = buildSessionTurnList(messages);
+            const turns = buildTranscriptTurns(messages);
             if (turns.length === 0) {
                 return '📋 当前会话暂无对话记录';
             }
@@ -1651,8 +1685,11 @@ export class CommandHandler {
     }
     async handleRewind(session, agent, turnNum, mode) {
         try {
+            if (session.threadId && turnNum === 1) {
+                return '❌ 话题会话暂不支持 /rewind 1，仅开放 N>1';
+            }
             const messages = await agent.getSessionMessages(session.agentSessionId, session.projectPath);
-            const turns = buildSessionTurnList(messages);
+            const turns = buildTranscriptTurns(messages);
             if (turnNum < 1 || turnNum > turns.length) {
                 return `❌ 轮次超出范围，当前共 ${turns.length} 轮`;
             }
@@ -1688,19 +1725,38 @@ export class CommandHandler {
             if (mode === 'chat' || mode === 'all') {
                 const discarded = turns.length - turnNum + 1;
                 if (agent.rollbackSessionTurns) {
-                    const ok = await agent.rollbackSessionTurns(session.agentSessionId, session.projectPath, discarded);
+                    const ok = await agent.rollbackSessionTurns(session.agentSessionId, session.projectPath, discarded, rewindTarget.assistantUuid);
                     if (!ok)
                         return '❌ 对话回退失败';
-                    const meta = { ...(session.metadata || {}) };
-                    delete meta.resumeAt;
-                    await this.sessionManager.updateSession(session.id, { metadata: meta });
+                    if (session.threadId) {
+                        await this.sessionManager.clearTopicResumeAt({
+                            sessionId: session.id,
+                            expectedThreadId: session.threadId,
+                            expectedAgentSessionId: session.agentSessionId,
+                        });
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        const meta = { ...(session.metadata || {}) };
+                        delete meta.resumeAt;
+                        await this.sessionManager.updateSession(session.id, { metadata: meta });
+                    }
                 }
                 else if (keepTarget) {
-                    const meta = { ...(session.metadata || {}), resumeAt: keepTarget.assistantUuid };
-                    await this.sessionManager.updateSession(session.id, { metadata: meta });
+                    if (session.threadId) {
+                        await this.sessionManager.setTopicResumeAt({
+                            sessionId: session.id,
+                            expectedThreadId: session.threadId,
+                            expectedAgentSessionId: session.agentSessionId,
+                            resumeAt: keepTarget.assistantUuid,
+                        });
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        const meta = { ...(session.metadata || {}), resumeAt: keepTarget.assistantUuid };
+                        await this.sessionManager.updateSession(session.id, { metadata: meta });
+                    }
                 }
                 else {
-                    // N=1：撤销全部对话，清空 session 从头开始
+                    // N=1：撤销全部对话，清空主会话 session 从头开始
                     const meta = { ...(session.metadata || {}) };
                     delete meta.resumeAt;
                     await this.sessionManager.updateSession(session.id, {
@@ -2102,15 +2158,15 @@ export class CommandHandler {
                 if (realManagedTempPath && isSameOrDescendant(realPath, realManagedTempPath) && stat.nlink > 1) {
                     return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_AVATAR_PATH', error: 'Avatar source cannot be a hard link inside managed TMPDIR' };
                 }
-                if (stat.size < 1 || stat.size > 500 * 1024) {
-                    return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_AVATAR_FILE', error: 'Avatar source must be between 1 byte and 500KB' };
+                if (stat.size < 1 || stat.size > MAX_AVATAR_SOURCE_BYTES) {
+                    return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_AVATAR_FILE', error: 'Avatar source must be between 1 byte and 10 MiB' };
                 }
                 // Open the user-supplied node with no-follow semantics after checking
                 // its canonical ancestors; the bytes passed to the uploader come from
                 // this descriptor rather than from a second path lookup.
                 fd = fs.openSync(resolvedPath, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
                 const finalStat = fs.fstatSync(fd);
-                if (!finalStat.isFile() || finalStat.size < 1 || finalStat.size > 500 * 1024 || finalStat.nlink !== stat.nlink) {
+                if (!finalStat.isFile() || finalStat.size < 1 || finalStat.size > MAX_AVATAR_SOURCE_BYTES || finalStat.nlink !== stat.nlink) {
                     return { ok: false, code: 'INVALID_AVATAR_FILE', error: 'Avatar source changed during validation' };
                 }
                 avatarBuffer = fs.readFileSync(fd);